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This study describes the development of system building in 
postwar social housing. 
System building required major transformations in the 
nature of the building producer and client. The 
transformation in the producer consisted of a change from 
the conventional pattern of selling the capacity to build 
individual buildings to selling a specific product, the 
building system, a general feature of which was its use of 
new building technologies and requirement for considerable 
capital investment. The transformation in the client 
consisted of a departure from the historical pattern of 
conceiving each building as an individual project to 
presenting large programmes of standardised buildings. These 
transformations took place within a specific historical 
epoch - the Welfare State. 
While the Welfare State provided conditions favourable 
to system building, it is argued that the policies persued 
by central government, the building industry, local 
authorities, the architectural profession and building 
trades unions played a crucial role in its development. 
These are examined in turn. The concept of mass production 
was continually associated with postwar developments in 
building technology, and the attraction of this idea to 
Welfare policy makers is also discussed. Chapters Six and 
Seven look in detail at the types of system promoted, both 
by government research and development architects and by 
2 
commerical sponsors. The last chapter examines the 
architectural character of the housing produced by system 
building and the. relationship between technology and design 
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INTRODUCTION 
Between 1946 and 1978 the state produced as much as 417 of 
its annual housing in building systems. In these years 
nearly one million houses were built by means which 
radically departed from conventional methods of building. 
System building was-undoubtedly the most dramatic feature of 
technological development in the postwar building industry. 
More than just a different way of putting buildings 
together, system building was a complete revision of the 
building process that had developed under capitalism over 
the previous two centuries. System building significantly 
altered the demands and contribution of each of the major 
parties involved in the building process: the client, the 
designer, the building materials and components 'producer, 
the building contractor and the labour used to put the 
houses together on site. To many, system building was more 
than just the most recent advance in building methods, `it 
was indisputably the construction technology of the, 20th 
Century: it was the direction in which building had to 
progress if society was to be provided with the volume of 
housing it both needed and desired. To some politicians it 
was the path to an industrial revolution, in building 
methods, and to many housing'experts it was the panacea to 
the `housing problem'. To the historian looking--back at 
system building it is evident that it -proved to be neither 
of these, things. Rather, it-was but another stage in the 
historical development of the building process. Furthermore, 
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it was by no means long-lived - in all system building 
produced significant numbers of houses for only 35 years. 
Upon looking at the history of system building more closely, 
what is remarkable is the fact that it was directly 
connected with a particular form of social policy: the 
Welfare State. The aim of this study is to explore the 
relationship between a way of organising the building 
process - system building - and the social and political 
epoch within which it developed. 
I. THE TECHNOLOGY OF SYSTEM BUILDING. 
System building was different in many ways from conventional 
methods of construction, and this section will attempt to 
describe these in relation to technical advances in building 
generally. 
A number of terms were commonly used to refer to the 
development of building technology in postwar Britain, each 
with distinct meanings. Prefabrication referred to the 
practice of making building components away from the 
building site and then transporting them to the place of 
erection. Prefabricated components, such as windows and 
doors, were present in building well before the 20th 
Century. After the Second World War staircases, trussed 
rafters and precast concrete panels were all added to this 
type of manufacture. Prefabricated components can be, and 
are, embodied in traditional building to a considerable 
extent. While, as a government committee pointed out in 
1945, prefabrication has been following a rising curve' 
from the mud hut to the motor-car trailer, C13 the term came 
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to have an added meaning in the period covered by this 
study. E. D. Simon, a former Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Minister of Health, saw, in 1945, a vital link between 
prefabrication and contemporary manufacturing methods: 'The 
possibilities of economy and improved design through 
prefabrication are great, but its main advantage... depends 
on the next stage: large scale production'. [2] It was 
thought that the assembly of houses from prefabricated 
components would mean that these components could themselves 
be mass produced in- factories like other commodities. The 
significance of prefabrication to 20th Century building 
technology was that it represented the application of mass 
production to dwelling construction. Prefabrication was 
constantly associated with building systems, indeed, 
previous writers, such as R. B. White, have tended to regard 
the two as synonymous. E3] Nevertheless, many systems were 
not based on the use of prefabricated components - No-Fines, 
by far the most successful system CTab. V] was fabricated on 
site to as great a degree as a traditional house. While of 
crucial importance to the development of postwar building 
technology, and a concept referred to many times in this 
study, prefabrication was not synonymous with system 
building. 
Industrialised building was another term used in 
association with the development of postwar building 
technology, and in particular, system building. During the 
1960s, industrialised building, or 'IB' as it was known, 
tended to replace prefabrication as a term to describe the 
rapid technological changes which it was thought building 
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should undergo. This terminological adjustment was made as 
it became apparent that industrialising the building process 
was not as simple as the concept, prefabrication, suggested. 
Industrialised building referred to the application of those 
features commonly associated with the development of other 
manufacturing industries. It was summarised by Geoffrey 
Rippon, the Minister of Works, in 1963 as the application 
of power and machinery and quantity production'. [43 In 
December, 1965, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
(M. H. L. G. ) " described industrialised building in `greater 
detail as: 
'all measures needed to enable the industry to 'work 
more like a factory industry. For the industry this 
means not only new materials and construction 
techniques, the use of dry, processes, increased 
mechanisation of site processes, and the manufacture 
of large components under factory conditions of 
production and quality control; but improved 
management techniques, the correlation of design and 
production, improved control of the selection and 
delivery of materials, and better organisation of 
operations on site. Not least, IB entails training 
teams to work in an organised fashion on long runs of 
repetitive work, whether the men are using new skills 
or old'C5] 
It is undoubtedly true that building systems, to varying 
degrees, embodied these qualities: however, it is also true 
that such qualities could also be found on a well organised 
traditional building site. Nevertheless, it is significant 
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that when the Ministry came to the measurement of IB, it in 
fact did no more than list each of the current building 
systems and their production figures. Industrialised 
building, particularly in the eyes of the government, was 
inseparable from system building. When the Ministry promoted 
IB, as it did, system building was the means by which this 
was done. Being a broader term than prefabrication, IB does 
indeed encompass all forms of system building, however, at 
the expense of also including the more efficient forms of 
that which system building tended to replace - traditional 
building. 
To compare system building with traditional building 
tells us a great deal about technological development in 
housebuilding. Indeed, non traditional building was a 
generic term for system building during the 1940s. During 
the 1950s the government encouraged the term, new 
traditional building to refer to the building systems which 
had established themselves on economic grounds. This 
tendency arose from the desire to establish a wider 
acceptance of new methods, but should not be allowed to 
obscure the fact that traditional and system building tended 
to be very different. 
One area of divergence concerned the construction of 
the building fabric. In 1917, the Tudor Walters Committee 
identified a salient feature of house construction which in 
'traditional' construction had remained largely unchanged. 
Taking the cost of labour and materials together they found 
that of the 11 trades involved in housebuilding, bricklaying 
accounted for 31% of the total cost. Carpentry and joinery 
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accounted for a further 26%. Together two trades accounted 
for nearly two-thirds of the cost of two-storey housing. t6] 
While carpentry and joinery were aspects of building made 
very much subject to prefabrication and the introduction of 
mechanisation during the 20th Century, brickwork was not. 
'Traditional' building might be characterised as a way of 
building in which bricklaying remained the dominant element 
of cost - the matrix into which other materials and 
components were built. A feature common to many building 
systems was that they replaced brickwork with other 
materials of construction. However, this was not always the 
case. For instance, `rationalised traditional' systems used 
brickwork for structural crosswalls, and 'timber frame' 
systems used it frequently for cladding. The abandonment of 
traditional walling techniques in favour of new methods was 
thought to confer a number of advantages. Construction time 
was frequently speeded up, the need for building labour on 
site - skilled or unskilled - was often reduced (although it 
is significant that these savings were in most cases 
outweighed by the addition of labour in the pre-site stages 
of production) and, in a few cases, overall costs might be 
lowered. Each of these potential features of system building 
were powerful attractions both to producers and social 
policy makers and formed an ever present theme in the 
history of system building. 
System building introduces the notion of a 'system' of 
construction, which might be described as a method of 
building departing from traditional construction. During the 
20th Century such techniques have ranged from a codification 
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of a conventional approach to building, such as the 
combination of timber panels with loadbearing crosswalls, or 
an entirely new approach to building, such as reducing the 
building shell to a series of large precast concrete panels 
connected by a specially developed joint. A particularly 
evident characteristic of system building resulting from the 
use of new techniques was the development of new contracting 
and tendering procedures. As the National Building Agency 
(N. B. A. ) pointed out in 1969: 'Before the introduction of 
industrialised systems the method of choosing a contractor 
was straightforward'. (7] Traditional building used 
conventional methods of construction familiar to all parties 
in the building process. The architect could design the 
building down to the last detail and the role of the 
contractor in the tendering procedure was solely to attach a 
price to each item of work. The prices given by different 
contractors for the same item of work could then be compared 
- like was compared with like. The process by which it was 
carried out was known as competitive tendering. However, to 
purchase a system built dwelling involved the purchase of a 
distinct method of construction most fully understood by the 
contractor familiar with it. The design of the system-built 
dwelling had to reflect this. System building involved the 
'sponsor' of the system in the design process, and the 
detailed solution to a given design problem differed from 
system to system. Like was no longer comparable with like. 
Furthermore, the architect was no longer the sole arbiter of 
building design. Indeed, in the early non traditional 
housing programmes of the late 1940s and early 1950s, the 
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individual client's architect was excluded from the dwelling 
design altogether. The client purchased a complete house 
from the producer for a fixed price - normal competitive 
tendering was eliminated altogether as each system produced 
different products not amenable to direct comparison. In 
addition to, this, to realise the claimed time, building 
labour, and cost saving potential of system building, -larger 
quantities of building had to be offered to one sponsor than 
were normal in a single building project such as a school or 
small, housing development. Buildings were no longer bought 
individually but in large quantities. Together, these 
features gave rise to a number of new contracting methods 
designed to introduce the eventual producer at a much 
earlier stage in the design process, and offer a quantity of 
building appropriate to the system. The first use of serial 
contracting was by the Hertfordshire County Council in 
association with its school building system in 1947. [83 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that traditional 
building could' also be made subject to new contracting 
methods, and frequently was during the 1960s, although not 
on the same scale as system building. 
A further difference between system building and 
traditional building, which was noted on a number of 
occasions, [93 was the introduction of a new party to the 
building process: the sponsor. The sponsor was the body 
responsible for initiating and operating the system. Every 
building system had a sponsor. One sponsor might operate a 
number of systems, or similar types of system might be 
operated by a number of sponsors. The sponsors of building 
is 
systems were various but fell into three types; building 
firms, non building firms, and client groupings (or 
consortia). Building firm sponsors tended to be the larger 
contracting firms. Non building firm sponsors ranged from 
primary materials Producers, such as steel firms wishing to 
enter new markets, to building component manufacturers. In 
most cases, non building firms sub-contracted building firms 
to erect their system. Client organisations tended to be 
groupings of the larger local authorities or government 
building, departments. 
Despite their different origins, one feature which 
sponsors had in common was the assumption of a host of 
expensive responsibilities not found in traditional 
building. Foremost of these was the fact that building 
systems required a far higher degree of investment in plant 
and equipment than traditional' construction. Although 
varying widely, the degree of investment/worker in system 
building was considerably higher than in traditional 
construction. 'It was estimated in 1966, by A. W. Cleeve Parr, 
a senior government architect, to be on average two to three 
times more than the 400 pounds/worker of traditional 
construction. [107 As well as financing the initial 
investment- needed to design, develop, and manufacture 
prototypes, a sponsor had to finance the manufacturing plant 
and the higher management costs associated with operating 
sophisticated building technologies. While these costs might 
be offset by higher profits when the system was operating at 
an economic capacity, they represented considerable burdens 
when demand was low. The. introduction of this new party, the 
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sponsor, to the building process was undoubtedly a major 
distinction between system building and traditional 
building. 
The tendency of sponsors to willingly assume these 
onerous financial burdens in the postwar period is all the 
more exceptional in the light of one of the most salient 
features of the traditional contracting industry - its 
historical aversion to capital investment. This aversion 
arose from the structure of the building market which was 
such as to deter firms from investing in technologically 
sophisticated production and marketing methods. Indeed, 
throughout the 20th Century, the contracting industry has 
generally been considered exceptional in its degree of low 
capital investment, lack of innovation and technological 
backwardness. According to Donald Bishop of the B. R. S., this 
state of affairs was the result of the adaptation of the 
industry to its market. As he pointed out in 1966, building 
was traditionally a bespoke activity - the construction of 
individual buildings to the directions of individual 
customers. Furthermore, the demand for building work was 
highly unstable. Regional fluctuations, uncertainties in 
timing, and the financial capriciousness of clients 
presented contracting firms with the prospect of 
considerable uncertainty. In addition to this, contractors 
generally avoided a high degree of specialisation in 
distinct building types, taking whatever type of work was 
offered: 
'The building industry, as at present structured, is 
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amorphous in character in that its resources are 
widely dispersed. The demands of the market, 
characterised by bespoke construction, uncertain in 
volume and timing, have produced an industry which 
must be adaptable, so that its resources can be 
deployed on whatever work is available, wherever this 
is. The employment of subcontractors, the availability 
of plant on hire, the presence of a casual labour 
force, all contribute to flexibility but create 
-production units which are ephemeral. In these 
circumstances there is little incentive for firms to 
invest heavily either in forward planning or in 
development because there is no certainty that the 
work in hand will be required again'[11] 
The character of the traditional building industry, in 
particular its reluctance to invest resources in 
sophisticated technologies directed towards specific 
building types, arose as a response to an uncertain building 
market. Indeed, rather than being producers in the normal 
sense of the word, Bishop suggests that 'Building firms 
viewed in this light are merely organistions capable of 
building'. (12] During the post Second World War period, 
system building was the antithesis of-the pre-existing state 
of affairs: substantial investment in technological 
resources directed towards specific building types and the 
marketing of a specific building product by a sponsor rather 
than the sale of a building service by a general contractor. 
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II. THE WELFARE BUILDING MARKET. 
This section will describe the historical conditions under 
which the changes in building construction technology and 
organisation described in the previous section took place. A 
new type of building market appeared during the 20th Century 
which generated the conditions under which building 
producers could depart from the traditional model of 
contracting, and become system building sponsors. - This 
market arose under " the- Welfare State, a"-form of social 
policy which,? had a distinct effect on the techniques by 
which housing was produced. 
Improvements in the living conditions of the working 
class through the redistribution of wealth under state 
control has been dated to the end of the 19th`Century. [13] 
A concern on the part of government for the national 
'economic and military 'deterioration'' which followed the 
Boer War prompted limited legislation designed 'to improve 
the health of the existing and potential labour force and 
armed services. A further stimulus to social reform was 
provided by the growth of the labour movement and the fear 
of radicalisation of the working classes. [14] Among these 
reforms were tentative moves by the state to assist in the 
provision of public housing. Beginning with the Labouring 
Classes Dwelling Houses Act (1866) a series of Acts were 
passed which sanctioned local authority housebuilding at low 
rates of interest: 22,000 houses or 1% of the nation's 
output up to August 1914 were provided by these means. t153 
The years immediately prior to the First World War saw a 
22 
renewed discussion by social policy makers of housing 
provision with tentative signs of an increase in state 
intervention. This, coupled with the housing shortage 
created by the war and renewed fears of social unrest 
prompted the launching of the Addison Housing Programme in 
1919. As an insurance against revolution' half a million 
houses were promised. State housing, subsidised- by the 
Exchequer for the first time, was adopted as the major 
element of the government's postwar stabilisation policy. 
[163 With the onset of the depression and the consequent 
waning of labour power, the 'Homes Fit for Heroes' programme 
was reduced in 1921 to an anticipated 176,000 houses. (173 
Nevertheless, a precedent for state subsidised housing had 
been set and an administrative machinery established to 
produce large quantities of a new building type - social 
housing. The state continued to build throughout the 
interwar period, providing a total of 579,000 houses between 
1924 and 1935 under the Wheatley and Chamberlain Housing 
Acts (1923 & 1924). [18] 
The events of the interwar years were crucial to the 
subsequent development of the-Welfare State. On the one 
hand, heightened class conflict manifested itself in the 
protracted labour disputes of the mid-1920s. On the other 
hand, the period witnessed the rise of the political 
strength of the Labour movement - the first Labour 
Government was formed in January 1924 under Ramsay 
MacDonald. According to D. Thomson, the crushing of the 
General Strike in 1926, and the rise of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party killed the notion of 'syndicalist revolution as 
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the road to better times... What gained new life... 
[following the strike]... was parliamentary socialism and 
the prospect of building a democratic Welfare State*. [19] 
The legislation passed under Baldwin, MacDonald and 
Chamberlain between 1925 and the Second World War, 
notwithstanding retrogressive measures such as the 1931 dole 
cut and family means test, extended health insurance and 
pensions schemes and unified the local authority apparatus 
though which the state alleviated the harshest aspects of 
working class living conditions. [20]' 
The Second World War saw renewed demands for a more 
even distribution of resources. The notion that the working 
class was suffering deprivation and sacrifice in order to 
secure a more equable postwar society was a crucial element 
in the prosecution of the war effort and ensuring social 
harmony in the years of austerity which followed. The need 
to perpetuate class unity through social legislation 
underlay the following Terms of Reference of the War Cabinet 
Reconstruction Committee established in 1941: 
'To arrange for the preparation of practical schemes 
of reconstruction... These plans should have as their 
general aim the perpetuation of the National unity 
achieved in this country during the war, through a 
social and economic structure designed to secure 
equality of opportunity and service amoung all classes 
of the community'E21] 
The 1945 Labour landslide ensured that the deliberations of 
the Reconstruction Committee were translated into 
legislation. In 1946 the National Insurance Act and National 
24 
Health Service Acts were passed with the avowed intention of 
'covering the whole population and all risks from the cradle 
to the grave". 122] The immediate postwar years saw the 
emergence of the three features identified with what has 
become known as the Welfare State: the nationalisation of 
essential, although not necessarily profitable, staple 
industries, such as steel and coal; a taxation structure 
designed to mitigate the excesses of inequality and finance 
the state welfare apparatus; and the avowed intention of the 
state to intervene in the economy 'in order to prevent a 
recurrence of the economic crises which had generated 
unemployment on the scale found in the interwar years. By 
1945, the state had accepted Keynesian economic theory based 
on the principles of government regulation of demand and 
direction of investment as a means of reducing unemployment 
and keeping the workforce productively employed. [23] The 
government's intentions were made explicit in the Employment 
Policy White Paper (1944): 'The government accept as one of 
their primary aims and responsibilities the maintenance of a 
high and stable level of employment after the war'. -(24] 
However, the wielding of state power was to extend beyond 
the management of potential unemployment crises to the most 
efficient use of the nation's resources: 
'In framing these proposals, the Government have in 
mind the more general aim of securing for the nation 
the most effective use both of its manpower and its 
material resources. That aim can be achieved only-if 
the whole productive power of the nation is employed 
efficiently: it is not enough that it should be 
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.a employed(25) 
For the first postwar decade the state was the major 
supplier of housing and built an unprecedented number of 
subsidised dwellings. The War Cabinet Reconstruction 
Committee had pointed out in 1942 that: 
'It is certain that the country will expect an even 
more vigorous policy after this war... Every family 
who so desires should be able to live in a separate 
dwelling -possessing all the amenities necessary to 
daily ' lifer in the fullest sense"1263 
It was recognised early that, in the light of-the certainty 
of-continuing rent controls- and -inflated postwar building 
costs, the state would have to assume responsibility for. the 
bulk of working class housing -supply. In the absence of a 
"prospect of a profit", private enterprise was not expected 
to rise to the task of building housing for rent. (277 8y 
1944 opinion polls were indicating that housing was 
popularly regarded-as the most important issue (28] and in 
March 1945, the Government announced its target of 300,000 
houses "built or building" within the first two postwar 
years. (29] Under conditions of strict controls on the 
building industry and the effective curtailment-of private 
housing and commercial building this target was achieved. In 
1950 the Cabinet stabilised the overall housing programme at 
200,000 dwellings per annum. 130] The defeat of Labour in 
the 1951 election was not immediately accompanied by a 
lessened commitment on the part of the incoming Conservative 
Government to state housing. The new Minister-of Housing and 
Local Government, Harold' MacMillan, was as aware as any 
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politician of, -the importance of ensuring a well-housed 
working population: "The People need more houses. They need 
them quickly. This is the most urgent of all- social 
services. For the home is the basis of the family, , just as 
the family is the basis of the nation". (1952) (31] As part 
of its election campaign, the Conservative Party promised to 
provide 300,000 houses a year by 1954.132] This was 
achieved, largely by reducing space standards in council 
housing by over 10%, under the same system of controls over 
private building as had been imposed by Labour. -Indeed, for 
the first eight postwar years private enterprise played a 
residual role in housing provision - it was not until 1952 
that it produced more than 15% of overall housing 
completions; 1954 that it produced more than a quarter; and 
1958 that it produced more than half. (Tab. I] 
In 1954, the Conservative Government abolished'controls 
over private housebuilding and restrained the output of 
local authorities. This was followed in 1955 by a revision 
of housing policy which moved away from general needs (the 
provision of state housing to supplement the existing stock) 
and concentrated on redevelopment (the replacement of 
sub-standard stock with new housing). ' 'The late-1950s saw a 
fall both in state subsidised and private housing 
completions. [333 The- Conservative % Party 7 was `` firmly 
entrenched in political power and, while it had no intention 
of abolishing the Welfare State, was intent on restoring a 
greater degree of autonomy to the market place- and 
restricting the increasing burden of social expenditure on 
the Exchequer. Nevertheless, - local authority housing 
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completions dipped below 100,000 in only three years during 
the Conservative parliamentary hegemony; 1959,1961 and 
1963. Thus, while there was no speech on housing at the 1961 
Conservative Annual Conference its provision was still 
considered a necessary and appropriate activity of the 
state. 134] 
The early 1960s saw a redirection of economic and 
social policies. Living standards were rising, but, in the 
opinion of many commentators and politicians, by comparison 
with the rest of the Western World, not fast enough. `(35] A 
higher level of growth was demanded by the electorate and 
thought within the capacity of the nation's resources. 
Furthermore, increased growth was to be accompanied by 
greater welfare expenditure. 1961 saw the publication of 
Homes For Today and Tomorrow, the first major review of 
social housing design since the Second World War. The report 
pointed out that social housing was not keeping pace with 
the living standards of the population - greater space and 
more amenities were needed. 136] As well as promising higher 
standards, the Conservatives pledged higher numbers of 
houses. In May 1963 the housing target in future years was 
raised to 350,000. In the run up to the 1964. election the 
target was raised again, in December 1963, to 400,000. (37] 
According to D. V. Donnison, housing issues formed the focus 
of the 1964 election debate: "Government was being drawn 
ineluctably back into deeper involvement in the housing 
field". (1967) 138] In the event, so far as the electorate 
were concerned, the Labour Party provided the most 
convincing response to issues such as housing, but also to 
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the larger problem of securing faster economic growth. In 
1964 Harold Wilson was returned to power and his government 
immediately began preparing plans to secure this. The basis 
for Labour's expansionist policies was the National Plan, a 
document published in 1965 covering all areas of economic 
activity including housing provision. In view of the "vast 
and ever increasing need", the plan targeted housing -, to be 
provided in tandem by state and private capital, 'at°an 
unprecedented level of half a million completions by 1970. 
Under-state-- supervision, housing production was to --rise to 
its highest ever. t393 
By the mid 1960s, welfare-policy, in association with 
other aspects of. expenditure, had made the state the major 
investor in the economy. Indeed, it has been suggested that 
the unusually high growth rate experienced by postwar Europe 
resulted largely from the consistently high demand , created 
by its Welfare social policies. According to B. Ward, it is 
likely that Welfare policy "was a more important stabilizer 
of demand and stimulator of growth than monetary -fiscal 
policy". [40] In 1960 government investment, including that 
ofilocal, authorities, amounted to 407. of the Gross National 
Product (G. N. P. ). This state of affairs was not peculiar to 
Britain. E. Hobsbawm noted that at- least 11 capitalist 
economies , (including the United States) had government 
expenditures in excess of 25% of°G. N. P., with some, such as 
Austria and France exceeding even Britain. [41] Just as it 
became the major investor in the economy, the British state 
also became the major customer of the building industry. In 
1968, it bought 48.97 of the new work produced by the 
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construction industry. (42] Approximately half of' this 
investment was in the form of social housing. Indeed, the 
postwar period saw the forging of an intimate relationship 
between the state and the industry upon which its social 
policy goals rested. This newly found relationship between 
government and the building industry was signified in 1947 
by the Ministry of Work's exhibition, 'The Builder and the 
State', held at Olympia in 1947.143] As Geoffrey Rippon 
pointed out in 1963: The social and economic progress of 
this-country depends on*an ever-increasing output from the 
building industry'. [44] 
The Welfare State created a new type of building 
market. The organisation of social housing investment'was 
certainly different to the type of market, which Donald 
Bishop described as having generated traditional approaches 
to building. By comparison, the social housing market was 
highly organised. Subsidised housing was commissioned on ,a 
large scale by centrally funded authorities, usually on the 
basis of nationally declared programmes which, as an element 
of government policy during the 1960s, were guaranteed fora 
number of years. Social housing was a highly specialised 
product, the spacial and amenity standards of which were 
established centrally. The degree of variation upon these 
was limited by ministerial loan sanctions and the tendency 
for local authorities to provide the minimum'in order to 
increase the number of units produced at the least burden to 
the ratepayer. Furthermore, the production of social housing 
was not controlled by the consumer but by the makers of 
social -housing policy. This immediately removed a layer of 
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resistance to new technologies which threatened to undermine 
the traditional architectural character of housing, and 
created within social housing the freedom to exercise 
technical policies which would be unnacceptable to the 
private market. Indeed, had local authority Itennants 
possessed more control over the housing'in`which they lived, 
the development of postwar building technology might have 
developed on very different lines. - It'could certainly be 
suggested that some of the forms particularly suited to 
-system -building, such as -high-rise, might never have been 
introduced in the first place had social housing design been 
controlled' by the consumer. In comparison to 'private 
building, social housing was a more certain market, typified 
by the large scale purchase of standardised products, and 
very amenable to centralised policy making. 
The considerable size of a`large portion of individual 
state housing contracts played its own part in encouraging 
new technology and the type of builder able to utilise it. 
Furthermore, the tendency was for state'housing contracts to 
grow in size throughout the , post Second World War period. 
Between 1960 and 1968 the proportion of contracts for over 
250' dwellings rose from 12.2 to 41.3% E453 encouraging the 
growth of the large building firm at the'expense of small 
builders. In its Annual Report for 1967 - in which year the 
state sector accounted for 507. of building work - E463 the 
National Federation of Building Trades Employers 
(N. F. B. T. E. )` noted the effect of state building on the 
industry: 
'There is an increasing trend towards the 
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concentration of the industry's wort: in the public 
sector. This creates problems for the medium and 
smaller firms in the industry which rely upon 
obtaining contracts of less value than those normally 
placed by government departments and local 
authorities. This problem... [is]... caused by the 
increasing trend towards larger orders"[47] 
Between 1949 and 1960 the portion of the labour force 
employed by firms-with between 6 and, 19-operatives fell from 
19.27. to 16.77. while the portion employed by firms with 
between 1,000 and 4,999 rose from 8.6% to 12.67.8 [48] This 
trend continued throughout the 1960s with firms employing 
over 1,000 operatives increasing the value of work 
undertaken by 567., and those employing between 6-10 
increasing their value of work by only 357., [49] While state 
building policy was not the sole cause ofý the growth- of 
large building' firms using technologically sophisticated 
methods, it undoubtedly played a , contributory part. The size 
of state building programmes, and in particular, housing, 
encouraged the large building firm which in turn could apply 
technologically sophisticated methods to increasingly large 
contracts. As Industrialised Building Systems and Components 
(I. B. S. A. C. ) noted in 1965: 
"Public sector housing is without question the ideal 
market for industrialised building, meeting as it does 
all the basic- requirements of large contracts and 
continuity of orders from land owning clients"[50] 
To recapitulate, welfare building gave rise to 
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important 'changes in the building process creating a market 
suited to investment in technologically sophisticated 
methods. The Welfare State created a new type of building 
customer, the "corporate or multiple client" 1513 and a new 
type of building producer, the sponsor. Indeed this 
relationship between producer and client together with the 
technologies to which it gave rise is the sense in which 
system building is understood by this study. In Welfare 
building programmes the emphasis changed from commissioning 
a , unique-product tailored to a particular individual's need, 
to the purchase of large programmes of standardised building 
products in which the market preferences of the consumer 
could be subordinated to the demands of new production 
technology. To some, the investment in capital intensive, 
technologically sophisticated building methods on the part 
of producers seemed theF most appropriate response to the 
postwar building market. In common with Marian Powley, many 
contemporaries felt that time honoured methods of organising 
and carrying out the building process were no longer 
applicable to contemporary conditions: 
"changes in the character of consumers, have developed 
so far that the traditional organisation of the 
process of design and construction of new buildings 
has obviously become unsatisfactory" (1965)[52] 
III. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY. 
As a result of the long upswing in the post World War Two 
world economy the period covered by this study was 
characterised by sustained full employment and periods of 
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acute labour shortage. Between 1945 and 1970, unemployment 
in Britain stayed below 2.57.. t53] The effect of this, 
coupled with welfare building programmes was to cause labour 
shortages in the building industry. In Britain, for reasons 
which have yet to be accounted for, building wage rates 
remained low and Job security and conditions of work 
inadequate compared with other industries. [54] Although the 
cheapness of British building labour was in itself no 
incentive to the introduction of new technology, it also 
meant that the ability of the industry to recruit labour was 
poor. The immediate postwar period found heavy building 
demands thrust upon an industry stripped of labour by 
conscription. Even after the building labour force had 
stabilised in the early 1950s, persistent labour shortages 
were experienced from then on and felt most acutely during 
periods when intense economic activity, and hence capital 
investment in building, coincided with peaks in social 
housing production. E55] As was often stated, the excess of 
building demand over building supply was a powerful stimulus 
to the use of system building in postwar social housing. 
1563 It is this theme which has dominated previous causal 
accounts of new technology. 
Nevertheless, to base an explanation of system building 
purely on the demand for building created by the Welfare 
State, as historians such as R. R. White have done, 157] 
obscures the fact that Welfare policies caused significant 
changes in the character as well as the overall dimensions 
of a major portion of the building market. The supply and 
demand model does not account for the fact that system 
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building was ever present in social housing - between 1947 
and 1977, according to official figures, it remained above 
14%. CTab. II] Although not measured consistently, and 
undoubtedly less successful than after the Second World War, 
attempts to launch 'system building in welfare housing were 
also frequently made during the interwar period. [Tab. II3 
The supply and demand model does not adequately account for 
the fact that system building in the sense described earlier 
in this chapter was, to the knowledge of this study, 
exclusively the preserve of the state sector. '-Some of`the 
less conspicuous and captial intensive techniques used by 
system building sponsors, such as timber frame, are used in 
contemporary house contruction-by- speculative developers. 
[Ch. VII3 However, although' generally referred to'as `system 
building', this is not in the'form found`in postwar social 
housing. In speculative housebuilding the'sponsor and client 
are the same and, the relationship between the'two, crucial 
to the development of system building as understood by this 
study, does not exist. It is the contention of this study 
that just as the the'state emerged the major consumer of 
building in the postwar period it also emerged the exclusive 
consumer of system building. 
The fact that certain forms of new technology in 
British housing were closely related to the Welfare State is 
something which has received little consideration in 
previous accounts of system building. R. B. White notes the 
role of government experts, and implicity of the state, in 
the development of 20th Century building, but does not link 
this to the larger framework within which they operated. 
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[58] Marion Powley was certainly aware of the search for 
forms of building which it was hoped might be more 
appropriate to the character of welfare building. Her study 
of the technical development of the British building 
industry, The -British Building Industry: Four Studies in 
Response and Resistance to Change (1966), was directed to 
this larger aim. Nevertheless, while a text much referred to 
in this study, her central concern is with the detailed 
political economy of innovation, rather than the social 
context--within which it-took place. Both. of-these works were 
written. in the thick, of the 1960s debate on new technology 
by involved and "progressive" authors - White's study was 
published by the Building Research-Station. Both of these 
authors' closeness to the subject is reflected in an, albeit 
restrained, enthusiasm for the subject. More recently, 
R. McCutcheon's unpublished thesis, `Modern Construction 
Techniques in Low-income Housing Policy: The Case of 
Industrialised Building' (1979), presents a rounded study of 
system building and housing policy, and, as well as 
providing a great deal of statistical evidence, compares the 
British experience with that of other countries. 159] 
B. Russell's book, Prefabrication, Systems and 
Industrialisation (1982) is a more recent addition to the 
literature. Through its conceptualisation of building 
systems as an intellectual approach to building, Russell 
does not attempt a historical analysis of technological 
development in postwar Britain, but does provide a 
retrospective critique of system building philosophies by an 
author committed to system building himself. Although not 
36 
primarily historical, an invaluable survey of the condition 
of the system building industry in the late 1960s is given 
in B. L. Gosschalk's 'unpublished thesis 'Industrialised 
Building: Concrete Systems in Great Britain' (1970). 160] 
None-of these studies address'the nature of the relationship 
between systems and the-Welfare State. - 
The period covered by this study spansA942 to 1976. 
The former. date was chosen as the starting point because not 
only was it the year in which the War Cabinet Reconstruction 
Committee -began to: consider=postwar welfare 'provision 
in 
earnest, but because 'it. was also the year in which the 
Interdepartmental Committee on House . Construction was 
charged with the examination -of'new methods of building. 
[61] The end date-was harder, to choose. The pressures on 
welfare provision, and the beginnings of its'-decline started 
in the mid 1960s., 'It was in -1967- that the National Plan's 
target of half a million houses/annum was abandoned and the 
. first fall in housing completions for ten years took place 
[Tab. I) Throughout, the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
government policy was-dominated by the balance of payments 
deficit. Throughout the 1970s the condition of the British 
economy worsened. Public expenditure came under increasing 
pressure and as social housing programmes fell so did the 
proportion of them carried out by system building. 
[Tab. I&II] However, this -does not necessarily mean that the 
concept of a Welfare State had been abandoned, but rather it 
was compromised by other priorities as government pursued 
the restraint of demand as a means of dealing with economic 
decline. 1975 was chosen for the end date of this study as 
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it was the year in which Edward Heath was unseated as leader 
of the Conservative Party by Margaret Thatcher. 'The demise 
of Heath represented the end of 'consensus' politics, and 
although it was three years until Thatcher took office, this 
was the year in which the Welfare State was Jetisoned by the 
party that currently holds parliamentary power. From 1979 
onwards the stimulation of demand by government expenditure 
and positive economic management were replaced by monetarist 
polices designed to reduce the money supply and restore the 
`free market' as regulator of economic 'activity. -t62] In 
January 1985, the Institute of Housing announced that it 
expected the coming year's state housing starts to fall 
below 20,000 dwellings - for the first time a smaller 
programme than that of 1919.163] 
This brief examination of the Welfare State has 
described the conditions under which system building arose 
and flourished. ' However, it has not described in any detail 
the policies which lay behind the decisions leading to the 
adoption of system building by the individual parties 
involved in the social housing process. Nor has it described 
the detailed character which this form of building assumed, 
of the buildings it produced-and of the way in which new 
building technologies and its products were viewed by those 
involved in their development. These issues will be dealt 
with in successive chapters. These -chapters are organised 
thematically for it is the contention of this study that 
there was no single piece of legislation from which system 
building arose, no single act'upon which it depended and no 
resolution towards which events were leading. Rather it is 
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suggested that system building was stimulated by a form of 
social policy that'lasted throughout a-historical epoch. The 
thematic structure of this study is intended to allow the 
many facets of system building to be -described without 
having their continuity broken by the disciplines of a 
strictly chronological narrative. 
The three chapters forming the first part of the study 
examine-the adjustment of the-major participants in the 
social housing process to the peculiarities of demand 
created by social housing, and the`- policyý., decisions, which 
led -them to adopt system building. Chapter One examines 
government policy and describes the role of system building 
within the rapid provision of subsidised housing at the same 
time as ensuring the stability of the building economy in 
the post World War Two transitionary period. In latter 
years, -itr is -argued, system building in social'' housing 
represented a means of increasing the efficiency' of the 
building industry as part of the' state's effort to secure 
more rapid growth of the economy. -The chapter also examines 
the attempt of government to establish- a new relationship 
with the-building industry in the hope that it would invest 
in capital intensive,, methods of building. Chapter Two looks 
at the motives underlying the investment in system building 
by commerce and argues that for non-building firms it 
represented the means-by which they could enter the social 
housing market in order to utilise excess manufacturing 
capacity. Chapter - Two also examines - the remarkable 
propensity of -building firms to over-invest in new 
technologies and suggests that this resulted from both an 
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unwarranted optimism in the certainty of ever-increasing 
volumes of social housing, and the hope that system building 
would be the means by which the larger contracting firms 
could increase their monopolisation of this newly enlarged 
market. Chapter Three proposes that, while many of the 
larger housing authorities adopted system building as the 
best means of executing large public housing programmes, a 
wider 'reluctance on the part of local government to 
substantially modify its housing `policies led to the 
under-utilisation of available lsystem°' building capacity to 
the frustration of government and industry. 
The second part of' the study looks at the role of 
building technology in architectural and political ideology 
and its impact on operatives and architects. Chapter Four 
examines the notion of mass producing buildings. While this 
does not provide a causal explanation of system building, it 
does explain'the tendency of architects, and housing policy 
makers to proselitise system building as the panacea to the 
production of social housing and as a means of giving weight 
to the building technology policy described in Chapter One. 
Chapter Five looks at the two largest areas of labour in the 
building process, operatives and architects, and describes 
the adjustment of their corporate `organisations to new 
technology. It is suggested that the'weakness of organised 
building labour forced it to'assume a passive role in the 
introduction of new technology. Furthermore, system 
building's association with welfare housing provision caused 
organised building labour to sanction new technologies 
despite their deskilling effects. Through the adoption of a 
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postwar. ideology of social responsibility, the architectural 
profession both adapted to system building and through its 
promotion, unlike labour, was able to raise its status in 
the postwar building economy. Chapter Six looks in some 
detail-at the role played in building technology by the 
government expert. The government building expert eschewed a 
philosophy of public service through the promotion of new 
building methods. The,. chapter describes how, in . pursuing` 
this, . the expert attempted to guide the development of. 
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system- building in a direction incompatible with. commercials 
interests. 
The final two chapters look in detail at the products 
of system building themselves. Chapter Seven will look at 
the various forms of building technology used by system 
building sponsors and describe the factors which led to 
their success at distinct times in the postwar period. The 
chapter also describes developments in traditional building 
and explains why new building methods found it so difficult 
to displace old. Furthermore, it will be suggested that the 
cost advantage eventually claimed for system building might 
in fact have been illusory. Chapter Eight concludes by 
discussing the design of system built dwellings. Rather than 
arguing that system building produced a visibly different 
type of dwelling to traditional methods, the chapter 
examines the attitudes to system building held by those 
involved in their design. It suggests that a wide divergence 
of opinion existed between architects involved in social 
housing,. and that the eventual architectural forms which 
system building took were determined less by the technology 
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of system building production itself than the attitudes of 
designers to this. 
A number of people have assisted greatly in the preparation 
of this study. I am indebted to my tutors, Adrian Forty and 
Dr. Mark Swenarton, for their help in developing and 
clarifying the basic arguments and for their. detailed 
scrutiny of the text. In addition, early assistance was 
provided by Professor Donald Bishop and Ed Cooney. Access to 
the -valuable Arcon =, -archives was.., provided . by "Jim Gear -who 
also entertained me to an enjoyable lunch. Of the friends 
who offered advice and much encouragement I would like to 
thank in particular Murray Fraser, Hetty Startup, Joe Kerr 
and Ruth Owens. I am grateful also to Ray Moxley for his 
generous help in the final stages, and to Ginny Fraser who 
proof read the text. 
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CHAPTER ONE. GOVERNMENT POLICY= THE MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES 
An examination of the policies that led to government 
attempts to promote new building technologies suggests that 
they were concerned less with increasing housing supply for 
its own sake than with the effect that such increases would 
have on the economy as a whole. This chapter will argue that 
the government promotion of new building technologies 
thoughout"the post World --War Two period was more the result 
of broad economic considerations than of a narrow focus on 
housing and other areas of construction policy. 
I. POSTWAR STAPILISATION. 
In November 1942, the Ministry of Health (M. O. H. ) presented 
a paper, 'Long Term Housing Policy', to the War Cabinet 
Official Committee on Postwar Internal Economic Problems. 
The paper noted that the likely demand for housing would 
place an unprecedented pressure on the building industry. It 
pointed out that after the First World War the building 
industry had slowly been built up, eventually achieving four 
million completions between 1919 and 1939. However, in order 
to meet the anticipated need for three to four million 
houses to be constructed in the first postwar decade, the 
M. O. H. argued that a rate of production double that of the 
interwar period would be necessary, imposing a considerable 
strain on the traditional building industry. As one measure 
to ease this, the paper informed the Committee that 
consideration was being given and would continue to be given 
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to "alternative" methods of construction including the 
prefabrication of houses on a large scale: "If practical 
methods are evolved which result in houses being provided 
quickly and at a reasonable-cost they will have, to be 
adopted". 11]. Indeed, earlier that year the 
Interdepartmental Committee on House Construction (Burt 
Committee) had been set up to review the benefits of 
alternative methods of construction. C2] As 'yet no 
conclusions had been reached. - 
-I «In = May'1943, the Internal Economic' Problems Committee 
presented the results of its deliberations' on housing policy 
to the War Cabinet. Its memorandum, `Post War Housing 
Policy', was particularly vehement about` not repeating-the 
mistake of the'Addison housing programme of'the post First 
World War transitionary period: 
'The worst of all possible courses would be toýattempt 
with high subsidies to force through a programme of 
new construction immediately after the armistice in 
excess- of the capacity of the industry: '- this would 
lead to higher prices 'and wages in the Building 
Industry which would not only tend' to defeat the end 
in view but in its wider reactions mightiwell upset 
the whole stabilisation policy"13] 
It added that a lack of attention to this problem might lead 
to the suspension of the housing programme as in 19210. In 
March 1944, the Subcommittee on Post War Building reported 
to the War Cabinet Reconstruction Committee on its 
investigation, into the post war demands on the building 
industry and its proposals for their restraint through 
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administrative controls. These controls were intended to 
ensure that the demand on building would not outstrip the 
ability of the industry to produce economically. By these 
means, the potentially inflationary situation referred to in 
earlier papers was to be avoided. [4] Control was eventually 
achieved through two measures. The licensing of building 
through Defence Regulation 56A was renewed by means of the 
Supplies and Services (Transitional) Act, 1945, -'which 
between, 1945 and 1949 `imposed 'limits on unauthorized 
building-that-were so-low that''practically all building had 
to be sanctioned by government. The Control of Engagement 
Order ensured that up to 1948 building labour was directed 
in persuance of government policy, and the consumption of 
individual building materials was controlled until well into 
the early 1950s. [5] While writers have questioned the 
success with which these controls operated, [6]`an essential 
component of the preparation of postwar housing policy was 
that the implementation of a substantial housing programme 
would be carried out within the limitations of available 
building resources - primarily labour. 
However, while licensing could keep demand and building 
capacity in balance and direct resources towards housing, 
the rate at which the building industry could expand was 
finite. As the Committee on Reconstruction Problems noted, 
industries such as building will have been so contracted as 
to be quite unable to meet demands immediately forthcoming". 
[7] The government was taking steps to increase the labour 
force to 1,250,000 [8] but it was acknowledged that this 
would take between three to four years during which housing 
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demand would be intense and building labour and materials 
short. 
This interval, dubbed the "emergency" period, began to 
occupy the thoughts of the Reconstrucion Committee during 
the latter part of 1943 and a much vaunted solution was the 
provision of temporary -accommodation using methods which 
departed dramatically from conventional building practice. 
In May 1943, both the Reconstruction Priorities 'Committee 
and Committee on Internal Economic Problems both recommended 
recourse to this expedient. E93 However, the real impetus 
for what eventually became the Temporary Housing'Programme 
came from the War Cabinet, and in particular` the Prime 
Minister. In the War Cabinet meeting of the 24th February, 
1944, Winston Churchill announced that he "envisaged a large 
programme for the provision of emergency houses, to be 
undertaken by exceptional methods" to meet the immediate 
demand for houses on the part of returning soldiers. 
Churchill's intention-was-to manufacture half a million such 
homes from steel, the whole operation being treated "as a 
military operation handled by the Government, with private 
industry harnessed to its service". 1103 The object of the 
programme was to provide'a large number of houses which 
could be constructed, without inflating the demand on 
conventional building resources and so jeopardise the 
progress of permanent housing. This role for new technology 
was explained to Parliament by the Minister of Health in 
August 1944: - 
"We felt that it was of the first importance that this 
project should not delay the building of permanent 
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houses, and, consequently, that it should make the 
minimum demand upon the building industry. That 
consideration pointed to a type of building so far as 
possible, factory made... whereas it is usually 
reckoned that it takes 100,000 building operatives to 
build 100,000 houses in a year, the building labour 
force required for 100,000 of these bungalows is not 
much more that 8,000 to 10,000'[11] 
Churchill's ambitious hope of a half million temporary 
prefabricated -dwellings was dashed in September 1944, when 
the committee he had set up to plan the implementation of 
the programme reported that little more than 150,000 of 
these dwellings could be provided without competing 
significantly for resources needed for permanent houses, and 
it was with this reduced target in mind that the programme 
was implemented. 112] 
As Churchill had commented, the programme was indeed 
carried out on the lines of a military operation, subverting 
the principles established for the provision of state 
housing. During the interwar period this had developed on 
the lines that, although subsidised by the state, local 
authorities designed, built and owned the houses themselves. 
Under the 1944 Housing (Temporary) Accommodation Act, which 
authorised the expenditure of 150 million pounds, provision 
was made for the manufacture of temporary houses on 
government account. [13] The production authority for the 
houses was the Ministry of Works (M. O. W) and the centrality 
of this ministry-to the programme was indicated by the type 
of contract into which it entered with the manufacturers 
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which it described: 
"as a management contract - with the firm which put 
forward the particular type of temporary bungalow, and 
that there should be a series of supply contracts for 
the supply of materials, prefabricated parts and 
components, and a series of erection contracts, all 
with the Ministry of Works"[ 14] 
Local authorities were not involved in the production or 
procurement of the dwelling and their responsibility was 
-limited to making a-bid- for an allocation on the-, --basis of 
their needs, obtaining the necessary sites and preparing the 
off site services and roads. [15] The instruction manual, 
which advised local authorities on layouts, maintenance, 
selection of tenants, rents, and management, clearly set out 
the terms on'which-they received their allocation: , 
'the houses will be provided and owned by the 
Government... The authority will choose the tenants,, 
fix and receive the rents, manage the property and 
keep it in repair. The authority will make an annual - 
payment to the Ministry of Health of an amount to be 
determined"[ 16] 
In September 1944, a new urgency was added to- the 
preparations for post war housing with a memorandum to the 
Reconstruction Committee from the Home Secretary urging the 
rapid implementation of the "agreed broad policy" on housing 
provision for fear of the social unrest that might be caused 
by housing shortages in the immediate postwar years. [17] In 
the Committee's meeting of the 8th August the Minister for 
Reconstruction, Lord Woolton, announced that the destruction 
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of 25,000 houses and the serious damage to a further million 
by flying bomb attacks had falsified earlier assumptions of 
housing demand: 
'In these circumstances I propose to re-examine... the 
means of harnessingýto the problem of providing living, 
accommodation, every form of construction, however 
unconventional'[ 18 ] 
Among these he made particular reference to the" experiments 
being carried out into permanent prefabricated housing by 
the M. O. W. which had indicated considerable economies in 
skilled building labour. The immediate tasks, he suggested, 
were to approve alternative designs and to ensure that 
manufacturing capacity for fittings and components would be 
'given priority second only to essential war production" in 
order to ensure their availability by the end of the war. As 
well as suggesting the setting up of a Housing Sub Committee 
Woolton concluded by stating that "Of all thee problems 
facing us on the Home Front, housing is the most urgent and 
one of the most important from the point of view of 'future 
stability and public contentment'. (19] 
While it might wish to produce housing in large 
numbers, the adopted policy of keeping demand within the 
ability of the industry to supply led the government to 
increasingly focus on towards alternative methods, of 
construction in the latter months of the war. Further 
reference was made to the M. O. W. 's experiments-at Northolt 
in the second meeting of the newly convened Sub Committee on 
Housing, on the 18th September 1944, during which Woolton 
was impressed by the prefabricated house which 'he 
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understood... required about half the number of manhours 
required on a house built by traditional methods. "120] 
In January 1945 the War Cabinet Housing Committee 
absorbed the functions of the Reconstruction Committee Sub 
Committee on Housing and discussions on the implementation 
of a permanent prefabricated housing programme started in 
earnest. In March 1945 Duncan Sandys, Minister of Works, 
presented his case for the maximum use of- permanent 
prefabricated houses. He argued that as building labour 
would be "the'---limiting factor in the construction, of new 
houses during the two year emergency period it was essential 
that prefabrication was used: "there was no doubt that novel 
methods would enable substantial economies of building 
labour to be effected". (21] Although both the Minister of 
Health and the Minister of Labour and National Service 
questioned the advisability of departing from traditional 
methods - the former through a scepticism that local 
authorities would accept the houses and the latter through a 
fear of the ý detrimental effect that prefabrication would 
have on recruitment to the building industry - Sandys' 
persuasive arguments on labour savings carried the meeting 
which resolved that "the aim should be to secure-. that in the 
emergency period as high a proportion as practicable of 
permanent houses were erected by new methods using the 
minimum of building labour". 122] In September 1945, Sandys 
quantified the contribution that new technology would make 
to the maximisation of house completions in the "emergency" 
period. A memorandum, 'Programme for Housing', detailed the 
results of a planning enquiry undertaken by the M. O. W. into 
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the resources of building labour expected to be available 
'with a view to suggesting... a target of construction of 
permanent houses with separate figures for traditional brick 
houses and non brick prefabricated houses". The combined 
total of half a million to be completed in June 1947, was 
comprised of 200,000 brick houses and 150,000 prefabricated 
houses, the remainder being made up of 150,000 temporary 
houses. However, delays in reaching a decision had reduced 
the anticipated completion of prefabricated houses by 30,000 
with only a 'small increase' in brick houses. Any further 
delays in the implementation of the programme of 
prefabricated houses would jeopardise its contribution to 
the overall programme and 
'would be open to the objection that owing to the 
greater call of the traditional brick houses for 
building labour there would be a reduction in the 
aggregate number of houses that might be erected"C23] 
In the implementation of the prefabricated component of 
the housing programme, as had been the case in temporary 
housing, government played a central role by both ensuring 
producers of a market and subsidising the product. By 1945 a 
number of commercially sponsored non traditional housing 
systems were available and the Housing Sub Committee began 
to give consideration to the means by which the programme 
could be launched. On the 22nd January 1945, the Committee 
approved a recommendation by the Minister of Works that: 
'manufacturers should be assured of a sufficient 
demand for these [prefabricated houses] to warrant 
their embarking on large scale production. To the 
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extent necessary to secure this, government bulk 
orders or production agreements would be used"C24] 
Indeed, for fear of prejudice on the-part of the building 
industry and local authorities, the M. O. W. prepared 
legislation for the manufacture of permanent prefabricated 
houses on Government account". E253 In May 1945 these 
proposals were approved by the War -Cabinet and were made 
statute later in the year as the Building Materials and 
Housing Act, 1945, which made financial provision for the 
M. O. W. - to ' purchase -building- -, materials 'and equipment, 
including complete prefabricated houses, sell these to local 
authorities, and where necessary erect them on their 
behalf . E26] 
However, although these powers existed, the eventual 
means of implementation relied on less direct measures. 
In September 1945, the M. O. W. Prepared its final paper on 
the implementation of the programme. The Minister 
recommended that local authorities should be notified of the 
various types on offer with an indication of the dates when 
deliveries could be made and that they should be asked to 
place orders. These enquiries would then allow an assessment 
to be made of the extent to'whicha I 
"bull; ordering of components or of complete houses 
should be undertaken, production agreements made in 
order to stimulate- production in advance of firm 
demands... or central negotiations undertaken to fix 
the price of components... In-some cases no action by 
the Government will be necessary, but wherever 
substantial factory production is involved, either of 
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complete houses or of steel frames or other steel or 
concrete units, action by the government in one or 
other of the directions indicated above will probably 
be found to be desirable in order to secure proper 
organisation of production and distribution and 
economy in costs'[ 27 ] 
In the discussion accompanying this paper the Minister of 
Works urged out that "the experimental stage should now be 
regarded as over" and the local authorities approached as 
soon as possible. E283 This was'done in October 1946 when 
Circular 182/45 asked local authorities to place orders for 
the steel framed houses "on the assumption that the cost 
will be comparable with the present cost of houses of 
traditional construction". [29] 
In certain cases the M. O. W. intervened directly in the 
production of houses. For instance, a guaranteed order was 
given to the British Iron and Steel Federation (B. I. S. F. ) 
for the "large scale production" of houses of its design 
[30] (31,320 were eventually built). [Tab. IV] The government 
used its powers under the Building Materials and Housing Act 
to order 20,000 sets of precast concrete components for the 
Aires system which were supplied to local authorities at 
cost price and also purchased 5,000 Swedish Timber House 
Hulls for sale to local authorities. In the case of one 
system, the Howard house, the full extent of the powers was 
used. In June 1945, the M. O. W. placed an order for 3,000 
Howard houses (only 1,303 were eventually built) and 
supervised delivery and erection. 131&TAB. III] 
However, the greatest support that the state gave to 
53 
prefabricated houses was the -financial aid--made under 
Section 17 of the Housing (Financial and Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act of 1946 which until December 1947 offset any 
increased costs of prefabricated houses through the payment 
of an additional capital grant to local authorities. 
CHLG/583-The optimism of the M. O. W.. that these houses should 
compare in cost with traditional houses, stated to the 
Cabinet as late as September, -19459 was ill founded. The 
first : report-- of:., the. Girdwood "Committee in 1948 -set : out-the 
average capital grant paid on'each of the houses. 15 of the 
19 systems which entered substantial production in the 
immediate postwar years received subsidies. The largest of 
these, 708 pounds, was that given to the permanent aluminium 
bungalow, followed by the B. I. S. F. house, 244` pounds, and 
the Airey house, 175 pounds. Eight other, systems received 
subsidies of more than 90 , pounds. 1323 -Given that A he 
average cost of"a three bedroomed local authority dwelling 
was estimated by the same committee as°costing 1,242 pounds, 
these subsidies were substantial and it-seems unlikely that 
they would have been offered had not the exchequer felt that 
they were essential to the success of the progamme. 
The need to. -increase' housing supply through the 
utilisation of' labour saving housing systems in the 
immediate postwar period should be seen in the light of the 
government's overall stabilisation policy. This expressly 
forbade the imposition°of an inflationary level of demand on 
the building industry for fears of its potentially 
destabilising effect on the economy as a whole. Building 
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controls fixed the level of demand to be placed on available 
resources and in the event of these being expected to be 
inadequate to meet planned housing targets, recourse to new 
technology was made. The degree to which the Cabinet both 
planned the use of new technology and intervened in its 
implementation can be compared to the post First World War 
transitionary period. In 1919 the government turned to new 
methods only when the effects of its refusal to control 
private building demand caused inflationary pressures to 
undermine the -Addison housing programme. -The unwillingness 
of the government to intervene in production and 
distribution and subsidise the additional costs ensured that 
this hastily conceived-recourse met with limited success. 
Less than 20,000 non-traditional houses were built under the 
Addison Act. 133] In the latter years of the Second World 
War government prepared its plans -early and made sure that 
they would meet with success. In 1948,30.8% of the 168,971 
local authority houses were produced in non traditional 
building systems, and this outcome must in large meaure be 
seen as the result of the government's postwar stabilisation 
policy. ETab. II ] 
II. PRODUCTIVITY AND THE BUILDING INDUSTRY. 
With the prospect of a heavy demand on the building industry 
in the post war period the government's first aim was to 
expand the labour force as rapidly as possible. In February 
1943 the government published a Command Paper, Training for 
the Building Industry, setting out measures to ensure a 
rapid increase of the labour force from its 1945 level of 
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500,000 [34] to 1,250,000, which it felt would correspond to 
construction demands for 10 to 12 years after the war. [35] 
By the end of 1946 Rosenburg estimates that, with the 
exception of certain of the materials producing industries 
(bricks, tiles, pipes and fire clay goods), the building 
industry, now with 953,000 operatives, had regained 
approximately 80% of its labour force. [36] In 1950 the 
Minister, of, Works reported to Parliament that the load on 
the building industry had been steady for the past three 
years, ' and the building industry labour force constant at 
one million operatives. [37] 
During the latter part of the 1940s there was little 
discussion of new building methods as a means of increasing 
housing -supply. In April 1950, the Labour Cabinet resolved 
to stabilise the national housing programme at 200,000 
completions 'a year for -1950 to 1952, thereby presenting the 
industry with the prospect of a demand well within its 
capacity. [38] This prospect was modified by the 
Conservative's election pledge of 300,000 annual housing 
completions by 1953. The implications of this dramatically 
increased housing programme were discussed in the Cabinet 
meeting of the 28th December 1951, when the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, R. A. Butler, stated the "three conditions on 
which he was prepared-to countenance such a programme. As 
well as demanding that no more steel should be used in house 
building unless supplies became more plentiful and that 
softwood consumption be subject to a level to be set by the 
Cabinet he insisted that the labour force engaged on house 
building should not be increased above its present level". 
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E393 This stipulation was agreed by the Cabinet. In March 
1952 MacMillan announced to Parliament that he was 
encouraging building by non-traditional labour saving 
building methods amongst housing authorities generally, 1403 
and in -1952 the M. H. L. G. instructed its Regional Production 
Officers to increase the use of systems "in areas of good as 
well as bad... [building]... labour supply'. (41] Rather 
than expanding the building labour force, government policy 
was now directed towards limiting it and labour saving 
housing systems had "become seen as. a -means of assisting 
this. 
The late 1940s and 1950s saw considerable discussion of 
the role of building as an activity within the economy and 
in particular the alarming fall in productivity. In 1944 the 
M. O. W. found that on its experimental housing site at 
Northolt the cost of traditional construction had risen by 
as much as 70% for labour and 60% for materials. (42] Much 
of this increase was accounted for by the rise in wages 
throughout the war, but also by the decline in the 
productivity of the labour forces'it was inevitable that 
although the fully trained worker regained his skill, the 
average level of skill was lower than that of pre-war days". 
[43] In 1948 the Committee of Inquiry into the Cost of House 
Building (Girdwood Committee) published its first report. 'It 
found that the postwar house was three and a quarter times 
more expensive than its prewar counterpart. Aside from 
improvements in specification, inflated materials costs and 
increases in overheads and profits, the report stated that a 
major portion of the increase was the product of higher 
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labour costs: 
'The decline in productivity in the building industry 
since 1939 led to an increase of some 457. in the 
number of hours required to build a house in 1947, and 
a resultant extra cost of about 150 pounds in the case 
of the' typical three bed house. This increase is 
manhours`is equivalent to a 31%. decline in output"[44] 
Excepting the bad weather of 1947, the shortage of materials 
and the overloading of the industry during the transitional 
period,. -the : causes of lowered productivity were twofold ý in 
the committee's view: the deskilling effect of the war on 
the quality of labour; and a "lack of individual effort" 
occasioned by full employment. The less coercive nature of 
the labour market under conditions of full employment was 
noted by G. C. Allen, who in 1970 still found that "adequate 
substitutes had not yet been found for the pressures, 'harsh 
but effective, that had existed before the war". [45] 
The absorption- of the nation's- resources by the 
construction of dwellings was the subject of discussion by 
the cabinet on- two occasions' in the 'postwar' Labour 
administration., In July 1948, The Lord President's Committee 
considered the problem of increasing' productivity within the 
industry, [46] and, in April 1950 the Ad Hoc- Cabinet 
Committee on Future Policy Towards the Building Industry 
stated that the economic- future is largely dependent upon 
the ability of such a large-and important industry to 
achieve a really high standard of efficiency and to reduce 
its costs'. [47] The perceived: lowering of productivity 
within the building industry brought forth two responses. On 
56 
the one hand fierce criticisms of the British building 
worker were made, in particular by the Rt Hon. G. P. Stevens 
who, in 1950, berated those building workers who were not 
'pulling their weight... and are therefore depriving us of 
that marginal productivity which would not only build more 
houses, but would cheapen houses". 148) The second reaction 
was the retention by employers of the payment by results 
scheme introduced in 1941 under the Essential Work (Building 
and Civil Engineering) Order. C49] The extent to which the 
scheme operated and . 
its contribution to lower, laboure:, costs 
is difficult to measure. In 1959 the M. O. W. acknowledged 
that less than half the labour force was, working to-payment 
by results. E503 
Despite the frequency with which government and 
industry was reminded that efficient building was essential 
to national economic performance, C51&523 the productivity 
of the building industry improved bnly slowly. In 1952 the 
third report of the Girdwood Committee found that little 
more than one hundred hours had been saved in the labour 
required to construct a house between 1949 and 1951. 
Productivity was still 20% below the'prewar figure. 1533 In 
its sympathetic review of the building industry of 1954 the 
British Productivity Council admitted that progressive 
techniques such as preplanning, standardisation and teamwork 
were 'beginning" to be adopted by progressive sections of 
the industry but for true progress these needed to be widely 
imitated. [543 
While there was a general awareness that the industry's 
low productivity was potentially harmful to the economy, 
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state intervention to rectify this problem during the 1950s, 
in terms of the promotion of investment in labour saving 
building systems, was minimal. Under Conservative housing 
policies of the mid and late 1950s housing programmes fell 
and no longer exerted the intensity of pressure on the 
building industry that they had in the immediate postwar 
period and in the early 1950s. While concerned with building 
efficiency, the need to take action was not pressed upon 
government - it could afford to take a less direct interest 
in the way in which dwellings were made. Furthermore, the 
bulk of production gradually reverted to private producers 
and the established postwar avenue of intervention in 
housing production methods - system building in association 
with large social housing programmes - was no longer present 
on the scale of the late 1940s and early 1950s. ETab. I] 
When the state did start to promote technical change 
within the building industry in the early 1960s, it seems to 
have done so for two reasons: an awareness that labour 
shortages within the industry would hamper the expansion of 
building programmes and a dramatic shift in the government's 
whole economic policy. Anxiety about the shortages of labour 
and bricks first appeared in the Report of the Ministry of 
Housing and Government 1961 which noted the effect of labour 
shortages on house construction over the year: this 
disappointing turn-out was the result of a further slowing 
in the pace of construction, due mainly to the shortage of 
craftsmen', t55] although it also commented that the 
situation had eased with government economic restraints 
imposed later in the year. The value of new building work 
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that the industry had carried out had risen in money terms 
by 42% between 1955 and 1962 [56] and it had become apparent 
that the increases in building output associated with the 
high ý rates of postwar economic growth and ''welfare 
expenditure were straining the capacity of the construction 
industry. - 
The second factor was the change in government policy 
in, favour of planning as a means of achieving 'increased 
economic growth. R. Opie cites four reasons for-, this-shift in 
emphasis , away from--the stop-go-°policies=°-of 'restraint 
favoured during- the 1950s, towards economic"", planning: 
firstly, a popular interpretation of the French "economic 
miracle" as the outcome of the planning policies exercised 
by the French state; secondly, a growing preoccupation with 
the discipline , of 'planning 'amongst- the managerial 
establishment of British industry and government; thirdly, a 
shift in this direction amongst the leaders of the maJor 
political parties; and fourthly, the balance of payments 
crisis' in the summer of 1961, the outcome of which was yet 
another stringent and disruptive economic' squeeze exercised 
through a rise in the-bank rate and public expenditure cuts: 
'It seemed- obvious that there must be a better way' of 
managing the economy than" this. One such way, it seemed to 
many, was to plan the growth of the UK economy". t573 This 
new policy was described to the 'Commons in July 1961, by 
Selwyn Lloyd, the Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer 
who outlined- the principles'of what became known as 
"indicative planning": 
"I envisage a `Joint examination 'of the economic 
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prospects of the country-stretching five or more years 
into the future. It would cover the growth of national 
production and distribution of our resources between 
the main uses... and would try to establish what are 
the essential conditions for realising potential 
growth"C 58 ] 
The outcome of this proposal for the Joint examination of 
the economy was the National Economic Development Council 
(N. E. D. C. ). t59] The Council, comprising representatives 
from. government,. industry-and organised labour,... was formally 
constituted in March 1962 and began to "consider together 
what are the obstacles to quicker growth, what can be done 
to improve efficiency, and whether the best use is being 
made of our resources", [6O] with the intention-of 
increasing 'the rate of sound growth'. In February 1963 the 
N. E. D. C. authorised the publication of-the Growth of the UK 
Economy to 1966 which set out optimised forecasts of'growth 
and the conditions that would have to be met for their 
fulfillment by individual industries. A general factor 
within this growth was the contribution of technical change: 
'A key factor in achieving a 4% growth rate will be 
the degree to which new investment --embodies the 
results of up-to-date technical advance. Its effects 
will be seen both in improvement in the product and in 
a reduction in man-hours, materials, space, machine' 
time, and fuel and power per unit of ouput'C613 
In the section on construction the report saw manpower as 
the major- problem inhibiting- the anticipated rapid rise in 
output. To achieve this an increased rate of recruitment was 
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necessary allied to a faster rise in productivity through 
increased investment in technologically sophisticated 
building methods. The Paper urged that increased building 
output could only happen if the... [technological]... 
changes under way proceed at a faster rate than in the 
past". [62] These changes included those being promoted by 
the M. O. W. in persuance of the findings of the 1962 
Emmerson report into the obstacles to improved efficiency in 
building. These included greater co-operation between 
clients, and -producers, , new contracting ; procedures, and the 
rapid acceptance of standardisation and promotion of new 
building technlogy. [63] 
Concern for the future performance of the building 
industry was not confined to the effect , which poor 
performance might have on the production of buildings, but 
to a wider concern at the distribution of real resources, 
primarily labour, within the economy and the -effect on. 
overall growth that the building industry was seen to exert. 
In September 1963, the Minister of Works, Geoffrey Rippon, 
pointed out that the nation's workers were "our most 
precious national asset" and one which must be "fairly 
shared among all our activities". [64] Later in the year the 
Government White Paper, A National Building Agency pointed 
out that construction demands would rise by 50% in the next 
decade and stated that This will have to be done without 
any great increase in the demand on the, Nation's limited 
labour resources'. [65] The solution, ýthe Paper continued, 
was higher productivity, which would be gained through the 
"industrialisation" of the industry's methods, in particular 
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by investment in labour saving system building techniques 
for housing. In 1964 the N. E. D. C. published its report The 
Construction Industry which, looking in detail at the role 
of building within the economy, forecast a regressive effect 
on the economy as a whole were demand to exceed the capacity 
of the industry to produce: 
"Looked at in the light of its ability to meet the 
level of demand forcast for the years ahead to 1966, 
it is clear that drastic changes will have to be 
made... What is clear-. -is that there is no certainty, 
in present conditions, that the industry will be able 
to meet the demands upon it. And the possibility 
cannot be ruled out that by falling short it may hold 
back the expansion of the economy as a whole"C66] 
Commenting more directly on building systems the report 
acknowledged that current experiments provided "little 
conclusive quantitive evidence on their advantages", but in 
view of the labour shortage in general the reason why 
increased industrialisation is ` essential for the 
construction industry is the saving of labour and the 
replacement of scarce skills by other skills". C67] 
1964 saw the return of the Labour Party to-power for the 
first time since 1951. One of the first tasks to which the 
new government addressed itself was the establishment of the 
Department of Economic Affairs (D. E. A. ), on the 26th October 
1964. This new government department, described by its head, 
George Brown, as the greatest contribution of the Labour 
Party to the recasting -of the machinery of government to 
meet the needs of the twentieth century", E683 published its 
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plan for the growth of the British economy, The National 
Plan, in September 1965. [69] While proposing a rate of 
growth in the gross national product of less than the 
N. E. D. C. plan of 1963 (3.87. per annum until 1970 as opposed 
to 4%) this, according to J. A. Hackett, was nevertheless an 
ambitious target, bearing in mind the constrained labour 
market, and relied heavily on increasing the efficiency-of 
British industries. [70] According to the National Plan a 
4.6% increase in the output of the economy was to be 
achieved with a 0.9'%. rise inýemployment. With the-exception 
of mining and quarrying the Plan cited building as having, 
in 1964, less fixed capital investment relative to output 
than any other industry. The-1960-4 period had seen capital 
investment by the industry rise at the sixth highest rate in 
comparison to other industries. However, Labour's plans for 
the economy envisaged an annual rate of increase in capital 
investment on the part of the building industry second to no 
other. [71] The main form which increased capital investment 
in building was to take was system building applied to 
housing. In the section on housing the plan proposed an 
annual house building programme of half a million dwellings 
by 1970. The role of industrialised building systems within 
such a programme was clearly stated: 
'with large scale production of a few selected 
systems, houses built by industrialised systems should 
become competitive in cost and in design with those 
built by traditional methods. The number of 
industrialised dwellings in tenders approved is likely 
to be 38,000 in 1965 rising to about 100,000 in 1970. 
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The use of industrialised systems should enable the 
larger building programme envisaged to be carried out 
with a relatively small addition to the labour 
force"C72] 
Ey the mid 1960s it had become apparent that the 
sources of new labour upon which the construction industry 
had previously drawn were becoming increasingly restricted. 
Ey 1965 the prospects for securing a further growth of the 
building labour force were declining. In 1965 the Ministry 
of --Labour's Manpower, Studies No. 3= The-, Construciton 
Industry, referred to the 12% rise in the number of males in 
employment in the industry since 1959, and predicted that 
such a rate could not continue for the next five year 
period: 
"Towards the end of the period the numbers of young 
persons entering employment will decline: construction 
may not continue to receive a net gain through 
transfers between it and other industries and it may 
be that in the future the industry will gain fewer 
workers than in the past through migration"C733 
Associated with this, what new workers there were were 
expected to be absorbed by the enlarged stock of existing 
buildings to be repaired and maintained. This area of 
building work, which absorbed up to 40% of the construction 
labour force, became a major source of concern. In March 
1965, P. A. Stone drew attention to the effect of this on the 
building economy as a whole: "there seems to be little doubt 
that expenditure on maintenance work will rise in the 
future... if the relative efficiency of this work does 
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decline... [which he suggested was inevitable due to the 
inherent difficulty of effecting technological change in 
this area]... other things being equal, a growing proportion 
of labour will need to be devoted to it. [74] In June 1966 
the Director of the National Building Agency, A. W. Cleeve 
Barr, forecasted that the labour force engaged on new 
building might actually decline in future years. [75] 
Nevertheless, the government's concern to improve 
productivity within building was not primarily a response to 
-envisaged building labour shortages. Indeed, from -1966 
onwards it pursued a policy of actively hindering 
recruitment to building. In 1966 the Labour Government 
introduced Selective Employment Tax (S. E. T. ) which was 
designed to constrain the building workforce in order to 
prevent construction from taking labour away from 
manufacturing industry. In 1965 C. A. R. Crosland described the 
need for a labour market policy designed to have a 
redistributive effect on employment in different sectors of 
industry: 
"It follows that unless we can make the fullest and 
most efficient use of the manpower available, and 
ensure that its distribution between industries makes 
the maximum contribution to growth, the shortage of 
labour will be more severe... it is clear that the 
Government will have to pursue an active and vigorous 
labour market policy"[76] 
The following year the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced 
his proposals for a Selective Employment Tax as part of the 
Budget Statement. Lamenting that between June 1960 and June 
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1965 employment in service industries had risen by one 
million while in manufacturing it had only risen by 142,000 
he proposed a system of taxation which would raise the costs 
of labour within certain industries. The distinction was 
made between service industries, which would be penalised, 
and manufacturing industry, which would not. Indeed, certain 
of the latter would receive a premium paid for from the 
taxes of the others. The anomaly to the broad classification 
of 'service' and 'non-service' industry was building which 
was also to be taxed 'in the same way as services so as to 
encourage the industry to scrutinise its use of labour more 
closely". Co-incidentally, the pill was sweetened by 
bringing the industry within the government's investment 
grants scheme "thus encouraging it to make use of more up to 
date equipment". t77] The effect of this tax levied on site 
labour, but not off-site construction labour (such as that 
working in system building component manufacturing plants), 
added, according to the National Builder, 80 million pounds 
per year to the cost of building, raising the cost of a 
traditional home by 70 pounds 178] and in 1969 costing six 
pounds "to get an operative on site before he even does a 
stroke of work". 179] The degree to which this measure 
increased productivity within building cannot be established 
(although P. Hillibrandt cites it as a contributory factor 
(80]). However, it does indicate clearly the government's 
intention to contract the building labour force in the face 
of competing demands from manufacturing industry. 
The government's desire to restrict recruitment of 
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labour to the building industry extended beyond the boom in 
construction output of the mid 1960s. Demands that the 
government should address its policies to relieve=the 10.2% 
unemployment within the industry, in February 1970, were 
rebuffed in the following terms by the Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Minister of Public Buildings and Works= 
with increased productivity, redeployment in . the industry 
can often be difficult... The industry will need a highly 
skilled and compact labour force, well abreast of new 
techniques". [81] Indeed, it was not until 1978 -that4the 
Secretary of State for the Environment, Peter Shore stated 
that: 
'My major concern... is with the efficiency of the 
construction industry... it is also with maintaining 
as high a level of employment in the industry as we 
possibly can. We shall always be prepared to consider- 
measures which promote these ends'[82] 
By this time 15% of Jobs under Job creation schemes were in 
building. [83] In contrast to the building policy of 
previous years, government was by -this, -time seeking to 
increase employment in construction rather than reduce it. 
The wheel had turned full circle. , 
III. THE STATE AND INDUSTRY IN PARTNERSHIP 
The previous section argued that industrialised building 
systems were a recognised part of government economic policy 
both during the early 1950s and more dramatically during the 
1960s. This section will examine the degree to which the 
government implemented that policy in terms of the active 
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encouragement of new building technology. During the 
transitional period (1945-47) the promotion of systems for 
housing relied heavily on direct government intervention, 
which in the case of the Temporary Housing Programme, and a 
number of the permanent prefabricated houses, resulted in 
the government assuming direct responsibility for 
manufacture and distribution. Furthermore, the government, ° 
by offsetting any costs above traditional construction, 
assured sponsors of a market. However, during' the 1960s, ' 
government : intervention _operated ý in a -very _: different. way.. 
Industrialised building policy was not implemented through 
fiscal provision, nor direct intervention in production. 
Rather, a new type of relationship with the building 
industry was developed by the government which, during the 
1960s, did its best to modify state housing policy in a way 
which suited the sponsors of capital intensive building 
systems. An important aspect of government policy,, the 
coercion of local authorities, is discussed in Chapter 
Three. 
The desire for government to promote policies 
favourable to system building sponsors can be observed as 
early as 1948 when the M. O. H. was debating what position, to 
adopt now that the 1946 Act subsidies no longer applied. 
Circular 6/48 noted that a number of systems, through the 
facilities offered during the past two years, had developed 
on economic lines to a point whereby they could, compete with 
traditional construction. As these promised to -form a 
supplement to traditional resources a policy was advised to 
enable sponsors "to plan -their production ahead on the basis 
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of estimates of the probable demand". Local Authorities were 
therefore advised to give early intimation to the M. O. H. of 
the systems they wished to use and their numbers in advance 
of the approval of their overall housing programme: "The 
information supplied in this way would then be collated and 
transmitted to the firms concerned". 184] 
When, in January 1952, the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government (M. H. L. G. ) again considered the means of 
expanding non-traditional housing production, the course of 
action adopted . 
included an extensive. series of interviews - 
with producers. They were asked to state "their maximum 
possible expansion", and where they would find it easiest to 
build. E853 Government enthusiasm to assist producers in the 
production of non-traditional houses even prompted, it to 
approach the single largest building firm without a system, 
Costains, with a suggestion that they should introduce one 
and build a factory in the Stoke-on-Trent area 'to build - 
say 50% of the miner's houses... Mr Costain felt they might 
well do that if they had some assurance of, say, two years 
output being taken up and they've now gone away to think 
about this". C86] Costain's response to this overture seems 
to have been favourable for, in December 1953, the firm was 
erecting 1,000 dwellings for the Coal Industry Housing 
Association in the West Midlands, having adopted the Swiss 
Schindler Goehner system. C87] 
Further active intervention by the government in 
housing technology followed the economic planning revolution 
of the early 1960s and in particular the publication of the 
Emmerson Report, commissioned in Autumn 1961 and published 
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the following year. E883 This report, in the words of the 
Ministry of Public Buildings and Works' (M. P. B. W. ) 
representative at the United Nations 1965 conference on 
industrialised building, was "the starting point of a major 
change of policy". [89] The central message of the report 
was that there was no specific remedy to the malaise of the 
industry, rather the need was for a new sort of relationship 
between it and its major client: 
the government needs to exercise a more powerful. 
influence on the general ». eff. iciencw of, the. zindustry. 
This is not a question of imposing controls, but 
simply of creating a new relationship between 
government departments and the industries, and of 
trying to establish conditions in which all of those 
engaged in construction can themselves increase their 
efficiency't90] 
Some of the measures by which the state could encourage 
the introduction of new technology anticipated 'the Emmerson 
report. In June 1961, Keith Joseph, Parliamentary Secretary 
to the Minister of Housing and Local Government, announced 
the replacement of the building bye-laws by a national 
system of building regulations in the 1961 Public Health 
Act, which superseded the 1933 Act. The bye-laws, he 
maintained, acted as an inhibiting factor on new techniques: 
'Even if the developer of a new technique may persuade my 
Right Hon. friend to vary his model bye-laws, it may be 
years before all the 1,400 local authorities are equally 
Persuaded' (91] The influence of bye-laws on system building 
had been noted in 1946 when local authorities were informed 
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that those which inhibited the use of non traditional 
housing were to be waived by the Minister of Health. (923 In 
reporting on the principles to be adopted for a revised 
system of national building regulations, in 1964, the 
Building Regulations Advisory Committee advocated a system 
of requirements which did not prescribe new techniques but 
'should be tailored to the circumstances -, the state of 
design practice, the level of technology... and-the economic 
importance of preserving flexibility or an incentive to new 
methods'. _C93]' : Commenting on the, 
imminent introduction of 
the new regulations-later in'1964, Geoffrey Rippon, Minister 
of Public Buildings and Works, described them as making "it 
possible to approve once and for all for-use. -anywhere -in 
England and Wales a new building method or design". 194] 
A further inhibiting factor on new technology, 'and one 
which had been a source of contention within the building 
industry prior to Emmerson's report, was the government's 
tendency to make public building, and housing programmes in 
particular, subject to short term economic policy. Between 
1945 and the end of licensing in 1954 programmes were 
approved on an annual basis. After licensing was abolished 
in 1954 local authorities were free to, build as"many houses 
as they wished within the subsidy-system but the economic 
crisis of 1957 prompted the, government to return to the 
requirement that yearly programmes were once again subject 
to, ministerial approval. 1953 The effects of such a policy 
were that, on the' one hand, programmes were, at the most, 
determined only one year in advance, and further, that they 
were always subject to cuts imposed as a result of 
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government economic policy. The stop-go policy exercised by 
the government in the late 1950s caused a series of credit 
squeezes which imposed drastic cuts on public building 
programmes. E96&97] The outcome of-such policies was to 
create uncertainty within the industry which, in the absence 
of stable and foreseeable demand, produced a ,, general 
reluctance to invest in technologies which might take years 
of full utilisation to provide an adequate return on the 
capital expended. 198] 
Following the, mini budget, of -:, 1961v: - the, N. F. B. T. E. met 
the Minister of Works to express concern at the loss of 
confidence occasioned by the latest credit squeeze, and when 
the Federation met Emmerson, in the course of preparing his 
report, they again emphasised the detrimental effects of 
short term economic planning on'the industry. (99] This view 
was to form a significant part of Emmerson's report 
No industry can be fully efficient when there are 
alternating spells of overloading, , and 
under-employment... There is real substance in=the 
view that 'greater efficiency will result if the 
Government can adopt as a main feature in its policies 
a steady and expanding construction programme"(100] 
As we have seen, one of the crucial elements of the economic 
planning revolution of the early 1960s was the replacement 
of short term policies of -restraint by planned steady 
growth. This was the central impetus behind the creation of 
the N. E. D. C. in 1962 and the Department of Economic Affairs 
in 1964. In a speech to the National Federation of Building 
Trades Employers, in August 1962, the Minister of Works 
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extended this philosophy to the building industry: "the main 
task is to increase the application to building of large 
scale industrial organisation. What the government can do is 
help by securing a balanced long term construction 
programme'. 1101] This help was to take the form of 
assurances of steady growth in overall building programmes 
and also in the approvals policy of the M. H. L. G.. Later in 
the year the Minister of Housing and Local Government 
announced to the Conservative Annual Conference that 
following discussions with -local authorities during---the 
course of the year he was about to 'agree firm forward 
programmes for several years ahead". 1102] By May 1963 the 
M. H. L. G. reported that it was encouraging authorities with 
large housing programmes to plan their housing five years in 
advance in order to allow them to "let big forward 
programmes", 1103] and had even given approval for a four to 
six year programme by the northern authorities faced with 
large building programmes. (104] The most definite advice on 
this initiative came in Circular 21/65 when the local 
authorities were instructed to submit, to the Ministry, 
housing programme forecasts for the years 1965 to 1968 
inclusive, after which "it is intended to repeat this 
request for four year programmes each year". (105] In 1965 
the M. H. L. G. guaranteed the four year programme of the 34 
London authorities, which together produced 20% of overall 
housing output and in 1966 this system was extended to cover 
another 106, with the effect that 60% of the state housing 
Programme was guaranteed for four years ahead. 1106] While 
the direct impact that such -measures had on the 
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proliferation of systems cannot be measured, there is no 
doubt that such a policy promised a secure market in social 
housing, for producers wishing to invest in sophisticated 
production techniques. At the least it must have alleviated 
the concerns expressed by the industry to Emmerson in 1962. 
Shortly after the Emmerson Report, the M. O. W. was 
reorganised and given a new maure, the Ministry of Public 
Buildings and Works (M. P. B. W. ). One of the first points 
Emmerson had made was that "there is a vast store of 
experience . within the works directorates of Government 
Departments, particularly those responsible for direct 
government building". In particular Emmerson recommended 
that greater publicity should be given to the specialist 
development groups in government departments working on new 
technologies, the lessons of whose work, he felt, needed to 
be more widely known. CCh. VI] One of the larger aims of the 
reorganisation of the M. O. W., in which all the government 
building departments were eventually brought within the one 
ministry, was to provide an example to the building industry 
by demonstrating the benefits of modern technology and 
practice. This policy was described by Rippon himself: 
'I am not going to spend my time exhorting the 
construction industries to accept the best modern 
practices and techniques. Now that my ministry is 
responsible for almost the whole of the Government's 
direct building programme, I intend to give a lead 
which will set the pace in new methods of contracting, 
site management, and development. It is my purpose 
that the results of Government action will serve as a 
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practical guide to all engaged in the construction 
industries and that any benefit which may flow from 
research and development in the public sector will be 
available to every builder"(107] 
From this policy flowed a stream of advice to the building 
industry, in the form of analytical-studies and information 
resulting from practical building projects - in particular 
the extensive barrack rebuilding programme which was 
undertaken during the 1960s almost entirely through 
... -. industrialised, building systems., - 
-- One area in which --government offered advice both to 
building firms and local authorities was in new methods. of 
contracting. As -Emmerson pointed out, there had been no 
official examination of, contracting methods in public 
housing programmes since the Simon Committee report of 1944. 
[108] Emmerson's-opinion was that such a review was long 
ovrdue and that new contracting methods, by securing -a 
closer relationship between building design and methods of 
construction, might do much to improve technical efficiency 
in building. 11093-This suggestion was taken up in the 
appointment of a Committee headed by Harold Banwell, - in 
1962, which reported on The Placing and Management. of 
Contracts for Building and Civil Engineering in 1964. In 
particular the Committee recommended the wider adoption of 
the negotiated contract which introduced the contractor at 
an early stage in the design process, thereby incorporating 
system building " methods into the design process. - 
Serial 
tendering, in which a number of contracts were awarded to 
one contractor was also advised to aid the introduction of 
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new technology. C110) The M. O. W. itself published reports of 
its own experiments"on new techniques advising public sector 
clients on the methods of selecting contractors most suited 
to system building. [1113 Specific advice `urging local 
authorities to adopt new contracting methods was given twice 
by the M. H. L. G. in official circulars; once in 1965, as part 
of its industrialised building drive, 11123 and again in 
1967.1 113 3 
A' further element of government policy designed to 
-create -. a, social -.. housing =market suited to -new. - building 
technology was the extension and promotion of°the consortia 
movement to housing authorities. Consortia, the amalgamation 
of local authorities to form larger purchasing organisations 
originated in educational building during the mid 1950s. 
CCh. V] By combining their building programmes, local 
authorities were able to provide a market large enough to 
enable them to design and operate their 'own systems. 
However, another feature of consortia was that the smaller 
housing authorities, who by themselves presented 
insufficiently large programmes' to"utilise system building 
economically, could, through combination, provide much 
larger programmes. This feature was of considerable 
attraction to the government and, although it did not 
originate them, the M. H. L. G. and the N. R. A. were very active 
in promoting consortia. Indeed, in October 1963, Keith 
Joseph announced consortia to be the panacea to promoting 
system building in social housing: The secret is to group 
authorities into consortia- so that they can 'place orders 
large enough to make invesment in labour saving systems 
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economical". t114] Government, promotion of consortia was 
noted both by The Builder magazine t115] and the Economist 
which noted that: 
'On the wall of Dave- Embling's office at the housing 
ministry is a map of' Britain with the housing 
authorities coloured in many shades. It is his 
progress chart on the job of talking them into 
consortia"C 1167 
By 1965 Embling was able to announce that the past 18 months 
had 
. seen 
the grouping. _of, . over -. 
200 authorities t into 22 
consortia, and although, as Chapter Three describes, 
consortia were not the panacea that was envisaged, this 
aspect of government policy played its part in'the promotion 
of new technology in social housing. 
Perhaps the most conspicuous result'of Emmerson's-plea 
for a new relationship between government and industry was 
the creation of the National Building Agency (N. B. A. ). While 
much of Emmerson's report emphasised the 'need to modify 
existing channels of communication between-state-, departments 
and the industry, or the reinforcement and extension of 
processes already underway, one suggestion was that for a 
new type of agency "a focal point where those matters which 
are common to all forms of building can be brought under 
examination and discussed". E117] In May 1963, Geoffrey 
Rippon indicated the lines upon which government thought on 
this matter was developing: ` 
'What is needed is a method of bringing together the 
building requirements of a large number of public 
agencies and even private building owners so that they 
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may be collated into programmes for industrialised 
building extending to one, two or even three-years 
ahead... One possibility would be the establishment of 
clearing houses of some sort for building orders which 
would also give advice to prospective clients about 
the potentialities of industrialised building"C1183 
In December the government published its White Paper on the 
subject, A National Building Agency, which proposed a new 
quango which would provide the advice and 'information 
necessary to. allow--bui1ding - clients to make, useýof the 
latest developments in building technology: 
Most clients, public and private also, need help in 
the choice and use of industrialised building methods. 
Those local authorities which lack whole-time highly 
qualified professional staffs cannot be expected to 
evaluate and employ the new methods unless they have 
access to expert objective advice... A new source of 
independent advice drawn from the available pool of 
specialised professional expertise appears to be 
essential "1 119 ] 
The services which the Agency offered were many and various 
but were all related to the purpose of assisting clients to 
modify their building policies and procedures in order to 
facilitate the use of new technology, and in particular, 
system building. The Agency's services included: assistance 
to clients to group their building requirements together and 
collate them into phased programmes (on the consortia 
principle); advice to clients on administrative procedures 
and the necessary professional services in order that they 
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may use new technologies and, if necessary, supply a full 
design and planning service; -advice on the suitability of 
individual methods of building; assistance to clients to 
form "sound working relationships" with the firms who 
control the individual systems; the encouragement of 
training in the use of new techniques; the appraisal and 
approval of specific systems for local authority use; and 
advice to contractors and manufacturers of systems on the 
best way to pursue their development. -The actual form that 
--the-. Agency was to take was, - in =1 ine wi th -current thought, :, M, a-- 
partnership" between the government, clients and the 
building industry, through the form of a limited company, 
governed by aboard of directors appointed by the M. P. R. W.. 
The intention was that the Agency should be staffed by 
highly trained experts transferred to the agency for a 
limited period subsequently resuming their normal work, "in 
this way increasing numbers of professional officers could 
gain knowledge of`the-new techniques". 1120] Initially the 
Agency was to be funded by a government grant, although. -the 
eventual aim was that it should fund part of its income 
through fees charged for its services. 
Two years after its- creation, in 1964, -I. R. S. A. C. 
carried out a profile of the N. R. A. and found: 
"three well organised divisions - administrative, 
architectural and operational-- with multiprofessional 
teams serving local authorities and a wide variety of- 
other building clients, a consultancy service, close 
links with government departments and professional. -and 
trade associations, a first class library and 
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information centre, a London headquarters housed in a 
new office block, regional offices in Edinburgh, 
Newcastle and Manchester`1121] 
In 1968 the M. P. B. W. reported that the Agency employed 208 
staff engaged, in the words of D. Turin, in stimulating "a 
rationalised market for industrialised products". C122] In 
1967 the N. B. A. received 157,772 pounds in fees and expended 
704,110 pounds, the balance being made up by public funds. 
11233 In November Official Architecture reported that the 
original intention of securing., a -high turnover, of -. staff had 
succeeded and that the Agency was engaged in a number of 
demonstration projects; developing brick construction 
techniques for Crawley New Town, providing design services 
for a 1,750 dwelling devel'opment in Sunderland, developing 
the Surebuilt system for a 316 dwelling scheme for Harlow 
New Town, and developing three systems on a housing estate 
at Glenrothes. (124] Published information on the number of 
interventions that the N. B. A. made into the building 
programmes of local authorities are not available, however, 
in 1965 it was called in by Liverpool to review its ailing 
housing programme and advised the clearance of larger sites 
in order to extend the use of industrialised systems, advice 
which was duly heeded by the Council. 1125] 
By the time that the Labour Government replaced that of 
the Conservatives in 1964, the essential groundwork for the 
boom in industrialised building techniques that took place 
between 1965 and 1969 had been laid. CTAB. II] Reporting on 
the impending growth of system housing The Economist 
commented in May 1965, that: 
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'We are on the verge of a great explosion in the use 
of these methods. But if Mr Crossman will be able to, 
say that he set it off, he ought also to recognise 
that the laying of the powder and the trailing of the 
fuses was the energetic work of_two Tory ministers 
fortunate in their civil servants: Mr Geoffrey Rippon 
and Sir Keith Joseph'(1964)C126] 
By this time the industry was marketing 400 building systems 
and-had carried out the. investment . -necessary. "to, -fulfil1. -the 
Labour pledge of half a million housing completions by 1970. 
The unleasing of capital already invested was emphasised by 
Crossman in the Cabinet discussions leading up to the 
implementation of the enlarged programme: 
'I had also stressed that the whole increase in the 
housing programme could be put through by expanding 
our industrialised -building. --This would not put a 
strain on our resources but simply employ unused 
capital resources in which millions had been invested,. 
and production could now take place"[127] 
Crossman's drive began in earnest in April 1965, with the 
distribution of Circular 21/65 which instructed local 
authorities to begin planning their housing programmes with 
particular reference to the use of industrialised building. 
1128] Seven months later this was followed by Circular 
76/65. The first part of-this second circular dwelt on the 
advantages that would accrue to local authorities if they 
utilised new technologies in terms of larger, faster and, 
even, qualitatively better programmes, while the second 
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outlined the procedure to be adopted for the immediate drive 
"aimed at giving the industrialised building programme the 
best possible conditions to get on its feet". E129] The 
larger local authorities, on whom the drive was to be 
concentrated, were required to discuss their proposed 
programmes with the Ministry's regional officers who would 
then be able to assess the magnitude of the industrialised 
component, the individual sites to be used, the density 
range, the general form'of development and the family sizes 
-to -be housed. The N. B. A. -. would then make its-contribution by 
recommending the systems most suited to the programme, and 
ensuring 'a satisfactory flow of work' for each of these. In 
order to allay any doubts that authorities might have, the 
N. B. A. was also to issue appraisal certificates for systems 
'considered by them to be suitable for local authority use'. 
A further measure adopted by the Ministry was the 
negotiation with sponsors of national prices for a range of 
systems so as to allow local authorities to select a scheme 
'in the confidence that the resulting contract sum is likely 
to be acceptable for loan sanction when application is made 
to the ministry". [130] This gave local authorities and 
producers a degree of certainty denied to the purveyors of 
traditional building technology. 
The new relationship between-government and industry 
was undoubtedly cemented by informal contacts between 
industry and government officials and politicians. A. Friend 
provides a list of high level politicians with interests in 
system building companies which included Keith Joseph 
(Bovis), Reginald Maudling (Open Systems Building), Geoffrey 
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Rippon (Cubitts Construction Systems). [131] R. McCutcheon 
adds the Permanent Secretary to the M. H. L. G., Dame Evelyn 
Sharp, to this. C132] However, the view that the sectional 
interests of a particular class of capital played a 
significant part in the"development of, policy towards new 
building technology implies a more passive position on the 
part of government than was the case. If* anything, the 
initiative was taken by the state which took considerable 
interest in guiding the industry. -, In 1962 the M. H. L. G. 
convened a --meeting ý° to- 4"-- which- it invited 60 to `= 70 
representatives of the- largest building"firms, Sand by July 
1964 had held over 700 interviews with various contractors 
during which it discussed its building policies. (133] It 
was a department of government that appointed an ex director 
of W. M. Thorntons, T. V. Prosser, as the first Chair of the 
N. E. A. [134] and Crossman who consumated the new 
relationship between the 'government and " industry by 
persuading Peter Lederer, a, director of Costains to join his 
ministry and be responsible 'for pushing and shoving and 
getting industrialised building off the launching pad"'. 
[135] When Crossman met Maurice Laing, McAlpine and others 
at 'the club' in December 1964, he found them apprehensive 
rather than bullish about the prospects for system building. 
This apprehension was founded on a suspicion that 'the stated 
intention of the government to secure steady and expanding 
housing programmes would not be carried through, a suspicion 




The view that central government played a significant part 
in the development of local authority housing policy during 
the postwar period is not shared by all. J. B. Cullingworth 
describes the -M. H. L. G. 's role in policy formulation as 
"remarkably weak: ". (137] The absence of fiscal subsidies 
during the 1960s, such as were offered during the post World 
War Two transitional period, does not necessarily diminish 
the role -of government -policy as a potent force in the 
promotion of system building. If anything the emphasis was 
on promoting confidence within the building industry that 
the adoption of advanced technology would be accompanied by 
the orders essential to commercial success. Coercion of the 
building industry as a means of forcing it to utilise 
technological developments would have been neither 
appropriate to the type of relationship that the state was 
trying to establish nor the political climate within which 
postwar government operated. Indeed, this had been discussed 
in relation to public building contracts by the Lord 
President's Committee as far back as 1948 but dimissed as 
impracticable. 1138] Despite the absence of direct measures 
it is evident that government played a large part in the 
promotion of system building: as the Court of Inquiry into 
the Collapse of Flats at Ronan Point observed in 1968, 
system building 'naturally blossoms under such Government 
policy". (139] Without the promise of a market, which only 
the government could provide, industrialised building would 
have had little future. It is to government policy, where 
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building technology in housing was part of a larger economic 
strategy, that we should look for much of an explanation for 
the use of system building in social housing. There can be 
little doubt that governments of the post war period 
undoubtedly gave effect, as indeed they intended, to 
substantial changes in building methods. 
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CHAPTER TWO. SPONSORS. 
This chapter will discuss two themes which stand out in the 
history of the commercial production of 'building systems. 
The first of these, examined in Section Is was the tendency 
for housing systems to be sponsored by firms outside the 
building industry - in particular engineering and steel 
firms. The second theme, examined in Section II, was the 
adoption-of systems-. by large building'. -contractors. These-. two ", 
groups by no means represent the full range of producers. 
The connection between system building and the development 
of the concrete precasting industry and the adoption of 
timber frame by smaller contractors will be examined in 
Chapter Seven. A further group often singled out in 
connection with system building- are civil engineering 
contractors. [17 However, many of these, including the two 
firms looked at in detail in this study, John Laing and 
Taylor Woodrow, undertook both building and civil 
engineering work, and, indeed, had established themselves 
through housebuilding before diversifying into the latter in 
the post Second World War period. For this reason, the 
sponsorship of systems by civil engineering firms is 
encompassed within the broader heading of large building 
contractors. 
I. DIVERSIFICATION 
The desire: of some engineering and steel firms to enter the 
mass housing market through the development of new building 
Be 
technologies may be observed as early as 1905. The Cheap 
Cottages Exhibition of that year - intended to demonstrate 
the potential of new methods to provide cheaper forms of 
accommodation for the working classes - featured designs 
from a number-of companies hoping to find new outlets for 
their metal products, either as cladding materials or as the 
structural framing. 12] There is no evidence to indicate 
that these initiatives-were successful in terms of the 
production of a significant volume-of houses and it was not 
until afterthe,. First, World; War. that engineering . _firms were 
able to realise their ambitions of 1905. The most 
successful-producer of a system based on steel products was 
Dorman Long, a steel- manufacturing firm which built some 
10,000 houses during the 1920s. [3&Fig. 1] A number of other 
attempts to enter social housing with engineering based 
technologies were made : in the depression years, of -the 
mid-1920s an-d.. 1930s, during which steel and engineering 
industries were particularly affected. As well the house 
promoted by Lord, Weir (Weir House), 14&Fig. 2] models were 
sponored by- Atholl - Steel Houses Ltd., (Atholl House), 
Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. 
- 
(Telford House), Denis Poulton, 
Cowieson, Walter -McFarland & Co and Thorncliffe, all of 
which -embodied substantial amounts of steel in their 
manufacture. 153 R. B. White estimates that less than 3,000 
dwellings were built using these systems, C67. the reason 
being that they were more - expensive than traditional 
construction., -- 
The government's intention to utilise non traditional 
technology in its post World War Two housing plans brought a 
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vociferous response from a steel and engineering industry 
inflated by six years of war production. The wartime 
expansion of munitions manufacture, heavily dependent on 
engineering products, was considerable. In November 1941 the 
War-Cabinet estimated the employment of workers in the 
manufacture of armaments to have risen by 2.5 million since 
1939. E73 In February 1941 the British Iron and Steel 
Federation (B. I. S. F. ) wrote to the Cabinet Reconstruction 
Committee expressing its member's, -fears of a collapse of 
markets in the immediate-.. postwar- period:.., LL 
'Many industries have extended beyond any possibility 
of having a postwar demand equal to present capacity, 
and unless the surplus capacity is liquidated and the 
policy controlled, unrestricted competition might 
result in a 'slump with serious unemployment"[8] 
In order to avoid the consequences of this collapse, many 
engineering firms, including the authors of this plea, hoped 
to enter the state housing market. Of the 12 systems of 
construction being considered in 'detail by the newly 
constituted Burt Committee in September 1943, seven featured 
techniques involving the substantial use of steel products. 
[9] In the Committee's` final listing of approved schemes no 
less than 29 of the 78 post war proposals involved steel 
frames. E 10 3 
One group' of manufacturers who made 'a successful 
diversification into housing was the Arcon group which 
consisted of an amalgamation of engineering firms and 
materials producers serviced= with designs by a firm of 
architects. The group's first project was a two storey house 
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using the products of Stewart and Lloyds, a steelwork firm 
based in Corby. This system was one of the first to be 
produced in preparation for postwar housing policy. The most 
remarkable feature of its construction was the use of a 
welded tubular steel frame - tubular steel was the main 
product of the firm and one for which they wished to find a 
post war market. With the M. O. W. 's decision broadening the 
number of designs to be used in its Temporary Housing 
Programme the Arcon Group eventually became producers of 
419000-., steel frame bungalows. =. E 1-i ] 'The . production . -of , the 
Arcon , house was a collaborative effort involving a whole 
group of industries, each individually assigned a portion of 
the manufacture according to their industrial antecedance. 
The roof trusses were manufactured by Stewart and Lloyds at 
Corby where 'the complete cycle, from digging the ore to 
mating the tube, is carried out practically under one roof". 
[12] The significance of this- diversification was 
considerable for the steel industry as it was the first 
substantial application of steel tubes in building 
structures - their use previously being confined to service 
piping and scaffolding. EFig. 43 Another steel firm, Williams 
& Williams, manufactured the framework for the walls, and 
the production of the asbestos cement roof covering was 
secured by Turners Asbestos Cement Ltd. Joinery was 
distributed between 60 Joinery firms under the aegis of 
Taylor Woodrow who Joined the group as production agents for 
the bungalow in 1945. By 1946 the Arcon group consisted of 
the following producers: Imperial Chemical Industries 
(industrially manufactured boards and plastics), Stewart & 
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Lloyds (steel), Taylor Woodrow Construction (erection 
agents), Turners Asbestos Cement (asbestos), The United 
Steel Co (steel) and Williams & Williams (steel). 1133 
In terms of permanent steel framed house construction 
the P. I. S. F. was the most successful producer. By 1945 it 
had established a Housing Committee 114] and was promoting 
three systems of steel house construction each of which 
involved substantial quantities of steel. The variant 
finally chosen had a steel frame, steel floor beams and roof 
trusses, sheet -steel. cladding to the roof-and upper floor, 
and a sheet steel backing for the sprayed render to the 
ground floor walls. 115&Fig. 7] By 1950 over 38,000 local 
authority dwellings had been built in steel systems of 
construction, comprising 297. of non-traditional completions. 
Of these 31,320 were accounted for by the B. I. S. F. which, by 
1950, was the largest single producer. CTab. IV] 
The late 1940s brought a hasty end to the engineering 
industry's extensive diversification into housing. -In 1947, 
the government withdrew subsidies to non traditional housing 
systems in general, thereby disadvantaging the more 
expensive steel systems. In 1948 this was followed by 
restrictions on the use of steel in housing construction in 
order to conserve supplies for manufacturing industry. 
Between 1951 and 1955-completions by steel systems fell to 
3,736.1 16&Tab. IV] 
The curtailment of steel systems prompted an export 
drive by a number of prefabricated housing sponsors which 
was also joined by firms promoting timber based systems (the 
use of timber in housing was also strictly limited during 
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the immediate- - postwar period). This drive was also 
encouraged by state building policies at home which 
restricted private building through the licensing system. 
[17] Py November 1950 prefabricators had supplied exhibition 
houses to 34 nations, in an attempt to promote overseas 
sales. [18] In 1949 exports in prefabricated buildings stood 
at 80,000 pounds and by 1952 this had risen to 7 million, 
with 4.6 million of this being sold to the Australian 
Continent. E-193 
Arcon was, a-maJar. -contributor to-this export--drive. The 
group's movement overseas followed two unsuccessful attempts 
to exploit the state building market at home. The first of 
these consisted of a steel frame and copper clad system for 
highrise construction developed for the L. C. C. However, the 
system eventually proved too expensive to enter production. 
[20] The group then turned its attention to school design 
and in January 1949, published a system in the press which 
was based on the products used in the temporary bungalow. 
The structural frame consisted of cold rolled rectangular 
stanchions and tubular welded steel trusses and the external 
wall units -were steel spandrel panels and windows within 
steel frames. Asbestos cement sheeting was used for the roof 
and fascias with timber framed internal partitions. [21] 
Again the groupwere unsuccessful, for the design, based on 
the outmoded* 'finger plan' principle, did not conform'to 
current 'educational design practice. A prototype was built 
in Hertfordshire, and later purchased by the county. [22&23] 
The technical direction. which Arcon's overseas 
development took was based upon an analysis of the 
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difficulties being faced by developing Commonwealth nations 
in the development of indigenous building production: - 
"In almost all countries there are generally available 
satisfactory local materials for walls and partitions, 
but there is often no, means of making a permanent roof 
for anything but the smallest spans"1243 
This difficulty was exploited by the Arcon Tropical Roof, 
designed in 1948. The design used the by now familiar welded 
tubular steel, frame and consisted of -a minimal structure, 
spanning 30 feet, for supporting-. a roof covering =of asbestos 
or aluminium sheet. CFig. 53 The system sold well for five 
years but was restricted by the fixed bay width and span. 
This limitation was remedied by a new design, the Arcon 
Roof, which was offered in three alternative spans and two 
alternative bay widths. These frames were sold until 1958. 
One of the many clients was the Anglo Iranian Oil Company. 
As well as the roofs, Arcon developed 'designs for other 
export markets. An order was signed with the New South Wales 
Government for 5,000 houses, a prototype and the Jigs for 
which were assembled before the cancellation of the order in 
the early 1950s. A circular aluminium roof, to -replace the 
thatch- in native huts, was developed, and an entire 
prefabricated town was designed to accommodate the 
government's ill-fated ground nuts scheme at Noli, 
Tanganika. Although in advanced stages of preparation, both 
these projects failed. 125] Nevertheless, these abortive 
schemes were more than compensated for by the success of the 
roofing systems, which were sold in over 100 different 
countries. In July, 1954 Interbuild reported that Arcon was 
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Britain's major exporter of prefabricated buildings. E26] 
The export of whole buildings was by no means an easy 
undertaking and a whole science of design, packaging and 
marketing was rapidly worked out to enable it. 1273 As well 
as being supported by Prefabrication, a journal dedicated to 
furthering new building methods, exporters were given help 
by the M. O. W. who provided advice and: assistance in 
marketing, E283 and allowed the use of controlled materials 
such as imported timbers-and aluminium. (297 Problems for 
exporter. s.., x included -a the - resistance of 
local.., -:. builders, 
satisfying a variety of national statutory requirements and 
entrusting erection of the often complex designs to non 
specialist indigenous builders. 1303 Nevertheless, 
expectations were high and in 1952 David -Eccles, 
the 
Minister of Works, estimated that by the 1960s 'these 
exports would be running at an annual rate of 50 million 
pounds to 100 million pounds and that they would eventually 
surpass motorcars as a source of- overseas earnings'. E31] 
However, rather than rising, exports began to fall from 1952 
due to the loss of the Australian market which shrunk-from 
4.7 million pounds in 1952 to 1.7 million in 1953. Not only 
had Australia's housing shortage eased, but stringent import 
restrictions were introduced by the government in 1952 in 
response to a balance of payments crisis. 1323 In 1954 
Britain exported only 2.4 million pounds worth of 
prefabricated buildings, and Prefabrication reported that 
firms were attempting to re-enter the British private 
housing -market, although this was not helped by the 
reluctance of building societies to provide mortgages for 
95 
,.. . 
non traditional forms of construction. [33] 
By no means all of the engineering firms that proposed 
systems based on steel frames found a market in social 
housing. Hills Patent Glazing Co., who made an unsuccessful 
attempt to market a steel framed house eventually 
manufactured frames for the prefabricated schools system 
developed by Hertfordshire County Council. C34&Fig. 14] 
Eventually the firm marketed its own system of school 
construction which, -by September-1953, had been used in, 30 
million pounds worth of educational building. (35] The firm 
eventually expanded its manufacturing facilities to include 
the precast concrete slabs with which the frame was clad. 
(36] In 1961 the company became the nominated contractors 
for the Second Consortium of Local Authorities (S. C. O. L. A. ), 
and had completed the design of the frame when, for reasons 
yet to be discovered, the firm was liquidated in the 
following year. 137] Other firms involved in system built 
schools were the Brockhouse Engineering Co., the Bristol 
Aircraft Company - which, by 1954, could boast that it had 
completed over 500 school buildings in Britain alone before 
returning to the more lucrative area of aviation work in 
1956 - and Sanders and Forsters. [381 
By the early 1960s steel was being reconsidered for 
use in housing. Indeed the ailing fortunes of the British 
steel industry prompted the government to once again promote 
its use in building. (39] As with the immediate postwar 
period there was no shortage of firms interested in 
extending their production to include housing. In May 1963 
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the Minister'of-Works reported that he and the Minister of 
Housing and Local Government "were receiving--a flood of 
enquiries about industrialised building, not only from local 
authorities but from building firms, building component 
manufacturers and many other industries which would like to 
diversify". (40] In 1963 the government published a report, 
Production of Building Components in Shipyards which 
considered both the practicalities of the shipbuildng 
industry diversifying into building and the means by which 
it., could. do 'so. 't41. ] The M. O. W. assisted- this' 'by `setting up 
a number of enquiry 'centres to encourage shipbuilding firms 
to enter housing. 142] A number of shipbuilders sponsored 
housing systems such as Blyth Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Ltd. 
and The Duxford & Sunderland Shipbuilding & Engineering 
Group. C Tab. V] 
The early 1960s saw an attempt by"the' Arcon`Group to 
exploit the expanding social housing market. - In''August, 
1962, their architectural consultants 'produced a report, 
'The Housing Programme and the Arcon Group', examining the 
possibilities which it saw as potentially considerable: 
'There seems to be little doubt that the Arcon Group 
should be involved in the Housing Programme as it has 
been in the past. Housing accounts far about one third 
of the total output' of our building... this rate of 
output is likely go on for at least 20 years'C43] 
In order to realise this potential'the group's architectural 
consultants suggested that two-thirds of the research budget 
up to 1964 should be devoted to the development of housing 
systems, even though this would involve dropping work on the 
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current programme. However, the consultants also pointed out 
that the group was not well placed to provide low cost 
housing systems as the basis of system built housing 
technology had shifted in favour of cheaper materials and 
techniques than those which the group were accustomed to 
using in their systems: 
'The 'question of manufacturers and materials is as 
much a question of Group Policy as is marketing. The 
cheapest or local authority kind of `system' house 
usually relies a good deal on timber,. -concrete , and 
brick to keep the cost down. Group members are more 
interested in steel, aluminium, gypsum, plastics, 
asbestos, etc. This needs very careful consideration 
and could affect the selection of the most suitable 
market "C 44 3 
Consideration of this problem indeed affected the selection 
of a market and resulted in the consultants proposing a 
single storey courtyard housing system aimed very much at 
the private market. In contrast to this, the Executive 
Committee of the Group decided that its best interests lay 
in the direction of social housing and instructed the 
consultants to produce a scheme on this basis-in 1963. In 
the meantime, the most significant member, Taylor Woodrow, 
was negotiating the purchase of a licence to use the Larsen 
Nielsen system in Britain, having decided to base its system 
built housing approach on the import of a foreign precast 
concrete system in` line with most of the other large 
building firms. The deliberations of the Executive-Committee 
were clarified- with the membership of Hawthorne Leslie 
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(Buildings), a diversifying shipbuilder who was already 
marketing a two storey -steel frame system for local 
authority housing. It was on the adaption of this, to a 
low-rise flatted system, that the architectural consultants 
were instructed to concentrate their efforts. 1453 No sooner 
had this been achieved than Hawthorne Leslie withdrew from 
the system building market, 146] leaving the Group without 
any means of continuing in the housing field. Following this 
the Arcon group was dissolved in 1967. 
Other engineering. firms- which produced housing=were 
British Ropes Ltd. (manufacturers of steel reinforcement 
rods), which completed 310 houses; Redpath Brown, which 
developed a steel hospital system; 147] and Williams and 
Williams, a member of the British Steel Corporation and 
formerly a member of Arcon, which erected 601 houses in its 
Rof ten . system. t Tab. V] 
The most ambitious project was mounted by two steel 
firms, Richard Thomas & Baldwin and the Pressed Steel 
Company, who, in 1963, unveiled plans to manufacture the 
I. B. I. S. house. 148] This system was intended to be 
manufactured in such quantities that it would justify 
flowline production of the components. Steel sheet was to be 
used for the beams, columns, internal and external wall 
panels, doors, windows, floor and roof decks, staircases, 
and bathroom and kitchen units -- a degree of utilisation of 
one material precedented only by the aluminium bungalow. 
149] By 1967 two prototype houses had been erected and the 
company was confident that I. B. I. S. would be produced in 
such quantities that it would compete easily with 
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traditional construction. 'However, this confidence did not 
endure to the stage of Production and development was 
eventually dropped. [50] 
Although this study has not identified all of the 
engineering firms that diversified into system housing in 
the 1960s, this latter movement does not seem to have been 
as successful as that following the war. The reason for this 
must be that government support, in offsetting the costs of 
using an expensive material in.; bulk forhouse production by 
the provision of financial subsidies, was not forthcoming. 
At the peak of steel framed systems'production during the 
1960s, (1967), only 3,759 dwellings were completed: rather 
less than 1% of all industrialised housing. [Tab. VI] 
II. OVEROPTIMISM AND OVERINVESTMENT 
This section will explore the building industry's adoption 
of system building. It will suggest that in providing large 
housing programmes tailored to new technology, welfare 
policy encouraged an optimistic building industry to invest 
in system building. This optimism led to overinvestment and 
severe financial losses by a number of sponsors hoping to 
monopolise the local authority housing market- with 
technologically sophisticated housing systems. 
The building- of houses during the interwar period was 
dominated by the private developer building for sale. After 
1933 the state relinquished building for general needs, and 
the task of producing housing was left to the speculative 
builder who achieved the unprecedented rate of 341,000 
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completions in 1938. E51] The bulk of this housing output 
was undertaken by small and-medium sized builders producing 
for local markets. However, the period also witnessed. the 
rapid growth of a number of large housing developers, such 
as Laing, Wates and Taylor Woodrow, building in and around 
the larger southern towns and in particular London. [52] 
Despite the outstanding success of these firms the majority 
of -housing 
developers remained of, moderate size. 1533 
According to Richardson and Aldcroft this arose from- the 
fact that, ., --. -in -. --the -absence major technological 
developments , in domestic construction, there, were few 
benefits to be gained from large scale housebuilding. 154] 
Although the interwar period witnessed the adoption by large 
contractors of a range of new, technologies, embracing 
reinforced concrete and steel construction, -(55] their use 
was confined mainly to the construction -of-commercial and 
industrial buildings, offices and some flats, having little 
impact on the-process of house building which remained much 
the same as-it had been in the 19th Century; a craft based 
labour intensive operation. 
By early 1944 the government's, plans for the 
introduction of new technology to housebuilding were well 
known and had prompted responses from the established, and 
apprehensive, organs of the traditional house building 
industry. On the 26th April 1944, the Minister of 
Reconstruction received a memo from the National Federation 
of Registered' House Builders criticising the government's 
plans. As well as pointing -out the advantages of brick for 
dwelling construction it poured scorn on the intention to 
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introduce new industries to house construction. 'E563 The 
argument - presented by the building industry not only 
centered on the" inability of new methods to produce 
constructionally sound dwellings but also that, were the 
building industry decontrolled, it could readily produce 
half a million houses each year. (57] This proposal was 
considered by Sir Hugh Beaver, at the time Controller 
General of the M. O. W., as "unrealistic". (58] Writing in 
1950 in the National Builder, ` Beaver remembered "how few 
were: the-builders'who supported the_intensivetýefforts of-the 
Ministry to develop alternative methods" although adding 
that "those who did support did so with a will" (59] - 
Indeed, although excluded from temporary house 
production (except in the capacity of erection agents as in 
the case of Taylor Woodrow and the Arcon house), a number of 
large building firms made a substantial contribution to the 
provision of permanent non traditional housing despite the 
opposition' of the National Federation of Registered 
Housebuilders. The Second World War had changed both the 
building industry and market, '-giving considerable impetus to 
large-firms and restricting the building of speculative 
housing. The mushrooming of firms such as Laing and- Taylor 
Woodrow are told in their house histories. -160&61] Indeed, 
John Laing, and Frank Taylor, their principals, became 
significant figures in the prosecution of the war-effort 
which `relied heavily on massive -construction programmes 
suited to firms with large organisational capabilities and 
the capital to invest in' the technologies necesary to-carry 
them out. `(62] In the case of Wates, a prewar speculative 
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house builder which also grew to large contractor 
proportions during the war, the Mulberry project - the 
construction of massive precast concrete cassions for use as 
a floating dock in the Normandy landings - furnished it with 
an expertise both in a new technology and large scale 
project organisation which it harnessed directly in the 
development of a housing system. (63] Thus, the Second World 
War saw-, the emergence, largely through their involvement 
with the state war machine, of a new breed of contractor, 
unprecedented: in size and the scale " . of -projects it_ could 
undertake and familiar with and able to invest in the level 
of advanced technology that is the province of large 
commercial organisations. 
On coming into power in 1945 the Labour Government 
continued the restrictions on private house construction of 
the Defence Regulation 56(A) under the Statutory Rule and 
Order of 1945. The effect of this was that throughout the 
period between 1945 to 1950 the construction of private 
dwellings was limited to a quarter of the numbers of local 
authority' housing, although, at one stage in 1947 private 
construction was totally suspended. While the building 
industry- could not complain that there was a shortage of 
work in the immediate postwar years, government policy was 
dramatically affecting the housebuilding industry, making it 
for the first time primarily bespoke builders for government 
departments and local authorities until it was finally 
decontrolled in 1956. (64] Marian Rowley noted that of the 
five most prolific builders of housing systems to the end of 
1950, three - Smiths Building Systems, the Unit Construction 
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Co. and Woolaway - were previously "moderate or small 
builders based on local markets'. t65] The other building 
firms, who produced the largest proportion of non 
traditional housing were, she maintains, large contractors 
previously constructing speculative estates during the 
interwar period. In her opinion they were attracted to 
system building because: 
'At a time when normal building was expected to be 
limited by a lack of traditional resources, it offered 
the--prospect of a market. --It is, - for instance, 
noticeable that all of the really big builders who 
came in, or tried to come in, Costain, Laing, Wimper, 
Wates and Henry Boot had been estate developers and 
house builders on a large scale in the interwar 
period; in particular it is relevant that they had not 
confined themselves to single localities. Such 
operations were impossible in the immediate postwar 
years. Thus non-traditional houses seemed more likely 
to offer a nation-wide market than did traditional 
ones, for local authorities are naturally inclined to 
employ local contractors for straightforward 
traditional housing work'166] 
A firm which proved successful in marketing a building 
system in the immediate postwar period was John Laing & Co. 
Laing's involvement in system building had started soon 
after the First World War when it introduced the Easiform 
method of construction, an insitu system of poured concrete, 
claimed by Coad to be 'one of Britain's first major methods 
of system building". 1673 Towards the end of the Second 
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World War the system was resurrected as one of the few 
prewar -systems to be reused, a feature which conveyed 
considerable benefits. Laing were first into the market with 
a system competitive in cost with traditional construction, 
fully developed and tested, and supported by the plant 
necessary for large scale production: by December 1946, the 
house magazine Team Spirit was able to report that one third 
of the dwellings constructed for housing authorities in 
England and Wales were Easiform. E683 Such was demand that 
the company- -- licensed ; the . -system -to , N-eight :; other, large 
contractors, including John Mowlems & Co. and Gilbert Ash. 
E693 The role of the government was crucial in this 
success, as the house magazine makes clear: - 
'When our present programme of Easiform houses was 
started... the business-of getting people interested 
was comparatively uphill"C70] 
Vigorous= promotion of- the system and the erection of 
demonstration houses helped, but: 
'the trickle turned into a flood when the Ministry of 
Health "blessed" Easiform in a circular to local 
authorities... ECircular 56/463... Then came the 
'National price" and the Government Subsidy, just at a 
time, when we could be proud of our progress, and the 
river became a flood'E71 ] 
Between 1948 and 1951 the system accounted for well over 
4,000 completions each year, more than any other system, a 
lead it held until 1953 when--it was overtaken by Wimpey's 
No-Fines. ETab. IV] Although losing its lead to No-Fines, 
Easiform provided Laing, reputed to have built 1/20 of 
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private dwellings in London'during the 1930s, with the 
market in housing that the curtailment of speculative house 
construction denied it. [72) In 1947 half the company's 
labour force of 7,000 were engaged in Easiform construction 
173] and by December 1950, this figure had risen to 5,267. 
(74) In 1950 the company erected 4,394 Easiform houses, 
rising in 1954 at the peak of MacMillan's housing drive, to 
8,300, CTab. IV] and although figures for the proportion of 
the company's labour force that this number represented are 
not available, they suggest an increasing commitment pof 
resources to Easiform construction throughout the housing 
drives of, the late 1940's and early 1950's. This degree of 
commitment to Easiform together with the company's 
involvement in the erection and production of the B. I. S. F. 
house illustrates the centrality of system building to the 
immediate postwar fortunes of a "company whose pre-war 
development had been mainly concerned with traditionally 
constructed speculative housing. Even though the mid 1950s 
saw a change of direction in Laing's application of 
technology to social housing, Easiform production continued 
until 1971, and although it never rose to the levels of 1956 
the system did better than many. Therefore, the proud boast 
of 100,000 Easiform houses completed between its 
reintroduction in 1945 and 1968 (75) should be borne in mind 
when considering the commercial failure of, the company's 
later initiatives in system housing. - 
The commitment to system building technology of large 
contractors as a means of constructing 'social housing 
continued throughout the -1950s. Although social housing 
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output fell, a consistent proportion of between 20 and 14.2% 
of local authority dwellings were completed by housing 
systems between 1955 and 1960 CTabs. I&II]. The 1950s also 
saw building firms adopting foreign systems for the newly 
expanding high-rise housing market. Compared to the level of 
commitment to be seen in the mid 1960s the industry's 
involvement was still tentative and concentrated on methods 
which involved moderate investment. One building firm, 
Robert M. Douglas, bought a licence to use the American Lift 
Slab system, which it-marketed through -. 3a-specially -formed 
subsidiary, British Lift Slab Ltd. By 1960 this company was 
working on a nine storey block of flats for the Birmingham 
Corporation. (76] At a similar time W. M. Thorntons, a 
Liverpool building firm was using the Swedish Prometo 
sliding shutter system for high-rise blocks at the 
Birkenhead docks. (77] In addition to these low investment 
insitu systems two other large contractors, Wates and Laing, 
were marketing systems developed by themselves for high-rise 
construction, both of which embodied a large degree of 
concrete precasting. (78] In---addition to these initiatives 
Wimpey was also adapting its No-Fines system to flatted 
construction at the Tile Hill estate for Coventry City 
Council. [793 
In common with other firms, Laing continued to apply 
new techniques to housing construction during the 1950s. In 
1951 J. M. Laing reported that 'Work was going ahead on other 
forms of construction in addition to Easiform... (and]... 
Prophesied interesting developments in the next few months". 
[80] In the same year - Team Spirit reported that-extensive 
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development was being carried out on precast concrete units 
for housing. E81] However, neither of these initiatives 
produced an alternative system to Easiform for several 
years. In 1956 Laing experimented with the applicaton of 
Easiform shuttering to the crosswalls of an estate of 6 
storey flats at Duddleston for the Birmingham Corporation, 
E82] and in 1957 introduced the Storiform system for 
multi-storey flat construction. (83] Current with 
developments in high-rise construction, such as 
W. M. Thornton's use- of the Prometo system of sliding 
shutters, Storiform utilised -insitu shuttering techniques, 
and could be considered as the application of Easiform to 
flatted housing. 
Laing's departure from insitu construction to precast 
concrete was made in the Picton Street scheme for the L. C. C. 
[Fig. 21] The initiative behind this experiment in new 
building technology-for multi-storey housing- came from the 
L. C. C. Architects' Department. However, Laings took a 
financial risk in entering into an agreement which included 
in its terms that any financial gains or losses (by 
comparison with traditional construction) would be shared 
equally between the council and the company. Picton Street 
was an experiment in the application of precast concrete and 
the tower crane to high-rise housing, and involved the 
collaboration of the producer and the architect within a 
novel form of contract, in order that the-most suitable 
building form was generated. The experiment was considered 
successful by both the council and Laing who entered into 
continuation contracts for further identical buildings. E84] 
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In 1957 the company was marketing the design as the system 
High Structure. However, the degree of precasting in High 
Structure was partial and confined to the cladding panels, 
balconies, party floor planks and horizontal beams. The main 
structural element of the design, the cross walls, were of 
insitu construction, and in this sense the design lagged 
behind precasting developments on the continent. 
The early 1960s- saw aa major -drive by the building 
industry to adopt technologically sophisticated - overseas 
housing.. systems. There can be. ., little , 
doubt that, this was 
linked to the government's expressed intention of securing a 
planned and ambitious increase in social housing- supply. 
Government policy was warmly welcomed by the N. F. B. T. E. in 
its annual report of 1962 t823 and again in 1963 when the 
Federation's President referred to his understanding of 
government policies in relation to the building industry: 
'They cannot fail to have important repercussions on - 
the contracting side of the industry... let me say 
here that this new-found government participation in 
the affairs of industry generally and of the building 
industry in particular is not resented"186] 
Following the Cement and Concrete Association's 1962 
conference, 'Housing From the Factory', during which a 
multitude of central and local government politicians, 
architects and building scientists spoke favourably on 
system -building, 187] Interbuild noted that a frenzy of 
activity was taking place in which contractors were rushing 
to license foreign systems, or bringing their older ones up 
to date. [883 
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By the latter part of 1963 system builders were 
beginning to distinguish themselves, from the mainstream of 
the British building industry. In September the General 
Council of the N. F. R. T. E. approved a proposal for the 
formation of a System Builders' Section of the Federation. 
(89] This was organised into two classes of membership; the 
first for members of the Federation who produced their own 
or marketed a foreign system, and a second for non 
Federation members who were also involved in system 
building. One of -the firsttasks-to which the new system 
building industry addressed itself was the promotion of 
industrialised building. The theme of the 1963 International 
Building Exhibition was `Industrialised Building' (90] and 
this was followed a year later by the staging of' a one 
million square- feet exhibition devoted entirely to the 
subject by I . 'E. S. A. C. Ltd, a firm formed by thq N. F. B. T. E. 
in association with Industrial and Trade Fairs Ltd 
specifically for the event. (91] As well as producing 
exhibitions, 1964 saw the industry launch a vigorous 
advertising campaign, discussed in some detail by 
P. Dunleavy, aimed- at persuading "local authorities that 
system building was the apposite solution to modern day 
building. E923 
Laing were one of the many firms to embark on an 
ambitious programme of acquiring new technology. In January 
1960 the Team' Spirit review of '1959 announced that the 
economic gloom of the past` few years had lifted, and that 
the company stood at the edge of an unprecedented period of 
building activity. (93] In September 1962 the magazine 
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announced, as the outcome of extensive studies, the 
acquisition by Laing of the sole rights to M. Lucien 
Quentin's Sectra system, designed for up to 25 storeys of 
construction. [94] Sectra, a more sophisticated version of 
Storiform, was the first and lesser of Laing's investments 
in foreign systems, and represented the first prong of a 
strategy for making an early and successful entry into the 
systems housing market, as they had done with Easiform 17 
years before. The system was insitu and therefore did not 
depend on the proximity of precasting, factories to the 
construction site, making it suitable for widely dispersed 
smaller contracts. According to Team Spirit, the largest 
contract for which it was used was 188 flats. [95] 
The second prong of Laing's strategy, the purchase from 
A. Jesperson & Sons of Copenhagen of the sole United Kingdom 
rights for the Jespersen system, was announced in April 
1963., E963 The subsequent development of this system for use 
in Britain was carried out in collaboration with the 
government who, together with Laing and Ove Arups, intended 
that the system should represent the ultimate in the state 
of-the-art of system building: it is a highly mechanised 
process in which a variety of precast concrete components 
are produced under highly controlled conditions in a 
semi-automated factory'. [97] The production characteristics 
of the Jespersen system represented the other extreme to 
Sectra in that it was a high volume, completely precast 
system suited to large contracts situated close to the 
casting factories: We have come to the conclusion that, 
where large numbers of dwellings need to be built in a 
ill 
limited area... our company is prepared to erect factories 
in those areas to produce component parts under- this 
system'. [9B3 
In the first few years of production Jespersen was used 
on a number of prestigious contracts. However, on closer 
examination it is evident that considerable support was 
being provided by government departments. The first major 
contract was for 977 dwellings for Livingstone New Town, in 
which the Scottish Development Department played a major 
role in -the choice of the-system. E993 The-second-contract 
was for a development project in Oldham designed by the 
M. H. L. G. Development Group, the organisation with which 
Laings were co-operating in the development of the system. 
1100] However, the third and largest contract was that 
awarded by the M. P. B. W. for a large slice of its barrack 
rebuilding programme. In fact, out of a total of 8,643 
dwellings which Jesperson eventually built in England and 
Wales, over 39000 were for contracts in which central 
government agencies were directly involved in the choice of 
contractor. By January 1966, Laing had won 15 million pounds 
worth of contracts for Jespersen E1013 and in 1967 this was 
followed by a 1,957 dwelling contract for the London Borough 
of Southwark. C1023 
The size of some of these contracts was matched by the 
scale of investment which Laing made into their newest and 
most sophisticated housing system. According to the National 
u er the first plant at Livingstone, near Edinburgh, cost 
the company half a million pounds, E1033 although I. E. S. A. C. 
estimated the cost of this and the two subsequent factories 
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at Andover and Heywood, near Manchester, at between 600,000 
and 750000 pounds each. [1043 In January 1967, I. R. S. A. C. 
estimated Laing's investment in Jespersen to be two million 
pounds in permanent casting factories, a further one million 
in research and development and they back this up with a 
continuing investment of a quarter of a million pounds each 
Wear'. E1053 
Laing were only one of many firms to make a substantial 
investment in high capacity production technologies. In a 
leader titled 'Slightly Ridiculous the January 1965 edition 
of I. B. S. A. C., commented that: 
'No other country in the world possessed such a 
variety of systems from so many building firms... with 
so few dwellings in production... A superabundance of 
systems, too many of which are inefficient and hastily 
designed, all confusedly jostling and crowding each 
other in the market, could well hoist industrialised 
building on the petard of its own success"t106] 
An indication of the motivation behind the willingness of 
firms to enter this overcrowded market is provided in a 
later issue of I. R. S. A. C. which commented , on the 
concentration of systems in the public housing market even 
though this sector could accommodate no more than a fraction 
of those available. The journal went on to speculate that 
the building industry was playing a waiting game: 
'This does not imply that those techniques due to go 
to the wall will be technically, qualitatively or 
aesthetically inferior to those which survive, indeed 
endurance and stamina in the form of capital and the 
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capacity to operate initially at a loss may well be 
the deciding factors in this building Armageddon, for 
the harvest to be reaped in the field of local 
authority housing is worth a long-term policy of 
financial outlay't107] 
It would appear that a policy of accepting initial losses to 
achieve an eventual monopoly of social housing was being 
pursued by Laing in their adoption of a system capable of 
Producing 12,000 dwellings per annum (nearly 107. of the 
-state housing market in any one year of the 1960s). Such a 
Policy was certainly suggested by a comment of Maurice 
Laing's in 1972, on the British Building industry: 
'The top ten contractors carry out less than 207. of 
new work, and not one contractor carries out as much 
as 4%. By comparison it is quite normal in other major 
industries for one firm to have over 407. of the 
market !"C 108 ] 
Indeed, two firms were already reaping the harvest that 
could be gained with a successful high capacity housing 
system; Nimpey with No-Fines and, less dramatically, Kirby 
Laing's own firm with Easiform. It may well have been the 
success of these systems that inspired other firms chasing 
too few contracts with too many systems to persevere. 
[Tab. V] 
In an analysis of trends in industrialised building, in 
1967, L. M. Madden noted that the proportion of system built 
state housing was increasing and that, within this, two 
storey housing was eclipsing high-rise as the major market 
for systems. However, looking in more detail at the figures 
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for contracts gained by low-rise systems in the first 
quarter of the year he pointed out that more than one third 
of the orders were accounted for by Easiform and No-Fines. 
Leaving these aside he found that the 33 remaining listed 
firms were sharing orders for 10,145 dwellings with six 
having orders for less than 40 houses and three for less 
than 20. [109] In a similar exercise carried out later in 
the year he found that the situation had changed little and 
that much the same was true of the high-rise systems (110) 
with two firms, Wates and Concrete Ltd., capturing the bulk 
of the market. C Tab. V] 
Py 1966 changes in government policy were also damaging 
the prospects of the system building industry: 
By 1965, the first results were beginning to appear 
from the considerable capital sums invested by these 
building firms... No sooner had the programme got into 
its stride than the cancellation of the first national 
plan, followed by the economic squeeze in 1966, 
induced major doubts about the government's intention 
to persist with the programme't1113 
With reduced building programmes a major factor in system 
building's favour, the shortage of construction labour began 
to subside. This was noted by the 1965 Annual Report of the 
N. F. E. T. E. which reported growing uncertainty within the 
industry and a steady improvement in the availability of 
bricklayers, although shortages of plumbers and carpenters 
remained. [112] The Annual Report for the following year 
stated that in some parts of the country 'a reasonable 
balance between supply and demand' had developed in the 
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availability of skilled labour. [113] 1968 saw this 
situation develop to one where "the availability of labour 
has generally been adequate' [114] and in 1970: 
'Architects' new commissions, contractors' new orders, 
housing starts, brick production, and the results of 
enquiries conducted by the industry itself have all 
suggested an appreciable decline in activity, with 
housing, which has in the past accounted for abut 40% 
of the total construction programme, the worst hit... 
the first drop in output for over 10 years'[ 115 ] 
In 1967 a spate of reports appeared in The Builder 
illustrating the difficulties being experienced by system 
building firms. Larger building firms with system building 
subsidiaries, such as Bryants, The Fram Group and Trollop & 
Coils, announced losses in profits directly attributable to 
system building and a number of smaller specialists, Dorrans 
and Hawthorne Leslie (Buildings) Ltd., were closing 
down. [ 116 ] 
The combination of too many systems and cutbacks in 
social housing programmes caused Jespersen to become an 
expensive liability to Laing. In January 1967 Jespersen 
contracts stood at 30 million pounds. Large though this sum 
might have been it only involved Laing's Jespersen plants 
working at less than half capacity. [117] In March 1967, 
Building reported that Laing were in severe difficulties "in 
the industrialised building field' [118] and indeed the 
completions of Jespersen dwellings for that year - four 
years after the introduction of the system - were only 765. 
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This figure rose to 1,588 in the next year but fell again to 
702 in 1969. In 1970 Jespersen reached its peak of 1,893 
completions therafter dwindling to zero in 1975 (these 
figures for completions do not include Scotland where 
Jespersen had one of its four plants). The company was 
having even less success with Sectra, which in the nine 
years of its production completed little more than 2,500 
dwellings, representing an average of 281 completions per 
year. [Tab. V] In 1963 company profits stood at 1.1 million 
Pounds, [119] and this rose to two and a half million in 
1965. However, by 1966 profits had fallen to 64,000 pounds 
and the relative loss which these figures represented was 
attributed by the company to its problems in the 
industrialised building. By 1969 the Scottish factory had 
been turned over to the production of various non-system 
precast concrete units. [120] In 1975 the Heywood factory 
closed, followed a year later by the Andover plant which was 
being turned into an industrial estate. The same year found 
the Princess Risborough factory producing the last few 
panels for the final stages of the huge Aylesbury estate in 
Southwark. [ 1213 
III. 
It would be untrue to say that all builders who adopted 
systems found their expectations unfulfilled. Considerable 
success was enjoyed by a number of sponsors, particularly 
Wimpey with No-Fines and Laing with their Easiform system. 
[Tabs. IV&V] In addition, Concrete Ltd and Wates with their 
Precast concrete systems also enjoyed commercial success 
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over an extended period. Furthermore, prefabrication offered 
opportunities for diversification to a number of firms in 
the immediate postwar years - in particular the B. I. S. F. and 
Arcon. 
Nevertheless, during the 1960s completions by the 
majority of sponsors were considerably less than 
anticipated. If the case of Laing is taken as an example it 
could be suggested that overinvestment in system building 
arose from a belief that it was the best way to win a large 
portion of the social housing market. The firm-certainly 
made its substantial investment with the expectation of a 
profit, as Maurice Laing pointed out a few months after the 
introduction of Jespersen: 
'Capital expenditure in the factory, in transport, and 
on site, as well as on stocks, on starting an 
'industrialised' system of building was generally 
extremely heavy, and the speed of turning over the 
capital very slow... when compared with traditional 
building... No manufacturer would spend the large 
amount of capital involved unless he was reasonably 
certain that his end product was likely to be 
acceptable, competitive in price and that over a 
Period of years he would receive an adequate return on 
the capital employed't122] 
What is significant in this degree of investment is the 
extent to which the building industry was influenced by the 
government's forecasts of steady increases in housing 
Programmes and an optimism that they would be ensured of 
markets. According to Peter Trench, ex Director of the 
its 
N. F. E. T. E., member of the Board of Directors of the N. B. A. 
and a 'director of a system building firm himself, it is 
unlikely that such a scale of investment in system building 
would have taken place without confidence in government 
policy: 
'It, could be said that anyone who puts hundreds of 
thousands into a system without some guarantee of 
continuity of orders or the ability to write off the 
cost on a guaranteed first contract needs his head 
examined. It could equally be said that there was 
. indeed a promise of a market 
implied by those in high 
places' [1233 
119 
__ ý , 
i: CHAPTER THREE. LOCAL AUTHORITIES: A BRAKE ON PROGRESS? 
In all cases but a few, local authorities were the agencies 
which built the housing funded by the Welfare State: they 
employed and controlled the professional services that 
bought the land, implemented design policies and chose the 
methods of construction. This chapter will demonstrate that 
the attitudes of local authorities were crucial to the use 
of system building -in: social housing. The chapter -will -argue 
that the response of local government to new building 
technology was varied. On the one hand a number of large 
housing authorities adopted system building wholeheartedly 
for their extensive. housing programmes. However, many 
authorities limited their use of housing systems to the 
minimum and displayed a marked resistance to the 
government's intention of effecting a radical change in 
building methods. 
I. ADOPTION. 
This section describes the broad consensus existing within 
the larger authorities that an alliance with national 
building firms, using new methods of construction, was the 
best means by which welfare housing programmes could be 
realised. The section begins with a brief general account of 
the adoption of system building by local authorities 
followed by case studies of two councils who were 
particularly large users, Coventry and the L. C. C. 
The impact of the Second World War on British industry 
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had a major effect on the distribution of non traditional 
housing in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The prewar 
building industry had been distributed in accordance with 
the centres of prewar industry. By the end of the war these 
centres had shifted, in particular to the Southern and 
Midland towns which grew at the centre of the munitions 
industries. Within these areas of rapid growth there were 
few incentives for workers to take Jobs in building in 
preference to other industries. As early as 1946 the M. O. H. 
noted -that- "we -. are losing--labour- which ° is ý badly needed 
because men are being attracted away from the building 
industry to other industries where they can earn more". C1] 
In 1951 the M. H. L. G. Regional Production Officer for the 
Southwest region, C. H. H. Smith, described the benefits that 
he felt non traditional housing offered local authorities in 
the area. The principal of these was their, ability to 
correct recent changes in the distribution of industry: 
'In this region there is a general shortage of 
bricklayers. Moreover in certain areas (of which 
Gloucester and Cheltenham are extreme examples), the 
building labour situation is much less satisfactory 
than before the war. The retention of new factories, 
established for armament production, has not only 
tempted many of the skilled craftsmen to leave the 
building industry for better paid and more 'congenial 
work in modern factories, but factory maintenance and 
extension work have thrown heavy burdens on the 
depleted building industry. At the same time, an 
influx of population has created exceptionally heavy 
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demands for new houses't23 
The concentration of non traditional housing from the end of 
the war to December 1955 in the Midlands and the South, 
areas of most rapid. industrial growth, supports Smith's 
view. -The highest was in the Southwest Region, which 
completed 46.7% of its housing programmes in non traditional 
systems; the Southwest Region was followed by Wales with 
32.2%-with the North Midlands and the Midlands coming third 
and fourth with 24.8% and `23.5% respectivley. The four 
lowest users, each -using non-traditional-methods for-less 
than 15% of their output, were Eastern, Northern, the South 
East and London. ETab. III] In addition to the redistribution 
ofýindustry Bowleg cites the availability of brickworks as a 
significant factor accounting for the low usage in London, 
the South East, and Eastern regions. Furthermore, the lack 
of a developed building industry in-rural areas influenced 
the exceptionally high usage in the South West, Scotland and 
Wales. [3] 
From the mid 1950s" onwards Britain's social housing 
output' was increasingly focussed on slum clearance 
programmes in the larger urban areas. By 1954 Birmingham was 
building on its Duddleston, Netchells, Ladywood and Bath Row 
redevelopment sites, [4] and in March 1957 Glasgow gained 
Ministerial approval for its 16,000 dwelling clearance plan, 
the largest yet, for the Hutchesontown and Gorbals 
redevelopment area. 15] The use of industrialised systems by 
urban authorities with large clearance programmes began 
early in the 1960s well before system-building became an 
important feature of government economic policy. By the time 
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of.. the "Housing From the Factory" conference in 1962, at 
which Keith Joseph announced his Ministry's wholehearted 
support for system building, Glasgow Corporation had already 
decided to use prefabricated components in place of 
brickwork for the Pollokshaws redevelopment area. E63 In 
June 1962 Liverpool adopted a similar course and sent a 
delegation to Paris to inspect the factories of three rival 
systems before placing a contract with the Unit Construction 
Co. for 2,500 dwellings in the Camus system. (7]'A trend was 
being set in -which large urban-authorities-were lookingýto 
new building methods for the execution of their 
redevelopment programmes. In March 1963 the Civic Trust 
Industrialised Building conference paper noted that: 
'It is only towns of 50,000 or more which have housing 
programmes of sufficient size for industrialised 
building, and have sufficient technical staff to 
handle necessary design, negotiation and research. The 
first 12 system constructed schemes -iný. Great Britain 
are all in cities of more-than 300,000'[8] 
The geographical distribution of system built housing 
between 1965 and 1972 displays a more even regional pattern 
than between 1945 and; 1955. With the exception of East 
Anglia and the North .- predominantly rural areas with few 
urban concentrations- - the starts in 'systems by local 
authorities-in England and Wales varied between 27% and 44% 
of total housing. Again, two of the three largest users were 
the East and -West Midlands, with the North West industrial 
region the second largest. CTab. III] However, 'an analysis of 
the housing starts in industrialised systems between, 1966 
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and 1971 by the different types of local government 
administrative unit reveals considerable variations. By far 
the largest users were the County Boroughs and the New Towns 
(with averages of 44% and 43% of completions); Greater 
London proved to be the third largest user (347. ) with Urban 
Districts coming third (28.77. ) and the Rural Districts the 
smallest users at 157.. Whereas between 1945 and 1955 the use 
of housing systems was focussed on specific regional areas - 
primarily the Midlands and Southwest - during the 1960s the 
-. focus was on the -larger -. administrative, units and new towns 
and bore less relation to their geographical location. C9] 
By 1967 Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds and Swansea were all 
using systems for over 607. of their municipal housing. (10] 
The larger local authorities were motivated to use 
system building for a range of reasons each connected with 
the practical problems of implementing housebuilding 
programmes of an unprecedented scale. In 1968 the 
Association of Metropolitan Authorities claimed only one 
advantage for system building: the benefits are in terms of 
improved and increased production'. 111] In signing a 
contract for 2,500 flats in the Camus system Liverpool felt 
that it had assured itself of the steady supply of ten flats 
a week for five years over and above that which it felt 
could be provided by traditional methods of. construction. 
According to the Director of Housing, a study of the 
resources of the local building industry had been carried 
out in which it had been found: 
'reasonable to suppose that a figure of 3,200 
dwellings is the maximum which can be achieved by the 
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Corporation by traditional methods and it follows 
that, if the City is to achieve its target of 59000 
dwellings per year, it must bring in some other 
methods of construction. The City Council, therefore, 
decided that a bold step in the introduction of an 
industrialised housing system was the only course to 
take' (1964) t 123 
Liverpool was but one city to turn a large portion of its 
housing programme over to system building. In 1964 
, -'-Birmingham completed 
2,506 , dwellings. By 1967 this had risen 
to 9,034,83% of which were built in industrialised systems. 
According to the City Architect in 1968: "There is no doubt 
that without it... CI. B. ]... last year's figures would have 
been impossible". 113] By 1967 the city was concentrating on 
three systems: No-Fines (1,660 completions in 1967) and 
Bryant (1,044 completions in 1966) for its low-rise housing 
and Bison for its highrise flats (1,530 completions in 
1967). In addition to these 1,030 houses had been completed 
in 1967 by four rationalised traditional systems. The reason 
for awarding large numbers of contracts to such a small 
number of selected firms using system building was provided 
by the Chief. Quantity Surveyor for the City: 
they should all have efficiency as the common 
denominator of their organisations and they should be 
rewarded with continuity of production by one of the 
many methods of negotiation now open to us... So the 
pattern emerges: a section of the programme set aside 
for competitive tenders invited from firms selected 
from the authority's lists and thus providing a means 
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of testing the market and giving an opportunity for 
firms to show their worth; and at the same time a 
trickle of schemes running through the programme set 
-aside for negotiated continuity for the efficient: a 
trickle that could become a steady river of 
productivity for the authority"(1968)[14] 
By the mid 1960s it had become easier for the smaller 
urban authorities to use industrialised systems. The N. B. A. 
offered a wide range of advice and assistance to facilitate 
the use of'systems, including a full architectural, -service 
in the case of authorities lacking the necessary expertise 
and staff to implement system building programmes. 115] This 
ease was increased by the tendency for firms to offer a 
'package deal', whereby the sponsors of the system, many of 
whom employed their own architectural staff or used 
consultants, would design the building and undertake all the 
professional duties in addition to construction for a fixed 
price. The approvals of "package deals' increased to 397. of 
industrialised building contracts by 1970.116] Building 
systems promised a solution to the problems facing local 
authorities during the redevelopment boom of the mid 1960s; 
shortages of building labour, shortages of professional 
staff - compounded by the additional technical complexity of 
dealing with high rise construction - and large housing 
programmes. Furthermore, in the light of'Ministerial policy, 
dealings with central government were eased in the case of 
authorities prepared to tackle their programmes through the 
use of'large contractors exploiting new'building-techniques. 
A Pleased Town Clerk of a modestly sized Midland town found 
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these advantages in the Bison blocks that it had bought "the 
tender for the three blocks at Kidderminster by Concrete 
Ltd., and- Bryant & Co. was the lowest, completion date 
offered was the earliest, approval by the Ministry was 
automatic". ' (1964) 1173 
CASE STUDY: COVENTRY. 
A visit to Coventry's municipal estates reveals a monotonous 
prospect: wide vistas of housing dominated by the grey 
concrete finish to -No-Fines construction. -This-case , study 
will examine the social housing production policy of this 
large Midland city and describe the factors leading it"to 
devote a major part of its general needs housing programme 
to one large national contractor, Geo. Wimpey and Co. and 
their No-Fines system of construction. By 1958 this-system 
had accounted for the construction of 6,000 municipal 
dwellings. 1183 
Coventry emerged from the Second World War with two 
claims to fame, an intensively bombed city core and a 
burgeoning engineering industry which established the city 
at the centre of British automobile manufacture. -The first 
of these did not contribute greatly to the city's housing 
problem as the damage was mainly confined to the commercial 
centre; furthermore, the city was relatively free of slum 
and blighted property. (19] It was the second of these 
claims that placed a massive strain on the city's ability to 
keep pace with housing demands. The type of growth that had 
typified the older industrial areas of Britain in the 19th 
Century occurredtin Coventry in the latter half of the 20th. 
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In 1951 Councillor W. Callow stated that'the population of a 
city the size of Canterbury had been added to Coventry in 
the past six years and had generated a 14,000 long housing- 
list. 120] The success of Coventry's engineering industry 
placed a double burden on housing supply. Not only did it 
increase the numbers to be housed but also the high wages to 
be earned in the factories inhibited the growth of the local 
building industry. In 1959 a breakdown- of the city's 
employment showed 66.1% in engineering and vehicle 
manufacture, with'6.2% in building, compared to -national 
averages of 16.8% and 8.9% respectively. 121] 
Coventry Council turned its attention to non 
traditional building methods during the early years of the 
war when, in September 1941, the Housing Committee approved 
in principle the construction of experimental houses. (223 
As a result, three years later, the City. Architect 
constructed an experimental house, of tubular steel and 
precast concrete in association with Messrs Gyproc. (23] As 
well as pursuing its own non traditional system, the 
Committee discussed a number of others, none of which were 
found to be satisfactory. In 1946, with the failure of the 
City Architect's own system, the Housing Committee directed 
its attention to the B. I. S. F. house, 2,000 of which it 
ordered in March. (24] Despite the government's subsidy, the 
S. I. S. F. 'house proved more expensive than traditional 
construction due to the cost of providing travelling 
expenses and subsistance allowances to the labour imported 
by the erection contractors. In the face of government 
refusal to bear these extra costs the Council reduced its 
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allocation to the 506 already in contract. E253 By 1948, due 
to the diversion of building labour to the rebuilding of the 
city centre and war damage repairs, the problems encountered 
with the P. I. S. F. house and the Labour Government's 
deflationary measures of the late 1940s, only 380 permanent 
houses had been completed by the Council. C26] I 
In: April 1949, the Housing Committee again considered 
the augmentation of its ailing housing programme through the 
use of new technology. A proposal to order a-further 500 of 
the ill-fated - B. I. S. F. , -, houses -, faltered, w for, with, the 
government subsidy withdrawn, the cost of these was now 
1,548 pounds each. The Committee approved a suggestion to 
enter negotiations with Unity Structures for 100 houses at 
the verbally -agreed price of 1,360 pounds. However, 
realisation of this proposal was dependent on the sponsors 
finding a . contractor willing to erect the houses. The third 
system under consideration was that offered by Wimpey. A 
firm price of 1,310 pounds/house had been agreed with the 
firm who offered to bear the cost of importing the', labour 
necessary to complete the 100 No-Fines houses in- 11 months. 
The offer was accepted. [27] In January 1950, the-Architect 
reported good progress on the No-Fines contract and, the 
Committee approved the negotiation of an additional 252 
flats. [28] Six months later the Architect reported on 
difficulties being experienced with the negotiation of a 
contract for 1,400 dwellings on the Tile. Hill North Estate 
with -traditional contractors busy with other, wort: and 
presented an 'offer made -by -- Wimper. The firm would undertake 
to provide the 1,636 houses in, accordance with the 
129 
Architect's site layout=providing the full range of dwelling 
types envisaged. CFig. 12] In September, with a reassurance 
that Wimpey's price would entail rents below those charged 
to the tenants of equivalent traditional houses recently 
completed, the Committee accepted the price of 1,149,576 
pounds for the development. (29] In. June 1952, at the same 
time that progress on the city's traditionally built estates 
was found to be less than that hoped for, progress on Tile 
Hill North was ahead of the programme. As a result the 
Housing Committee considered the award of further -contracts 
to Wimpey: 
if their labour force is to be retained... it will be 
necessary to allocate to them a further contract on 
another estate, to which their labour force can be 
transferred without interuption in house building 
progress'( 30 ] 
By this time the Council had become aware that its housing 
programme was dependent on the commitment of the resources 
of a major national contractor to the city and that to 
ensure the continuation of this a succession of contracts 
would have to be provided. In September 1952, the Housing 
Committee approved a proposal by the Architect to reserve a 
portion of each of the Willenhall, Tile Hill, Bell Green and 
StoKe. Aldermore Neighbourhood Units for non traditional 
construction in order to maintain the housing programme at a 
satisfactory level. [31] Eventually , the Council agreed a 
five year programme of 5,000 non traditional houses for the 
city, the first installment of which was to be 848 dwellings 
in No-Fines at Tile Hill North and Bell Green. 1323 
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The growing dependence of Coventry on one system of 
building was not occasioned through a neglect to consider 
other systems. In February 1951, the Architect opened 
discussions with Wates on the use of their system 133] and 
three months later the Housing Committee invited Mr Costain, 
of R. Costain Ltd., to its June meeting to discuss a 
programme of housing using the Schindler Goehner system. 
[34] At a similar time the Committee also considered a 
system by Redifice and were pursuing Unity. C35] However, 
with the exception-of Unity, which was used for a contract 
of 126"dwellings at Bell Green, discussions fell through due 
to difficulties in negotiating satisafactory prices and 
specifications. [36] The site set aside for Costain's system 
went to No-Fines, and although the Committee eventually 
built in the Unity system it tool; five years from the 
opening of negotiations in 1949 to the approval of the 
project in 1954.137] In contrast to the other systems, 
No-Fines was tried and tested, competitive in price and 
readily available from a large building firm which already 
had resources committed to the area. 
A further fillip to the use of No-Fines'in Coventry 
came with the delicensing of speculative -'housebuilding in 
1953 which placed a further strain on the city's inadequate 
traditional building industry and prompted a further 
increase in the non traditional programme. C38] In mid 1955, 
by which time private completions had outstripped public 
housing in the city, the Council had 2,791 No-Fines houses 
in contract, with 909 by other contractors using traditional 
methods. Two years later, towards the end of Coventry's 
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general needs programme, these figures were 2,142 and 235 
respectively. C393 
The late 1950s saw a redirection of Coventry's housing 
policy from general needs to redevelopment. This was 
associated both with a change towards high-rise and a sharp 
fall in the output of council housing. 140] This fall in 
public housing was also accompanied by a reduced rate of 
private housebuilding in the city. Between 1961 and 1965 
total housing completions in Coventry remained below 2,000 
per annum in°contrast to over 3,500 in both 1955 and 1956. - 
1413 Nevertheless, although redevelopment began in a context 
of lessened demand on the local building industry, the 
Architect's Department framed its redevelopment programme 
with the intention of continuing the use of large national 
contractors, as these were the most experienced in 
multi-storey construction and promised the speediest 
progress with the programme. As the Architect explained: - 
-sit local firms were to be seriously considered it 
would mean that full tender drawings, together with 
bills of quantities, would have to be prepared in this 
department, which would mean that the start of work on 
the ground would be delayed. On the other hand were 
authority given for the negotiation with a national 
contractor, experienced in this form of development, 
advantage could be taken of his technical design 
services and a start could be made earlier"142] 
By mid 1966, four national contractors were building 717. of 
the Council's 2,368 houses in contract. Three of these were 
system building specialists, Truscon, Vic Hallam and British 
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Lift Slab, and the fourth was Wimper using No-Fines on two 
contracts totalling 560 units. The Direct Works Department 
and the Midland Housing Consortium, of which the city was a 
member, were building 16% leaving only 13% under 
construction by local builders using traditional methods. 
E433 The Council's policy of letting large contracts (the 
877. of contracts to non local firms varied between 100 and 
250 units, while the remainder averaged 39) assisted in the 
exclusion of local builders and prompted the Coventry & 
District Association of Building Trades Employers to form a 
grouping of small contractors hoping to negotiate some large 
housing contracts in order to "heal the rift" that it felt 
had arisen between the itself and the Council. In response 
to this overture the Architect pointed out that future 
years' programmes had been planned on the basis of 
negotiating contracts with a series of national firms using 
proprietary systems. Of the sites unaccounted for in the 
1966/8 programme the majority were earmarked as continuity 
contracts for the system builders already committed to the 
city. In support of their case the local builders also 
suggested that they would be easier to deal with than 
national contractors with remotely situated headquarters. To 
this the Architect responded that "There is no reason to 
believe that out of town firms are difficult to contact or 
negotiate with; it is common practice for any contractor 
dealing with say 400 dwellings... to establish... 
[locally]... an efficient management team". E44] 
Furthermore, the architect considered that communication 
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with a loose association of small builders might prove very, 
difficult, and referred to the last time, shortly after the 
war, when large contracts had been negotiated with a number 
of small builders: "this particular arrangement was not 
found to be particularly efficient and as other building 
work became available the negotiated schemes tended to 
become 'hospital Jobs'". (45] 
In the 25 years of intensive house building following 
the Second World War Coventry Council increasingly 
substituted national contractors able to produce large 
volumes of housing through the use of their own special 
techniques for the local builder relying on traditional 
construction methods. By far the most successful of these 
was Wimpey whose ability to produce housing in volume was 
unrivalled by the other commercial interests available to 
the City. The appreciation of the Council for its favoured 
contractor was indicated by the ceremony held to mark the 
opening of the 61000th No-Fines house in Coventry in 1958. 
At this the Mayoress celebrated the partnership between the 
city and the building firm that had played a crucial role in 
Coventry's housing programme by presenting a bouquet of 
flowers to the management of George Wimpey & Co. 1463 
CASE STUDY: THE LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL 
This case study will concentrate on the 15 years leading up 
to 1965 during which the London County Council (L. C. C. ), in 
partnership with national contracting firms, attempted to 
develop a technology of construction suited to its large 
redevelopment programmes. In 1953 the Municipal Journal 
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estimated the L. C. C. to be the largest producer of housing 
in the world, with an annual output of 10,000 homes. C47] 
The L. C. C. was a pathfinder in the application of 
industrialised building to redevelopment programmes and its 
influence spread far and wide, both through the practical 
example of its building proJects - Coventry Council' visited 
its schemes at Roehampton and Picton Street'. wheny it was 
formulating its policy toward redevelopment C48] - and 
through the web formed by its architects who took senior 
posts elsewhere in the public service. McCutcheon lists 
three L. C. C. architects; J. Foreshaw, H. J. Whitfield Lewis and 
A. W. Cleeve Barr who became Chief Architects of the M. H. L. G. 
and four who became city architects or planners-for other 
large cities; A. Ling (Coventry), D. Jenkins (Hull), 
J. A. Maudsley (Birmingham), W. Bor (Liverpool). C49] Because 
of its influence the experience of this authority in 
industrialised building provides an understanding of the 
developments that took place within local authority building 
in postwar Britain. 
Like many authorities with large-housing programmes the 
L. C. C. 's involvement with new building technology began in 
the closing years of the Second World War with the 
allocation of 3,000 temporary bungalows in November 1944, 
150] and the consideration of reports from the Architect on 
which systems of permanent construction would best suit the 
council's needs. C51] Between 1946 and 1953 the Council 
built 12,000 of' its 54,000 general needs houses in non 
traditional systems. According to the Director of Housing in 
1953, the use of new methods had -allowed the Council to 
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maintain its housing programme through times of shortages in 
materials and labour. (52) 
With the shift in emphasis towards redevelopment during 
the 1950s the L. C. C. turned its attentions increasingly to 
the development of methods of multi-storey construction., A 
feature of this was the formation of close relationships 
with large contractors. This manifested itself as early 
early as 1947 in the Minerva Street scheme which witnessed 
the "close collaboration' between the L. C. C. architects and 
Holland Hannen and Cubitts, through,, the standardisation, of 
detailing to maximise the use of -mechanical aids and 
facilitate the re-use of standardised shuttering. (53] In 
1953 the Architect to the Council, R. H. Mathew, ' prepared a 
report for the Housing Committee proposing an experiment to 
be carried out with a maJor contractor into high-rise 
construction. Bearing in mind the Committee's concern with 
economy Mathew was convinced: 
'that scope exists for savings in cost and, more 
particularly, for more rapid construction of flats at,, 
no extra cost, if the design, erection and engineering 
aspects of a scheme could be, planned together from the 
outset by the architect, structural engineer, quantity 
surveyor and a contractor working together't54] 
In July 1952 the Committee had authorized a structural 
engineer, Ove Arup, ' to carry out an investigation of new 
constructional techniques, but, in order to experiment with 
these on-a practical building protect, Mathew proposed to 
introduce a contractor before the-design had been completed, 
thereby circumventing the normal tendering procedure. The 
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contractor, chosen 14 months before the site start of what 
eventually became known as the Picton Street experiment, was 
Laing. [55] In December 1956, Mathew's successor, H. Bennett, 
reported the findings of the experiment. Although the first 
phase had exceeded both the target costs and the time 
schedule, phase two was expected to reveal considerable 
economies in time while costing no more than traditional 
construction. To follow up what, in his opinion, had been a 
successful experiment, Bennett made two proposals for the 
Housing Committee'sapproval; firstly, a complete -scheme 
would be designed on the Picton Street lines to be let by 
competitive tender to a number of contractors, and secondly, 
another scheme would be prepared exclusively for the Laing 
system developed in the original experiment. (56] 
As well as carrying out this experiment with Laing the 
L. C. C. also built an experimental project in order to adapt 
the Reema system, previously confined to two storey housing, 
to its multi-storey designs. The first block of the -Aegis 
Grove scheme, in Battersea, was completed in 1962, 'and as a 
result Reema also began to market the design to other local 
authorities. 157] As with the Picton Street scheme savings 
in cost were marginal, due, in Bennett's opinion, to the 
fact that only a small part of the building, the basic 
structure, had been prefabricated. (58] 
In the early 1960s the L. C. C. 's use of new technology 
took on a new character. Rather than conducting experiments 
in which the Architect's Department and contractors 
developed and tested new designs and methods of 
construction, increased housing programmes and the 
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overloading'of the-building industry forced the L. C. C. to 
turn to foreign systems operated by national contracting 
firms. In November 1961, Bennett reported to the Housing 
Committee on a recent visit by officers from the Architect's 
Department and the Deputy Director of Housing to view the 
'large scale" prefabrication methods currently in use on the 
continent but little studied in Britain. As a result of the 
group's findings Bennett informed the Committee that: 
'the possibilities in terms of increased housing, 
output appear on'the information, available to be-so 
promising that I propose to make a thorough 
investigation with the object of submitting detailed 
proposals for supplementing the present output by 
large scale industrialised prefabrication"C59] 
In 1962 the increasing workload on the building industry 
added a note of urgency to the Council's consideration of 
foreign systems. Before having a chance to report further on 
the use of continental systems, and in the same month that 
the Council announced its intention to 'clear 10,303 unfit 
houses in the next 'five years, 160] Bennett prepared a 
report for the Council on the serious staff shortage in the 
Architect's Department which was threatening the execution 
of the housing programme. Between 1959 and 1961 the workload 
on the department had grown 11% while the numbers of 
architectural staff had fallen by 13/.. -In the Architect's 
view this was the result of the increased workload of the 
'industry inflating 'the salaries to , be gained in private 
offices above those' offered by the, Council. As well as 
improving recruitment and reducing turnover, in order to 
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keep abreast of the building programmes, the report stated, 
the architectural department would have to "increase 
productivity per man". 161] 
Five days later Bennett unveiled his proposal to 
introduce the Danish Larsen Nielsen system into 'Britain. 
Preliminary discussions with the sponsoring firm had 
revealed that the system could be adapted to a number of the 
Council's approved dwelling plans allowing its speedy 
introduction to London. Furthermore, Larsen & Nielsen were 
prepared to--grant a manufacturing license to Taylor Woodrow 
Anglian, a company established to operate the system by the 
fusion of a subsidiary of Taylor Woodrow, Myton, with the 
precast concrete specialists, Anglian Building Products. 
1623 With these necessary preliminaries under way Bennett 
reported that he was investigating the development of a 
number of sites on the basis of placing a contract for 1,000 
dwellings in the system. (63] In August a delegation from 
the Housing Committee visited the parent Larsen Nielsen 
plant'in Copenhagen and a number of completed projects and: 
"In general... considered that the use of this system 
of industrialised building was capable of being used 
in London to make an effective contribution to the 
Housing effort of the L. C. C. "164 ] 
The Morris Walk development at Greenwich, at which 562 
dwellings were built, was the first scheme chosen for the 
Larsen Nielsen system. In the event of a satisfactory 
performance from Taylor Woodrow Anglian the Council intended 
to enter into continuation contracts for the remainder of 
the 1,000 dwellings, in which case 50% of the cost of the 
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moulds would be discounted by the sponsors. [65] In 
September 1962, Bennett notified the Council that its 
building programme was being held up due to labour 
shortages, particularly in the finishing trades, and that 
that year's programme would be underfulfilled. [66] In April 
1963, the Housing Committee considered, and accepted, an 
offer of 2,179,086 pounds for the Morris Walk scheme [67] 
although the Valuer pointed out that this would exceed 
traditional construction by 3-3.5%. However, as the Valuer 
also pointed out, the great saving would be in time, for 
even with the construction of the precasting factory, in 
Norwich the contract was expected to take only 27 months, 
bringing it to completion nine months faster than 
traditional methods would allow. [68] 
In the event the contract at Morris Walk was completed 
to the Committee's satisfaction and followed not only by the 
continuity contracts envisaged by the contractors and-the 
Architect (eventually built in Brixton, Fulham and Peckham) 
but also a 'futher 850 dwellings by January 1968. [69] In 
all, 182 blocks were built for the Council in the Larsen 
Nielsen system. Although Taylor Woodrow Anglian completed 
many dwellings for the L. C. C. it was not the Council's 
policy to concentrate on one system. By this time the L. C. C. 
was using a number of systems to produce its large housing 
programme for, as Bennett pointed out, "It... would be 
unwise to assign the whole 'programme to a single 
manufacturer; there must be some diversity". [70] Between 
1959 and 1965 the Council had let 15 industrialised housing 
contracts using seven systems (including a low-rise system 
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which it developed in association with Taylor Woodrow 
Anglian to complement the Larsen Nielsen high-rise system) 
171] totalling 3,192 dwellings, 2,050 of which were let in 
1965. (72] Therefore, at the outset of Crossman's housing 
drive, the L. C. C. had already committed a major part of its 
housing programme to system building and, furthermore, could 
boast that it had played a developmental role in the design 
of a number of the systems it was using. 
In the cases of Coventry and the L. C. C., alliances were 
formed with contracting firms capable of bringing 
organisational expertise, large labour forces and new 
technologies to bear on local authority housing programmes. 
System building was adopted for various reasons ranging from 
shortages of building labour, shortages of architectural 
staff, a desire to increase the rate of housebuilding or the 
desire to ensure the continued commitment of the resources 
of 'large contracting firms. In each case system building 
offered a solution to the difficulties of carrying out large 
housing programmes at a time of shortages in traditional 
building resources. However, it could also be suggested that 
system building in the hands of national contractors became 
seen by many local authority clients as the most appropriate 
method of dealing with postwar housing. Coventry, having 
embarked on the course of using a limited number of national 
firms, was reluctant to return to the small builder using 
traditional methods during its redevelopment programmes of 
the 1960s, even though the evidence suggests that the local 
building industry was eager to take the work on. Indeed, and 
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important feature of some of the larger local authorities 
committed to system building was that their interest 
preceded government policy supporting industrialised 
building during the 1960s. Thus, when early in 1966 the 
L. C. C. Housing Committee considered the M. H. L. G. Circular 
76/65 on the government industrialised building drive the 
Committee's response was to note the contents but regard it 
as little more than an affirmation of its present policy. 
'Because of the early start made by the L. C. C. in the 
application of such methods, the G. L. C.... [as it 
became in April 19653... is already well advanced in 
the knowledge and use of the points contained in the 
circular, in some ways indeed, it has progressed 
somewhat further'73] 
II. RESISTANCE 
Although the use of industrialised housing systems by local 
authorities was considerable, it persistantly fell below the 
expectations of government and industry. As well as 
describing why system building was resisted by many local 
authorities this section will describe the state's efforts 
to overcome the refusal of many authorities to make the 
maximum use of new methods. 
An exchange of memorandum between C. H. H. Smith and his 
superiors in London described the difficulties that the 
M. H. L. G. had in encouraging the use of non traditional 
housing systems by local authorities during the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. By 1951 the larger authorities in the South 
142 
West Region for which Smith was responsible, such as 
Bristol, Plymouth, Cheltenham, Gloucester and Swindon, had 
come to the view that system building was essential to the 
implementation of their housing programmes. However, 
according to Smith, impressing this need upon these 
authorities had not been easy: 
"The methods of encouragement have been various, and 
have covered a period of several years. In the early 
post war period, every opportunity was taken of 
inviting local authorities, at individual interviews, 
zonal conferences and group meetings, to examine the 
labour situation and to assess the output potential... 
This process of general education was long and 
difficult: and it was pursued in the face of strong 
opposition and prejudice which, even today, has by no 
means been overcome" (74] 
Although emphasising that local authorities had not been 
forced to use non traditional housing he admitted that we 
may sometimes go rather near the line" by refusing 
applications for loan sanction for traditional methods on 
the grounds that the necessary skilled labour was 
unavailable whereas, he added, care was taken never to 
penalise an authority if it included non traditional houses 
in its programme. 175] Other measures included exploiting 
the desire of many councils to maximise their allocations of 
licences for private housing development in which case the 
Regional Office had "dangled extra licences before their 
eyes, with non traditional allocations attached to the other 
ends of the strings". (76] In conclusion, Smith considered 
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the use of coercion to have been pardonned by circumstance: 
-'This all seems a little underhanded but the 
justification is that local authorities refuse to face 
the facts unless they are led to them, and- that-we 
have maintained a well balanced programme with more or 
less even progress in relation to comparative needs, 
throughout the region" CHLG/793 
Despite his best efforts Smith was- finding It 
increasingly difficult to ensure that non traditional 
systems of construction were exploited as widely--as-he 
thought necessary to maintain the Region's housing 
programme. According to Smith local authority resistance was 
focussed on the expense of building and maintaining non 
traditional houses, their unattractive - and monotonous 
appearance E Ch. VI II], the unsatisfactory performance of some 
contractors and 'constant pressure from interested parties' 
such as councillors with building interests. The job of 
ensuring the use of new methods had been made all the more 
difficult with the abandonment of the government subsidy in 
1947. Summing up, Smith feared 'a severe risk of non 
traditional houses fading from the picture'. (78] If the new 
Conservative administration were to realise the increase in 
non traditional methods that they envisaged, Smith urged 
that "special measures" would' have to be adopted. After 
discussion at the M. O. H. the following course of action was 
agreed in order to influence local authorities in their 
choice of building methods. The Ministry intended to write 
at once to local authorities stating the 'merits' of non 
traditional systems - that they offered a 30-to-50/. saving 
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in labour and allowed much faster construction - and would 
offer authorities a 507. increase in approvals on any part of 
their housing programme which included non traditional 
houses. Councils were to be instructed to encourage private 
building of housing systems through the issue of block 
licences to speculative developers prepared to use such 
methods, and Regional Officers were to be instructed to push 
alternative methods and "increase their popularity and 
remove prejudice". Although the general policy would be to 
achieve willing acceptance, the , -possibility 
"'was not ruled 
out that in areas of acute labour shortage specific quotas 
might have to be allocated. 179] Despite these preparations, 
in February 1952, Smith once again contributed to the 
development of Ministry policy by suggesting that a circular 
should be sent to local authorities emphasising that the 
policy to be pursued had emanated from the Minister. 
Furthermore, he considered, a circular "will recieve 
publicity, and be regarded as an issue of real importance'. 
(80] Such a circular (Circular 28/52) was indeed produced 
which, as well as stressing the advantages to be gained by 
using new methods, stated quite baldly that: 
"the Minister feels quite justified in offering 
increased programme instalments to those authorities 
who employ in their current or future programmes the 
new methods of -building for some or all of the houses 
they had intended to build by traditional methods. 
Authorities will thus be able to get more houses under 
contract" E813 
During the early 1960s the M. H. L. G. relied on two 
145 
measures to increase the use of system building by local 
authorities. The first of these was advice in the form of 
government reports on the benefits of system building and 
the creation of the N. P. A. as an agency to actively assist 
local authorities to overcome any technical : problems 
associated with system building. The second measure was the 
encouragement of the consortia movement. [Chs. I&V] Despite 
the fact that, by 1968,482 authorities combined to form 40 
consortia, this did not have the impact on system building 
completions hoped for . by, = the government. [82] In January 
1969, D. Llewellyn, a Director of the N. P. A., pointed out 
that while authorities producing 70% of housing belonged to 
consortia, only 8% of housing was carried out by such means: 
"In other- words. '.. the authorities which are nominally 
supporting the consortia have, -in total, put less than one 
eighth of their output through Joint machinery for design or 
programme'. (83) Furthermore, half of the 16,334 dwellings 
in contract by consortia in mid-1968 were accounted for by 
two, untypically prolific organisations, the Yorkshire 
Development Group (Y. D. G. ) and the Midland Housing 
Consortium (M. H. C. ) - both using their own systems. CCh. V] 
1968 was the peak year for consortia housing: the number of 
dwellings in consortia contracts fell to 12,274 in the next 
year and 5,441 by 1972. (84] According to Llewellyn, in his 
experience, the poor performance of consortia resulted from 
the inability of authorities to find common agreement on 
building policies: 
'Where consortia programmes were led centrally, there 
was a tendency for authorities either to withdraw from 
146 
the programme if they did not like what they saw as a 
result of the Joint negotiations, or, alternativley, 
they tried to adjust what had been done by the group, 
organisation to their own whims. Thus a firm 
successfully tendering for what it thought was a- 
consortium programme of identical types finds it is 
building specials for individual authorities'1853 
The effect of such disputes was to increase the cost-of 
contracts thereby defeating the intended aim of consortia 
which was to make system building cheaper. -Llewellyn, also 
provided three other reasons for the apparent failure of 
consortia: firstly, the desire of lay committee members to 
make a personal contribution to housing programmes refusing 
to accept centralised solutions; secondly, a concern by 
authorities that they would lose control over their building 
programmes if they placed too large a portion of their 
programmes in the hands of an organisation over which they 
had only joint control; and thirdly, -the fact that, the 
internal administration involved in letting a contract in 
conjunction with the consortia machinery was often greater 
than for one handled entirely within the authority. 
The reluctance of many local authorities to adopt 
system building for a major part of their housing programmes 
prompted frequent rebukes from government ministers and 
eventually the adoption of a more coercive policy by the 
M. H. L. G. In February 1965 Charlie-Pannel, Minister of Public 
Buildings and Works, addressed a Council Meeting of the 
Association of Municipal Corporations (A. M. C. ) on the 
subject of system building, complaining that too many 
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councils "leave their neighbours to make use of 
industrialised systems of building while they proceed with 
traditional methods". (86] By July 1965 the capacity of- the 
industrialised building industry was estimated to be 50,000 
units per year' while the government's forecasts expected 
only two-thirds of this to be used. As Pannel stated in 
Parliament, in response to a demand for the government-to 
set up system building factories of its own, "the principal 
obstacle to greater use of industrialised building is the 
need to organise the demand, not-to supplement the supply". 
(87] In April 1965, Circular 21/65 departed from the 
Ministerial policy pursued hitherto of seeking to increase 
the use'-of systems through consensus and introduced a 
coercive measure reminiscent of that used in 1952: ' "In 
deciding what programmes to approve the Minister will be 
influenced by the extent of the proposed use of 
industrialised methods". E88] This intention was restated in 
The Housing Programme 1965-7 White Paper published later-in 
the year. (89] While this advice did not amount to a 
specific instruction to local authorities' its implications 
were readily seen by one local politician, the Lord Mayor of 
Norwich, who felt that "the threat is there that unless we 
use these industrialised systems our subsidies will be 
affected'. r903 
While many authorities were prepared to use building 
systems few were prepared to offer' contracts of a'size that 
compensated for the investment of capital and organisational 
expertise on the part of the sponsors. As Cleeve Barr 
pointed out to local authorities in the Municipal Review: 
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'They cannot be run economically on the basis of one order 
for 300 houses here, 30 different houses in another part of 
the country, 20 elsewhere and infinitly protracted 
negotiations for a few dozen again-different types 
elsewhere'. (91] Circular 76/65, published in December 1965, 
advised authorities that contracts for industrialised 
building systems should be for at least 100 dwellings and 
that a string of different systems should be not be used. 
192] Although the letting of contracts for over 100 
dwellings increased from 39.5'% in 1960 to 66%' in 1966, '[ 93 ] 
the bulk of contracts for system building remained below 100 
dwellings despite ministerial advice. In late 1966 The 
N. F. B. T. E. found that out of 87 current industrialised 
building contracts 51 were for less than 100 units. (94] As 
regards Circular 76/65's advice that only a few systems 
should be used, Crossman, in May 1966, described, as one of 
his department's greatest problems in extending the use of 
industrialised systems, the tendency for councils to 'flit 
from one building system to another according to the whim of 
fashion'. 195] Local authorities were unwilling to adjust 
their policies to embrace system building to the point of 
ignoring ministerial advice. 
A further source of frustration for the promoters of 
system building was the reluctance of local authorities to 
exert a discipline on their building policies in accordance 
with the accepted tenets of industrialisation. In the Oldham 
development, near Manchester, on which the Jespersen system 
was used, the Council insisted on having 13 different types 
of housing unit which, linked with the undulating site, 
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prevented the standardisation of the" concrete units and 
slowed erection. At the Hulme No. 2 development, where 
Jespersen was used by the Manchester Corporation, the 
Council insisted on implementing its favoured 8'9" floor to 
floor height, - instead of the 814" -dimension to which the 
system was designed, again increasing the number, of 
non-standard components. The effect of such deviations was 
to render system building even less competitive in 
comparison to traditional building. E96] In 1964 Interbuild 
cited as-a prime case of the irrationality and reluctance of 
local authorities to accept the , implications- of 
technological change the withdrawal from a 700,000 pound 
system building contract by a council only a fortnight after 
it had initially approved the contract. 197] In 1965 a 
specialist with a, 'carefully designed". housing system, 
Housing Development and Construction, Ltd, withdrew from 
system building. The reason offered by the Chair of the firm 
for his early departure from system building was . the 
difficulty in dealing with local authorities: 
"In the municipal housing market one is dealing with 
laymen... Ihave been appalled and shocked at some of 
the questions.. -. all we get from the biggest potential 
market is procrastination and a lot of waste of 
time"C98] 
The opinion of one particularly heavy investor in system 
building, Maurice Laing, was that government policy towards 
local authorities was too weak: "despite all that it has 
appeared to say to the contrary, the Government is not 
Prepared to bring the building owner, in the shape of the 
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various local authorities, into line". C993 
While government and industry continually expressed 
dissatisfaction with local authorities, an equal discontent 
was felt by many of the authorities being pressured into 
using system building. Such complaints were conspicuously 
absent from the building industry and professional Journals 
of the time, but occasionally surfaced in conference reports 
on industrialised building carried by the Municipal, Journal. 
A group which proved particularly resistant to 
industrialised building systems was the rural district 
councils. In 1951 a deputation from three Cotswolds R. D. C. `s 
visited the Minister of Housing and Local Government with a 
request that they should be allowed to build in traditional 
methods using the local stone. [100] Throughout the 1960s an 
often stated opinion by such authorities was that, in the 
words of the representative of the Thingo (W. Sussex) R. D. C. 
it was the duty of councils in places like Liverpool and 
Manchester to Break away from traditional building'. E1013 
According to the Engineer, Surveyor and Architect for Warmly 
R. D. C. , A. Chubb, the: 
'problems of planning for dense urban areas should be 
separated from planning for rural areas... this 
division would save rural districts endless talk on 
industrialised building and housing consortia"C102] 
The Housing Centre Trust conference in July 1964 found a 
number of delegates from both urban and rural councils 
sceptical of the benefits of the large system building 
contracts that were being let by the 'pioneering' large 
urban councils such as Liverpool and the L. C. C. 11033 
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At the 1966 Annual Conference of the Association of 
Municipal Corporations (A. M. C. ) the most sustained public 
criticism of system building by lay members took place. Many 
of those present, by now, had actually had experience of 
system building. The controversy was undoubtedly fuelled by 
a paper delivered by the Managing Director of a system 
building firm, W. S. Jones, which criticised local authorities 
for not rationalising their building policies in order to 
make the fullest and most efficient use of housing systems 
and, in a particularly partisan manner, attacked direct 
labour organisations. [1047 The "counter attack" was led by 
a Wigan Alderman, H. R. Hancock, who stated that, as an 
authority which had used systems? Wigan had found them to be 
neither the panacea for the evils of building that Jones had 
described them to be, nor cheaper than traditional methods. 
[105] The representative from Reading pointed out that 
councils had a "Justifiable" fear of the possible future 
maintenance costs of industrialised housing which was not 
allayed by the apparent refusal of private speculators to 
depart from traditional methods. [106] However it was left 
to the Lord Mayor of Norwich, H. Derry, to ask when the 
building industry intended to rationalise itself and reduce 
the 240 systems available to a reasonable number which were 
proven and economic: 
"How can we evaluate all 240 systems and know which is 
the most economic... it is not in this year 1966 
economical at all to go in for industrialised systems. 
In my authority we can build traditional homes and 
traditional flats in very nearly the same time as it 
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takes to put up industrialised buildings at something 
of the order of 600 or 700 pounds cheaper for two 
bedroomed accommodation... I am suggesting to the 
building industry it ought to rationalise itself and 
it ought to decide which are the best systems... 
because until costs are reduced considerably my 
authority is prepared to fight the Ministry in 
relation to the threat in the White Paper"[1073 
Local authority fears cannot have been allayed by the A. M. C. 
which, -in July 1965, six months before Crossman launched his 
drive, reported that it had approached the M. H. L. G. for the 
provision of financial assistance to local authorities who 
found their first attempts with building systems had not 
provided the savings that they had been led to expect. [108] 
III. 
The response of local authorities to system building was 
varied. Authorities with large building programmes, and the 
necessary technical resources, relied heavily on system 
building and provided the market which enabled sponsors to 
establish their products in Britain. The partial 
monopolization housing programmes by a single sponsor took 
place in cities other than Coventry. By May 1960, Laing had 
built 59% of Carlisle's 4,935 municipal dwellings and two 
years later completed the 8,000th Easiform house for 
Leicester. (109] For five years, between 1963 and 1968, the 
Unit Construction Co. produced 10 flats each week for 
Liverpool Council in the Camus system. 11103 Indeed, the 
forging of close alliances between individual cities and 
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system building firms is cited by Gosschalk as a major 
factor behind the profitability of those systems that-were 
commercially-successful. (111] 
However, an opposing tendency was local authority 
resistance to government and industry efforts to achieve a 
permanent change in housebuilding methods. While many 
consortia were set up they achieved very little in the way 
of providing large building programmes for system builders. 
The reasons for which local authorities rejected system 
building were various and included a reluctance to alter 
building policies to conform to the disciplines of system 
building, a fear of eventual maintenance problems, a 
distaste for its visual monotony, and a distrust of the 
system building market which they felt to be disorganised 
and overpopulated with untried building methods. 
In particular, local authorities complained of the 
greater expense of system building. At the height of the 
1965 industrialised building drive the architect to the 
G. L. C., an authority committed to, and very experienced in 
system building, admitted that although it had hoped for 
cost savings through system building, "The results of 
tenders received to date do not bear this out". E112] For 
some authorities, with massive building programmes and 
shortages of labour, the absence of a cost advantage did not 
seem to be sufficient discouragment from using system 
building while to others, with perhaps a lesser burden on 
their building resources, it was presented as a major 
objection. The cheapening of system building in the 
mid-1970s (according to official figures in Table VII) did 
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not prevent an accompanying abandonment of new metheds as 
overall housing programmes fell. Indeed, the conclusion 
which might be drawn from this is that, so far as the use of 
new building technology by the bulk of housing authorities 
was concerned, its usefulness as a means of discharging 
unprecedentedly large housing programmes ' was of equal 
importance to marginal cost comparisons. 
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CHAPTER FOUR. THE RHETORIC OF MASS PRODUCTION. 
In 1945 the Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan, informed an 
audience in Birmingham that: 
"I have been looking eagerly, ever since I took 
office, for some system of prefabrication which would 
enable us to build houses in the same way as cars and 
aeroplanes. So far my search has been in vain, but I 
do not despair(1) 
Bevan was but one of a number of housing ministers and 
experts to see mass production as the solution to the 
'housing problem'. This chapter will attempt to explain why 
a link was repeatedly made between methods of production 
used by manufacturing industry and the provision of social 
housing and why this link proved- so attractive to 20th 
Century politicians and housing experts. 
I. STANDARDISATION AND THE HOUSING PROBLEM. 
The notion of applying mass production'to building seems to 
have been peculiar to the 20th Century. The solution to 'the 
housing question' was discussed by Frederic: Engels in 1872. 
Although Engels argued that the development of-manufacturing 
technique and the subsequent 'urbanisation' of society had 
created the slum, he did not propose a similar revolution in 
building technique to ýbe its' remedy. 12] Indeed, 19th 
Century attempts -to remedy the inability of capitalism to 
provide adequate-housing for all members of society seem to 
have-concentrated'on securing cheap methods of finance. Over 
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100,000 rooms were built by the 5% philanthropy movement 
between 1841 and 1914 which provided housing at modest rents 
by borrowing capital at low interest rates. 13] A similar 
solution was proposed by the Garden City Movement which 
sought to finance housing for the labouring classes by using 
the capital created by increases in land values consequent 
on developing a garden city. Py this means 11,000 houses 
were built prior to the Great War. C43 The inability of 
these methods to solve `the housing problem' was 
demonstrated by eventual state 'intervention in housing 
provision during the latter years of the 19th Century. Like 
previous initiatives, this intervention took the form of low 
interest loans, on this occasion by the state to local 
authorities. 153 
The 19th Century lack of"interest in adapting the 
principles of large '-scale manufacture to dwelling 
construction probably arose from the general level of 
tecnological development in manufacturing industry. The 
application of machinery to manufacture had been a feature 
of industrial. development for many. centuries and the moving 
line-and mass production were techniques used throughout the 
19th century. As early as 1829 Thomas Carlisle desribed his 
times as "the Age of Machinery, in every outward and inward 
sense of that word". 16] Nevertheless, despite Carlisle's 
awareness of the technological transformation in industry 
wrought by the industrial revolution,. the application of 
large scale production methods to complex artefacts for mass 
consumption came only in the latter years of the 19th 
Century with a second phase of industrial development. 
157 
According to Hobsbawm, this was characterised by the growth 
of a new generation of science based industries, the 
systematic extension of the factory system, an increase in 
the scale of economic enterprise and the discovery that the 
'largest potential market was to be found in the rising 
incomes of the mass of the working citizens in economically 
developed countries". 17] 
The technology of working class housing , received 
increased attention in the early years of-the: 20th Century 
largely as a result °of the identification of. 'the housing 
problem' and early attempts . to solve it. Between 1905 and 
1908 three exhibitions were held in Britain to "demonstrate 
the cost-reducing potential of new methods for cottage 
building", C8] at which many novel and patent methods of 
construction were demonstrated. In 1905 J. Cornes described 
technological changes that were taking place to cheapen 
cottage construction, in order to 'erect healthy, sanitary, 
well-lighted and attractive-homes which will pay interest 
and return the capital... at such rentals as the class of 
people for" whom they are intended can, pay". 193 These 
changes consisted of reductions in the costs of traditional 
techniques by using thinner walls, smaller roof timbers and, 
where stringent bye-laws allowed, the increased use of 
fireproof timber construction. A further experiment which 
took place in 1905 was the construction of a block of 
apartments in Liverpool by the City Engineer, J. A. Brodie, in 
a steel framework clothed in precast- concrete panels. E10] 
The first decade of the 20th Century also saw the continual 
urging by W. Thomson, author of The Housing 
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HandbookUp-To-Date (1907) that the cost of production of 
the dwelling, like that of other manufactured articles, 
ought to be capable of reduction as a result of experiment 
and production on a large scale". (113 
Subsequent discussion on the application of 
manufacturing techniques, to housing seems to have been 
considerably influenced by two early 20th century 
developments in methods of business" organisation and 
manufacture: Scientific Management and the assembly line. 
The study of the rationalisationýof operations within`- the 
workplace developed in America during the latter decades of 
the 19th Century and in 1895 F. W. Taylor began-lecturing and 
publishing his theories on Scientific Management. 112] The 
basis of Taylor's theory was that the productivity of each 
worker would be maximised by management prescribing, as a 
result of exact measurement and detailed study, the most 
efficient way of carrying out any working operation. ' [13] 
Taylor's ideas gained considerable prominence in the 
American efficiency craze of the decade following 1910, 
making a fundamental impact on industrial methods and 
popular consciousness. (14] The innovation in industrial 
methods, the assembly line, took place in the automobile 
industry, itself a product of the late 19th Century phase of 
industrialisation. The success of the Ford Motor Co. was 
initially based on the identification of a mass market for 
cheap motor cars. This market was exploited by designing a 
standard model which could be produced in large volumes. BY 
1913 this strategy had proved successful enough to allow 
Henry Ford to begin the application of moving line 
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techniques to the manufacture of standardised components. 
The assembly line brought the task to the worker, thereby 
eliminating 'fetching and carrying. With the aid of 
"scientific study", the worker's task was reduced to the 
simplest and most repetitive operation: 'He does as nearly 
as possible only one thing with only one movement'. 115] 
Both the conveyance of the task to a stationary point and 
the rationalisation of its execution to one repeated 
movement allowed the introduction of machinery. Ford's motor 
operation combined the three prerequisites essential to the 
mass production of complex artefacts: the identification of 
a market large enough to support volume production, the 
standardisation of components to the minimum number of 
variations and the accumulation of sufficient capital to 
invest in expensive, but eventually cost reducing mechanised 
production plant. 
The wider dissemination of these products of American 
industrial development was fostered by the destabilisation 
of Europe following the First World War. The 1917 Russian 
revolution was followed in 1918 by revolution in Germany and 
widespread social unrest in the majority of the beligerent 
nations. [16] In Britain, a victor of the war, industrial 
unrest followed the armistice culminating in major disputes 
in the power and transport industries. The severity of this 
unrest was the cause of renewed commitment to social housing 
by the state. [17] A feature of this crisis was the 
promotion of advanced methods of industrial organisation as 
the means of providing the wealth required to satisfy the 
demands of labour without fundamentally altering the social 
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and economic system. As J. Merkel pointed out, the ideas 
promoted by Taylor and Ford possessed considerable 
attractions to politicians: 
'The Scientific Management doctrine of technocratic 
control, central planning, and high productivity, 
leading to a golden age of mass-production in which 
high levels of material consumption would banish class 
enmity and create permanent social harmony, had a core 
of truth that made it a powerful doctrine in the 
political sphere' (1980)[183 
If standardisation and the assembly line had cheapened the 
motorcar to the point of enabling it to become an article of 
mass consumption, then, in the view of a number of 
politicians and housing experts, it could do the same for 
housing. By 1916 the architect S. D. Adshead, a member of the 
Liverpool Group of architects had come to the opinion that 
'The cost of producing a simple article of commerce depends 
very largely upon the number of similar articles produced... 
this holds good with standard cottages". 119] In `The 
Standard Cottage' (1916), Adshead proposed a method of 
lightweight wall construction combining brick, concrete and 
a light steel frame "which would be extremely economical" if 
allied with standardised cottage design and "if a big 
repetition could be ensured". A more direct reference to the 
social benefits to be gained by the application of Ford's 
production methods to housing was made by Pemberton Billing 
M. P. in a speech to the House of Commons in 1919: 
'As regards motorcars Mr Ford, the American, has 
taught what can be done by standardising them, and I 
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submit it would be possible to standardise every door 
and every window frame, to make them by the hundreds 
and thousands in Government factories and thus get rid 
of a good many difficulties... if next winter finds us 
where last winter found us, the social state of this 
country will be far more serious than it is today"C203 
The post First World War re-evaluation of housing 
production was also prompted by increased state intervention 
in housing provision. The state now had a direct interest in 
the means by which housing was produced. In the 1917 Tudor 
Walters report, which examined the implications of mounting 
a large publicly funded housing programme, building 
technology formed a significant element. The section on 
'Economy in Construction" stated of the 19th Century that: 
'while science and skill were devoted in ever-increasing 
measure to the development of, industrial processes, no such 
attention was paid to housebuilding'. [21] In the opinion of 
the Committee, -housebuilding should be the product of 
up-to-date methods of "business organisation, ' scientific 
costing, standardisation, etc., which have been found 
effective in other industries'. C22] While the Tudor Walters 
Committee did not consider the degree of standardisation 
found in automobile manufacture to be- appropriate to good 
dwelling design, it nevertheless recommended the adoption of 
a range of standardised plans, window and door opening 
sizes, and fixtures and fittings. The postwar interest of 
government in housing technology also gave rise to the 
appointment of the Building Materials Research Board 
(B. R. M. P. ) by the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
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Research, (D. S. I. R. ) itself a result of the state's wartime 
interest in promoting technological advance in industry. 
[23] In 1920 the R. R. M. P. was replaced by the Building 
Research Board (B. R. B. ) at the behest of the Standardisation 
and New Methods of Construction Committee formed to examine 
methods of circumventing acute shortages in skilled building 
labour, and consider the benefits to be gained by 
standardising building components. The P. R. R. was created as 
a permanent state body to carry out research into building 
materials and experiment in new methods of construction. In 
1921 a modest research station was set up at Acton which 
later became the Building Research Station (B. R. S. ). [24] 
The state maintained its keen interest in housing technology 
thoughout the interwar period, partly because of recurrent 
shortages-in skilled building labour, and partly because of 
its continued involvement in low cost housing provision. In 
1924, - a government committee on Methods of House 
Construction (1924) reported on the steel clad housing 
system being promoted by Lord Weir and noted with interest 
the fact that it'had been designed with "a view to adopting 
such methods of standardisation as will lead to cheapness in 
large scale production and to rapidity of building". [25] In 
its report on the industrial dispute following the 
introduction of the house, [Ch. IV] the government court of 
enquiry found against the unions stating that: 
'In the ordinary course of the progressive evolution 
of industry changes are made, as a means of increasing 
the volume of production and lowering the cost, which 
have the effect of substituting standardisation and 
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mechanical processes for the individual effort of the 
skilled craftsman. The whole history of modern 
industrial development in this country and elsewhere 
shows that this is true"(1925)[26] 
II. HOUSING PRODUCTION THEORY AND THE MODERN MOVEMENT. 
The prolonged depression of the 1930s saw an intensified 
interest in the concept of mass producing houses. From 1921 
onwards unemployment remained high. However, in 1929 the 
Wall Street Crash precipitated the longest and most severe 
slump hitherto experienced by industrially developed 
economies. 127] By 1931 world trade had fallen below that of 
1913.128] Within a scenario of world economic stagnation 
Britain fared particularly badly. According to A. Madison it 
experienced the highest levels of unemployment in Europe. 
(29] Nevertheless, despite the severity of the interwar 
depression in staple industries, such as heavy engineering 
and textiles, more recently established areas of the British 
economy, such as synthetic yarns, cars, and electrical 
goods, thrived. The combination of new forms of employment 
and a reduction in the cost of living which accompanied 
falling world commodity prices created new areas of 
affluence in the Midlands and South East able to enjoy the 
mass products of new manufacturing industries. 130] Typical 
of these was the growth in the annual output of the British 
automobile industry from 34,000 cars and trucks in 1913, to 
nearly half a million in 1937. (31] While not able to 
provide for all, the more technologically advanced aspects 
of the industrial system were providing in unprecedented and 
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very evident abundance for many. Rather than proposing 
fundamental changes in the structure of society, the 
solution which an increasing number of politicians, 
scientists and housing experts proposed to alleviate 
inequities in provision was the wider distribution of the 
fruits of new technology. Nowhere was this proposed more 
vigorously than in housing Prod4ction. Typical of this 
interest in the relationship between technology and social 
progress was the Social Relations of Science Movement which 
'seemed to dominate the- British scientific world between 
1932 and 1945" and advocated scientific rationality as the 
means- towards creating a utopian society of abundant 
provision and the erosion of social conflict. (32] 
The consideration of housing production during the 
1930s was encouraged, and its tenor influenced, by the 
dissemination of the European Modern Movement in Britain. 
The rapid industrial expansion of Germany following 
unification in 1871 and its tradition of planned state 
industrial development and scientifically biased education 
system Iprovided strong encouragement to industrial 
innovation. C33] Indeed, German industry took a world lead 
in many of the new late 19th Century science based 
industries, such as electrical and chemical manufacture. The 
principles of standardisation and industrial efficiency 
promoted by Taylor and Ford were adopted by areas of German 
and French engineering industry during the early years of 
the 20th Century. C34] By 1910 the German architect, Walter 
Gropius, was advocating the mass production of housing 
through the standardisation of products as had been achieved 
165 
in automobile and machinery manufacture. 135] The years 
which followed the end of the First World War intensified 
the relationship between architectural theory and models of 
industrial production. Architects such as Charles-Edouard 
Jeanneret (later Le Corbusier) advocated Taylorisation as 
the means of physical' reconstruction in France. 136] The 
imperative. for the new Weimar Republic to rebuild its 
economy and prevent a recurrance of the social instability 
which had followed the war caused it to become the most 
technologically innovative nation in Europe. In , 1921, a 
grouping of German state officials, industrialists, 
engineers and academics formed the National Board for 
Efficiency, with the aim of aiding a major reform of German 
industry in accordance with the- latest principles of 
American management theory. [37] This, movement, known as 
German Rationalisation, contributed greatly to the formation 
of architectural theory during the 1920s. The outcome of the 
interelation between Rationalisation and architectural 
design was the Neues Bauen, a movement which adopted models 
of industrial'organisation fora series of low cost state 
housing developments in the larger industrial cities of the 
Weimar Republic. 138] With the political ascendancy of the 
National Socialist- Party after 1933, under which 
architectural theories associated with Bolshevism were 
outlawed, a number of Neues Bauen architects sought refuge 
in Britain and America. This group of architects and 
theorists assiduously propagandised what since the late 
1920s was known as the Modern Movement. (39] 
Throughout the 1930s a number of British architects and 
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housing experts discussed building production technology 
integrating technical theories with a political programme 
intended to ensure adequate housing provision to-all classes 
of society. A characteristic of the models of production 
proposed was that they. anticipated the pattern of housing 
production adopted by the postwar Welfare State, calling for 
the central organisation of building. -to provide markets 
large enough for mass production. In 1934, F. R. S. Yorke 
stated that he was confident that the solution to 'the 
housing problem' lay in factory production of standardised 
building components:, 
'It seems that the provision of the economical house 
of good quality can only be made possible through 
rigid standardisation and prefabrication... The low 
cost house will be manufactured as a whole, or in 
parts, in central factories and assembled on the site. 
Production will-be similar to that of the automobile. 
Design will be dictated not only by convenience and 
efficiency but by economical machine production, 
handling and distribution"1403 
Writing- five years later, - Yorke acknowledged that the 
realisation of his vision was not practicable within the 
current pattern of demand for new building. The tendency for 
buildings to be commissioned singly from the architect 
'leaving to posterity a series of little monuments that are 
scarcely seen in the chaos', [41] and the domination of 
production by individual commercial producers made the scale 
of production required by mass production unrealisable. 
However, a role was identified by Yorke for both the 
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architect and the state which he felt pointed to the way 
forward. . For the architect, able to unite industrial 
technique with design, it is the common people who now most 
need his services", and for the state, a willingness to 
involve itself in the production of buildings: "The Job is 
too big for the individual, and a government cannot 
undertake the work while it is reluctant to compete with 
him'. [42] 
During the Second World War a group of experts 
purported to devote. -itself "-to a concentrated programme of 
research into the benefits and implications of the proper 
application of scientific methods to house production. The 
conclusion to which the Committee for the Industrial and 
Scientific Provision of Housing (C. I. S. P. H. ) came was that 
under advanced industrial conditions of production housing 
would no longer be an expensive capital investment but an 
artefact , of everyday consumption available 
in 
superabundance. C. I. S. P. H. originated with the consideration 
by Raymond Perry, an industrial economist and administrator, 
'of the social importance of a rapid housebuilding 
programme" [43] to follow the Second World War. Perry then 
embarked on the research for a thesis on the application of 
machinery to "the enclosure of space for human consumption", 
[44] leading eventually to the formation of the Committee in 
-November 1941. Perry, and' an early architect collaborator, 
Dennis Clarke Hall, then approached Harry Weston, who, as 
well as being the owner of a machine tools business, was the 
chair of Coventry's Housing Committee, thereby providing 
Perry and Hall with an influential connection in the field 
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of social housing: 
"So they came to tell me all about it and I was rather 
proud. And I can remember when they asked me if I'd 
take the chair at the first meeting, which I did... 
Well now that meeting was a real sensation. All those 
clever men with only the thought of the country at 
heart, comparing-notes, giving their suggestions. It 
would have cost millions of pounds to have set up a 
committee like that. This was free"145] 
C. I. S. P. H. 's premise was that -the-basis. -, of traditional 
construction in craft technique, involving as it did the 
putting together of building parts and pieces with a large 
degree of cutting and fashioning, all by hand, "sets by 
itself a certain limit to the rationalisation" of building 
operations. 146] What it proposed was a revolutionary 
approach to housing provision. In October 1943, Perry 
submitted a memorandum to the M. O. H. on 'The Limitation of 
Life of Houses: * its Industrial and Economic Implications' 
which, current with the Ministry's consideration of a 
temporary housing programme, presented the Committee's views 
on housing production. As with most informed discussion on 
the subject C. I. S. P. H. acknowledged that a secure and large 
market must be obtained prior to production in order to 
amortize the capital costs of development and manufacturing 
plant, "after which production becomes unbelievably cheap". 
Using the example of the light bulb, the cost of which 
through mass production had been lowered to a two/hundredth 
of its original price, the memorandum stated that house 
production would follow the "common curve" of price 
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reduction. The cost of a 1,000 sq. ft. house "with a hitherto 
undreamed-of amenity standard" would cost between only 300 
and 350 pounds at prewar prices. The revolutionary 
implication of such a cheapening of the dwelling on the 
property market was also noted by Perry; 
by a small capital payment and continued income 
payments a man becomes a consumer of. motor cars. This 
position has been brought about entirely by the 
application of quantity production... If the idea of 
permanence in a house -be- once abandoned and 
particularly its permanent association with the land 
upon which it is built, similar conditions begin to 
apply, and if the quantity production element can be 
brought in as well the analogy is complete"C47] 
In its first report, published in January, 1943, the 
Committee gave considerable space to the discussion of ways 
in which the work of firms involved in the production of 
house parts could be "co-ordinated both technically and in 
terms of production schedules". E483 The solution to this 
problem, the Committee felt, lay in the establishment of a 
Housing Production Council, relying on the donations of 
industry and operated by a full time staff. In 1944, with 
the publication of its second report, an extensive analysis 
of existing systems of construction, the Committee dissolved 
itself and founded in its own place the Housing Production 
Society comprising 15 members, many of whom were on the 
original committee. 149] However, this initiative seems to 
have petered out and Weston explains that soon after the war 
the architect members of the Society left to begin their 
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work on practical rebuilding projects. 150] 
The rebuilding programme following the Second World War 
provided the opportunity for Modern Movement architects to 
apply their ideas in practice. Maxwell Fry, writing towards 
the end of the Second World War, considered the marketing 
problem described by Yorke more optimistically. In Eine 
Building (1944), which looked forward to the contribution 
which modern architecture could make to the era of 
reconstruction, Fry, like Yorke, r, - pointed out the 
significance of marketing to the success of mass production 
through reference to the example of Henry Ford: 
When Henry Ford built his first `T' model Ford, the 
beloved old boneshaker... he assumed a demand... he 
assumed that the need was widespread and varied only 
within narrow limits: that was the standard need. On 
this he based his production"C51] , 
The extent of the market identified by Ford, Fry suggested, 
had now been forced onto the nation by the Second World War: 
four years without "serious" town building and four years of 
bomb destruction concentrated in major cities. The demand 
that the war had created was so great and the social 
imperative for rebuilding such that standardisation and mass 
production would have to be extended to all parts of the 
building. Tatting as--his hypothetical case a standardised 
bathroom and kitchen Fry insisted that there was not: 
'a first class industrialist in the country who would 
not agree that if we could standardise five such 
models - five and no more - and get them adopted by 
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five big cities for use in their rebuilding over a 
term of ten years, that a kitchen better than the best 
in the Ideal Home could not be brought within the 
means of all who need them. It was by such means that 
Ford made his `T' model universal"[52] 
A review of C. I. S. P. H. 's pedigree suggests that the 
philosophy of scientific housing production was shared by a 
range of influential figures. For instance, the membership 
of C. I. S. P. H. included the following: Harry Weston, the 
Chair of-a major --Midland Housing 'Committee; Ove Arup and 
F. J. Samuely, both of whom practised successfully as 
structural engineers during the war; Max Lock, who taught at 
the Architectural Association; Lewis Silkin, a member of the 
Central Housing Advisory Committee to the M. O. H.; 
D. E. E. Gibson, City Architect to Coventry; Edric Neel, who 
upon 'leaving C. I. S. P. H. initiated the Arcon group, and 
Elizabeth Denby, author of Europe Rehoused, a widely read 
survey of social housing programmes in interwar Europe. [53] 
Furthermore, Weston describes Lord Portal, the Minister of 
Works responsible for the production of the Temporary 
Housing Programme, as a frequent and "valuable" attender of 
the Committee's meetings and refers to a visit he made to 
London to explain C. -I. S. P. H. 's ideas to a special meeting of 
the House of Commons. [54] The Second World War saw a wide 
range of-architects and influential figures participating in 
discussions on standardisation and prefabrication. If the 
membership of C. I. S. P. H. is' any indication, the ideal of 
compensating for 'inequities in housing provision through 
mass production was upheld by a number of individuals able 
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to exert a considerable influence on the formation of state 
housing production theories. 
III. THE PREFABRICATION MOVEMENT. 
During the Second World'War prefabrication became a popular 
issue in discussions on the physical reconstruction of the 
nation. As the Royal Institute of Architects of Ireland 
commented in 1945: 'Unquestionably prefabrication, more than 
any -other aspect of building has excited public interest in 
recent, -yearsl. C55]'-Indeed the-subJect of prefabrication was 
even raised by the Workers' Education Council as a topic of 
conversation in the 'Houses and Towns We Live In' series. 
(56] The catalyst which- pushed prefabrication to the 
forefront of discussion was the Second World'War, which 
focussed opinion on housing ° issues and the role of 
technology in economic development. 
The model of technocratic success focussed upon during 
the war was provided by Britain's ally, America.. Whereas the 
Continent, in particular Germany and France, had served as 
the prewar focus of modern architectural theory, interest 
shifted to the contribution, to housing technology made by 
the U. S. A. 'This interest was to colour developments in 
Britain and was encouraged as a matter of policy by the War 
Cabinet. In a report, `British Ignorance of America', 
prepared by the Committee on Reconstruction Problems, it was 
pointed out that the lack of knowledge of American 
achievements -- bred by the popular press concentrating on 
Vaudeville and prohibition gangsters -- fostered "mutual 
misunderstanding and suspicions which tend to hamper a 
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co-operative war effort". 1573 A programme of propaganda was 
then proposed, utilising all the avenues of popular 
communication including radio, the press, films and school 
education, to concentrate attention on American 
contributions to cultural, scientific and industrial 
progress. The intentions of the government were fulfilled by 
journalists such as Alistair Cooke who began his highly 
successful career in broadcasting the "passions, the 
manners, the flavour" of the American way of life to an 
eager British audience-by taking up the position of Special' 
Correspondent to the R. R. C. on American affairs in 1936 and 
launching his `Letters from America' in 1946.158] 
One American development seized upon by the British 
architectural press was the use of prefabricated timber 
housing in the welfare programmes of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (T. V. A. ). One of the first of many articles on 
this subject appeared in Architectural Design in September 
1941, which reported on the "cottages' produced in the 
T. V. A. 's workshops assembled from four prefabricated 
sections and taken to site on standard trucks. [59] Indeed, 
if a precedent is to be sought for the Temporary Housing 
Programme then this was it. The aluminium bungalow, produced 
by the aircraft industry as part of the Temporary Housing 
Programme, used an identical concept of construction, albeit 
translated into aluminium: it was manufactured in four 
complete sections in the factory and transported to site on 
derequisitioned aircraft trailers. [60] In 1942, The Puilder 
concluded that the "panel and caravan" types of temporary 
prefabricated house, produced under the American 
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government's Defense Housing Programme "will most probably 
be the prototypes for any adopted over here". [61] 
The interest excited by American building techniques 
prompted the dispatch of two missions to observe their 
methods at first hand. The first of these reported directly 
to the Minister of Works in 1944, [62] and the second was 
sent in 1949 by the Anglo American Productivity Council, 
itself a product of British interest in American industrial 
organisation. [63] Indeed, the first years of peace, saw the 
establishment of the Urwick Committee, (headed by Lyndale 
Urwick the propagandist of Taylorism in Britain and 
eventually Chair of the British Institute of Management), 
which established a national syllabus for the teaching of 
management theory in 1947. [64] While Urwick had complained 
that there was little real understanding and adoption of 
Scientific Management by industry in Britain during the 
interwar years, the late 1940s saw the beginning of a 
process whereby American Business theory began to permeate 
management techniques at every level of British industry and 
public administration. [65&66] 
The contribution which transatlantic industrial 
technique made to the war effort was noted by Alfred Bosson 
M. P. in 1944, who claimed that prefabrication had reduced 
the assembly time of the Liberty Ship to three to four days, 
and proposed that such methods should be used to tackle the 
postwar housing problem in Britain. [67] The methods adopted 
for the Liberty ships were also used in Britain and the 
technique of prefabrication became a familiar feature of the 
war effort. Belman demountable hangers and transportable 
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Bailey Bridges all relied on the use of structual units 
individually manufactured and coupled together insitu. In an 
attempt to increase the anti-submarine fleet, 110 frigates 
and 200 tugs were "mass produced" by'76 firms contributing 
large prefabricated parts. (68) By the end of the war, 
Ford's assembly line had invaded vastly expanded industries, 
many of which experienced -a phase of accelerated 
development. Typical of these was aircraft manufacture. 
Whereas prewar aircraft production methods were crude by 
comparison with the American automobile industry, the war's 
end saw aeroplanes rolling off assembly lines in vast 
numbers -a product of industrial co-operation relying on 
the' production of standard components by numerous 
subcontractors. (69) 'The words "standardisation", 'mass 
production' and "prefabrication" became everyday terms in 
the prosecution of the war effort and in-the vocabulary of 
those, including architects, who looked on. Such was the 
interest aroused in this subject that the formation of 
C. I. S. P. H. was welcomed by the Architectural Review as a 
possible means of translating the "ceaseless talk, talk, 
talk" on prefabrication into positive action. 170] Small 
wonder that by June 1943, the Architects Journal couched its 
remedy for reconstruction in singular terms: "There is one 
solution only to the problems of post-war housing. It can be 
expressed in three words - use the machine". 1713 
FY 1948 the Interdepartmental Committee on New Methods 
of House Construction had vetted 101 of the non traditional 
housing systems which the government hoped would expand 
housing supply. While all of these departed from 
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conventional construction, very few utilised prefabrication 
extensively, t72] and many were of insitu poured concrete. 
Prefabrication was used to a greater degree in the Temporary 
Housing Programme, but only one model, the A. I. R. O. H. 
bungalow, actually consisted of large factory made units. 
Nevertheless the majority of non traditional dwellings used 
new materials (such as concrete, steel and laminates) and 
familiar materials (such as timber)-in new ways to replace 
labour intensive craft processes. While the houses 
themselves were- not prefabricated, prefabrication was used 
to a larger extent in the preparation of the parts and 
materials of which they were built. More important than the 
real extent of the application of mechanised technique=_ was 
the innovative nature of the materials and methods of 
construction used. The fact that the houses were sponsored 
by commercial concerns - often from engineering industry - 
and appeared as standard models in the manner of automobiles 
made them very distinct from-traditional construction. 
Although not mass produced, these new methods of 
construction were promoted by the advocates of scientific 
methods of housing production as the beginnings of the major 
change in building technique forecast by the Modern 
Movement. In 1946 a spate of publications appeared all 
devoted to prefabrication. The content of these publications 
was characterised by two features; a conviction that factory 
made houses had arrived and an optimism that this tendency 
could only continue in the future. In a survey of the 
systems produced both in America and latterly in Britain - 
Prefabrication in Building - Richard Sheppard, later to 
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become a noted postwar architect, introduced the reader to 
the subject by pointing out that the book did not consider 
the merits of the argument for prefabrication as this was no 
longer necessary: 
'It does not question the feasibility of 
prefabrication and such a discussion is now largely 
academic, for it has been amply demonstrated that 
efficient buildings can be constructed from mass 
produced factory units. Prefabrication is no longer a 
possibility but a fact'[73] 
J. Madge, editor of a 'practical book written for practical 
men', commented of the A. I. R. O. H. bungalow, constructed by a 
consortium of aircraft firms, that although it did not have 
the beauty of the Spitfire, 
'the minds which have created the modern aircraft have 
turned their attention to the solution of an almost 
equally urgent problem. In so doing they have produced 
a design which is more completely prefabricated than 
any which has so far appeared... the substance of the 
method may equally well be applied in the future to 
the provision of permanent homes"[74] 
The interest excited by the revolutionary aspects of the 
Temporary Housing Programme prompted the Women's Group on 
Public Welfare, an organisation committed to the alleviation 
of domestic labour, to carry out a study of the temporary 
bungalow's effects on domestic labour for the Ninth 
Scientific Management Congress held in Brussels in 1951. [75] 
The tendency to make a firm distinction between the new 
and the old in building technology, and by implication, the 
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new and the old in social policy, was seized upon by the 
state. On many occasions politicians demonstrated an 
enthusiasm for new building methods, which can only have 
served to aid the acceptance of new housing methods by 
reluctanct local authorities and a possibly apprehensive 
working class. In 1944, Winston Churchill described the 
proposed temporary bungalow as 'far superior to the ordinary 
cottage". 1763 The suggestion that new ways of building were 
at least as good, if not superior to old, was repeated in 
Parliament by the Secretary of State for Scotland who said 
this of the M. O. W. prototype bungalow exhibited outside the 
Tate 'I have been inside the house which struck me as 
splendid. The gadgets, the health conditions - everything 
splendid'. (1944) 177] The Temporary Bungalow was 
particularly focussed on by politicians as the embodiment of 
the state's ideal of scientific progress applied to the 
'tasks of peace'. As Dr. R. Stradling M. P., formerly the 
Director of the B. R. S., pointed out to Parliament, 'this 
bungalow has had more attention in matters of detail than 
any house or bungalow has ever had before. ' It is probably 
more scientifically correct than any house has ever been". 
(78] When describing the progress made in'house design since 
the war at the Ideal Home Exhibition at Olympia in 1948 the 
M. O. H. described the Temporary Bungalow in the following 
terms: 'really they are luxury flats on the ground", and 
proudly announced that 'in prefabrication Britain now leads 
the world'. 1793 
While the affection of politicians for new housing 
technology could be understood as expediency, it was 
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undoubtedly fuelled by the government's wartime recognition 
of the role of scientific research. According to N. Vig, it 
was the Second World War which constituted "the great 
turning point in government-science relations". t80) Wartime 
scientific and technical developments had been seen to make 
a crucial contribution to the outcome of the war, and 
scientists and engineers came to play a significant part in 
operational strategy and tactics. In 1945, Herbert Morrison, 
Lord President of the Council, proclaimed that: 
'The Government attach the very greatest importance to 
science. We recognise the contribution which science 
made to the prosecution of the war and the achievement 
of victory, and we are no less desirous that science 
shall play its part in the constructive tasks of peace 
and of economic advancement and progress'181] 
The war firmly placed scientific invention and technological 
advance in the minds of politicians as the means of ensuring 
a continuation of economic growth. It could be said that 
while the formation of the Welfare State guaranteed a more 
equal distribution of wealth without fundamental social 
change, it could not of itself guarantee the continually 
rising levels of consumption essential to maintain unity in 
a stratified society. If technological innovation had 
ensured the survival of the state in war then, allied to 
welfarism, it might ensure the survival of the state in 
peace. A sure belief in the benefits which scientific 
advance could bring to the embryonic Welfare State prompted 
Aneurin Bevan, on taking office as Minister of Health in 
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1945, to embark upon his search for a method of mass 
producing housing. Soon after he was forced to admit that he 
was as yet unsuccessful, but he reassured those among the 
electorate unconvinced that welfarism would prove capable of 
satisfying their housing needs: 
'The age we live in will surely be known as the age of 
invention... the skill and ingenuity of our 
technicians can revolutionise housing as they have 
revolutionised so many other undertakings"C82] 
IV. THE MODERNISATION OF BRITAIN. 
During the 1950s popular discussion on prefabrication and 
mass production subsided. Like the enthusiasts who had 
formed C. I. S. P. H., architects were preoccupied with 
designing the buildings with which Britain was 
reconstructed. Throughout the 1950s the further application 
of the philosophy of prefabrication was concentrated on 
educational schoolbuilding programmes and it was in this 
field that many of the advocates of new methods of building 
worked. Nevertheless, despite a lessened prominence, 
prefabrication continued to arouse interest. In 1951, the 
Building Research Congress was held on the subject of The 
Influence of Mechanisation and Prefabrication on Techniques 
and Costs of Building. E83] The rationality of 
prefabrication also had a particular appeal to the postwar 
generation of newly trained architects. As the Principal of 
the Architectural Association, M. Pattric, pointed out in 
1956, 'Generally speaking, the idea of prefabricated 
building appeals to students and they find it difficult to 
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understand how a system of construction which is" so 
obviously cheaper in theory is not more used". (84] 
While the 1950s saw a lessening of the rhetoric of mass 
production in relation to building methods in the speeches 
of politicians, it is evident that state interest in science 
and technology grew. Indeed, according to A. King, this tool, 
place on an international scale as a result of the 
relatively recent appraisal of the role of science in 
economic development and a tendency to make international 
comparisons of research expenditure which 'provided an 
international ranking order somewhat like a football league 
table... the United States, at the top, was the pacemaker". 
185] The culmination of the 1950s embodiment of science and 
technology into state policy was the appointment of Quentin 
Hogg (Lord Hailsham) as Minister for Science, a new 
ministerial post created by the Macmillan Government in 
1959. In Science and Politics Hogg described the process by 
which: 
'This expansion of --Government provision, this 
development of the political interest in the 
scientific, has rested upon the clear demonstration 
that a nation's power to prosper in peace, survive in 
war, and command the respect of its neighbours, 
depends very largely on its degree of scientific and 
technological advance"186] 
The 1960s saw the identification of a new role for 
technology by the state in 'The Modernisation of Britain'. 
The aims of this programme of rapid techological change were 
to. accelerate economic growth to levels enjoyed by Britain's 
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neighbours on the Continent and halt the nation's relative 
decline as a world economic power. Indeed, the government's 
Indicative Planning policies of the 1960s, previousy 
discussed in Chapter One, were an aspect of what was 
intended as a larger reform of the British 'economy. As 
M. Shanks pointed out, by 1963, the year in which the 
N. E. D. C. was formed, the need to effect technological reform 
had become urgent - the existing system was simply not 
producing the goods fast enough: 
"if existing productivity trends in the -various- 
countries were to continue, by the early 1970s the 
average Briton would find himself worse off than 
almost all his Continental cousins, and on a roughly 
comparable level with the average Russian, Venezuelan 
or Israeli "187 ] 
A response of the state to this latter crisis of capitalism 
was to focus attention on the benefits to be gained by 
dramatic advances in technology. The intention to pursue 
`The Modernisation of Britain' programme was announced by 
the Conservative Government at the opening of the 1963 
session of Parliament. [88] While writers, such as N. Vig, 
have characterised this policy as little more than an 
electoral manoeuvre, "an element of style rather than 
substance', E89] it is evident that it reflected a broader 
movement towards -regarding technology as the panacea to 
economic and social problems among the political and 
intellectual establishment. As H. &S. Rose point out, the 
1960s saw the birth of science policy journals, such as 
Minerva-and the formation of the Science of Science group on 
183 
the lines of the Social Relations of Science movement of the 
1930s. t90) 
The idea that a 'revolution' in building techniques 
would accompany the 'Modernisation of Britain' was advocated 
first by Conservative politicians and began with the 
introduction of their industrialised building policy. In 
this, it is significant that system building was identified 
as 'revolutionary' - in a manner similar to that during the 
1940s, rather than as a trend in the construction of-social 
housing -which had developed since the Second World War. 
Politicians such as Geoffrey Rippon, Minister of Works, 
displayed a degree of enthusiasm in system building which 
was more the product of faith in techniques as yet unproven 
than a realistic assessment of a quickening in the 
development of housebuilding technology. Nevertheless, by 
focussing on the "miraculous" qualities of system building 
Rippon at'once validated current beliefs in the role of 
technology and gained support for measures designed to 
reform the production methods of social housing. Furthermore 
he drew the nation's attention to the progressiveness of 
Conservative technical policy. Thus, in 1963, Rippon 
enthusiastically announced to Parliament that the gradual 
evolution of traditional technology would no longer satisfy 
the pace of change demanded by Conservative policy: 
'progress in increasing output which has been made so 
far has been achieved without any major change in the 
characteristic methods of work of the construction 
industries. If these methods of work could be 
transformed, we might get increases of output which at 
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this moment would appear to be almost miraculous. What 
is needed is something of the nature of an industrial 
revolution in building"1913 
The rhetoric of 'revolutionary' advance in building 
technique was no less vigorously promoted by the Labour 
Party. As Harold Wilson pointed out of Britain's relative 
industrial decline in 1964, "Without a quickening of 
innovation and productivity in Britain, the very basis of 
our social fabric would be endangered". 1923 The role of 
technology in the -postwar Labour Party's interpretation of 
socialism was indicated in Harold Wilson's equation of 
socialism with science: 
'In a recent newspaper interview I was asked what, 
above all, I associated with socialism in this modern 
age. I answered that if there was one word'I would use 
to identify modern socialism it was 'science'"C933 
Indeed, Wilson's biographer, Paul Foot, has noted the way in 
which `technologism' gradually removed overtly socialist 
policies from Labour Party policy in the early 1960s: 
"Perhaps the main change in Labour's home and economic 
policies between 1959 and 1964 was a shift in emphasis away 
from traditional welfare demands towards economic growth, 
efficiency and technocracy". 194] Technology played a major 
role in Labour's election campaign, minimising the party's 
identification with sectional working class interests and 
broadening its appeal to all classes concerned with economic 
reform. Wilson claimed that 'the cities of the future, 
cities worthy of our people" were to be constructed by 'a 
great breakthrough in science and technology" (95] rather 
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than through the fundamental restructuring of the social and 
economic system as had been the orthodoxy of Labour Party 
socialism in previous years and was still demanded by more 
radical sections of the Party. 
When speaking in public, politicians tended to hedge 
their sometimes dramatic statements of intent regarding the 
building industry by pointing out that future construction 
demands would provide more than enough work to keep 
traditional builders fully occupied. (96] However, senior 
architects in the public service were less cautious. As 
K. J. Campbell, housing architect to the L. C. C., pointed out, 
the "real" reason why industrialised housing systems were 
being introduced was that traditional building had "run its 
course" and as a method of housebuilding was now obsolete. 
197] Cleeve Barr, Chief Architect to the M. H. L. G., saw 
changes in social housing technique as having implications 
beyond this immediate sector of the building market. He 
hoped that advances in housing technology would eventually 
serve as an example for the whole industry: 
"There are unique opportunities in housing, which if 
matched with good design and good quality in building, 
could act as a catalyst for transforming the industry 
generally, from its present low state to a highly 
mechanized level in a comparatively few years"198] 
Given that state housing in 1967 comprised 20% of new 
building, 199] the pathfinding role identified by Cleeve 
Barr carries with it some credibility. 
Having persuaded itself of the inevitability of 
technological revolution in building, the state set out to 
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promote this idea among the population at large, and in 
particular the local authority client. Rather than as a mere 
substitute for traditional methods of housing supply, system 
building was urged as an inevitable feature of progress and 
the contribution that modern science and technology would 
make to the era of welfare architecture. The means by which 
these ideas were promoted ranged from conferences which were 
openly attended to lectures aimed at specific groups. The 
fervour with which this was mounted was noted by Interbuild 
in July-1964: 
'A widespread propaganda campaign has been carried out 
in which the national press, television and even the 
glossy women's magazines have played their part. The 
aim was to get the concept of industrialised building 
accepted by potential clients and the general public 
and to encourage the building industry to participate 
joyfully in the increase in industrialised 
building"1104] 
The first major event in this process of persuasion in which 
government, industry and the architectural profession 
co-operated was the Cement & Concrete Association 
conference, 'Houses From the Factory' held at the R. I. B. A. 
in October 1962. Such was the interest in new building 
technologies among the building professions and industry 
that the main lecture theatre was filled and an overflow, 
gathering watched the proceedings on closed circuit 
television. 1101] Addressing the conference, Cleeve Barr 
presented a highly reduced, but persuasive argument, which 
tended to ignore the practical complexities of system 
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building and concentrate on the theoretical rationality of 
prefabrication, setting a style of argument which pervaded 
lectures and conferences for the remainder of the decade. 
Rather than being promoted as a means of compensating for 
shortages in building labour, Cleeve Parr promoted system 
building as the means by which extra space, could be provided 
in social housing in conformity with the Homes For Today and 
Tomorrow report published by the M. H. L. G. in 1961. [102] 
Underlying this was the proposition that, due to the 
supposedly small labour content in manufacturing 
prefabricated components, larger wall and floor panels would 
only incur extra costs in terms of materials, and as 
concrete was relatively cheap up to 10% more space could be 
provided by industrialised building at possibly a third to a 
half of the cost of provision by traditional methods. [103] 
In later lectures Cleeve Parr simplified this proposition by 
stating simply that "standardisation can give greater space 
for very little extra money". Pointing out that concrete 
panels came in 23 varieties of finish and 57 different 
colours Cleeve Barr also claimed that it would not be 
difficult to improve on the quality of traditional building. 
Furthermore the contribution of the machine would 
automatically ensure a higher quality of finish: 
'You only have to think for a moment about the quality 
of factory made goods, which are standardised and 
produced in large numbers, particularly the standard 
of finish, to realise this - television sets, 
motorcars, furniture, office equipment and so on"[104] 
By 1963 both Keith Joseph and Geoffrey Rippon were 
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contributing optimistic articles to, national newspapers on 
the forthcoming breakthrough in house building technology, 
[105] and the next year saw the Deputy Chief Architect of 
the M. H. L. G., O. J. Cox, delivering lectures throughout the 
country including one to the South Yorkshire and District 
Society of Architects titled simply, 'The Revolution in 
Building', which, according to fashion, drew the attention 
of the audience to the 'revolutionary' changes in 
housebuilding technique being' enjoyed in social 
housing. [ 106] I 
The conviction that system building was at least as 
good, if not better than traditional construction was also 
promoted in speeches of housing politicians and official 
advice given in ministerial circulars. Circular 28/52, 
published at the outset of MacMillan's housing drive in 
1952, claimed, in the face of the conflicting example of the 
many reluctant authorities, that non traditional methods 
"provide 'thoroughly satisfactory houses at prices fully 
competitive with traditional methods, and, given judicious 
and careful lay-out, not 'less satisfactory appearance". 
[107] When Brigadier 'Barraclough, Chair of the Regional 
(Midland) Housing Production Board, acknowledged that there 
were "admitted disadvantages" in non-traditional building he 
received a curt response from Whitehall: "we do not admit 
any disadvantages in the current models other than the 
prejudice we have to wear down! ". [108] 
Such was official policy's enthusiasm for new housing 
methods that systems were promoted as the means to the fine 
era of welfare building anticipated by Maxwell Fry in 1944. 
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In 1963 Rippon extolled system building with an evocation of 
18th Century neo-classical town planning: 
'industrialised building is perfectly capable of 
making a proper contribution to the beauty of our 
towns and villages... you have only to look at a 
terrace of Georgian or Regency houses to see that 
uniformity of design and architectural merit can go 
together. What we have done before we can do again. We 
are a rich country. We must afford to bring a new deal 
to. those who still live in conditions of dreary 
squalor; and we can afford good design"['109] 
At the very least, as the M. H. L. G. Circular 59/63 impressed 
upon local authorities, system building would allow current 
design standards to be maintained: "There is, in fact, no 
reason why houses built by industrialised building methods 
need be more standardised than houses built by traditional 
methods... the use of these components... opens up new 
opportunities for skilled and imaginative design". (1963) 
[110] By 1965, the proposition that system building would 
provide an environment worthy of the Welfare State had been 
elaborated to suggest that it would allow local authorites 
to achieve a higher standard of design than if they- relied 
on traditional construction. The logic of this argument was 
described in Circular 76/65- which proposed, as had Cleeve 
Barr, that a better quality of finish would be achieved but 
also that: 
the use of carefully prepared standard designs will 
release scarce professional time to concentrate on 
raising the quality of layouts both for industrialised 
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and traditional building... the aim of all authorities 
should be by careful attention to groupings, layouts 
and landscaping to use industrialised building to 
improve the environment"1111] 
Furthermore, the same circular 'gave an incentive for 
authorities to persevere with the drive, despite any 
reservations that they might have as to the qual-ity'and cost 
of system building, by suggesting that they would reap the 
benefits of an eventual transformation in building 
processes. Circular 76/65 pointed, out, that 'there 1s a 
continuing need for industrialisation but the- immediate 
drive is a short term effort aimed at giving- the 
industrialised building programme the best- possible 
conditions to get on its feet". [112] Once on its feet, the 
Ministry suggested, industrialised building would eventually 
become cheaper, `in the manner oUgeneral industrial advance, 
as larger quantities of increasingly standardised components 
were produced. As Cleeve Barr had advocated in '1964-, 
initially production of building components would be by`the 
batch, but the ultimate aim was to secure "'flow' production 
in order to gain the full benefits of industrialisation'. 
[113] Authorities were assured that the Ministry and the 
N. P. A. were working on improved techniques, -although it was 
also pointed out that their realisation was "not the kind of 
development- in which quick solutions can be expected". 
11143. The message was clear. If authorities ignored their 
reservations -and played -their part they would be the 
eventual beneficiaries of the revolution in building 
methods. 
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To argue that the notion of inexorable change in 
building methods was the invention solely of politicians and 
official architects astýthe means of implementing their 
industrialised building: policy denies the wider influence 
which such. expectations had among those involved in 
construction. The developments that were taking place in 
social housing technique inspired architectural Journalists 
to envisage an Orweltl-jan building scene of future years in 
which unproductive traditional builders were "swallowed up" 
by giant building corporations- utilising the full benefits 
of automated product, ion. [1153 J. Carter, Journalist and 
Architectural Advisor-, to the-R. I. R. A. Journal, described a 
future building site devoid of mud and of such clinical 
precision that it would, fully merit a place in the era that 
lay ahead of a modernised Britain. In years to come Carter 
envisaged a technocratic society, of, abundant provision, for 
all classes where ? worker and, architect, builder. and 
-occupant then go back' to their ample comfortable homes, to 
their ample culture--, filled, well organized leisure time. 
The contribution to this scenario of wealth and. contentment 
-focussed on by Carter., was building technology: 
"a group of (almost) white coated, well paid workers, 
slotting and dipping standard components into place in 
rhythmic sequence.; on an orderly, networked and 
mechanized site to. a faultless programme-without mud, 
mess,, sweat or sweAring"[116] 
1967 was the- heyday of industrialised building. The 
housing programme was still aimed at producing half a 
million dwellings each year by 1970 and the difficulties of 
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promoting system building were not yet seen as 
insurmountable. However, the years following Carter's vision 
saw the inevitability of a revolution in building technology 
grow less certain and the frustrations of sponsors more 
acute as the balance of payments crisis prompted cuts in 
housing expenditure and dispelled optimism that technology 
was the means to uninhibited economic growth. Significantly, 
science and technology were relegated to a minor role in 
Labour's re-election programme of 1966 as the difficulties 
of achieving the 'Modernisation of Britain' -subdued 
optimistic statements of; a scientific revolution. [117] 
Despite the support which the government still professed 
towards system building, popular discussion of the subject 
waned. Between 1967 and 1969 the two journals devoted to the 
propagation of system building, Interbuild and I. P. S. A. C., 
ceased publication without a word of explanation to their 
readership. 1967 saw the highest proportion of new housing 
tenders approved in system building and 1970 the highest 
completions. [Tab. II3 Thereafter, despite a brief resurgence 
in the early 1970s, C118] discussion of industrialised 
building, which had dominated editions for the four years 
between the creation of the N. P. A. in 1963 and the economic 
crisis in 1967, is scarcely tobe found in the architectural 
press. Si>: years later a rare mention in Building Design 
declared the completion of the last stages of the 
Thamesmeade Development to be industrialised building's 




Despite the currency of theories of mass production in 
housing, there were many experts who pointed out that 
expectations of this type were unrealistic. "As early as 1919 
The Builder pointed out that "The economy to be attained by 
repetition in building is limited, and cannot be-compared to 
that which can be effected in turning out -machines or 
domestic implements". [124] A similar view was held by the 
Tudor Walters Report. 1121] The point that unwarranted 
optimism was being invested in prefabrication was made at 
regular intervals in the subsequent development of new 
building technology by expert bodies and individual writers. 
The 1945 report by the Royal Institute of Architects of 
Ireland which noted the popularity of prefabrication was 
also sceptical of the benefits claimed, 1122] and in 1965 
the L. C. C., an authority particularly committed to the use 
of new methods of housebuilding, admitted that no economic 
advantages were to be gained from increasing the scale of 
production in the systems they were using. "1123] Indeed, as 
late as 1965 it was noted by C. Pratten and R. M. Dean that: 
'Economists have long written about economies of 
large-scale- production, and every economics textbook 
has a section on the subject. Very few, however, give 
any particular quantitive -notion of 
how, important 
these economies are in any particular industry"[124] 
Nevertheless, architects and politicians displayed a 
recurrent tendency to proselitise the benefits of applying 
the principles of mass production to housing, forecasting 
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miraculous gains in output and reductions In cost. 
Developments in manufacturing technique applied to the 
manufacture of complex artefacts such as cars and aeroplanes 
served as an example which housing experts found impossible 
to ignore. It is also significant that the application of 
these methods to housing production gained particular 
prominance at times when the political establishment- felt 
the existing social structure to be under pressure. 
Technology appeared the solution to many 20th Century crises 
in production, for it offered a solution to insufficiencies 
in the supply of wealth and inequities in its provision 
without major changes in the social structure. Where housing 
formed an important element of policy, prefabrication was 
proposed as the means of its provision. 
By the mid 1960s, politicians such as Geoffrey Rippon 
and Keith Joseph shared a belief in 'progressive' housing 
production theory. By adopting the rhetoric of the Modern 
Movement, politicians involved in housing reinforced their 
belief in technology and at the same time were able to give 
weight to their policies concerning the building industry 
described by Chapter One as central to a government building 
industry strategy that had developed over many years. 
Indeed, the argument that a fundamental change in methods of 
construction would be both beneficial to the client and an 
inevitable fact of the future building economy was a 
powerful one with which to press new methods onto local 
authorities and the public. It is evident that central 
government made full use of the persausive power of 
'progressive' housing production theory for these ideas were 
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presented repeatedly at forums which included local 
authorities, such as the Cement and Concrete Association 
conference of 1962 and the official circulars advising local 
government on state policy. By reiterating the inevitability 
of change the framers of policy were at the same time 
promoting the changes they sought. This must be born in mind 
when considering the enthusiasm with which ministerial 
policy embodied the most progressive theories of housing 
production. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. WORKERS BY HAND AND BRAIN 
Visiting a factory making aluminium temporary houses in 
1947, a contributor to the New Statesman observed a 
radically different way of making buildings to that which 
had existed before the advent of prefabrication: 
'The whole process of making prefabricated houses goes 
on here. The raw material comes in - aluminium, wood, 
glass and various complementary knicknacks; completed 
houses go out"C 1] 
Instead of craft workers, assisted by labourers, fashioning 
and placing materials on site in accordance with detailed 
drawings provided by the architect, he found automatons 
standing "on one spot for eight hours a day putting strips 
of metal into the guilotine, pressing the lever and taking 
them out again'. E23 Production of the aluminium house 
represented perhaps the most mechanised of the postwar 
building systems, but, in light of current architectural 
theory, many thought it to be the shape of things to come. 
In the manufacture of the bungalows considerable changes 
were affected on two of the largest areas of labour in the 
building process; operatives and architects. In the case of 
operatives, craft skills were dispensed with: any worker 
might walk off the street and stand before the- guillotine 
without ever having held a saw or trowel. Prefabrication 
threatened to upset the whole craft structure of the 
industry and therefore the basis of its trade union 
structure. In the case of the architect, accustomed to a 
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position at the head of the building process, design ended 
with assisting the engineers in the preparation of the 
prototype and a single set of drawings furnished the 
production of 50,000 houses. In addition to this, 'one of the 
architect's largest areas of work, supervising construction, 
was obviated by the factory production of prefinished units 
assembled with minimal and unskilled site labour. As one 
architect pointed out: 
'If 'one's house was produced as a motor car, was 
produced, and one received with - it a book of words 
showing the spare parts that could be bought, where 
was the need of the architect? "13]' 
As 'a result of 'a perception of the deskilling 
implications of prefabrication both the°the craft unions and 
the architectural profession developed strategies to 
safeguard their positions 'in the context of radical 
departures in building technology. This chapter will=discuss 
the response to -system building technology of both the 
National Federation-of Building Trades Operatives and the 
Royal Institute of British Architects. 
I. OPERATIVES. 
This section will explain why, -throughout the'entire postwar 
period, organised building labour did not attempt to thwart 
the use of system building even though the assembly on site 
of factory finished building components could not but have a 
significant effect on the work of skilled craft labour. 
The postwar acceptance of system building by building 
labour was in direct contrast to prewar precedent. During 
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the 1920s a serious dispute took place over the Weir House-. 
There was little that was revolutionary in the design of 
Lord Weir's system for it was "essentially a timber-framed 
house faced externally with steel sheeting". [47 What was 
significant about Weir's proposal, from the point of view of 
building labour, was that its economic viability was based 
on the use of engineering workers and engineering rates of 
pay which were lower than those for building. In its 
manufacture and, more significantly, in-its site erection 
the nationally agreed flat 'rates for building were 
circumvented. In response to this the National Federation of 
Building Trades Operatives (N. F. B. T. O. ) warned local 
authorities that the erection of Weir houses with labour 
paid under other than building trade rates would result in 
the withdrawal of Federation labour on municipal 
construction sites. Although the Court of Enquiry, appointed 
by the Minister of Labour to review the dispute, found 
against the N. F. B. T. O., the fear of disputes on the part of 
local authorities helped to undermine'the market for the 
house which was later withdrawn. A precedent had'been 
established: while the Unions had not sought to control the 
rates of -pay within- factories, the site --erection of 
prefabricated systems was-to be the work; of building labour 
paid under the established rates. Both Telford and 
Braithwaite, also promoting steel based systems before the 
war, observed this practice. 153 
The government was careful- to involve the building 
unions in its wartime deliberations on future building 
policy. As well as being approached to sit on C. I. S. P. H. - 
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an offer which he declined - Richard Coppock, Secretary of 
the N. F. P. T. C., sat on both the subcommittee of the Central 
Housing Advisory Committee considering temporary house 
construction and the Burt Committee. But Coppock harboured 
few illusions on what prefabrication meant for building 
labour. In a memorandum prepared for his Federation in 1944, 
Coppock concluded that, as well as introducing non building 
labour controlled by other unions, prefabrication threatened 
to undermine the craft structure of the building industry: 
'unless we are prepared boldly to face up to the 
questions we may find our craft processes broken down 
to small units of such simplicity and specialisation, 
that the entire fabric of our organisation... [the 
N. F. P. T. O. 7... and our economic position is placed in 
jeopardy'16 ] 
However, as Coppock pointed out, any initiative by 
government to expand housing supply would receive the 
acclamation and support of the nation, and the hinderance of 
this through a clash between the Federation and the 
government over prefabrication would attract the 'most 
caustic criticism". A more productive approach, 'reasoned 
Coppock, would be to seek to influence the development of 
prefabrication in order that any new processes and classes 
of labour involved would be brought within the "control" of 
the N. F. P. T. C. In 1945, the Federation's annual conference 
passed a- motion accepting non traditional methods of 
construction on the basis that "whatever type of 
prefabricated house may be invented, it should be regarded 
as normal building trade practice, and that building trade 
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rates and conditions should apply'. 173 
While the unions saw prefabrication, both within, and 
without the factory, as building work; deserving the proper 
demarcation of-skills and rates of pay, sponsors did not. 
For instance, when Weir launched a postwar housing system he 
acceded to the Almalgamated Society of Woodworker's demand 
that that the site labour should consist of gangs containing 
a high proportion of skilled labour paid at current rates. 
However, within the workshops the company insisted on the 
use of unskilled labour in tasks such'as pipe-bending, paint 
spraying and preparation of wall and floor units, claiming 
that "scientific methods of efficient industrial production" 
obviated the need for craft skills. The Federation was 
disturbed to hear that trade work: was being carried out by 
"girls" and men, all on a labourers rate of is/8d per hour. 
[8] The lack of a dispute over this breach of N. F. B. T. O. 
policy indicated that, as in the case of Weir's earlier 
house, the unions were prepared to insist on a high, degree 
of control on, the building site but not in the factories. 
In March 1946, the Minister of Labour and `National 
Service and the Permanent Secretaries from the M. O. W and 
M. O. H. visited the General Council of the N. F. P. T. O. to 
discuss future building policy. Pointing out that building 
demands over the next decade would more than absorb the 
planned increase in the labour force and that prefabrication 
was a temporary expedient only they found a Council very 
sympathetic to the Labour Government's housing policy: 
The meeting pledged itself to support all the 
Ministers in all steps necessary to expand the housing, 
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programme... and appreciated the vital importance, of 
supporting the present government in such a way that 
there should be no failure of the - housing 
programme"C9] 
By 1946, organised building labour chose neither to 
Jeopardise the survival of a Labour-Government pledged to 
social reform nor the welfare policies that it was pursuing. 
A year later, the M. O. W. was able to-report that, with the 
careful consultation of the workforce on the non traditional 
building sites for which they had been responsible, --"The 
co-operation of the workmen has been as wholehearted as 
could have been wished". 1103 
By 1950 non traditional methods had not proved as 
transient as the government had claimed. At the N. F. R. T. O. 
Conference that year the Midland Counties Region (an area 
relying heavily on system building) proposed a motion 
opposing new methods which it felt were causing not only a 
"deterioration of craftsmanship" but also unecessary expense 
and a reduction in housing quality for the working class. As 
the delegate from the plasterers union pointed out:,. "it is 
the people of our class who have "to pay for all the 
experiments and all the stunts that have been introduced in 
the name of housing since 1945". 111] In the ensuing debate, 
opinions ranged between support for the motion and fear that 
the Federation might be branded as "people not prepared to 
face up to new developments in the industry". 1123 No vote 
was taken and the motion was referred to the Executive 
Committee for further consideration. 
The subsequent development of union policy in relation 
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to system building was heavily influenced by two postwar 
developments; full employment (although this varied in 
different regions), and a weakening of organised building 
labour. The first of these had a crucial effect on the 
acceptance of new technologies and, as was noted by Coppock, 
reduced the potential for conflict. 113] Workers made 
redundant by labour saving, or skill eliminating 
technologies were able to find employment elsewhere. The 
second tendency also minimised industrial confrontation. The 
weakening of organised labour began with the introduction of 
payment by results under emergency legislation to improve 
productivity in wartime building. (14] The scheme, one of 
the first examples of state intervention to improve 
efficiency in building, was retained after the war by 
employers eager to introduce piecework to building 
operations. ' According to L. W. Wood, the opportunity to 
negotiate wage payments locally opened the door to labour 
only subcontracting (`the lump'). The seemingly generous 
premium (untaxed wage) offered under 'the lump' reduced the 
incentive for workers to Join the unions which negotiated 
the hitherto universally applied national flat rates. [15] 
From 1947 building union membership began to fall, and by 
the late 1960s a number of the craft unions were 
experiencing financial difficulties and considering 
amalgamation. 116] This was eventually carried out in 1968, 
when the individual craft unions, previously federated under 
the N. F. B. T. O., combined to form the Union of Construction 
and Allied Trades Technicians. The eventual combination of 
the unions into a stronger whole and a greater militancy 
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provoked by declining building wage rates and increasing use 
of 'the lump' culminated in the first ever national building 
strike in 1972. This brought an end to the period of 
relative tranquility covered by this account. 
The introduction of continental large panel systems in 
the early 1960s was thought by the unions to herald the 
greatest change in building methods so far. On this occasion 
there was no suggestion by government or the industry that 
this latest departure from traditional building methods was 
temporary. One delegate at the 1962 N. F. B. T. O. conference 
described his visit to a system building factory in East 
Germany and the threat that large panel systems held for 
skilled building labour: 
'Here were complete wall units manufactured in a 
factory without one skilled operative having to touch 
that work. They were transported to site and Joined 
together like a pack of cards... This is what we are 
going to face, this is industrialised building'C17] 
Not prepared to resist new methods which severely diminished 
the labour content of building operations in principle, the 
Federation, in 1963, reiterated its 1945 position by 
demanding that not only should it be informed of government 
intentions on the extent to which industrialised building 
was to be used but also that The labour engaged in the 
production and erection of new materials should be that 
trained within the construction industry and controlled by 
the unions affiliated to the N. F. P. T. O. ". 1183 This was also 
endorsed by the National Joint Council (N. J. C. ) for the 
Building Industry, on which representatives of the Unions 
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and Employers sat (the N. J. C. for the Precast Concrete 
Industry, under which many precasting firms worked, did not 
accept the agreement). (19] Thus, the building firms 
promoting systems had, for the first time as a body, 
formally agreed to observe the application of building rates 
of pay and conditions both within the factories in which 
components were manufactured and on the sites on which they 
were erected. 
In order to avoid friction with the unions over new 
techniques, large building firms displayed a meticulous 
desire to involve the Federation in early negotiations. In 
1962 Laing approached the Executive Committee of the 
N. F. B. T. O. with an invitation to view the Sectra system that 
it about to import from France. Eventually, in consultation 
with the Federation, it devised an erection gang made up of 
a mix of skilled and unskilled labour. (20] A similar 
process was undertaken by the Unit Construction Co. over the 
introduction of the Camus system, who agreed an erection 
team comprising of 7 trade operatives, three steel fixers 
and 16 labourers. (21] In April 1964, the National 
Federation of Building Trades Employers agreed to the 
setting up of a committee, comprising members of both the 
employers' and operatives' federations to settle any 
disputes that arose on the composition of gangs for specific 
systems. 122] One conspicuous exception to this conciliatory 
process was Taylor Woodrow, who, "unlike most of the other 
firms", introduced the Larsen Nielsen system without 
consulting the Federation, intending that building rates of 
pay and conditions would not be extended to their factory 
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workforce. In response to this, the Federation 'told the 
firm quite frankly" that if they did not observe the 
national agreement in the manufacture of their panels "it 
was quite likely there would be considerable difficulty in 
getting them erected". [23] Next March, the Federation-noted 
that not only were the facilities and working conditions of 
the factory excellent, but that the firm was also employing 
a , large number of craft operatives who were tobe paid under 
the conditions of the national agreement. 
In attempting to'examine the impact of system building 
on craft skills, and the degree to which the unions were 
successful in realising their aim of controlling all the 
labour involved in industrialised building, it is essential 
to realise that developments in this field were also 
accompanied by wider changes in methods of building during 
the postwar period. In 1958, the N. F. B. T. O. 'Conference-noted 
that a recent one and a half million pound contract in 
Swindon'had been completed in 10 months by only 40-50 
labourers and 14 craft operatives. In 'a conference called in 
the following year to examine new technologies, Coppock 
reviewed the changes that had taken place:, 
The modern structure of today is a suspended one, 
mainly of concrete beams and roofs and floors carrying 
a light covering of bricks... the artistic development 
of- the industry has been assimilated to straight 
lines... Architects today have rarely demonstrated 
what is known ý as Victorian or Edwardian 
architecture... until we can get a different format in 
the structure that is being erected, our industry is 
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bound to become more simplified and part of the 
craftsmanship may be eliminated"C24] 
One of the most significant effects of new trends in 
building was the increased use of the semi-skilled worker. 
Where new materials and techniques were introduced, rather 
than being assigned to an existing craft they were often 
carried out by quickly trained unskilled labour paid at a 
higher rate for the time spent on the new job. 1253 This 
tendency was particularly evident in the use of precast 
concrete. - For instance, of the 26 operatives in the Unit 
gang the 12 workers responsible for erecting and sealing the 
concrete panels were plus-rated labourers, with the number 
of bricklayers used in the system reduced to two. This 
tendency brought the complaint that 'this prefabrication 
work' is being based on the labourer, and not on the 
craftsman". 126] As H. J. O. Weaver noted in 1964, so far "the 
big problem had been the desire of most of the firms to use 
as high a ratio as possible of non-craft labour in the 
balanced gangs erecting the systems". [27] The figure aimed 
at by the Federation was a 50% mix, which corresponded to 
traditional construction. The feeling that this was not 
generally achieved was the cause of the Conference on New 
Techniques convened by the Federation in 1964 in which the 
problem was discussed. 
The effect of system building on operative's skills was 
discussed by the P. R. S. in-a study on the skill structure of 
the building industry in 1966. The study noted that system 
building had indeed influenced the work of skilled trades 
and labourers affecting the proportion of work; carried out 
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by each. Of the five main trades it found that bricklayer's 
work had been reduced both in quantity and complexity, and 
noted that on some sites it had been dispensed with 
altogether. However, in the case of carpenters and joiners, 
the study found that, although simplified to the erection 
and assembly of prefabricated panels and components, the 
proportion of wort: had increased. (28] Unlike bricklayers, 
carpenter's work had adapted to system building and their 
skills were utilised- to a larger degree. Indeed, the 
discrepancy between the fortunes of the two largest trades 
involved in building was the source of a marked division of 
interests which manifested itself in both the N. F. B. T. O. 
conferences on new technology held in 1959 and 1964. The 
bricklayers, represented by the Amalgamated Union of 
Building Trades Workers (A. U. B. T. W. ), finding themselves 
vulnerable to modern technology, advocated the amalgamation 
of all building unions and the centralised negotiation of 
rates of pay for all trades. (29] While the carpenters, 
represented by the powerful Amalgamated Society of 
Woodworkers, were sympathetic to the difficulties of the 
A. U. R. T. W. they were not prepared to proceed on a basis of 
sharing out the available wok" or contenance any federal 
negotiation of rates. t30] However, the fact that this 
dispute manifested itself as early as 1959, suggests that it 
was as much a symptom of the wider changes in building 
technology that were taking place as the product solely of 
system building. The R. R. S. also found that system building 
brought changes to two other trades. In the case of 
plasterers, half the sites had dispensed with the trade 
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altogether and where the trade was present it comprised only 
half the proportion of the labour force that it did on a 
traditional site. However, with the widespread use of 
plasterboard in both traditional and system building, the 
numbers employed in this trade had been falling overall 
since the late 1950s. Like bricklaying, the erosion of the 
plastering trade was not peculiar to system building. (31] 
Painters' and decorators also comprised a larger proportion 
of-- the labour force than they did in traditional 
construction. - 
As well as debating the degree to which they might 
control the labour involved in system building, the unions 
also contemplated the "wider" issues involved in the 
relationship between social housing and new building 
methods. The outcome of this discussion can only have 
lessened the potential for conflict-over the introduction of 
new" technologies. In 1963 a delegate at the Annual 
Conference, of the A. U. P. T. W. pointed out that the building 
unions could not condemn the government for building too few 
homes at the same time as opposing the new methods of 
construction which it was thought would make them possible. 
Furthermore, 
they could not condemn the lack of high investment in 
the industry and the lack of scientific planning 
without some , responsibility in participation in 
methods of building"C323 
This sentiment was heightened with the return of the Labour 
Government in 1964. At the N. F. B. T. O. conference of that 
year Coppock urged support for the new government in its 
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housebuilding programme with another speaker suggesting that 
sectional interests in relation to new building technologies 
should be abandoned in the wider interests of the economy 
of the country". [333 Indeed, the eventual culmination of 'a 
consideration of wider issues was the adoption by the 1966 
N. F. B. T. O. Conference of a motion proposed by the Northwest 
Counties Regional Council calling for the setting up of 
state owned factories to manufacture 'prefabricated 
components for 'houses, multi-storied flats, schools and 
hospitals' to be supplied to local authorities at cost price 
on long term loans. 1343 Since 1945, the erstwhile opponents 
of industrialised building had become one of its many 
advocates. 
II. ARCHITECTS. 
In 1939 F. R. S. Yorke wrote of the oldest and most powerful 
body in the profession', the Royal Institute of British 
Arhitects (R. I. R. A. ) that: - 
The bulk of its members, as of the profession as a 
whole are academic practitioners of one form or 
another of revivalism... The Architect's Department of 
His Majesty's Office of Works.. appears wedded to a 
staid neo-classical style. -The same is true of the big 
banks and many of the local government 
authorities[35] 
Criticism of the stylistic and technological conservatism of 
the R. I. P. A. - was nowhere more severely expressed than by the 
Chief Scientific Advisor to the Minister of Works in 1940. 
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Reginald Stradling described the tendency of the 
architectural profession to "live in the the past' and 
ignore the technological developments of recent years. At 
its worst Stradling thought the architectural profession. 
about to descend into "parasitism" which only a radical 
reappraisal of its training and outlook could arrest. 136] 
The view that the R. I. B. A. was technologically backward can 
only have been confirmed by the actions of its 
Reconstruction Committee in August 1942. In a `First General 
Statement- of Conclusions' the- Committee recommended the 
'greatest practicable proportion of factory production to 
site works, so that factories and factory workers formerly 
employed on munitions may relieve the 'pressure" on 
traditional resources,. but, contrary to Modernist beliefs, 
did not advocate prefabrication as a long term solution to 
housing. 137] Indeed, in its representation to the sub 
committee of the Central Housing Advisory Committee 
considering temporary housing the R. I. P. A. stated that° it 
'would regard with regret the creation of a body of labour 
unskilled in any craft but the assembly of ready made houses 
by means of the spanner". C38] The antagonism of the 
official wartime committees of the R. I. B. A. towards 
permanent changes in housing tecnology 'caused it to 
stigmatise the factory 'production of housing in `House 
Construction of a Definite Limited Life', as fit only for 
temporary construction. This was greeted with severe 
criticism by Architectural Design on behalf of 'the more 
active and forward looking members of the profession". E393 
Although not as rapid as many advocates of new methods 
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would have liked, it is evident that, the latter years of the 
Second World War saw areas of the architectural profession 
attempting to adapt to changes in technology and identify a 
new role in society. P. Malpass locates this as originating 
before the war and identifies two themes; the notion of the 
architect as the purveyor of a broad range of distinct 
technological skills, and the belief that they -could be of 
"quintessential value to society". [40] The association 
between the social role of the architectural profession and 
their technical expertise as a means to this end was a 
dominant motif of the profession's adjustment-to the postwar 
Welfare State and may be seen as a major aspect of its 
eventual policy towards system building. In 1936, the 
President of the R. I. B. A., Percy Thomas, set out this new 
view of the profession: 
Most thinking persons in- this country realise only 
too well the many ills from which-our civilisation 
suffers. Architects know, that the cure for many of 
them lies in ordered replanning and the rebuilding of 
our congested towns and cities... it is on the 
technical ability of architects that the success or 
otherwise of rebuilding our towns and cities will 
depend... we exist solely to. serve the community and 
we must bend our utmost power to that end"C413 - 
Elements' of the profession also saw in a mastery of new 
techniques the means by which it, might enhance its status in 
the postwar world. Already, by 1942, the R. I. E. A. had 
established in the Architectural Science Board a body 
designed to discuss, and disseminate among the profession, 
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the impact of technological developments on building 
practice. (42] A major purpose of the education of the 
profession in new technologies was undoubtedly to maintain 
the architects position as the central figure in the design 
of buildings. As an Architectural Design leader pointed out 
in 1944, postwar design had become a multidisciplinary 
effort involving a number of technical specialists: 
'Science has -contributed much to practically every 
aspect of building and building organisation during 
the- war years, - and the professional standing of 
architects can be proportionately enhanced, provided 
they grasp the situation in a realistic spirit"E43] 
The identification of a social role for architects and 
the introduction of science to building was accompanied by 
both a growth in the profession and the assimilation of a 
major portion of architectural- practice within the state 
machine. Whereas before the war the norm was for architects 
to work in private practice the balance had changed and the 
large increase in the profession was finding employment in 
the state sector. 144] This tendency continued for, by 1967, 
407. of all architects were employed by local-or, central 
government; furthermore, the 507. remaining in private 
practice found that, by then, more than half their work was 
awarded by the public sector. As Martin Pawley put it in 
1971: 'Thus within 50 years, the involvement of the 
architectural profession with'the state has become almost as 
complete as that of the doctors or the teachers". (45] 
The state direction of building resources to social 
housing and educational programmes through the licensing 
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system of the 1940s and early- 1950s relegated private 
practice to a subsidiary role in the development of postwar 
architecture. As the Economist noted, it was the public 
architect who was getting the interesting work, and the 
private architect who was carrying out the overflow of work 
from public offices. Indeed, it could be suggested that the 
synthesis of the profession's interest in new technology and 
its belief in a social role for architecture was the public 
sector office where many of the new systems of construction 
were being developed,. '', 
'Thus the Hertfordshire County Council first showed in 
its school building what could be done by 
pre-planning, modern technology and cost planning... 
[furthermore the Ministry of Education' architects)... ' 
have not only reduced the cost/schoolplace by 457. 
since 1949... but have demonstrated a variety of non 
traditional methods and materials - and even invented 
some - within a genre of architectural comeliness 
which has brought foreign architects flocking to these 
shores. A bitter pill this for the old school, whose 
efforts in the interwar years hardly raised a flicker 
of interest among their questing overseas 
colleagues' 146 ] 
Even the R. I. B. A. Journal admitted, in 1960, that, while the 
ideal of most professional architects might still be to 
become the principal of a private practice, the opportunity 
to open up new fields of technical development offered by 
public service had done much to counter this. 147] 
From the 1950s onwards the official architects who had 
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been promoting prefabrication began to assume an exalted 
position within their profession. With pride the Chair of 
the Hertfordshire County Council pointed out the success 
which the use of new technology had brought to two members 
of his professional staff: "up to 1945, we had no 
architect... our first County Architect is now your 
President, and our first Deputy is now the Chief Architect 
at the Ministry of Education' (1954). [48] However, it was 
D. E. E. Gibson who personified the 'public service" architect 
with a sucessful 'career based on the furtheranceof new 
technology in welfare building. In 1938 Coventry City 
Council appointed Gibson as their first City Architect. (49] 
Gibson's commitment to new technology was expressed during 
the 'war with his membership of C. I. S. P. H. CCh. IV] In 1941 he 
attempted to set up -a committee- to discuss the use of 
aircraft factories for housing' production and, as well as 
designing an experimental prefabricated house for his 
corporation, Gibson's department eventually designed a house 
for the Bristol Aircraft Company (P. A. C. ). [50] Indeed, it 
was Gibson who wrote the reports advising Coventry Council 
to concentrate their housing programme on No-Fines 
construction. While the leader of- the Council, George 
Hodgkinson, displayed some anxiety over this 'step into the 
dark", 151] Gibson's philosophy was more confident: "I find 
one ought to assume full' responsibility for one's ideas' and 
if lay committees resist "do the job and take what comes". 
[52] Gibson's proclivity to boldly assign entire building 
programmes to firms promoting new methods of construction 
applied also-to schools. In 1951 he proposed that the City's 
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educational building programme for the next five years 
should be awarded to P. A. C. for construction in their 
prefabricated aluminium system. [53] Although the city 
eventually used four systems, the bulk of this programme was 
eventually carried out in aluminium as Gibson intended. [54] 
In 1957 Gibson moved to Nottinghamshire where he became 
County Architect and supervised the design and establishment 
of the Consortium of Local Authorities Special Project 
(C. L. A. S. P. ), [discussed in the following section] an 
undertaking which was to have great significance for the 
subsequent development of prefabrication. In 1963 Gibson was 
appointed head of the Directorate of Research and 
Development of the Ministry of Public Buildings and Works. 
In 1964, Gibson became President of the R. I. B. A. 
Perhaps the most singular public success for both 
prefabrication and the architectural profession was the 
award of a special prize to a C. L. A. S. P. prefabricated 
school at an Italian design fair in 1960 - the significance 
of which was eloquently noted by Raynor Banham in `A Gong 
For the Welfare State': 
'In July, if you had taken a poll of the 16,000-odd 
registered architects in Britain on the subject `who 
is Dan Lacey? ' barely a couple of hundred could have 
told you he was county architect for Notts, but by the 
end of the month every thinking architect in Europe 
could have told you he was the titular designer of the 
Schola Inglese at the Triennale di Milano, which so 
far outdid all other exhibits that an unprecedented 
class of award - Grand Premo con Menzione Speziale - 
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had to be created for it"[55] 
With the wholehearted support the R. I. P. A. gave to 
government efforts to improve productivity within the 
construction industry during the 1960s, the bond between the 
architectural profession and industrialised,, building was 
cemented. In an attempt to set its own house in order the 
Institute commissioned a survey on working practices in 
architects' offices, The Architect and Productivity, which 
it published in 1962. A -characteristic of the report, 
indicating the-flavour 'of opinion within the profession, -was 
the distinction between the "good" and the "bad" offices. 
The former tended to be the larger, more highly organised 
and efficient practices, while the latter were smaller, less 
profitable and less inclined to make use of modern 
organisational techniques. Both types of office were aware 
of the increasing trend toward industrialised building. 
While the "bad" offices "did not understand the effect it 
would have on the practice of architecture" and felt. it a 
threat to their professional position, not suprisingly, the 
"good" offices "welcomed the inevitability of increasing 
industrialisation in, the building industry as an aid to 
higher productivity" and felt that the profession should 
become more involved in order to strengthen the architect's 
position. 156] In 1963, the R. I. B. A. 's annual conference was 
held on the subject of Architects and Productivity and in 
his opening speech the President, Robert Mathew, illuminated 
the social need to -execute rapid building programmes. 
The 
foremost responsibility of architects to their clients, 
whether individual or collective, was clearly to increase 
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the output of buildings: 
'As architects we -have to think first of our 
responsibility 'to-our clients, and" to the-public at 
large, all of whom- want '-a vast output of, new' 
buildings, and can't afford, 'or-aren't prepared, to 
wait very long for them. The word 'affluence' will 
continue to have a rather hollow 'ring until we have 
provided society with the buildings-it requires. The 
-building programme is indeed at the- centre of all our 
social and industrial problems'157] ' 
Two years- later the R. I. P. A. published its definitive 
statement on system building, The Industrialisation of 
Building, pointing out the benefits of system building to 
both the architect and the client. If the system was 
properly designed, the report stated, architects would 
maintain high standards while at the same time handling up 
to 60% more work. ' Referring to the benefits which 
industrialisation conferred on the client, whether 
collective or `individual, the report left architects in 
little doubt where their professional responsibility lay: 
'Many forms of industrialisation enable the architect 
to give him... [the client, ]... a better professional 
service, the manufacturer to produce better quality 
components at a more favourable price, and the 
contractor to maintain a more uniform and high 
standard of construction'C58] 
As Cleeve Barr commented the following year, 'the 
architectural profession is adapting itself to the needs of 
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the daj . C59] 
III. THE CONTROL OF DESIGN. 
This section will discuss a form of organisation, the local 
authority consortium, by which architects, through the 
agency of local government, became both the designers and 
sponsors of systems. Consortia represented the only means by 
which architects were able to wrest the absolute control of 
system building design and production from commercial 
interests. As such, consortia can be seen as the 
architectural profession's attempt to resist the tendency 
for system building to take design responsibility away from 
the architect and place it with the manufacturer. 
It was in Hertfordshire's schoolbuilding programme that 
the architect's hand first came to the fore in the design 
and successful sponsorship of a building system. The vital 
difference between Hertfordshire's system and those marketed 
by commercial interests was described by the County 
Architect, C. H. Aslin, in 1950. Up to this time, Aslin 
pointed out, the design of system building components had 
generally been dictated by manufacturers, but, in the case 
of Hertfordshire's schools, a vital difference was that the 
various parts of the structure... have been designed by 
architects". (60] However, the conditions under which 
Hertfordshire were able to design and operate their system 
were not enjoyed by other authorities whose building 
programmes were simply not large enough to support a system 
of their own design. (61] By the late 1940s, Hertfordshire, 
whose boundaries encompassed the new towns of Stevenage 
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(designated 1946), Hemel Hempstead (d. 1947), Hatfield 
(d. 1948) and Welwyn Garden City (d. 1948), [62] was building 
up to 20 schools a year. Although other local authorities 
had educational building programmes large enough to exploit 
proprietary systems of standardised construction designed by 
manufacturers, programmes were generally too small to 
operate systems of their own. 
The solution to this impasse was found through an 
innovation in local authority building policy which 
originated in Nottinghamshire. In common with a number of 
other education authorities experiencing shortages in 
traditional building supply, Nottinghamshire turned its 
attention towards system building for its primary schools 
early in the 1950s-1633 In 1955 a new County Architect was 
appointed, D. E. E. Gibson, and a number of staff changes 
occurred including the importation of new blood which had 
been subjected to the Hertfordshire experience". [64] The 
policy which the authority then pursued was to place the 
1956/7 schoolbuilding 'programme with outside architects 
using ' commercially available systems while Gibson's 
department developed one of their own. [65] However, it was 
the solution to the difficulty of providing a market 
sufficiently large to support a system designed by 
themselves that was the most significant feature of 
Nottinghamshire's contribution to the development of system 
building. Through the amalgamation of a number of 
neighbouring authorities under the umbrella of the 
Consortium of Local Authorities Special Project (C. L. A. S. P. ) 
a vastly larger programme was offered to the firms selected 
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to manufacture the parts than any one of the member 
authorities itself could provide. Furthermore, the member 
authorities were not forced to commit the whole of their 
schools programmes to new methods to enjoy a system designed 
and managed by their own architects. The 1957/8 programme 
included 11 schools with a total programme worth 900,000 
pounds, in 1958/9 this rose to 2.8 million and by 1959/60 
stood at 3.4 million pounds. 1663 
It is important to emphasise that C. L. A. S. P. did not 
represent a significant development -in' system building 
technology. The basic principles of the structure had been 
developed ten years previously by Hertfordshire. (67] What 
technical innovation there was was confined to the 
development of a flexible joint in the steel framework to 
accommodate ground movement found in the coal mining 
counties that comprised the membership. Nor was the 
association of local authorities into larger buying units 
the invention of the Nottinghamshire Architect's Department. 
In 1935, the M. G. H. Committee on the Standardization and 
Simplification of the Requirements of Local Authorities 
urged firstly the standardisation of the innumerable 
articles" bought by local authorities and secondly that in 
order for smaller authorities to "obtain for themselves the 
full benefits of bulk purchase... (they].., should combine 
for purposes of buying either with other local authorities 
similarly situated or with larger local authorities". [68] 
Indeed, a major benefit which C. L. A. S. P. and its advocates 
consistently pointed out, was the apparent savings made 
through bulk purchase -'it was on this basis that consortia 
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were promoted by the Ministry of Education. Through the 
principle of combining a number of building . markets, 
C. L. A. S. P. proved the model by which architects could be 
both designers and sponsors of building systems. As one of 
the C. L. A. S. P. design team, Henry Swain, pointed out: 
The inherent limitation of prefabrication was that it 
was always liable to be directed by commercial rather 
than architectural considerations. The manufacturer of 
the system would generally control its development and 
It would tend to appear on the market for `architects 
to' take it or leave it. Many of them would take it, 
but somewhat reluctantly... The consortium formed by a 
number of public authorities was devised to overcome 
this disadvantage. Its architects, by'accepting the 
responsibility of co-ordinating many factories and 
sites and by carrying out continuous technical 
development are able to reconcile architectural 
control with the need to standardise components for 
quantity production"169] 
The architectural profession described its attempts to 
control the design of building systems through consortia as 
a part of its newly identified social role. The suggestion 
that the control of, prefabrication-should be taken by the 
profession as a part of- its' social duty was made by the 
Architects Journal as early as 1941. The journal urged that, 
unless the profession resolved to dominate 'shop made 
buildings... in the interests of the community" there would 
be "chaos" after the war'. 170] In 1964 the Architectural 
Review explained consortia as the outcome of architect's 
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'strong conviction... that user needs and not the exigencies 
of production should be the deciding factor' in. design. C-71] 
Indeed, in sponsoring proprietary systems industry was 'in 
fact usurping the function of the architect' which was to 
interpret the client's needs and protect the architectural 
quality of the environment on behalf of the community. Being 
aware'-that buildings designed by the production engineer 
provided an environment lacking-in 'human quality and 
convenience' the journal described the formation of 
consortia as a strategy arising 
The next conclusion in the 
was that the architect could 
control over industrialised 
medium of the large clients 
resort has been had to 
from, this-=concerns 
furtherance of this idea 
only obtain sufficient 
production through the 
in the public sector... 
the building authority 
consortium'1723 
The desire for architects to gain control of new technology 
on behalf of the building client, rather than in their 
professional interests, -formed ýa powerful thread in the 
profession's promotion of its social role. 
One of the first application-of consorting to housing 
was initiated by Coventry -: - one of the early members of 
C. L. A. S. P. In December 1961, the Coventry City Housing 
Committee considered a suggestion by their Architect, now 
Arthur`Ling, to -join together with neighbouring Midland 
authorities in order that they might: 
'exchange information on designs, methods of 
construction and building costs and confer on the 
possibilities of standardising fittings and components 
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and bulk purchase of such items for authorities in the 
group as a whole, which apart from effecting savings 
in costs could also speed up production"173] 
With the Committee's approval for the architect to make the 
necessary approaches, the establishment of the first housing 
consortium began. In July 1962, representatives from 12 
neighbouring borough councils met to discuss the 'obvious 
advantage from the point of view of client design and 
control" of joining together to forma consortium. C743 In 
February 1963, -Municipal Journal announced that the 12 
Midland authorities, with a combined population of two 
million and housing capital expenditure of 6.5 million 
pounds, had joined together to form the Midland Housing 
Consortium (M. H. C. ). 1753 
The first job- which the M. H. C. 's joint development 
group, tackled was the organisation of a bulk tendering 
programme for commonly used items such as ironmongery, 
doorsets, and rainwater goods. By the end of December, 1963, 
the Board of Chief Officers of the consortium was able to 
report to the Coventry Housing Committee that, whereas it 
would contribute 2,134 pounds toward development costs in 
1964/5, it would save 4,204 pounds through bulk purchasing 
agreements. C763 However, as the Principal Architect to the 
Consortium pointed out, this had been only a preliminary 
step, for, 'The real work of the Development Group... began 
with its first development project... resulting in 
production of the M. N. C. building system". 1773 By mid-1964 
M. H. C. had completed its first project of 129 houses at 
Woodwag Lane, Coventry, in its Mk. I system which combined 
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blockwork crosswalls with timber infill panels. Like 
C. L. A. S. P., M. H. C. made little-in"the way of a-technical 
contribution to housing, the novelty was in the promotion 
and control of a housing system by architects. 'E78] 
By the early 1960s consortia had produced systems 
capable of building schools and low-rise housing. However, 
one field of system building technology which consortia, as 
yet, had left untouched was that of large panel concrete 
construction. Intervention in this latter area of system 
building technology-was 'considerably, harder as it required 
more organisational and technical resources than the types 
of building with' which consortia were familiar. For this 
reason, high-rise precast concrete construction had remained 
the exclusive preserve of large building contractors and 
specialist precasting firms. 
Nevertheless, by 1964 a further consortium had begun to 
take on this as yet untouched area of system building 
technology. The Yorkshire Development Group (Y. D. G. ), 
comprising Leeds, Sheffield, Nottingham and Hull, had been 
formed in late 1961 and in December 1964, it unveiled plans 
to develop a large concrete panel system for an initial 
programme of 4,500 dwellings. E79) The first step consisted 
of the rationalisation of members' house plans on the basis 
of a standardised superstructure four to seven stories high. 
This was then developed to a stage where it was suited to 
construction in precast concrete panels and "could be built 
in a variety of systems of manufacture and erection... 
capable of using a limited range of large simple 
components". [807 However, the key to Y. D. G. 's appropriation 
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of precast concrete-, construction from commercial interests 
lay in a tendering procedure based on the two-stage-method 
developed by the Ministry, of Public Buildings and Works. 
[81] Rather than purchasing an existing 'system, two stage 
tendering was designed to allow contractors to compete for 
the manufacture-and erection of--a system designed by outside 
architects. As the : first- stage of the procedure, Y. D. G. 
considered the manufacturing techniques and organisational 
capabilities of '24 firms - in relation to its -outline 
proposals. As a- result : of--this -examination four-competitors 
proceeded to 'stage two' and were required to submit tenders 
on the basis of detailed performance specifications and 
scale-plans and elevations of typical blocks. The Shepherd 
Building Group won the initial contract to manufacture and 
erect the Y. D. G. system for the first 440 dwellings in the 
programme at Leak Street, Leeds, and eventually constructed 
the remainder of the. programme. C82], Through the use of a 
modified contract procedure developed by the government, 
local authority architects, through the consortia system, 
had gained control of the design and production of the 
complex and sophisticated precast concrete systems. A firm 
which'would otherwise-have been a system building sponsor, 
had become merely the supplier of components to the client 
architect's design. 
Ey the mid 1960s, the control of systems had divided 
into two camps: -commercial producers and consortia, with the 
latter growing rapidly in number and size. This bipartisan 
division was reflected in the alignment of the building 
journals: R. I. P. A. Journal and Architects Journal gave 
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considerable coverage to consortia, while those representing 
building interests, such as Interbuild and The Builder were 
conspicuous for the lack of space afforded to such important 
developments in the building world. In 1965 Concrete Ltd, 
the most successful of the precast concrete system-sponsors, 
published The Function of I. B. which argued against the 
design of systems by client organisatons-in favour of the 
greater efficiency of commercially sponsored systems which 
embodied the best expertise of' the- commerial specialist. - 
(833A dispute was developing over who should control the 
design and production-'of system building; industry or the 
architectural profession. So far as the large contractors 
were concerned, consortia were a threat to their attempts, 
described in Chapter Two, to monopolise the social building 
market. The publication of the White Paper on the proposed 
N. P. A. in-1963, and the government's intention to use its 
new organisation rto promote consortia provoked the most 
notable'attack by The Builder. The journal enlisted the 
services of a firm- of Industrial Consultants, O. W. Roskill, 
in the hope that its prejudice against consortia would be 
justified by an expert examination. This report, published 
in 1964, makes interesting reading- for it presents a 
sustained counter argument against consortia which is 
difficult to dismiss as entirely partisan - despite the hail 
of indignation with which it was greeted from an affronted 
architectural profession. 184] 
The report confirmed that the building industry had 
indeed much to fear from the growth of the consortia 
movement: 
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'If a significant number of powerful consortia are 
established, they are likely eventually to have a big 
impact on the building industry. Large contractors 
think that consortia may lead to the elimination of 
medium sized contractors some of whom are already 
seeking to avoid this fate by having themselves 
nominated as approved contractors for proprietary 
systems" C 85 ] 
Looking in more detail at the claims made by C. L. A. S. P., the 
report made a number- of criticisms--suggesting that a myth 
had been created by member architects to gain credence for 
their system. The points made included the allegations that 
low initial capital costs had been achieved at the expense 
of higher eventual maintenance costs; that, by not including 
development costs in published statistics, local authority 
architects were concealing the real costs of the schools 
produced by their system; that although costs might be lower 
than the national average, other authorities were building 
schools for less than C. L. A. S. P. in traditional 
construction; that manufacturers were now able to produce 
standard products as cheaply as the special items provided 
in bulk to C. L. A. S. P.; and that the monopolistic position of 
some of the consortium's specialist manufacturers, 
particularly the steel frame suppliers, was contrary to cost 
efficiency. Nevertheless, perhaps the most substantial 
criticism was that no systematic statistical basis existed 
to support the many claims made on C. L. A. S. P. 's behalf: 
'Members of C. L. A. S. P., as would be expected, are 
loyal to their organisation. Those who were 
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interviewed made very similar claims for its 
usefulness though in all cases they admitted that no 
detailed investigation had ever been carried out to 
prove that their claims for C. L. A. S. P. designs could 
be firmly substantiated by figures'C863 
Having been created, the report suggested that overlapping 
membership and the continuous interchange of staff had 
transmitted the myth widely throughout the public 
architectural service, and that the sudden recent growth of 
the movement resulted from its support-by government policy 
- to a large extent framed by, previous consortia members now 
in senior positions. Indeed, the role of the continuous 
interchange of staff and ideas within the state 
architectural sector was noted by other writers as a 
significant factor in the growth of consortia. [87] Turning 
to the M. H. C. the report drew attention to the "impressive" 
anticipated 35,000 pound saving through bulk purchase in the 
1964/5 programme which it felt=, 
has clearly been used tactically to reinforce the 
acceptability of the idea' of the consortium with the 
elected representatives of the member authorities... 
[however] ... in two of the four cases there has been a 
change in the specification... there is a strong 
. 
temptation to build up these advantages in the eyes of 
the elected representatives"[88] 
Indeed, as a local authority architect working within a 
member authority was later to maintain of the M. A. C. E. 
consortia: "all the information is in the hands of the 
authorities and can be manipulated at will. The whole 
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costing of schools is so fluid and obscure that statistics 
can be made to prove almost anything". (89] 
Rost'ill's general conclusion was that the case for 
consortia designed systems had yet to be proved. However, 
the one respect in which the report did opprove of consortia 
was as a means of rationalising local-authority programmes 
into larger units for the more effective use of proprietary 
systems. Indeed, while criticising government support for 
consortia, The Builderoverlooked the fact that it was as a 
means of rationalising the social-housing market on behalf 
of the large contractor sponsored systems that government 
and the N. E. A. gave consortia their support. [Ch. I] The 
M. H. L. G. were as concerned as the industry that the numerous 
systems already existing should not be added to by the many 
consortia they were fostering. (90] 
In the field of education, consortia did indeed 
displace the proprietary system. In 1969 the National 
Federation of Building Trades Employers complained that 
three quarters of system built schools were constructed by 
consortia, (91] and 'by 1971 30% of the national 
schoolbuilding programmes was being carried out by the three 
largest; C. L. A. S. P.,, South Eastern Authorities Consortium 
(S. E. A. C. ) and the Second Consortium of Local Authorities 
(S. C. O. L. A. ). 192] However, their impact on housing was 
considerably less than anticipated as Chapter Three pointed 
out. Y. D. G., in'the event the only consortia concrete panel 
system, built no more than 4,500 homes in its Mk. I, and by 
1970 differences between the membership had brought about 
its demise. (93] The M. H. C., the most prolific housing 
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consortia sponsoring a system of its own design, rarely 
built more than 1,000 houses a year, and by 1979 had 
completed barely 11,000. [Tab. V] Many of the consortia which 
were established, such as the London Housing Consortia - 
which provided the largest of all the combined programmes - 
(94] used proprietary systems in conformity with government 
policy rather than devise their own. 
Consortia were not the only attempt by the 
architectural profession to maintain its status within the 
building industry in the face of system, building. - In 
November 1963, the R. I. B. A. conference on 'The Architect and 
Productivity' resolved to take further action on two 
proposals designed to allow the profession to exercise a 
greater control over system building. Firstly, it might 
attempt to operate, on behalf of the government, the central 
building agency (eventually the N. B. A. ) recently proposed by 
Geoffry Rippon; and secondly it might allow architects to 
become directors of "building and manufacturing firms, but 
not development firms" in order to have a greater impact on 
the design of components and materials. 1953 As events 
demonstrated, neither of these proposals came to any effect. 
Of more success was the G. L. C. 's operation of the value cost 
contract in its Thamesmeade development of the late 1960s 
through- which-the authority gained control of its largest 
system building contract yet. Frustrated by ignorance of the 
'true costs" of system building, and convinced that this 
would continue "so, long as the manufacture of I. B. 
components remains completely in the hands of the 
contractors concerned", 1963 the authority used a modified 
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contract procedure under which it owned the factory in which 
the Balency components were made. Nevertheless, this 
initiative remained unique in the history of system building 
and the desire for architecture departments, without the 
capital resources of the G. L. C., to design and control the 
systems they used was realised through the consortia 
movement. 
IV. 
System building -did not provide the basis fora major 
confrontation between organised labour and sponsoring 
industries during the postwar period. The changes that it 
effected on working practices were consistent with general 
developments in postwar building technology lessening the 
opportunity for system building to be isolated as a specific 
issue. The conciliatory attitude of sponsors, and their 
willingness to negotiate over the balance of skills in 
erection teams - according to F. Knox and J. Hennessy, the 
only skilled labour theoretically needed to erect 
prefabricated structures was a crane operator and lorry 
driver - served also to reduce the opportunity for conflict. 
1973 The fears that prefabrication aroused in the 
speculations of Richard Coppock-in 1945 were not realised in 
its eventual development. ' It was not system building which 
initiated a narrower specialisation of skills and the 
weakening of the craft union structure but general 
developments in building technology and `the lump'. Rather 
than choosing to oppose a potentially injurious form of 
building technology, the building unions sought to influence 
2 3g 
the labour policies of the sponsoring companies hoping to 
bring as much of the new types of work as possible within 
their control. Furthermore, building labour' supported the 
system building policies of both the Atlee and Wilson 
governments. In calling, in'1965, for the-establishment of 
state operated component producing plants organised labour 
embraced building methods which held few immediate benefits 
promoting what it perceived to be the larger aims of its 
class. Building unions were committed to the goals to which 
system building was seen as the means - increased state 
housing provision and a strengthened Welfare State economy - 
making a concerted resistance to new methods all the more 
difficult to justify. 
The resistance of the architectural profession to 
system building was also shortlived. The vigorous activities 
of its members ideologically committed to prefabrication, 
and the success with which they realised their ideas in 
postwar social building programmes presented a powerful 
influence on a profession attempting-to find a place in the 
much changed postwar building economy. Up to the mid-1950s 
many of its most progressive members influenced the 
development of prefabrication and, through consortia, 
eventually found a model by which to control the design of 
building systems. In the light of architects' concern to be 
of service to society, involve themselves in the development 
of new technology, and maintain their professional status as 
leaders of the building team, C. L. A. S. P. and the other 
consortia were paradigms of the postwar profession. Although 
successful in schoolbuilding, where consortia eventually 
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dominated the market, the profession was less so in housing. 
Nevertheless, the speed with which the profession adapted to 
the advent of new technology, in attempting to maintain its 
professional status and develop an ideology which embraced 
the industrialisation of building, dispelled any tendency 
for it to remain wedded to the outmoded architectural 
philosophies described by F. R. S. Yorke-in 1939. 
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CHAPTER SIX. INNOVATION IN THE STATE SECTOR: THE EXPERTS. 
Despite their often revolutionary statements, one feature 
which typified the various post war ministers responsible 
for housing was that they generally had little technical 
knowledge of building. Foot's detailed biography of Bevan 
discloses no interest by the Minister in building prior to 
his appointment 11] and Nigel Birch, Minister of Works in 
1954, made a-virtue of ignorance when he"announced to the 
assembled architectural profession that he was "entirely 
unburdoned by the slightest technical knowledge of this 
subject'. E23 The ignorance of the political masters of the 
M. G. W. seems to have presented few problems for the 
Permanent Secretary, Harold Emmerson, who found that party 
political-changes tended to affect the scale of work done by 
the, Ministry rather than the "way in which it is done". 
Pointing out that a Minister usually stayed with the 
Ministry for less than two years, Emmerson found it 
understandable that he had "difficulty in getting to know 
the full extent of his responsibilities". 13] The conclusion 
which might be drawn from this is that Ministers, whether 
responsible for housing or building, took their technical 
advice from the departmental experts to whom they had access 
when in office. 
Evidence suggests that state departments reponsible for 
housing and the building industry provided a strong 
undercurrent to government policy. This does not necessarily 
imply ineptitude or carelessness on the part of government 
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for, while retaining the reins of overall economic and 
social policy, Ministers drew enthusiastically on the 
expertise of the scientists and technologists under -their 
employ in matters of building science and technology. The 
common pursuit of welfare policy, and in particular housing 
provision, by the major political parties created the 
context in which the expert played a significant role. For 
as long as there was agreement on goals, the expert was 
needed to advise on the means by which these might be 
achieved. Postwar government embraced and elevated the 
building expert, raising to high office a generation of 
architects committed to the promotion of prefabrication and 
mass production in building. This chapter will describe the 
process by which the central state itself became the 
designer and, in some cases, the sponsor of building 
systems, and the attempts of state experts. to guide system 
building in the direction they felt most beneficial to 
society. 
I. THE M. O. W. AND PREFABRICATION. . 
As Chapter Four described, the state took an increasing 
interest in building technology from the point at which it 
first became a significant producer of housing in the 
immediate post First World War period. This interest was 
maintained during the interwar period largely through the 
Building Research Station (B. R. S. ). While the state financed 
a permanent research station and periodically set up 
committees to consider specific issues, as yet there was no 
department charged specifically with overall responsibility 
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for the organisation and efficiency of the building 
industry. The Second World War, and with it the 
reorganisation and extension of the state machine, 
precipitated a more concerted examination of the building 
process. The Office of Works, as the government department 
responsible for crown buildings had been known for many 
centuries, was inadequate for the task of°assimilating the 
building industry into the `total war machine' and in 1940 
the Office was transformed into the Ministry of Works and 
Buildings in order to control the competing demands for 
building resources of government departments. Whereas the 
staff of the Office of Works had stood at 6,000 in 1939 the 
staff of the Ministry of Works (M. O. W., as it became in 
1945) stood at 22,000. t4] As well as taking responsibility 
for the administration of building resources the M. O. W. was 
originally made responsible for the postwar reconstruction 
of 'towns and country' and in the latter years of the war it 
played a major role in housing policy. However, housing and 
town planning functions were taken away from the fledgling 
department with the creation of the Ministry of Town and 
Country Planning in 1943 153 and the reversion of all 
matters concerned with housing design and policy to the 
M. O. H. in 1945. By 1945 the M. O. W. 's role had been narrowed 
to the technical aspects of postwar construction. 
Nevertheless, whereas previously the Office of Works was 
concerned purely with government buildings, 1945 saw the 
creation of a ministry with, in the words of the Prime 
Minister, "a general responsibility for the organisation and 
efficiency of the building industry as a whole". E6] 
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The first Chief Scientific Adviser to the Minister of 
Works was in fact the former Director of the R. R. S., 
R. Stradling, and in 1940 he described the extent of the work 
ahead of the Ministry and made clear the lack of 
technological sophistication within the industry for which 
he was now responsible: 
The building industry has not yet adjusted itself to 
modern conditions. Its personnel is largely ignorant 
of the basic priciples of science upon which modern 
industry, and life itself has now come to depend...., a 
new type of world has happened which has largely 
killed the possibility of still using the traditional 
methods"17 ] 
In Stradling's view radical change was needed, and needed 
fast if the nation's reconstruction plans, were to be put 
into effect. As well as transforming the industry through 
basic research and education, Stradling suggested that the 
government itself should lead by the example of its own 
works: "Nothing will be so effective in this education as 
the realisation that government can produce better, cheaper 
and quicker construction than anyone outside". C8] In his 
paper Stradling set out two of the basic principles on which 
government building research policy was to rest: education 
through the publication of research findings, and education 
through the example of government building projects. 
Together the M. O. W. and the R. R. S. pursued the 
application of the scientific method to all aspects of 
construction. In 1946, J. D. Bernal, Chair of the Minister's 
Scientific Advisory Council, described the division of 
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research work within the Ministry into requirements, 
materials, structures and construction. Of these, 
construction was "both the largest and the most immediate". 
Under this heading, attention was" being given to human 
efficiency - the first time that any attempt has been made 
scientifically to deal with the question of human productive 
effort'; the mechanical and organisational means by which 
building technique could be improved; and structures and 
calculation. Research also included the wider `economics of 
building in which the application of expensive plant and 
larger organisational Units were being compared against the 
individual attention that the small man can give to the 
job'. C93 It could be said that the principles of Ford and 
Taylor were now being applied to the building industry 
through the latest addition to the state machine. 
Characteristically, one of the Ministry's first publications 
was a time and motion study' of the expenditure of man and 
machine hours in the execution of building and civil 
engineering. (10) 
Despite the eagerness of the M. O. W. to effect rapid 
changes in building methods, the formation of the 
Interdepartmental Committee on New Methods of House 
Construction (Burt Committee) in September 1942, did not 
contribute significantly towards this end. As has been 
pointed out by R. P. White, this Committee was not intended to 
further the application of prefabrication to house 
construction but to assess the alternative methods with 
which traditional construction could be supplemented. (113 
Indeed in its first report the Committee refused to "express 
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an opinion on prefabrication except in so far as it is 
already advantageously applied in the building industry". 
1123 Nevertheless, the Burt Committee's three reports on 
contemporary housing systems provided both the M. O. W. and 
the M. O. H. with a wealth of technical information on the 
systems they were considering. (13] 
Current with the Burt Committee's deliberations, the 
Minister of Works appointed a controller of Experimental 
Building in 1943, to assist "private enterprise and local 
authorities to develop new methods". 114] The extent of the 
M. O. W. 's supervision of the introduction of new systems was 
considerable. If the Ministry felt a system to be of value 
it assisted promoters in the development of the system and 
issued licences for the erection of prototypes. 115] These 
prototypes were then reported by the Burt Committee and the 
P. R. S. and the more promising selected for further 
development. In the final stage the M. O. H. found sites for a 
development group of up to 150 houses with a local authority 
willing to purchase the dwellings on completion. This last 
stage was monitored closely by the M. O. W. which, by 
observing factory manufacture and erection on site, 
calculated a "definite figure" for the labour content. Such 
was the detail of this study that the Deputy Chief 
Scientific Adviser estimated that one million cards were 
passed through a Hollerith machine. 116] However, as well as 
studying and analysing the products of industry, a 
conclusion to which government experts in the B. R. S. and 
M. O. W came was that they should involve themselves more 
actively in development. 
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The effect of this interest was the promotion of a 
number of steel frame systems using the resources and latest 
techniques of the diversifying engineering firms described 
in Chapter Two. In view of the concentration of the M. O. W. 
on this particular approach to system building it is worth 
looking at the development of the steel frame in more 
detail. Steel frames had been exploited in system building 
before the war, most notably in the Dorlonco and Weir 
systems. These houses relied on labour, intensive methods of 
bolting and rivetting steel-members together, EFigs. 1&2] and 
used considerable amounts of steel in their structures and 
claddings. The subsequent development of steel frame systems 
was guided by the introduction of welding and new steel 
fabricating techniques. The use of welding in engineering 
and building became increasingly common during the 1930s and 
was greatly stimulated by the Second World War which caused 
the necessary plant to be installed and labour to be 
trained. (17] The cold rolling' of thin steel sheet, 
stimulated in particular by the introduction of pressed car 
body shells, also developed during the interwar period. 118] 
The combination of lightweight steel sheet and welding 
allowed the manufacture of more efficient structural 
members. Lightweight steel sheets could be shaped into 
complex sections and a number welded together into composite 
members, enabling the full tensile properties of steel to be 
exploited. Furthermore, the production of lightweight steel 
sheet provided an external cladding. Lightweight steel 
engineering technique formed the basis for a tradition of 
prefabricated building systems promoted by government 
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architects in which it was hoped that prefabrication and 
mass production could be applied to housing. 
A lightweight steel frame manufactured by the Hills 
Patent Glazing Co., formed the basis of the first 
prefabricated housing system designed by the M. O. W. at 
Northolt in 1944. The M. O. W. found their steel-frame house 
not only to have taken less than one half the labour hours 
of the traditionally constructed 'control' house, but also 
to have been the only system of those tested to have been 
cheaper. Encouraged by results so favourable to the steel 
frame, the M. C. W. claimed a whole range of "considerable" 
advantages for this type of construction. Firstly, the 
components for the frame could be standardised, facilitating 
mass production. In addition to this, the cladding could be 
varied according to the availability of suitable materials - 
in the case of the Northolt House precast concrete was used. 
Furthermore, as had been found with the Dorlonco house, the 
rapid erection of the frame and its roofing protected the 
remainder of the works from the weather. It was noted that 
this early provision of the structure allowed the other 
trades to work simultaneously, greatly speeding the 
construction process. t19]'Such was the success of the first 
state promoted system that the Minister of Works, Lord 
Portal, advised the Cabinet-Reconstruction Committee that 
the M. O. H. should recommend the Northolt House to local 
authorities. 1207 
Although nothing came of this initiative, Portal was 
soon at work on a new project which promised to be the 
Ministry's first large-scale intervention in housing design 
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and production; the Pressed Steel Bungalow. Commonly 
referred to as the Portal House, this design was conceived 
by the M. O. W. in response to the Cabinet's intention to 
produce 'a large number of temporary bungalows. Portal's 
scheme was "based on mass production by the government of a 
single type of house" 121] and was 'intended to directly 
apply engineering industry methods to housing. The Portal 
House embodied the latest in lightweight steel technology. 
The name of the manufacturer 'chosen for its production, 
Briggs Motor Bodies, indicates the source of'inspiration for 
its design. The basic structure of the Portal House 
consisted of ribbed pressed steel panels fixed to steel 
columns by a system of spotwelded cleats. Joi. nts in the 
external cladding were protected by pressed metal 'snap-on' 
cover pieces. The sheet steel roof covering was supported on 
pressed steel lattice trusses and the rectalinear shell was 
further subdivided by sheet steel partitions and pressed 
metal storage cupboards. CFig. 3] In May 1944, a prototype 
manufactured by Briggs Motor Bodies was exhibited at the 
Tate Gallery. Reviewing the bungalow for Architectural 
Design, Edric Neel, one of Portal's acquaintances on 
C. I. S. P. H., saw 'in it the most sophisticated application yet 
of engineering technique to housing: 
'Lest any reader of the above critique should have 
lost sight'of the wood for the trees, let it be said 
once again that this official solution to the problem 
of postwar emergency housing stands head and shoulders 
above anything yet attempted in this country or 
abroad"C22 
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Portal's bold initiative in the application of steel 
engineering to the emergency housing programme was 
frustrated by the the prolongation of the European war. The 
extension of the conflict prevented the diversion of 
engineering industry from war production soon enough to 
produce the bungalow in accordance with the Cabinet's 
emergency housing plans. 123] Eventually the order placed 
with the Ministry of Supply for the manufacture of 50,000 
bungalows was cancelled and contracts awarded to seven 
manufacturers who, unlike the Portal House which was made 
wholly of steel, utilised a wide range of materials which 
included asbestos, aluminium and timber. 124] 
Although the Portal bungalow was scrapped, a proposal 
to convert it to a permanent two-storey design capable of 
'real mass production" was greeted enthusiastically by a 
M. O. W. Committee, chaired by J. D. Pernal. This committee, 
charged to review current systems and 'consider the 
practicality of designing an ideal type" concluded of 
Portal's design that: 
'We are strongly impressed with its great 
potentialities and recommend that its development 
should be prosecuted in an energetic manner so as to 
permit a decision to be taken as soon as pos=sible"025] 
In August 1945, the new Minister of Works, Duncan Sandys, 
reported to the War Cabinet Housing Committee that he wished 
to place an order, again with Briggs Motor Bodies, for 
25,000 Pressed Steel houses. While authorising Sandys to 
enter negotiations, the Committee refused to place an order 
in the absence of detailed cost data and moved that the 
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issue should be re-presented when this was available. (26] 
The production of the Pressed Steel House was not brought 
before the Cabinet Housing Committee again and it may be 
inferred that the eventual costs were such as to cause the 
schemE to be abandonned. 
The steel framed house eventually chosen by the 
government for production was that sponsored by°the British 
Iron and Steel Federation (P. I. S. F. ). By the end of the war 
the B. I. S. F. had designed three models in which were 
displayed the full range of- new and old steel frame 
technologies. The frame ofi- the first B. I. S. F. prototype, 
Type 'A', departed little from the principles of the 
Dorlonco House, comprising short length=_ of hot rolled steel 
bolted together, on site. The Type 'B' house accorded more 
with the general trend in applying cold formed composite 
members to provide a structural frame, while Type 'C', the 
most highly 'prefabricated, was akin to the Portal bungalow 
in its assemblage of two-storey pressed steel prefabricated 
wall panels. t27&Fig. 7] In the event, Type 'A' was selected 
for the government grant, and- despite the adoption of 
methods of construction using less steel by other producers, 
such as Hills Patent Glazing-Co., far more B. I. S. F. houses 
were built than any of the alternative steel frame systems. 
[Tab. IV] The reasons for the eventual selection of the Type 
'A' by the B. I. S. F. and its subsequent support by the 
government are not clear but, may have resulted from an 
insufficiency, within the Federation, of the expertise and 
capacity needed to provide the volume of components in the 
newer technologies used in the Types 'B' & 'C': therefore it 
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chose the least sophisticated design in order to involve the 
maximum number of its member firms. Alternatively, it could 
be argued that the very object of Federation policy was 
indeed to use the maximum amount of steel, thus 
automatically excluding the more efficient designs. One way 
or the other, the P. I. S. F. house indicates that commercial 
policy and the most -technologically innovative methods 
supported by the state building experts did not necessarily 
coincide. 
The last attempt by the M. O. W. to develope a 
prefabricated house was the proposal to blend the Arcon 
temporary bungalow and the Coventry House - designed by 
D. E. E. Gibson under the aegis of C. I. S. P. H. - to produce a 
hybrid design which might be offered to local authorities. 
The closest this latter project came to fruition was the 
allocation to Coventry of 2,000 of the blended houses. 
Production of these was. to commence by the Arcon Group late 
in 1945. However, this project failed due to the inability 
of the Arcon group to produce components before 1947. (28) 
The latter years of the war saw a concerted effort by 
architects in the state sector to sponsor technologically 
sophisticated building systems. Although none of their 
models entered production an important precedent had been 
established: the state had become a designer of building 
systems. 
With the non traditional housing programme underway and 
the disbanding of "the brilliant team of scientists and 
technologists brought together during the war" (29) the 
M. O. W. and the B. R. S. abandoned the design of systems and 
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turned their attention towards the measurement of the costs 
and labour savings of new methods of construction. The need 
to measure new methods in comparison with old was realised 
by the E. R. S. as early as August 1943, when it pointed out 
to the Burt Committee that the "remarkable dearth of 
systematic data" produced widely differing opinions even 
amongst those who had had actual experience of new methods. 
Referring to its development of building physics in the 
interwar period the P. R. S. remarked that: 
'There seems no reason why the methods of scientific 
research which have been applied to problems of 
heating and so on should not be equally successfully 
applied to practical problems of construction... it is 
of the highest degree of importance nationally, that 
an effort should now be made to collect a body of 
systematic data on the subject`, and develop the 
necessary experimental technique"1303 
The first application of the new experimental technique was 
made at Northolt where four types of alternative system, 
including the M. O. W. 's steel framed design, were 
constructed. In line with orthodox scientific method a brick 
house was constructed as "A standard, or control... to 
measure the relative costs of these less familiar methods as 
compared with traditional brick building". 1313 The results 
of this experiment were remarkable in the light of 
subsequent experience for it found that the M. O. W. 's house 
made a 50X saving in labour and a marginal saving in cost 
over the control house. Despite their avowed objectivity, it 
could be suggested that the Ministry were partial to their 
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own design particularly as it exploited the principles of 
prefabrication most thoroughly. According to the P. R. S., the 
less_ prefabricated types showed no saving in labour and were 
considered to have been more expensive than traditional 
construction. Thus, the results of the first 'measured' 
experiment confirmed the views of many progressive building 
experts that the route to cost savings lay in the maximum 
use of prefabrication. In April 1944, Portal informed the 
War Cabinet Housing Committee, currently deliberating on the 
use, of new methods, that he hoped that-"the costs of 
prefabricated houses will not exceed that of houses of 
normal constructions. 13423 
In the event, non traditional houses proved more 
expensive that traditional - the level of government subsidy 
offered to local authorities to offset the 'greater cost 
reflected this disparity. Indeed, the most prefabricated 
types, such as the B. I. S. F., Airey and Cussins houses, 
required the greatest subsidies of between 244 and 147 
pounds. [33] The results of the first large scale postwar 
measured experiment in new methods were published in 1948. 
The results contradicted the findings of the Northolt 
experiment and showed that prefabrication and building 
economy were by no means automatically connected. In this 
experiment ten types of house were built in groups of not 
less than 50. With the exception of a timber system and the 
brick control group, the systems were all based on concrete. 
It is significant that the more prefabricated steel framed 
types were excluded from the experiment for by this time 
they were realised to be both more expensive and in conflict 
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with government policy designed to reduce the use of steel 
in building. The factory and site operations were measured 
by Ministry officers to ascertain the precise labour content 
and costs. Compared to earlier expectations this experiment 
showed a more complex; situation. The report stated 
confidently that new methods of` construction showed 
appreciable manpower savings, but was less certain on the 
question of costs. 
'From first principles it seems reasonably certain 
that the economy actually -achieved in man-power must 
be reflected in a lowering of costs, but from the 
information obtained from production on a pilot scale 
it has not been possible to reach a final conclusion 
as to the level at which costs can be expected to 
settle when the houses are in normal production"[34] 
Furthermore, the experiment disclosed wide disparities 
between the construction of similar types by different 
contractors, suggesting that problems of organisation and 
materials availability were more crucial to eventual 
performance than the technological principles of the systems 
themselves. At its most specific the report was unable to 
say more than that at their best new methods both saved up 
to 20in labour and that - when working at an economic 
tempo and assuming sufficient continuity of operation - they 
were capable of being cheaper. [35] 
With this experiment completed, and a lessened interest 
in new methods on the part of the M. O. W., [36] the only 
further significant contribution that the Ministry made to 
prefabrication in housing was a large measured experiment 
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carried out during the latter 
this were published in 1959 and 
results of earlier research. 
1950s. (37) The results of 
confirmed the disappointing 
ndeed, ` such was the poor 
Performance- of the systems tested that the Deputy Chief 
Scientific Officer to the R. R. S. suggested that: 
'it =seems for house building at least, economy is more 
to be sought in the evolution of traditional processes 
rather than by the introduction of radically' different 
methods of construction"[ 383 
II. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT GROUPS. 
Following the work carried out by the M. C. W. during the war, 
the development of building systems by the state was taken 
up by the Ministry of Education (M. O. E. ). Whereas plans for 
the use of new methods in housing-had'been laid and most of 
the models' designed by 1946, little 'work had been done on 
preparations for ' the school building programme. 
Nevertheless, events that took: place in the M. C. E. during 
the 1950s had a considerable impact on the administration of 
housing research and development policy during the 1960s and 
therefore require examination in some detail. 
In 1944 the Wood Committee, convened by the Minister of 
Works and comprising architect=_ promoting standardised 
construction suche as C. G. St il lrrman (W. Sussex County 
Architect) and Dennis Clarke Hall, published Standard 
Construction-for Schools. 1393 The report concluded that 
'there is no reason in principle why the same plan should 
not serve for two or more schools of the same type and size" 
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and examined various methods of standardising and 
prefabricating school construction in order to speed the 
considerably enlarged educational building programme. The 
apparent success with which authorities such as 
Hertfordshire supplemented limited building labour resources 
with system building prompted the M. O. E. to take a more 
active role in promoting new methods of building in the late 
1940s. (40] In December 1948, the Minister of Education 
informed local authorities, by circular, that he had "for 
some time encouraged the development of various new methods 
of building and their application to educational needs", 
141] and that in order to carry this work further he 
intended to establish a small Development Group in the 
Architects and Building Branch. The duty of this group was 
to interpret new building technologies in terms of 
educational needs, and the choice of head architect was 
Stirrat Johnson Marshall, the Deputy Architect for 
Hertfordshire County Council. Marshall's purpose was to 
increase the use of prefabrication in school building beyond 
the tendency of local authorities to regard it as no more 
than a short term expedient. (42] The way in which the 
M. O. E. Development Group achieved this was to embark on an 
ambitious programme of building projects. In these, the 
combination of standardised steel frames and prefabricated 
claddings, used in house construction and subsequently 
developed by Hertfordshire, were applied to the development 
of a range of schoolbuilding systems. CFig. 143 Five systems 
of this type were developed by the M. O. E. between 1950 and 
1953. (43] As well as developing the systems, the group also 
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intended to "stimulate demand... for whet we know already to 
be good and available". [44] The means by which this was 
done was twofold, a series of meetings was held with 
authorities to persuade them to adopt the group's systems in 
their advanced programmes, and Building Bulletins were 
issued publicising the success of the M. O. E. 's developments 
in prefabrication. [45] In the event the Group was 
successful - each of the systems it developed entered 
production - partly because the systems were considered to 
have real architectural merit, but also because of the 
enlarged educational building programmes of the mid-1950s. 
As the Development Group commented, "it has been our working 
hypothesis that two factors will ensure their widespread 
adoption by authorities; the pressure of circumstances and 
the quality of the systems". [46] 
The success with which the Research and Development 
Group introduced prefabricated systems was accompanied by 
two developments in the administration of school building 
programmes. The first, resulting from the slow start to 
educational building, -was the requirement that programmes 
should be planned in advance, and by 1947 authorities were 
asked to submit proposals for two years ahead: "It enables 
Authorities to group projects together from the point of 
view of development work, planning and bulk ordering". [47] 
The second development was the adoption of a new approvals 
procedure in 1949. Rather than submitting each project to 
the M. O. E. for individual approval of the overall cost, a 
cost limit per child place system was devised. If an 
authority demonstrated that the schools it designed met the 
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Ministry regulations on minimum areas and did not exceed the 
cost/place limit, approval was automatic. [48] The use of a 
standardised system of construction by an authority greatly 
facilitated this prediction of costs and aided the advanced 
programming policy. Allied with these administrative changes 
the M. C. E. made a concerted attempt to reduce-the costs of 
school construction through more compact planning. These 
changes were made in school design by means of a steady 
reduction in the cost/place limits: in 1949=they were set at 
200 and 320 pounds for primary and secondary schools 
respectively; between 1950 and 1951 they were twice reduced 
by 12.5::. [49] The planning of schools radically changed 
from a distended finger plan, with long corridors, to a 
highly compact form with minimum circulation areas and the 
dual use of spaces (such as combined dining rooms and 
assembly halls). EFig. 173 Between 1949 and 1954 the British 
school became 407. smaller in plan area. 150] Significantly, 
the very building projects in which the Development Group 
tried new systems were also the vehicles for the development 
of space saving plans. Thus, the M. O. E. Research and 
Development Group of the Architects and Building Branch had 
been seen to combine new and rapid building technologies 
with a dramatic space, and hence, cost saving to the 
Exchequer. The point was not lost on policy makers observing 
these developments. 
Addressing the closing of the 1951 Building Research 
Congress 'Sir Ben Lockspeiser urged the application of 
Operational Research techniques to construction whereby the 
building scientist would leave the laboratory and take the 
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'powerful techniques" of the scientific method to the 
building site. Describing the work of the education 
architects Lockspeiser concluded that "because such a 
scientific attack has 'been made successfully in one corner 
of the building world... I believe we could all profit from 
a study of what has been done". 151] Indeed, in May 1952 an 
economy conscious Cabinet Building Committee report examined 
educational building policies and concluded that M. O. E. 
building policies were "conducive to economy" and that this` 
was largely due to-the Architects and Building, Branch. - (523 
Like Lockspeiser the report advocated the extension of the 
principles of the M. O. E. to other government departments. 
In 1961, Roger Walters, Chief Architect to the War 
Office Development Group, noted that nine state departments 
currently operated development groups. Describing the 
purpose and organisation of these he stated that as a 
prerequisite the parent organisation should be one which was 
financially responsible for a large volume of building work. 
Turning to the group itself, it must not only be aware of 
the current state of technology but in its practical 
building projects "should be sensitive to future 
developments and should be ready to pioneer". E53] The 
architects working in such groups, Walters felt, must have 
quite specific qualities. In a statement which reflects the 
degree to which Modernist architectural values had been 
adopted by the architectural establishment, he described 
these qualities, -stating that the architects must be: 
'intelligent and... all share a basically similar 
attitude of mind. They should I think care more about 
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architecture as a social service than as a means of 
personal expression... They should be architects who 
will ask the user not what he wants, but what he wants 
to do, and how often he wants to do it: who believe 
that there is always a better answer to be found"C54] 
Speaking for a parent department, and demonstrating the 
willingness with which policy makers accommodated the 
architectural theories of their professional experts, 
W. D. Pile, administrative head of the M. O. E. Architects and 
Building Branch, saw the ideal 'pioneering" architectýas, one 
with: 
'The ability to make as well as to follow policy. 
There is no place in this dynamic organisation that 
the state needs for the slave... a perpetual 
discontent with the status quo, a revolutionary 
desire... to change the order of things... that 
revolutionary feeling must be guided by some 
systematic and scientific methodology.., he has to be 
a business like character, I don't want any prima 
donnas or little Corbs"1553 
Put less vehemently, another top administrator, A. Part, 
Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Public Buildings and 
Works, felt his duty was to 'understand the vision and the 
hopes and fears of architects, - and to help create the 
conditions in which they can do their best word; ". [56] 
The changes that took place in the public architectural 
service during the late 1950s and early 1960s were noted by 
Evelyn Sharp, Permanent Secretary to the M. H. L. G.. Between 
1951 and 1969 the numbers of professional and technical 
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staff in her ministry rose from 570 to 900. One of the 
largest contributory factors to this was the much greater 
amount of research, development and promotional work carried 
out. Indeed, as she pointed out, the growth of 
industrialised building had enormously increased the 
contribution which the Ministry's architects made to the 
work of the housing division. Rather than performing a 
regulatory role, as previously, Ministry architects became 
increasing involved in the "formulation and dissemination 
among local authorities of new ideas and new techniques". 
1573 Furthermore, during the staffing difficulties of the 
mid-1960s, when the state had been unable to offer salaries 
equivalent to the private sector and had found it difficult 
to recruit staff, the opportunity for architects to "try out 
their ideas on the ground" had been an important fillip to 
recruitment. 
The elevation of architects to senior administrative 
posts in the early 1960s was greatly aided by organisational 
modifications in the M. O. W. and M. C. H. In 1958, the War 
Office became a civilian department and D. E. E. Gibson, 
previously noted for his work with new technology at 
Coventry and Nottinghamshire, was appointed head architect. 
On the Ist April 1963, the War Office was amalgamated with 
the M. O. W. which was restructured to become the Ministry of 
Public 'Buildings and Works (M. P. P. W. ). A major part of this 
reorganisation consisted of the creation of the Directorate 
of Research and Development with Gibson at its head. The 
authority and status which Gibson was given in this new 
post, which according to his Minister was intended 'to 
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further the development and application of industrialised 
building techniques", 158] was considerable. Gibson was 
answerable only to the Permanent Secretary and received a 
salary of 7,000 pounds, larger than that of the Controller 
General for the entire Crown building programme and second 
only to that of the Permanent Secretary. (59] Gibson was not 
the only proponent of prefabrication to gain promotion in 
the early 1960s reorganisation of-the public architectural 
service. In 1959, Municipal Journal reported that important 
changes were taking place at the M. H. L. G.: the-Ministry was 
forming a Development Group with a former Hertfordshire 
architect, Oliver Cox, at its head. In addition, 
J. H. Forshaw, Chief Architect of the Ministry since 1945, was 
stepping down in the belief that "a younger man should take 
charge of the developments". (60)' The new Chief Architect, 
Cleeve Parr, had, like Gibson, spent his life in the public 
service, previously with Hertfordshire and then the L. C: C. 
Prefabrication had made an early impression on Cleeve Barr; 
as a boy during the early 1920s he remembered "watching, 
fascinated (by] the erection of the first steel houses in my 
village", 161] and in 1958 he spoke of his time at the 
L. C. C. where he had "tried on a number of occasions... to 
evolve, for housing, systems of lightweight steel 
construction- and of precast concrete construction, 
comparable to those, which have made possible such notable 
advances in the field of school design". 1623 
As Gibson pointed out in 1961, "There is now a 
well-established (although-small) cadre of architects with 
the `know-how' of development work and its history and its 
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possibilities". 1633 More importantly, however, this cadre 
had become firmly lodged in the upper levels of the state 
building machine. 
III. COMPONENT BUILDING. 
To understand official research and development policy 
during the 1960s it is necessary to return to the 
development of prefabrication theory during the 1930s. The 
proposal that prefabricated building components should be 
designed to a common dimensional framework - modular 
co-ordination - was promoted. by a number of prefabrication 
experts including Gropius, Corbusier and Albert Farwell 
Bemis. 164&653 
The =standardisation of building components was first 
initiated by the British Government in 1920 when the M. C. N. 
Standardisation and New Methods of Construction Committee 
proposed standardising domestic fittings such as baths, 
water fittings, gutters and ironmongery. (66] The 
application of standardisation to building elements was 
continued by the first Minister of Works, Lord Portal, who 
appointed the Standards Committee in 194, with the 
following terms of reference: To study the application in 
building of standard plan elements, standard specifications 
and building components, and methods of prefabrication'. 
167] The salient feature of this committee is that it failed 
to fulfill Portal's ambitious terms. The committee's 
discussion concentrated on the ability of standardisation to 
facilitate the interchanging of fittings, thereby allowing 
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manufacturers to stockpile prior to the onset of the postwar 
housing programme, and made no comment on the relationship 
between the standardisation of dimensions and specifications 
to facilitate the production and use of prefabricated 
building components. 1683 In the event the Committee made 
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( . S. I. ) on fittings ranging from metal sinks to floor tiles 
and was able to note that these changes, minor as they were, 
had been happily taken up by industry. 
The timidity of the Standards Committee did not satisfy 
the B. R. S. and the M. O. W.. Writing to the Burt Committee, 
the E. R. S. urged that it should compile an encyclopedia of 
standard interchangeable components which could be 
manufactured in far greater numbers than components for 
individual systems and selected freely by housing 
architects: 'If a mass production system is adopted it is 
vital to ensure that the advantages of mass production are 
not thrown away". E69] However, as with the Standards 
Committee, the Burt Committee showed little desire to take 
such an ambitious approach to new methods of construction. 
In 1945, D. Dex Harrison, an architect working for the M. O. W. 
described the implications on prefabrication of the refusal 
of Government Committees to promote dimensional 
co-ordination: 
'5-10,000 off is [not] mass production as we know it 
today. Entrepreneurs tend to think rather in terms of 
100,000 and we have to face the chance that the market 
may be collared by a few big scale producers who have 
broken into the market, achieved economy and gained 
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control of the field. The alternative, equally 
disastrous, occurs if too many big interests try to 
participate in a programme too small to enable them 
all to mass produce on the requisite scale, for then 
the cost of housing will not fall and prefabrication 
will languish... we need to establish a common basis 
of dimensions to which sponsors of individual products 
can adhere and so that we get a range of standardised 
products that will fit together in different ways in 
the building, but, above all, that will fit 
together"C 7O ]' 
In noting the divergence between the interests of commercial 
producers, which were to monopolise the system building 
market and limit the interchange of components, and the most 
'rational' way of organising mass production in building, 
which called for the establishment of a common dimensional 
framework, Harrison identified the conflict that subsequent 
official research policy sought to overcome. The way to 
achieve a common dimensional basis, according to Harrison, 
was through a "central body" which could itself instigate 
standards both in the dimensional basis of buildings and in 
the specification of components. By 1947, with the work of 
the Burt and Standards committees completed, Harrison felt 
that Britain had missed its chance and that government had 
failed the cause of mass produced housing. 1713 
The concept of assembling buildings from parts that 
could be combined into varying building forms underlay the 
initiatives in standardised schools construction during the 
1950s. In 1948 the M. O. E. advocated that prefabrication in 
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schoolbuilding should not entail the factory production of 
standard schools, "in a sense comparable with totally 
prefabricated houses", [723 but the production of standard 
ranges of components. Although educational systems did not 
consist of components that could be interchanged between 
different systems on a national scale, the design of frame 
systems which would allow- flexible planning and the 
insertion of different types of wall panel - albeit all 
exclusive to an individual system - provided a far greater 
degree of variation in the form of the buildings than was 
achieved in system built housing. CFigs. 14,15&163 
A=_ Harrison had predicted, the initiative in 
formulating a modular system moved to an international 
forum. 'In 1954 the European Productivity Agency (E. P. A. ) of 
the Organisation of European Economic Co-operation initiated 
research on modular co-ordination with the involvement of 11 
European countries of which Britain, represented by the 
P. S. I., was one. In 1956 it published a report on the 
subject but many of the countries dissented from the'basic 
module proposed for components. In 1961 the E. P. A. produced 
a second report based on further negotiations and research 
which reccommended a 10cm. module for metric countries and 
4" for imperial countries. This latter proposal was accepted 
and approved by the International Organisation for Standards 
(I. S. O. ). C73] With a plea in 1962 in the Emmerson Report 
that the state should finally adopt a modular framework 174] 
a consistant policy was initiated on dimensional 
co-ordination by government departments. In May 1962 an 
Interdepartmental Committee was set up among building 
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ministries with the object of agreeing a set of standard 
dimensions. [75] Between 1963 and 1968 the M. P. P. W. 
published seven documents advocating a non mandatory series 
of both horizontal and vertical dimensions that covered 
commercial, housing, educational, industrial and public 
buildings. [76] In 1963 the Minister of Public Buildings and 
Works reported to Parliament that from then on all 
government buildings would be designed to these standards. 
[77] 
The renewed promotion of modular co-ordination in 
housing during the 1960s can be seen in the development of 
the 5M system by the M. H. L. G. in 1962. The stated object of 
the Ministry in developing 5M was to provide a much needed 
flexible low-rise system for small sites capable of being 
used by small builders. However, it is evident that the 
design of 5M was determined by the intention of official 
architects to implement recent agreements in modular 
planning and hence move toward the goal of open systems. The 
system represented the direct application of the modular 
steel frame systems used in educational building. The 
designation '5M' referred to its planning grid which was 
derived from five times the size of the I. S. O. 4" module. 
The initial market for the system was provided by the Crown 
barrack re-building programme when it was awarded a 370 
house contract at-Catterick. This project, undertaken by the 
M. P. P. W. Research and Development Group, was intended to 
establish the production of 5M components by individual 
manufacturers and represented a form of co-operation that 
was to endure between the development groups of the two 
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ministries. £78) By 1966,5M, the first government designed 
housing system to enter production, was in use by 14 
authorities, and, true to its original intention, 20 
different house types had been conceived. [793 
The extension of modular principles was also made 
through the Nenk system. Designed by the M. P. P. W. Research 
and Development Group in 1963 as an all-purpose building 
system, the Nena; was also based on the flexible frame and 
infill panel technique developed in educational building. 
Like 5M, the barrack building programme of the early 1960s 
was used as a development and production vehicle; the system 
was first used for a half million pound programme of 
communal buildings at Invicta Park, Maidstone. C8C)) Although 
specifically conceived for Crown use, Nena;, like 5M, was 
intended to further a national system of interchangeable 
components: 
"In Nenk; an effort has been made not only to devise a 
method of building which would allow the designer 
greater flexibility in planning... but it was also 
hoped that as it evolved, it might evolve in a more 
open manner. A key point for the future development of 
Nenk would be to ensure that new components could be 
introduced into it more readily than was possible with 
the existing systems"181] 
Indeed, the Research and Development Group intended that the 
use of the system should not be restricted to the Ministry 
but hoped that in the national interest" it would be 
adopted by local authorities and any architect public or 
private, who wants to use it". E82] 
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The most ambitious state designed system was Jespersen 
12M, developed in 1963 in association with John Laing & Co. 
CCh. II] The first practical application of the 12M was in 
the M. H. L. G. Research and Development project at Oldham, in 
which the group based its modifications to the system on a 
12 times 4" module (12M). The choice of Jespersen for 
Ministerial support was quite deliberate: it was the only 
heavy precast concrete system whose panels sizes were based 
on a dimensional module rather than a limited range of 
standard designs. (83] Furthermore, the cladding' panels to 
the front and rear did not form part of the system: panels 
made by other manufacturers of varying design could be 
introduced in accordance with the policy of "opening" 
commercial systems. 1843 The condition that the Ministry 
attached to carrying out development work on behalf of Laing 
was that the company should make the components available to 
outside contractors (this was duly done in November 1967). 
Like Nenk, the ministry was attempting to spread the use of 
its systems as widely as possible. As Chapter Two describes, 
considerable state support was given to Jespersen in the 
form of a contract for 2,25'"' barrack dwellings in the Home 
Counties and 1,000 houses at Livingston New Town. 1853 
By 1965 the notion of component building had become 
commonly accepted as the next phase in industrialised 
building technique. In the same year Interbuild opened a 
monthly section on the subject listing any form of new 
component that came onto the market, 186] and by early 1966 
the Ministry of Health had developed a range of standard 
components for use in hospital building that included 
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complete door sets, partitions, storage units, and window 
assemblies. [87] Indeed the words "component" and "open" 
became fashionable among commercial firms. In 1965, 
Hawthorne Leslie named their modified low-rise system "the 
flexible component" system [883 and in the same year Cosmos 
launched an 'open" housing system claiming that its 
components could be bought individually and if wished could 
be used in traditional construction or with other systems. 
1893 
While industry acknowledged this trend the fortunes of 
the three systems designed by the state were failing. 
Although sophisticated and attractive to experts in "open" 
system building they were unsuccessful with potential 
purchasers. The complexity of ordering the 5M components 
from a large number of individual manufacturers made it 
uneconomical in comparison with commercially sponsored and 
more highly standardised systems and required a large 
programme to make the effort worthwhile. 190] Eventually 
only 3,468 houses were built. [Tab. V] For Jespersen to be 
economical it needed vast contracts and a rationality in 
design which belied its apparent flexibility; [Ch. VIII] the 
sponsoring company eventually lost heavily on the project. 
Nenk, conceived to be openly available was used only on 
Crown projects, and did not survive the completion of the 
barrack rebuilding programme. 191] 
The design of these three systems comprised the first 
phase of government building research and development policy 
during the 1960s. The second was to prove even more 
ambitious: an attempt to bring into being the national 
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system of interchangeable prefabricated components envisaged 
by D. Dex Harrison. Its 1966 the government announced that it 
was halting the development of further systems and 
concentrating on the development of standard 'components. 
192] The way in which this was to be done was explained to 
Parliament by the Minister of Public Buildings and Works in 
July. Departmental professional staff, working in the 
Interdepartmental Component Co-ordination Group (I. C. C. G), 
would provide potential producers with dimensional standards 
and performance specifications. When components satisfactory 
in performance, design and price had been developed with 
industry it was intended that they should initially be used 
in public building programmes to stimulate large scale 
production. [933 
The first component to be promoted by the state was the 
I. P. I. S. Partition for schools. Describing educational 
research and development policy, in 1966, the Assistant 
Chief Architect to the Department of Education and Science 
(D. E. S. ) explained that his department was hoping to promote 
the use of standard components in a number of the systems 
being sponsored by local authority consortia. Indeed, a 
number of educational consortia were currently considering 
sharing window units devised by S. E. A. C. However, the 
building element first chosen for development was an 
internal prefabricated classroom partition; a complex 
component- - needing to be soundproof, lightweight and 
durable - which, it was hoped, would be the first to be 
interchangeable and nationally used within a variety of 
systems. [943 
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By July 1967, the D. E. S. had prepared the performance 
and dimensional specifications upon which the partition was 
to be based and advertised for willing manufacturers in the 
press. Some suppliers dropped out in the early stages and of 
the remainder, two designs, I. P. I. S. and the Expanded Metal 
Partition System, were considered to have met the D. E. S. 's 
design specifications. The manufacturers of the former, 
Richard Thomas & Baldwin, were prepared to have a mock-up 
ready in six weeks and, were this to prove acceptable, the 
Second Consortium of Local Authorities (S. C. O. L. A. ) 
undertook to enter negotiations with the firm for the 
inclusion of its partition in their schools programme. 
However, it was not until 15 months later that it was 
reported that I. B. I. S. was satisfactory in terms of 
appearance, technical performance and - if half the 
consortium's programme was guaranteed to it - price also. In 
the ensuing discussion of the adoption of the partition by 
the Board of Chief Architects of S. C. 0. L. A., it was pointed 
out that the wort; involved in its immediate inclusion into 
the Mk. II would prevent development work from taking place 
on the next system. Furthermore, as the Chief Architect from 
Leeds pointed out, the trend towards open plan schools 
threatened to reduce the use of partitioning by 80%. 
Already, the extensive lead in period of the product 
threatened to make it obsolete before production could 
begin. The argument for adopting the system concentrated on 
the wider question of moral commitment" to support the 
attempt to develop open components. The D. E. S. were prepared 
to offer a guaranteed programme to the consortia large 
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enough to cover any commitment they made to the partition. 
In the vote that followed I. B. I. S. was accepted by a narrow 
majority. Neverthele=_=_, the adoption of the first centrally 
designed open component had become a contentious issue and 
prompted a special meeting of the Board in which the 
previous decision was overturned by the representatives of 
five authorities who refused to guarantee the use of the 
untried partition in their share of the programme. By March 
1969, S. C. O. L. A., S. E. A. C. and the Consortium for Method 
Building (C. M. B. ) had all, withdrawn from the I. B. I. S. 
project due to a price rise resulting from refusals to 
guarantee a sufficiently large programme. 1953 In October 
1969, with the design of a further, cheaper, version of 
I. B. I. S. by the D. E. S. Research and Development Group, Dan 
Lacey, - the` Department's Architect, asked S. C. O. L. A. : 
'to consider the adverse reaction non-use of the 
partition in the next programme year might have on the 
industry as a whole... a modest use of the partition 
in 1970/71 may give a good impression"C963 
The resolution, that the use of I. B. I. S. should be left 'to 
individual members to decide", seems to have sealed the fate 
of the partition for it was the last reference to the 
subject in S. C. O. L. A. 's minutes. 
Early in 1969, Patricia Tindale, Principal Architect to 
the M. H. L. G. announced that her Ministry was abandoning 5M 
and putting all its resources into practical experiments 
into the B. S. I. 's programme of dimensional co-ordination in 
building components. [977 Despite the intention to carry out 
research on component co-ordination and the formation of a 
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working party of architects from local authorities to 
prepare performance specifications for standard housing 
components, there is no evidence that the M. H. L. G. 's new 
policy bore fruit in development projects. In the latter 
years of the 1960s the initiative in housing development 
work was taken up by the N. P. A., headed by Cleeve Parr since 
its inclusion into the M. H. L. G. in 1966. 
In 1966 the N. B. A. carried out an exercise in the 
application of "standardisation, dimensional co-ordination, 
serial contracting and a rationalisation of the design and 
building processes' for the North Eastern Major Authorities 
(N. E. M. A. ) consortium. As it made clear, the N. B. A. had "not 
produced yet another 'system" but a "rational approach to 
repetitive building'. 1983 Essentially the Agency developed 
a range of house types each of which shared a common 
dimensional basis. The object of the "basic shell approach" 
was to allow the use of a standard external wall component, 
which could be constructed in a variety of techniques by 
different manufacturers. In April 1968, the Agency published 
Metric House Shells in which it proposed that the design of 
the nation's housing should be rationalised to a set of 
external shell sizes each of which bore a common dimensional 
relationship to each other. 199] As I. B. S. A. C. pointed out, 
the proposals "would provide the greatest single impetus to 
date for developing industrialised building methods". [100] 
In the next year the adoption of the shell plans, in 
association with the metrication of housing dimensions, 
became official ministerial policy. Circular 69/69 pointed 
out to local authorities that: 
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'During the next three years local authorities will be 
changing the design of their dwellings to metric 
dimensions... This Provides_ an opportunity which may 
never recur, for bringing about a significant 
reduction in the great variety of two storey house 
plans used by local authorities"[101] 
In the Minister's view the application of the disciplines 
described in the N. B. A. 's Metric House Shells "provides the 
best means of securing this objective". According to the 
Circular, house shells conferred many advantages on the 
local authority and comprised a major initiative in the 
wider use of industrialised methods. Primarily, the use of 
shells would enforce reduction=_ in dimensional variety and 
hence the greater use of standard components in system 
building. From the 31st December 1969, the adoption of 
N. P. A. dimensions by local authorities was made a condition 
of loan sanction by the Ministry. At a stroke the M. H. L. G. 
had enforced a national system of dimensional co-ordination 
for public sector housing, and had it not coincided with the 
rapidly declining use of systems and resurgence of 
traditional construction, CTab. II3 might have made a 
significant impact on the development of postwar building 
technology. As it was, the flurry of excitement caused by 
the introduction of the house shells policy soon subsided, 
and shells became little more than a source of complaint by 
architects about the increasingly centralised direction of 
housing design. [Ch. VIII] 
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IV. 
The systems developed by research and development experts 
displayed a conspicuous feature: in every case they were the 
most technologically sophisticated available and represented 
an "advance" on those promoted by industry. The systems 
sponsored by the state were intended to lead the development 
of prefabrication in the direction favoured by the 
government expert. However, equally as conspicuously, these 
attempts failed. 
Three reasons may be offered to explain this. Firstly, 
despite the status given to this elite within the state 
architectural service, and their innovative : eal, it is 
evident that, while they were given the resources to promote 
system building, they were not provided with the means to 
determine the basis upon which it was to develop. For 
instance, the I. C. C. G., responsible for co-ordinating the 
dimensions and performance specifications for the entire 
public sector building requirement was staffed by only 17, 
1102] and the B. S. I., with whom they worked in the laying 
down of standards was a voluntary body quite inadequate to 
the volume of work involved. 11033 Secondly, the 
'rationality' of the state expert demanded a degree of 
technological sophistication inappropriate to the postwar 
building market. Thus, the pressed steel systems of the 
later years of the Second World War failed. Where dimensions 
and performance specifications were agreed during the 1960s, 
the latter were often set too high for manufacturers to meet 
within cost limits. 1 104] As the I. E. I. S. project 
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demonstrated, the more sophisticated the product, the longer 
the lead in time and the less the chance of securing a 
sufficiently large market to justify production. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, manufacturing 
industry had little incentive to conform to government 
research policy. Indeed it had good reasons to frustrate it. 
As the M. O. E. pointed out in 1952, An attempt, therefore, 
to co-ordinate several different elements is liable to 
involve considerable changes in factory plant", 1105] 
increasing the capital costs to the producer and placing at 
a disadvantage any manufacturer prepared to put the 
philosophies of expert opinion into practice. The incentive 
for manufacturers to change their ways was further reduced 
when, in times of peak demand, a-market was ensured for 
their existing products. With increasing economic 
instability in the late 1960s the expectation that 
manufacturers would invest capital in mass production 
techniques was even more misplaced. The reluctance of 
industry to follow the lead of science and rationality in 
building production was discernable as early as the Burt 
Committee's cool reception to prefabrication. This committee 
was chaired by Sir George Mowlem Burt (Mowlem), and included 
John Laing (Laing) and G. W. Mitchell (Wimpey). (106] 
Dominated by such building interests as these, the Committee 
could hardly be expected to espouse philosophies such as 
those which C. I. S. P. H. thought might change the basis of the 
property market at a stroke or threaten to introduce firms 
to building such as Briggs' Motor Bodies and the subsidiary 
of British Steel, Richard Thomas & Baldwin. While each of 
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these firms launched building systems at one time or another 
their designs owed nothing to mass production theory, but, 
rather, were ba=sed on the hard facts of current building 
economics. ICh. VII] Furthermore, the motivation, suggested 
in Chapter Two, behind the promotion of systems by large 
contractors was to monopolise the state housing market. 
Allowing the interchange of components between different 
systems could only conflict with this policy by making the 
market available to a larger number of producers. Far from 
establishing a common dimensional basis, commerical firms 
jealously guarded the technical details of their systems. 
With reluctance, and in strict confidence, they provided the 
information required by the N. P. A. to assess their systems 
in order to advise local authorities on those best suited to 
their housing programmes. Indeed, a fear expressed by some 
builders, in the mid-1960s, was that component 
co-ordination, allied to what was expected to be a wider 
growth of consortia, would provide a basis from which 
government could nationalise the building industry. [107] 
The demand by Rene Short M. P. in 1965,1106] and that by 
N. F. B. T. O. in 1967, [Ch. V] that the state should set up its 
own component producing factories can only have fuelled 
these fears. Paranoia was excited among system builders, 
already known for their secretiveness [109] by the N. B. A. 's 
development work for N. E. M. A. in 1966. This led to 
accusations that the Agency was exploiting technical 
information provided by commercial producers in the 
development of its own system. [110] In 1967 the N. F. R. T. E. 
insisted on a reduction in the information its system 
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builder members provided to the N. B. A. [111] 
The experts, promoting science, rationality and the 
common good, were, for the most part, in conflict with the 
economic rationale of the building market they sought -to 
change. While able to influence government technical policy 
and disseminate their ideas within the architectural 
profession, they were unable to achieve their primary aim - 
a° major structural change in the organisation of the 
building market through the mass production of 
interchangeable prefabricated building components. As the 
Deputy Director-of the B. R. S. pointed out in 1972, shortly 
after S. C. O. L. A. 's final rejection of I. P. I. S., "component 
building in the sense of catalogues of generally available 
components which can be readily assembled in a wide variety 
of ways seems a remote possibility". 11123 
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CHAPTER SEVEN. THE DYNAMICS OF POSTWAR BUILDING ECONOMICS. 
As the previous chapter described, housing systems sponsored 
by the state met with little success. In contrast, a number 
of the systems developed by commercial interests met with 
considerably greater success. In the years covered by this 
study commercial producers, using a range of technologies, 
were able to provide alternatives to traditional 
construction in social housing. However, with the decline of 
large social housing programmes it is apparent that system 
building proved incapable of supplanting traditional 
housebuilding methods. This chapter will review the 
approaches to system building of commercial sponsors and 
suggest that their success resulted from the conditions 
created by postwar social and economic policies. The final 
section of the chapter will attempt to explain why, in the 
absence of the conditions created by the Welfare State, 
house construction in Britain has consistently favoured 
traditional methods in place of capital intensive 
technologically sophisticated building systems. 
I. PRECAST CONCRETE. 
The savings -to be gained by dispensing with costly 
shuttering and reducing site labour through the off-site 
casting of concrete floor elements were exploited both 
before, and more conspicuously during, the Great War. In the 
Cheap Cottages Exhibition of 1905, Cubitts demonstrated a 
polygonal single storey cottage made up of a small number of 
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reinforced concrete slabs, with the claim that it 
facilitated rapid erection. [1] The subsequent development 
of a distinct precasting industry was signified by the 
formation of the British Cast Concrete Federation in 1928. 
Further attempts were made between the World Wars to apply 
precasting, primarily in the form of large blocks, to wall 
construction but, according to Bowley, labour savings were 
insufficient to provide a cost advantage over masonry and 
production concentrated on the further development of 
flooring units -and-non stuctural components such as paving 
slabs and fence posts. - [2] As well as being used in 
Frankfurt's municipal housing schemes of the late 1920s, 
precast concrete slabs formed the cladding for the Mopin 
system used in the construction of the, Quarry Hill Flats 
(Leeds, 1938). 13] Although the building industry submitted 
a number of designs to the M. O. H. Committee considering 
methods of constructing flats for the working classes in 
1937, none featured the extensive use of precast 
concrete. C4] 
The precasting of large structural elements for the 
wartime construction of concrete barges and floating 
harbours gave rise to a serious consideration by the 
building industry of a conceptual scheme by Professor 
A. L. L. Fak; er and V. G. Hatherly. Their proposal featured the 
construction of multi-storey buildings with large panels, 
weighing from 3 to 5 tons, hoisted into position by crane. 
In August 1945, the National Builder reported that 
contractors familiar with engineering methods were 
investigating the scheme from the point of view of the 
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arriount of site labour involved and the probable total cost 
of the building". 15] 
The first post World War Two applications of precast 
concrete to housing avoided the use of the latest 
technologies. Both the Cornish Unit and Airey house=_ used 
small precast components which bore little relation to the 
techniques being considered by the building industry for 
multi-storey construction. The basis of the Airey system had 
been developed as early as 1925 and, as in the case of 
Cornish Unit, was manufactured- by a precasting specialist 
rather than by a large building firm with engineering 
experience, such as those who were later to exploit large 
panel technology. These houses were intended to be erected 
by small builders often in rural areas which precluded the 
use of large elements erected with heavy lifting 
gear. C6&Fig. 83 
The use of concrete in small units seems to have been 
uneconomic. The Airey house received a capital grant of 175 
pounds, second only to the Aluminium and B. I. S. F. houses. 
C7] In 1948 the M. O. W. found that, of the non traditional 
houses it had tested, the model featuring large precast 
units (although not mentioned specifically, most certainly 
the Wates system) proved to be most competitive with 
traditional construction. 183 Wates, a large building firm 
involved in the wartime Mulberry precast concrete harbour 
project, was the first British building firm to market a 
system with room-size precast concrete panels. CFig. 103 The 
economy of this method, in the hands of a large building 
firm with the requisite experience and organisational 
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capacity, enabled Wates to increase its production after the 
withdrawal of government subsidies to non traditional 
houses. [Tab. IV3 In 1948, Reed and Mallick built their first 
large panel precast concrete panel house. Unlike the Wates 
system which required a self supporting internal lining, the 
Reema panel was cast with an internal surface which could 
simply be given a half inch plaster coat, meaning a further 
element of wall construction had been incorporated into an 
increasingly complex panel, CFig. 113 and whereas the Wates 
house required 1,500 labour hrs, the Reema required only 
1,280. C93 By 1962, as well as over 300 village halls, Reema 
had constructed 20,000 houses using its hollow panels. 110] 
By 1950, a tradition of using large precast concrete 
panels for house construction had emerged. However, the 
wider exploitation of this technique and its increasing 
sophistication was stimulated by three factors: a change of 
government policy in favour of high-rise building, the 
introduction of the towercrane and the improvement of 
external wall finishes. In November 1955, the M. H. L. G. 
changed the subsidy system to encourage the greater use of 
multi-storey flats. Due to the greater cost of building 
high, local authorities had concentrated their flats in 
three to five storey blocks resulting in lower densities 
than the government 'wished to achieve in redevelopment 
projects. 1113 The eventual operation of the new progressive 
storey height subsidy positively favoured high-rise 
construction. This may be judged from tender approvals for 
dwellings over five stories in height which rose from 8,044 
in 1955 to a peak of over 44,000 in 1966. C12&13] In 1964, 
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P. A. Stone calculated the cost of building a 775 square foot 
dwelling in London to be 2,737 pounds for two stories and 
3,936 pounds for 15 (for the North the figures were 1,916 
and 3,473 pounds respectively). 114] The government subsidy 
system had created a market for a very expensive type of 
building. The implications of high-rise housing were to 
prove considerable to precast concrete construction for a 
major part of the increased cost was accounted for by the 
introduction of a steel or concrete structural frame, 
unecessary in low-rise housing, but required in 
traditionally constructed flats over five stories. The need 
for this expensive item was eventually eliminated in large 
concrete panel systems by simply supporting loadbearing 
panels on one another thus securing for precast concrete a 
major cost advantage over traditional construction in this 
housing type. (15] 
The lifting technique which was essential to exploit 
the' newly created high-rise housing market, whether with 
precast panels or framed construction, was provided by the 
rail mounted towercrane. Developed in Europe between the 
wars, the first models were introduced to Britain in 1951 
and vigorously promoted by the M. O. W. 116] Although 
essentially an efficient means of lifting heavy components 
to considerable heights, the tower crane itself exercised a 
powerful influence on building operations. Calling for 
detailed preplanning and the systematisation of erection 
processes, the wide application of tower cranes played its 
part in encouraging the adoption of sophisticated methods by 
industry. E173 If a firm possessed the expertise to use a 
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tower crane it had encompassed much of the skill needed to 
operate system building. By 195., four different-continental 
make=_ were available in England and home produced models 
were rapidly being developed. (18) 
In 1947 the-range of finishes for concrete included 
Painting, rendering, the application of special facing mixes 
and stone facings. However, a newcomer was the use, of 
aggregate for facing precast units. (19) As precast panels 
were cast face down in horizontal moulds, aggregate, or 
crushed stone, could be applied by placing alayer over the 
bottom of the mould (prior to pouring) which would set into 
the face of the panel as the mix dried. An early application 
of this technique was to the facing slabs to the Quarry Hill 
flats where Derbyshire Spar and brown gravel were used. 
Whereas painting and rendering required maintenance, 
aggregate facing formed a permanent and (due to its 
irregular relief) self cleaning finish. In 1954 
Prefabrication pointed out that early postwar precast 
concrete houses: well built and otherwise satisfactory... 
show within a few years a sad picture of deterioration in 
colours, streaking patterns of stains and chipped corners". 
[20] In 1956 Reema- dispensed with its stippled and painted 
finish and adopted Cotswold Stone aggregate. 1213 By the 
early 1960s precast concrete was able to present a finish 
equivalent to brickwork in durability and low maintenance. 
In April 1962, W. J. Reiners and Donald Eishop, both of 
the B. R. S., published a theoretical cost study of different 
methods of multi-storey construction. Using Operational 
Research techniques the study compared the use of large 
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panels and conventional construction in a theoretical 
project of "B00 maisonettes built to a single design in 20 
nine storey blocks on four different site=s. in outer London". 
[i2] The study was of necessity theoretical for at this time 
fully industrialised large panel systems had not been used 
in Britain. The large panel system showed a 3.5% saving over 
conventional construction, representing 'a gross return of 
about 30% per annum on the additional capital investment of 
about 100,000 pounds" for purchase of the factory plant and 
a transport fleet. Were the transport hired, capital 
investment would be reduced to 65,000 pounds and the return 
correspondingly higher at 3511. per annum. Apart from the 
elimination of the frame, a major factor in`this saving was 
the reduction of plasterer's work due to the smooth internal 
surfaces obtained in precast concrete. Were plastering 
dispensed with altogether, as was current on the Continent, 
a further saving could be expected. Provided, the investor 
could be assured- ofa 800 dwelling contract (or a series of 
continuity contracts amounting to the same total): 
'At present- it-appears that large panel construction 
can be -undertaken with prospects of saving in cost 
representing an acceptable return on investment and 
with little danger of appreciable loss'[23] 
By 1964, 'according to government statistics, tender prices 
for system built flats above four floors, in which large 
panel construction dominated, were over 27. cheaper than for 
conventional construction. Indeed, in two consecutive years, 
1967 and 1968, high-rise system built tenders actually fell. 
[ Tab. VI I] 
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The first and most successful British firm to introduce 
a large panel system into the high-rise housing market was 
Concrete Ltd., the largest of the precasting specialists. 
Although the systems it manufactured were erected by 
subcontracted building firms, Concrete Ltd. may be 
considered one of the most successful entries of a non 
building firm into housing production. Concrete Ltd. was 
founded in 1919 and began by manufacturing precast floor 
beams. Rather than enter the housing market in the immediate 
post Second World War period the firm concentrated on 
developing pre-stressed concrete for flooring panels. [24] 
With the introduction of tower cranes in 1952 the company 
designed the Bison Wide Slab, a large pre-stressed flooring 
unit up to 7'6" wide. This was incorporated into a system 
with the introduction of precast beams and columns and a 
nine storey block of flats was built in 1957 for Barking 
Council. In 1961, in a further development for Barking the 
frame was replaced by load bearing wall panels and in July 
of the following year the introduction of the Bison Wall 
Frame was announced, with Birmingham Corporation as the 
first takers. C25] The essence of the system was a 
collection of precast concrete panels (integrating completed 
internal and external finishes, wiring, and 'plumbing) 
forming the entire structure of the dwelling, with stairs 
and bathrooms cast as complete units. CFig. 19] By the time 
that it introduced Wall Frame the company had increased its 
total output of precast products from half a million pounds, 
in 1945, to five million pounds and had established five 
casting factories in various parts of the country. [26] The 
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first large panel system was introduced by a major 
manufacturer with a regional- system of manufacturing plants. 
1271 Between 1964 and 1979 Concrete Ltd. constructed 31,668 
dwellings in Wall Frame. CTab. V] Three years after it was 
introduced, the system had captured 20% of the high-rise 
market. 128] 
While it is evident that British manufacturers were 
adapting their production techniques to the economic 
characteristics of high-rise construction it is also true 
that British development owed much to continental practice 
which had advanced further by the early 1960s. France, 
Scandinavia and the Low Countries had been applying new 
techniques to flat construction continuously since the 
Second World War. By 1949, the French engineer, R. Carrius, toad 
patented his system and by 1962 it had completed 40,000 
flats with factories in France (5), Russia (2), Algeria (2), 
Germany (1), South America (2) and Italy (3). The standard 
practice was for Camus to jointly own the factories in 
partnership with indigenous contractors and industrialists. 
(29] Rather than develop their own systems three British 
firms, Unit Construction Co., Mitchell, and Fram, Higgs & 
Hill, all became joint owners of British factories producing 
panels under the Camus patent. [30] Four other firms also 
licensed continental panel systems for production in 
Britain. CTab. V] 
Those systems that were developed in Britain owed much 
to foreign developments. Indeed, in the crucial years in 
which Concrete Ltd. converted their frame system to 
loadbearing wall panels they seconded a senior engineer to 
283 
the Danish offices of P. E. Malstrom, consulting engineers to 
Jespersen and Larsen Nielsen. Rather than pay a royalty on a 
continental design, Concrete Ltd. were able to study at 
first hand continental practices and apply therr, to their 
system in return for a consultancy fee. 1313 A central 
element in the design of panel systems was that of the joint 
between the panels, the principles of which were established 
by continental engineers. Where an internal wall met the 
external wall eight panels abutted and the junction had both 
to transmit the loads from one to another and be 
weatherproof. In framed construction the structural members 
are monolithically connected: in large panel construction it 
was crucial that they could be rapidly stacked, one above 
the other, with the minimum amount of site work to make the 
connection. Accurate casting of the panels in moulds 
obviated the need for laborious aligning processes on site. 
Any discrepancies in the alignment of the wall panels was 
accommodated by adjusting a bolt cast into the top of the 
panel below. The Larsen Nielsen joint, upon which the Bison 
and many other joints were based reduced the insitu work 
needed to join the wall and floor elements to a minimum. The 
panels abutted each other directly and the residual voids 
were either dry packed or filled with grout. The weather was 
excluded by a grooved channel holding a flexible tongue in 
the vertical plane, and, in the horizontal plane, by a 
down-stand in the face of the outer leaf of the panel. The 
dry joint was crucial to the production of large panel 
systems whose profitablility required minimal site work: the 
bold orthogonal grid imposed on elevations is their 
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hallmark. [ 32&Fig. 24 ] 
The sponsorship of a large panel system was a 
considerable undertaking. The most expensive element in the 
production process was the concrete casting plant. The 
factory built by Taylor Woodrow Anglian at Lenwade, in 1963, 
to produce components under the Larsen Nielsen patent was 
estimated to have cost 250,000 pounds by -I. B. S. A. C.. The 
factory consisted of four 330' long casting shops each 
mating different types of component which were transported 
about the works by two 10ton overhead cranes. The stockyards 
included custom built racks for the storage of panels, and 
sidings were constructed to connect the works to the rail 
network (eventually the firm purchased a road transport 
fleet to avoid the vicissitudes, of rail transport). Concrete 
was mixed and conveyed from a central batching plant by a 
system of conveyors. 90 5ton steel casting moulds were 
imported from Germany and Denmark at a cost of between 1,000 
and 1,700 pounds each. Capital costs also included training 
the 120 strong workforce in precasting techniques. [33] 
Larsen Nielsen represented a norm for precast panel 
investment. The four, rather more sophisticated, plants 
built by Laing for the Production of Jespersen components 
were estimated to have cost between 600,000 and 750,000 
pounds each. As well as a steam curing shed, Laing's plants 
featured a conveyor belt system to transport the units and a 
travelling hopper and'vibrating machine. Only 14 workers 
were required to operate the highly mechanised wall and 
floor manufacturing shops. 134] 
Not all firms invested in this level of technology. The 
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cost of a "crude but effective" Reema plant with an output 
of 500 dwellings per annum was no more than 150,000 pounds. 
Fy using a greater amount of labour in the production and 
erection process, investment costs could be substantially 
reduced and greater flexibility built into the design. (35] 
A further means of reducing the investment needed in a 
permanent factory was the setting up of temporary casting 
works on site. Although Wates had had considerable 
experience in precasting by the early 1960s and had studied 
foreign factory produced systems, it dissented from the 
fashion for centralised factories and developed a "mobile 
manufacturing unit" which. was resident on site for the 
duration-of the contract. The logic behind this decision is 
described by Wates' Managing Director: 
"a central factory will cost between half a million 
and three quarters of million pounds: it will produce 
2,000 dwellings per year... A mobile factory costing 
125,000 will produce 750 dwellings per year. The first 
must be amortised over at least ten years... The 
mobile factory can be amortized over three' [363 
Furthermore, while central factories built up considerable 
overheads which could be Justified when operating at full 
capacity, they were an expensive liability when production 
was slack. Site factories avoided much of this expense and 
could cope more easily with the climate of uncertain demand 
which eventually characterised system building. Between 1964 
and 1979, Wates built 17,782 dwellings in their precast 
concrete system, and their success was second only to 
Concrete Ltd. C Tab. V 
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The enthusiasm of British building firms for importing 
expensive high capacity foreign systems was not shared by 
the I. R. S. which toot: an early and active part in panel 
production technology. In 1963 the Station developed the 
Battery Casting technique for use by smaller building firms 
and Direct Works Departments. This project was consistent 
with official policy designed to spread the benefits of 
industrialisation beyond the larger building firms to the 
industry in general and break: down the autonomy of the 
closed system. [37&Ch. VI] This ingenious and cheap 'technique 
of casting panels vertically in multiple moulds was intended 
to be suitable for contracts as low as 100-200 dwxwellings. 
[38] Contrary to the Station's expectation the system was 
little used by Direct Works Departments, and a Midland 
Housing Consortium scheme to develop a panel system of its 
own using Battery Casting also foundered in 1968. [39] 
Nevertheless, the technique was willingly taken up by a 
number of larger contractors and was incorporated into the 
systems marketed by Wates, The Fram Group and Gleeson 
Industrialised Building Ltd. The Station's last contribution 
was a concrete panel pressing machine, which applied the 
techniques of hydraulically pressing kerb stones to large 
panel proportions. Launched in 1969, the 1,000 ton press, 
costing a quarter of a million pounds, could produce panels 
sufficient for 4,500 flats per year, and could be packed 
into 12,13 ton sections. Impressive though this was, there 
were few producers by this time able to utilise this order 
of capacity. 1407 
High-rise housing was a short lived phenomena. As early 
287 
as 1962, Cleeve Parr pointed out that for industrialised 
building to make a real breakthrough it must be applied to 
low-rise housing. [41] Embling and Marlow, of the M. H. L. G., 
re-emphasised this in 1964, when they noted that 80% of 
local authority housing was built in two stories. 
Furthermore, ministerial design policy was moving towards 
the concept of two storey, high density housing interspersed 
with low blocks of flats or maisonettes. 142] Conspicuously, 
the West Ham housing development, intended to implement 
Parker Morris recommendations for more flexibly designed 
living accommodation, used a load bearing brick and timber 
frame to give the flexibility and variation of first floor 
plan shape in relation to the ground [floor]". 143] 
Changing design policy was crucial to large panel 
sponsors. Norman Wates pointed out in 1964 that it was 
doubtful if precast concrete could be successfully applied 
to low-rise housing. This fear may indeed have been an 
important factor in his firms decision to use a site-based 
system which could be amortised quickly. (44] Concrete 
panels could compete with frame and cladding construction in 
multi-storey building but, as simple walling materials were 
more expensive than brickwork and could not compete with the 
loadbearing brickwall in low-rise construction. [45] In 
December 1965, the government announced that it intended to 
reduce the quantity of high-rise flatbuilding and withdrew 
the progressive storey height subsidy over six floors. (46] 
This policy change produced a rash of local authority 
housing at six 'stories, at which point it was generally 
understood that precast concrete still maintained a 
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positive, but lessened, cost advantage over conventional 
construction. In April 1967, the 1965 measure was followed 
by a cost yardstick system which prescribed limits for local 
authority housing costs and reframed subsidies in favour of 
low-rise high density development. 147] The effect of these 
policy changes was dramatic: between 1966 and 1974, tender 
approvals for housing over four floors fell from 44,306 to 
2,390. (48] With'the decimation of high-rise building came 
the demise of large panel systems. Between 1970 and 1976 
housing completions in precast concrete fell from 25,566 to 
1,766, or, from 45% of system built housing to 7%. CTab. VI] 
A number of two-storey housing systems were in fact 
marketed, although often to supplement a sponsor's high 
blocks in mixed development projects. 049] The general trend 
was to reduce the amount of precast concrete, often only to 
the structural crosswalls, as the system took on lower 
building heights. In 1966 Concrete Ltd. modified their 
system to accommodate the six storey heights favoured by the 
1965 modification to the subsidy system. Featuring a 
prestressed floor slab which could span between the precast 
party walls, the system used timber frame panels for 
internal walls, and a single leaf non structural concrete 
spandrel panel for the front and rear cladding. 050] 
C. Bryant & Co. produced a low-rise precast concrete 
crosswall' system using a substantial amount of timber frame 
components which completed over 12,674 dwellings. However 
the success of this firm must be considered in the light of 
the corrupt relationship into which it entered with its 
major client, Birmingham Corporation. 1513 The tendency of 
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systems such as Jespersen and Yorkshire Development Group to 
be used for medium rise developments also slowed the 
eventual decline in precast concrete systems. CTab. V] 
Associated as it was with a particularly conspicuous 
aspect of state housing policy - the high-rise boom - the 
rise and fall of precast concrete systems constitutes one of 
the most dramatic aspects of the development of system built 
housing. Nevertheless, this surge coupled with the 
importation of continental designs and techniques should not 
obscure the fact that a tradition of precasting concrete 
panels for social housing had developed in Britain, and that 
successful systems had been marketed for low-rise building 
by the end of the 1940s. The acute concentration on 
high-rise in the early 196Cºs undoubtedly informed the need 
to hastily exploit methods developed elsewhere. Had these 
not existed, it is evident that the British building 
industry would have developed its own precasting 
technologies for high-rise construction. Indeed, had large 
contractors not flooded the market with high capacity 
factory based continental systems, it is likely that more 
flexible techniques requiring less investment would have 
been utilised, such as Battery Casting. The inability of 
large panels to re-enter the low-rise market during the 
1970s most probably arose from the fact that, not only had 
design trends changed in the direction of greater 
flexibility in layouts and houseforms, favouring more 
complex high density arrangements than the tight disciplines 
of precasting could achieve, but that traditional building 
had itself become more efficient than in the years of 
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dislocation, materials and labour shortages that typified 
both the early postwar years and the heights of the 1960s 
building boom. Furthermore, a new type of system building 
technology, timber frame, had entered the market. 
II. TIMBER FRAME. 
Despite the fact that timber is well suited to 
prefabrication, its use in system building did not reach a 
peak until the mid 1970s - right at the end of the period 
considered by this study. This section will explain why the 
development and widespread use of prefabricated timber 
technology took: so long to become established in Britain and 
why, when it had, it eventually dominated system building 
technology: in 1976 it accounted for more than half of 
system built housing. [Tab. VI] 
The use of timber for housing construction has a long 
tradition in Britain particularly for the construction of 
temporary and emergency accommodation during the World Wars. 
[52] The introduction of plywood in the 1930s, and its 
subsequent postwar development, gave a considerable impetus 
to the use of timber in prefabricated construction. 
Industrially manufactured, light and strong, plywood 
provided the basis for eventual timber frame technology. 
When stiffened with timber battens, plywood forms rigid, 
easily handled units of considerable lightness and strength 
which can be made up in small workshops without expensive 
machinery. Between 1941 and 1944, Uni-Seto Structures 
claimed to have built five million square feet of 
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accommodation in their plywood and timber system for 
government hutted programmes with 30 factories supplying 
timber components to 200 contractors. [53] The firm 
eventually constructed 29,000 bungalows under the Temporary 
Housing Programme in a timber and asbestos system. 
However, at the end of the war stringent controls were 
imposed on the use of timber. Not only had the war disrupted 
the world timber supply, but government policy reduced the 
import of timber through the licensing system until 1953 in 
an attempt to improve the balance-of payments. Whereas the 
prewar consumption of timber was 2.5 standards/dwelling, the 
allowance in 1947 was 1.6. [54] Although the import of 2,444 
Swedish timber houses was allowed by the government in an 
attempt to boost housing output in the immediate postwar 
years, CTab. IV] timber was limited in non traditional 
construction. In 1945 the Interdepartmental Committee on 
House Construction turned down British Power Boat Co. 's 
design for a prefabricated house as it required large 
amounts of timber despite the fact that it seemed an 
otherwise economic method of construction. [55] In common 
with Uni-Seco, many timber prefabricators turned to overseas 
marketss, in which case timber was made available. The 
systems which this firm marketed in Britain - for schools, 
hospital buildings and offices - featured a gradual 
reduction in timber content throughout the late '1940s. [56] 
Before the war, Britain's consumption of timber was the 
highest per capita of any predominantly importing country. 
By 1953, with the exception of Ireland and Hungary, it had 
the lowest. Furthermore, timber had become an expensive 
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material: since 1945 it had risen in price by 378%, whereas 
the average inflation of building materials was 216%. [57] 
Following the decontrol of timber in 1953, the 
M. H. L. G., in conjunction with Canterbury City Council, 
commenced an experiment in crosswall construction on 24 
maisonettes. [58] In this experiment, the loadbearing 
brickwork was confined to the structural crosswalls of the 
houses. The cladding was made up of prefabricated timber 
frame panels and the use of plasterboard on the internal 
partitions reduced the wet plastering work to a minimum. In 
1957, the results of a cost analysis of this experiment in 
partial prefabrication showed a 142 pound saving per 
dwelling over the cost of all brick construction. 159] In 
December 1957, Unity, a firm which had previously sponsored 
a composite concrete and steel frame housing system, began 
marketing a two-storey system using brick cross walls, 
prefabricated non structural timber wall panels and 
prefabricated roof trusses. [60] Thereafter, this method of 
construction, referred to as rationalised traditional or 
crosswall, remained a popular one for housing construction, 
[Fig. 23B] and a number of system were marketed on these 
principles during the 1960s. [ Tab. V] 
The increase in housing programmes'of the early 1960s 
saw a rise in the use of timber frame. An additional fillip 
came with the replacement of local building bye-laws with 
the national system of Building Regulations in 1964. 
Although waivers could be obtained in "specific cases' the 
model bye-laws effectively prohibited the use of timber for 
external cladding and party wall construction in housing. 
293 
E613 With the National Building Regulation's emphasis on 
easing the introduction of new techniques, "deemed to 
satisfy' provisions were replaced with performance standards 
(thus a method of construction would be required to have a 
specific performance rather than be of a specific 
composition). External timber claddings could now be 
accommodated within the new performance standards and the 
construction of a fireproof timber- party wall, of 
satisfactory performance, was pioneered by the M. H. L. G. 
Research and Development Group in the 5M system. [62] 
The technique that predominated timber frame technology 
during the postwar period was the 'platform frame'. 
Originally developed in America and Canada, platform frame 
differed considerably from the traditional timber house 
eliminating a large part of its skilled labour content. 
Rather than embodying- a skeleton timber frame constructed 
insitu, prefabricated wall panels were brought to site and, 
in conjuntion with the floor and roof constru; tion, rapidly 
nailed together to form a rigid box structure. [Fig. 27] Like 
steel frames, this allowed the simultaneous working of 
finishing and roofing trades. The standardised wall panels 
were made up in workshops using large table jigs on which 
the timber studs, ply sheathing, windows and door frames, 
vapour barriers and insulation were assembled with unskilled 
labour. [63] The adoption of prefabricated timber 
construction was assisted by the introduction of craft 
eliminating jointing techniques such as plate connectors 
which could be driven home by hydraulic presses. [64] 
Traditional carpentry required either the skilled and labour 
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intensive processes of cutting away considerable amounts of 
wood and the connection of members by hand nailing. Platform 
frame replaced traditional jointing techniques, such as 
halving and morticing, with the universally applied 
buttjoint, whereby machine cut lengths were butted against 
each other in the jig and mechanically plate nailed. 
The cost savings which the use of these techniques 
provided cannot be calculated precisely as reliable data on 
the cost of specific types of system building is not 
available. In 1965 the Timber Research and Development 
Association claimed that, when used efficiently, timber 
frame required one third to a half of the labour required in 
traditional housing, 1653 and was capable of a cost saving 
of 5-10%. Official statistics on tender costs for low-rise 
system built and traditional housing also suggests that 
timber frame was competitive with other systems and 
traditional construction. By 1969, by which time timber 
frame was a popular form of system built two-storey housing, 
Table VII shows system building tenders-to be cheapening in 
relation to traditional construction. During the mid-1970s, 
by which time timber frame was the predominant form of 
system built low-rise housing, M. H. L. G. statistics indicate 
that this cost competitiveness had increased substantially. 
CTabs. VI&VII ] 
While some specialists, such as Vic Hallam, both 
manufactured and supplied the components for large housing 
contracts, an alternative trend was for a sponsor to 
restrict its involvement solely to the distribution of the 
components. A system on these lines was Frameform, marketed 
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by James Riley & Partners. If a client selected Frameform, 
its scheme designs would be sent to James Riley who would 
modify the drawings. in the light of the system's design 
constraints. The components were then manufactured by 
subcontracted woodwork manufacturers, using their standard 
equipment, to James Riley's specifications. A licensed 
building firm, whose supervisory staff were quickly trained 
in the use of the system, would then erect the components, 
which could be handled without special lifting plant, on 
site. In this manner contracts as small as two houses could 
be handled, as in the case of a pair of dwellings for 
Bedford Council erected by a small local builder, William 
J. Bushy Ltd. [bb] By this means_ of organisation James Riley 
estimated themselves to be capable of supplying up to 15,000 
houses each year (although successful the firm never 
attained this figure) [Tab. V] without having to invest in 
any production plant. The capital required by the firm 
needed to be sufficient only to provide the accommodation 
and staff necessary to co-ordinate suppliers and 
contractors. Furthermore, supply could be rapidly expanded 
or contracted to suit the state of the market. Compared to 
other forms of system building, the level of investment, and 
hence the financial risks were modest, and more importantly, 
were within the reach of a much larger number of firms. 
A further feature of timber frame, important to its 
success, was its ability to allow considerable design 
freedom in comparison with steel frame or concrete panel 
systems. The planning grid on which Frameform was based was 
a 16" external module - coinciding with the intervals at 
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which the wall studs were placed - and a 4" internal module. 
However, as the manufacturers were at pains to point out, 
where desired these could be departed from without imposing 
high cost penalties. (67] This relative freedom in planning 
was accompanied by a wide choice of external finishings 
which included a single leaf of brickwork, render, tile 
hanging, asbestos sheet, concrete facing slabs and timber 
boarding. Frameform was capable of mimicking a wide range of 
traditional house types. C68&Fig. 28] Indeed, so confident 
were James Riley of the ability of its system to be 
indistinguishable from traditional construction that it ran 
a competition in which participants were invited to select, 
from 16 photographs, four houses which were not built in 
Frameform. Organised at the 1966 Housing and Town Planning 
Exhibition, successful competitors stood to win 100 pounds. 
(69] 
The combination of timber frame's ability to be 
indistinguishable from and competitive in cost with 
traditional construction most certainly enabled its 
application to the private housing market. Furthermore, the 
minimal investment required to operate the system enabled 
housing developers to easily incorporate the technique into 
their speculative operations. In the late 1960s, Wates were 
marketing a two storey timber frame housing system, 
concealed beneath a veneer of brickwork, for use in 
speculative housing. 1703 By 1967 the firm had gained 
approval from the three major building societies., The 
adoption of timber frame by large speculative housing 
developers has been rapid. A. Cullen estimates that, whereas 
297 
during the 1960s and 1970s no more than 1.5% of private 
housing was built using timber frame, in 1979 it had reached 
15%. with many developers making a complete switch in their 
techniques towards this form of construction. [71] Unlike 
other methods of system building which modified the 
character of the buildings they produced, timber frame 
appeared to be an almost perfect substitute for loadbearing 
masonry construction. With the exception of timber frame 
there are no indications that the other forms of system 
building were adopted on a significant scale by private 
housing developers. 
III. NO-FINES. 
Whereas previous sections have concentrated on particular 
categories of system building, this section will look at one 
particular system; No-Fines, sponsored by George Wimpey & 
Co. There were many systems which shared the principle of 
pouring concrete into reusable shutters, but none, with the 
exception of Easiform for a brief period immediately after 
the Second World War, which enjoyed the success of No-Fines. 
In June 1968, a Director of Wimpey, Philip Ainley, claimed 
that over three quarters of a million people were living in 
No-Fines houses built by his company. 172] This section will 
explain why the large scale exploitation of No-Fines was 
undertaken by one firm only, and why, in the hands of George 
Wimpey & Co. it was uniquely successful in terms of the 
volume built. 
No-Fines was developed in Holland, which, like Britain, 
was affected by shortages in skilled building labour and 
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traditional materials immediately following the First World 
War. The system was imported to Britain in the early 1920s 
and used by a number of firms, including Laing. [73] In 
comparison with its later success, only a relatively small 
number were built between the wars. This was explained by 
the M. O. N. in 1924, as the result of a dearth in plasterers. 
[74] By the end of the Second World War both Wimpey and 
Holland Hannen & Cubitt had also experimented with the 
system. [75] However, of the two, Wimpey were the only firm 
to pursue No-Fines construction in England immediately after 
the war, and by 1951 the firm had reached an annual 
production of 109000 houses. [Tab. IV] 
No-Fines was based on a concrete mix which omitted sand 
- hence "no-fines" - and was poured into reuseable shutters 
to form the external wall and internal partitions. [Fig. 12] 
According to the M. H. L. G., No-Fines was not a particularly 
labour saving system, using on average 1,700 labour hours 
per house. [76] However, Gosschalk points out that the 
labour used was classed as unskilled, representing a 
considerable labour cost saving. [77] The erection of 
No-Fine=_ shells, in one 'throw' at the rate of one a day, 
like steel and timber frame, speeded the remainder of the 
building work. The omission of sand, as well as lightening 
and cheapening the mix, allowed the use of lightweight 
reusable shutters which constituted the major element of 
investment in the system. The omission of sand also gave the 
wall a cellular composition providing thermal insulation and 
preventing the capilliary attraction of water. Due to the 
lack in tensile strength of the cement mix, openings were 
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required to be of modest size and evenly distributed 
throughout the wall - very much in the manner of brickwork. 
This requirement, together with the rendered external 
finish, makes the greatest contribution to the character of 
the finished dwellings which are indistinguishable from 
rendered brick construction. The floors and roof to Wimpey 
No-Fines were constructed in timber. Of perhaps most 
interest to prospective clients was the design flexibility 
allowed by the system. According to the Director of Housing 
and Valuer to the London County Council, a large number of 
its general needs nontraditional housing of the 1940s and 
early 1950s was built in No-Fines because, as well as being 
competitive in price with traditional construction, it could 
mimic the Council's standard house plans. 1783 By 1953, 
Wimpey were using 11 different house types on the Willenhall 
estate for Coventry City Council, including a special corner 
unit devised by the City Architect. 179&Fig. 123 
The capital investment required to operate Wimpey 
No-Fines is not known but its magnitude can be roughly 
guessed by comparing it with a similar system: Easiform. In 
1952 the M. H. L. G. estimated a kit capable of producing 34 
Easiform houses per annum as costing 4,040 pounds. The 
pre-World War Two Easiform house was identical to No-Fines, 
but its postwar version differed in three respects; it 
incorporated a cavity in the wall construction, used an 
inner leaf of dense concrete and smaller shutters. To ensure 
the weatherproofness of the solid No-Fines walls the 
shutters were a full storey high, and, unlike Easiform's, 
could only be handled by cranes - this in turn conferred an 
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additional capital expenditure and organisational burden on 
the No-Fines sponsor. Although a single shutter set 
represented a modest investment, the number required to 
produce a poured concrete system in substantial quantities 
was considerable. For instance, in 1952 the M. H. L. G. 
estimated the cost of a concrete precasting factory with a 
capacity of 1,000 houses a year to be 60,000 pounds. 
According to the M. H. L. G. 's figures for Easiform, in order 
to produce 1,000 houses a year, the shutter sets alone would 
cost 116,000 pounds. 1803 
A further feature of No-Fines was that it required 
considerable organisational expertise on the part of the 
sponsor for its successful operation. In 1948 the M. O. W. 
noted a considerable discrepancy between the two firms who 
used No-Fines (by this time the Unit Construction Co. was 
also using No-Fines in small numbers [Tab. IV]) in their 
measured experiment of that year. 
'Because the "no-fines" concrete houses on a 
particular site proved outstanding, one might be 
tempted to say that "no-fines" concrete construction 
was in itself superior to traditional construction... 
[however]... The methods and organisation used by a 
different firm to build "no-fines' houses on another 
site produced very poor results"[81] 
It would appear that Wimpey possessed both the 
organisational expertise to successfully build No-Fines, and 
the financial resources to expand production. As the use of 
the system increased, according to Peter Ainley, so did 
Wimpey's selling and contracting organisation: 
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'a developing network of area and regional 
organisations made it possible to offer No-Fines to 
local authorities throughout the United Kingdom. All 
the advantages of a local contractor with . 
the service 
facilities of an international organisation are thus. 
available as required by every local authority"C82] 
As the case study of Coventry demonstrated, in the hands of 
a firm with the resources of Wimpey, not least of which was 
a large permanent and mobile workforce, No-Fines was capable 
of obtaining the partial monopoly of. a local authority's 
housing programme. Once established, the type of 
relationship which the firm enjoyed with its municipal 
clients would have been difficult for a newcomer to 
dislodge. Furthermore, Wimpey's had no intention of sharing 
their expertise with other and possibly less proficient 
firms. In 1952 the M. H. L. G. approached the firm suggesting 
that it should license its No-Fines technique to smaller 
builders but received a curt response from the Managing 
Director: "he was quite definite that Wimpeys will not 
associate with other firms: they would not be prepared to 
risk their goodwill... it has been considered carefully in 
the past and definitely turned down". 183] 
Having successfully introduced the system, the postwar 
years saw its refinement and adaptation to the high-rise 
market. In 1953, with the casting of a dense reinforced 
concrete frame into the walls, the system was developed for 
an estate of-six storey flats at Birmingham, (84] and in 
1956 a series of 11 storey blocks were built for Coventry. 
1853 While the principle of constructing the external shell 
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remained the same, the 1960s saw the refinement of the 
internal work, with the increasing prefabrication of timber 
roof trusses, timber flooring, and internal partition units 
and service installations. [86] Indeed, the postwar 
development of No-Fines owes more to progress in timber 
technology than to any development in the basic principles 
of casting the No-Fines walls. 
Although outstandingly successful, the peak of No-Fines 
production was passed in 1967. The overall decline in system 
building did not begin until three years later. Furthermore, 
the system was less vulnerable to the reduction in high-rise 
housing - it could be applied to all building heights. 
Therefore, it could be suggested that the use of No-Fines 
was declining in relation to other forms of construction 
during the late 1960s. [Tabs. II&V] With the demise of 
high-rise flats, and hence precast concrete systems, the two 
main competitors to No-Fines were timber frame, whose 
postwar development had been delayed, and traditional 
construction whose efficiency had improved considerably by 
the late 1960s. It is most likely that the development of 
both of these methods of construction was eroding the cost 
competitiveness of No-Fines. Remarkable though its successes 
were, No-Fines was as vulnerable as any other technology to 
the dynamics of postwar building economics. 
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF TRADITIONAL BUILDING. 
Previous sections have explored the alternatives to 
conventional construction provided by system building. This 
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section will examine why they had such difficulty in 
competing with traditional methods of house construction. 
In assessing productivity increases in traditional 
building, non technical factors must be considered. The 1948 
M. H. L. G. Committee of Enquiry Into the Cost of Housebuilding 
noted the deleterious effect of postwar dislocation on 
housebuilding productivity. CCh. I] As these were overcome in 
the succeeding years, traditional building could but become 
more efficient. However, the considerable strains imposed on 
the building industry in the 1960s once again exerted 
periodic influences on efficiency. [87] Official figures for 
productivity suggest that the efficiency of traditional 
building improved steadily from the end of the war onwards. 
[88] Some sources also suggest a dramatic rise in 
productivity during the 1960s, with the Under Secretary of 
State for the Environment announcing to Parliament in 1972 
that over the past decade output/per worker had risen by 
between 47. 'and 8% per annum. 189] However, the optimism of 
these figures must be tempered by the N. E. A. 's more 
circumspect analysis in 1976 of "little improvement" in 
productivity in house'building over the past ten years. E903 
Despite difficulties in measurement it is apparent that 
real developments in conventional house construction 
proceeded along a number of different paths. One of these 
was the introduction of mechanised plant to site operations. 
Many of the basic innovations were made before the Second 
World War: the portable electric drill, the powered concrete 
mixer and the towercrane, however, their wider application 
in building operations was a postwar phenomenon. C911 
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Between 1948 and 1964, investment in mechanical plant by the 
building industry grew from 11 million to 50 million pounds 
annually. C92] Nevertheless, the application of mechanical 
plant to building is not as easy as in other types of 
industry. While ideal, for tasks such as earthmoving and 
heavy materials and components handling, it is less'easy to 
use mechanical plant in the construction of the fabric of 
the conventional house. Furthermore, its overall efficiency 
is impaired by the 'long periods for which plant lies idle 
awaiting the appropriate stages of the Job to be 
reached. C93] 
Of more significance to housebuilding have been 
advances made in materials manufacture. These have 
benefitted system building and traditional construction 
alike. The production of many basic materials - ie. bricks 
and concrete --were highly mechanised before the Second 
World War. 194] Indeed, one interwar innovation, 
plasterboard, and its mass production was acknowledged by 
R. B. White in 1965, as "perhaps the greatest single 
contribution to, prefabrication of any period". C95] The 
postwar period saw the introduction of extensive ranges of 
industrially produced boards to building, and in 1957, 
L. L. Goodman cited the production of chipboard as an early 
example of fully automated manufacture. 196] The impact of 
such advances on house building were legion for nearly half 
the costs of construction are accounted for by basic 
materials. -Indeed, as Donald Bishop pointed out in 1966, 
over the past decade the prices of building materials had in 
real terms fallen in common with other mass produced 
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commodities: To this extent - amounting to perhaps 407. of 
the cost of building - the industry is industrialised 
already". 1973 
Also of great significance has been the introduction of 
limited prefabrication. Rather than attempting to 
prefabricate the entire structure, conventional builders 
have increasingly inserted prefabricated components into"a 
structure built by conventional means. By the mid-19th 
Century Thomas Cubitt was serving his building sites with 
centralised workshops pre-manufacturing and finishing 
plasterwork, marbles, steel components and joinery. t98] The 
pre-manufacture of windows, doors and joinery fittings was 
common practice among interwar speculative housing 
developers, and, indeed, has been noted in existing 
histories of prefabrication. t993 Led by Crittalls, the 
interwar period also saw the marketing of standard ranges of 
windows and doors in both timber and steel. A more recent 
innovation has been the introduction of" prefabricated 
roofing trusses during the 1960s. These have since come to 
dominate the housing market, both private and public, and a 
significant part- of house construction - the basic roof 
. structure - 
is now manufactured under industrially advanced 
conditions: in 1978 three million trusses were made on 250 
machines by between 150-200 firms. Other components, such as 
metal lintols, are also manufactured by flowline production. 
11003 
A further area of advance has been in management 
techniques. A' particularly active participant in this field 
was the state. One of the first time and motion studies of 
306 
building operations was produced by the M. O. W. in 1945 to 
aid the application of the payment by results scheme 
introduced during the war. 1101] As a means of increasing 
efficiency in state building contracts, the M. O. W. reported, 
in 1948, that it and most local authorities were insisting 
on the use of Time and Progress Schedules by government 
contractors. 1102] In view of the fact that, at this time, 
the bull: of building wort; was carried out directly-for the 
state, this measure must have brought such techniques to the 
attention of a large number of firms. Many firms, both large 
and medium, adopted management techniques in their building 
operation during the postwar period. According to G. MacLean, 
of John MacLean & Sons, the prospect of competition with non 
traditional producers was an important incentive towards 
this. 1103] During the 1950s and 1960s Work Study and 
Network Analysis were imported from America and applied to 
building operations, both conventional and industrialised, 
by larger firms. 1104] The degree of systematisation 
required by building systems was a factor in the 
introduction of computers to building. In this the M. P. B. W. 
also played a*developmental role. (105] 
Advances in traditional building were only one of the 
difficulties facing investors in capital intensive, labour 
saving technologies. The inhibiting effect of the cheapness 
of British building labour on attempts to industrialise the 
housebuilding industry was noted on a number of occasions 
during the 1960s. At the Housing From the Factory conference 
in 1962, Donald Bishop observed the need for building labour 
to become more highly paid in relation to other types of 
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labour for the 'potential" economies of system building to 
be realised. [1063 In 1965, A. Tozer, Managing Director of 
Cubitts Construction Systems Ltd., anticipated that in 
'about two years time" building wage rates would rise 
sufficiently for a real cost advantage to be found in system 
building. 11073 In 1967, D. V. Donnison repeated Tozer's 
forecast that "before long" there might be a structural 
change in the relationship between building and non building 
wage rates. However, this did not take place and building 
systems were forced to compete in a- building market 
inherently unsuited to capital intensive labour saving 
building methods. As Go=schalk pointed out in 1970, the 
cheapness of British building labour can only have 
contributed to the commercial failure of -firms exploiting 
capital intensive foreign systems by comparison with the 
cruder models developed in Britain by Concrete Ltd., Wates 
and Reema. 11083 
Despite the considerable 'demand on building resources 
during the 1960s, the fact is that building in Britain 
remained relatively cheap. Referring, in 1966, to the latest 
figures produced by the Organisation for European 
Co-operation and Development (O. E. C. D. ) the National Builder 
proudly noted that: 
'the British building industry had the best record of 
any in Europe for holding its prices down during the 
ten years, 1953 to 1963, and that during this period 
our housebuilding costs rose even less than that of 
other building works"[109] 
Other sources support this boast. [110&111] The fact that 
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this relative cheapening of housing costs took place before 
the major industrialised building drives of the 1960s does 
little to support the contention that postwar productivity 
increases in building generally were aided by system 
building. 
Detailed studies of the effect which'system building 
had on building operations suggests that the gains which 
system building made over traditional construction had less 
to do with the inherent labour saving advantages of new 
methods, than the effect they had on building operations and 
the type of contractor which they attracted. To use a 
building system successfully, sponsors had to introduce a 
considerable degree of organisation and rationalisation into 
their building operations. The dependence of sy=stem building 
on good management was noted by the M. O. W. in its measured 
experiment of 1948. The M. 4. W. 's verdict was that, on 
average, non traditional methods of construction had indeed 
shown significant savings in, labour -content and that 3 had 
shown savings in cost. However, in achieving this, 
successful sponsors had developed a degree of managerial 
expertise uncharacteristic of the traditional builder: 
'to achieve useful results with new methods of 
construction it is 'necessary to have the appropriate 
organisation for - the design of the house, for the 
production of the components, and for erection on 
site. It is probable that all three functions will 
need to be very closely integrated if success is to be 
assured, and that management of the "production 
engineer' type will yield the best returns't112] 
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This aspect of system building was re-emphasised by the 
E. R. S. during the 1960s. According to Donald Bishop, the 
benefits of system building resulted from the 
rationalisation it forced upon the design and organisation 
of the building process rather than from the superiority of 
system building construction techniques: "the discipline 
imposed by large panels* on the design makes operational 
control and high productivity more feasible than is the case 
with conventional construction". [113] Hence Bishop proposed 
that the "average" labour productivity of building systems 
was likely to be higher than the "average" labour 
productivity for conventional brick construction although 
the difference between the best exponent of each was not 
great. In 1968 Bishop suggested that the average labour 
content of a traditional house might vary from between 2,400 
hours when building is just allowed to happen" to 700 hours 
in the hands of a specialist. The latter figure competed 
easily with best results obtainable in system building. So 
far as raising the productivity of the industry as a whole, 
Bishop's analysis suggests that either system building 
removed the difficulty that the average contractor had Yin 
mating traditional construction as efficient as it might be 
or attracted the type of sponsor amenable to improved 
management techniques. 1114] 
In 1970 the N. P. A. suggested that it was in terms of 
the latter thesis that the higher productivity of system 
building should be understood. So far as the Agency was 
concerned the technical merits of different types of 
building in two-storey house construction were the lesser 
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factor in the efficiency with which they, were built: 
the productivity which is achieved by using 
industrialised building methods is less dependent on 
the construction techniques adopted than on the 
management of design and construction. Industrialised 
housing is operated by contractors who are generally 
larger and more efficient than the average contractor. 
The size of industrialised housing projects is also 
somewhat larger than the national average. In this 
situation, system builders have achieved markedly 
faster building times and higher site 
productivity"I 115] 
According to this view, official statistics which suggest 
significant cost savings in system building for two-storey 
housing after 1969 [Tab. VII] may well be describing an 
altogether different phenomenon: that of larger, more 
efficient firms taking on larger contracts. The fact that 
they were using building systems may not be the reason for 
their lower tender prices - the firms may well have achieved 
the same efficiency with conventional building methods. 
The degree to which building methods could be made more 
efficient without introducing capital intensive building 
methods but by mimicking the close relationship between 
design, production and organisation found in system building 
was demonstrated by the N. P. A. in the late 1970s. The 
Pitcoudie I development project concentrated on the effects 
which the rationalisation of conventional construction could 
have on productivity. The 1141 houses, completed in 1977, 
were funded by the Glenrothes Development Corporation, and 
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designed by the Scottish Development Corporation using the 
N. P. A. as project management and productivity consultants. 
The layout, although consciously intended to avoid the 
extremities of design rationalisation often associated with 
system building, consisted of straignt terraces of simply 
designed houses in five types, varying from 1- to 3-storeys. 
Pitcoudie combined a productivity raising design strategy 
with the latest limited prefabrication techniques. Firstly, 
although the housetypes differed in layout and elevational 
treatment they were designed in such a way that, as far as 
practicable, the same building sequence could be followed in 
each house" thereby allowing a more regular flow of work 
from one house to another. Secondly, the building sequence 
consisted of fewer and larger operations than was normal, 
reducing the number of return visits by individual trades 
and reducing their interdependance: the wiring harness was 
delivered complete and installed in one operation. Thirdly a 
high degree of standardisation was used in the construction 
details: there was only one bathroom layout. Fourthly, 
readily available materials and components were used, 
concentrating on reducing the 'learning curve' in their 
installation and application. Fifthly, the house plans were 
dimensionally co-ordinated using only two shell sizes to aid 
the use of standard components: there was only one size of 
joist and two roof truss spans. 1116&Fig. 29] 
According to the N. B. A., this approach was an 
unqualified success. Whereas between 1974 and 1977 the 
average labour content of a Scottish dwelling was measured 
at 1,584 hours for traditional construction and 1,139 for 
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system building, the Pitcoudie I houses measured in the same 
survey took an average of 1,016 hours. A second phase of 283 
houses, Pitcoudie II9 completed in 1980 achieved comparable 
productivity using similar techniques. [117] In the light of 
the possibility of obtaining such dramatic increases in 
productivity in conventional construction, it is no suprise 
that, with the benefit of hindsight, contemporary observers 
such as P. A. Stone (1976) and D. W. Cheetham (1976) tended to 
question the approach of marketing prefabricated and 
complete building systems as many sponsors continued to do. 
[ 118&119] 
V. 
The individual development of the types of system building 
described in this chapter proceeded along very different 
lines, each occupying a different position in the changing 
economics of postwar building technology. However, it is 
also true that they had much in common, not least of which 
was the fact that sponsors tended to borrow their 
technologies from elsewhere; either from developments in 
engineering technique, in the case of steel frames, or from 
abroad, in the case of large panel systems and No-Fines. So 
far as British system building sponsors are concerned, 
little real innovation took place. Usually they were 
extensions of, or modifications to, existing trends in the 
development of traditional building technology: large panel 
systems were based on the development of concrete 
precasting; and platform frame on a long tradition in the 
development of American timber technology. Nevertheless, in 
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the case of the eight-way dry joint in large panel 
construction and the M. H. L. G. 's fireproof party wall in 
timber frame, there were instances where innovation was 
generated specifically by system building and not adapted 
from traditional construction. 
The success with which timber frame has' been exploited 
in private housing raises an interesting question on the 
distinction between developments in traditional 
construction, and system building. The fact that timber 
frame techniques were promoted in the form of systems for 
social housing by proprietary producers has earnt this 
method of construction the status of 'system building'. In 
this form it certainly conform=_ to the understanding of 
system building presented in this study. Nevertheless, it is 
significant that timber frame represented the least dramatic 
departure from traditional techniques of all the forms of 
system building noted in this study and required the least 
capital investment. The difference between timber frame and 
advanced methods of traditional house construction in the 
1980s is little more than that the internal wall leaf is 
constructed of premanufactured timber wall panels in place 
of blockwork. It may equally be characterised as the recent 
introduction of a cost saving component to traditional 
speculative house construction. Indeed, were it not for the 
legacy of 'system building' in social housing -a concept 
involving more than just the technicalities of construction 
- the term 'system' would probably not be applied to a 
comparatively modest development in housebuilding technique. 
In the view of contemporary commentators, new 
314 
technologies in the hands of system building sponsors were 
generally faster to build. In specific instances, official 
statistics record them as being cheaper, however, these 
statistics are open to alternative interpretations. They 
also economised in site labour to varying degrees, even 
though, in the majority of cases, system building's 
relatively high costs would suggest that these savings were 
compromised by increased labour inputs at other stages of 
production. By supplementing building labour with factory 
labour, they represented a real addition to the building 
resources of the nation at times of peak demand.. In this 
respect it is doubtful that they fulfilled government 
policies intended to reduce the overall labour content in 
building. While they seemed to possess merits in terms of 
executing large social housing programmes, one feature which 
the capital intensive alternatives to traditional 
construction all had in common was an inability to 
ultimately usurp conventional methods of house construction 
as they developed in post Second World War Britain. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT. THE RATIONALISATION OF DESIGN. 
Compared to traditional forms of construction, system 
building imposed considerable limitations on the design 
freedom of the architect. To understand the response of the 
architect to these, and the building forms that resulted, it 
is necessary to consider what seems to have been the two 
dominant views on design in relation to system building. On 
the one hand, as C. I. S. P. H. maintained in 1943, it was 
thought that prefabrication, under the guiding hand of the 
architect, should be allowed to generate its own 'mass 
production' aesthetic. Cl) On the other, as expressed by 
G. A. Gellicoe in 1944 following his visit to America, it was 
asserted that the architect should not simply stand back and 
allow mass production to generate its own aesthetic for: 
it is surely the fundamental task of our profession, 
and of ours alone, to preserve the humanities... we 
must have good design and good planning; but the main 
thing is the maintenance of human qualities over 
machine quality"127 
However, an issue on which both Gellicoe and C. I. S. P. H. 
agreed was that it was the architect alone who was invested 
with the responsibility for bringing about a successful 
resolution between architecture and prefabrication. It is 
with these different views on the architect's role, and the 
profession's attempts to reconcile architectural values with 
system building technology that this chapter is concerned. 
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I. THE DISCIPLINES OF IB. 
In order to discuss the design of system built housing it is 
appropriate to establish whether system building forced the 
architect to produce a different type of building to that 
which could be provided by conventional means. The evidence 
of contemporary commentators and the buildings themselves 
suggest that systems did indeed modify the formal character 
of housing and enforce a degree of repetition 
uncharacteristic of conventional construction. 
The influence which non traditional- systems had on the 
design of housing was commented on by the M. Q. H. in 1924, 
when the Committee on New Methods of House Construction 
pointed out of, the Weir House that 'From an architect's 
point of view the necessary sameness of the buildings in any 
extensive scheme is some `disadvantage" E33 and -advised 
'careful attention' to layout, colour schemes and grouping. 
A similar concern was voiced by the M. O. H. in the Housing 
Manual 1949 which pointed to two characteristics of post 
Second World War non traditional housing: the-designs were 
made prior to the introduction of the architect concerned 
with the specific scheme --and --could not be altered, 
furthermore they were in nearly all cases semi-detached: 
'the uniform appearance of these houses creates 
special problems in regard to-layout. Not only are the 
majority of these houses designed -in pairs, but it is 
hardly practicable to make variations in detail as in 
traditional houses- because the design is 
predetermined"E 4] 
To combat these drawbacks the Ministry advised "special' 
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measures such as the preservation of'trees and hedgerows 
and, more specifically, the intermingling of small groups of 
non traditional with traditional housing. CFig. 7E3 Despite 
this advice, The City Architect for Bristol, J. Nelson 
Meredith, found the'non traditional estates designed by his 
department monotonous by comparison to those which they had 
been` able to design in conventional construction: 'In the 
traditional houses a strong effort has been made to get away 
from the monotony of large areas of semi-detached housing, 
though this is inherent in the non traditional type'. C53 ' 
Many of the systems which were widely used during the 
1960=_ were rarely marketed as standard dwellings and were 
capable of some variation from scheme-to-scheme. However, 
the rationalisation of the construction process into the 
assembly of large premanufactured components exerted a 
considerable influence on the design of the buildings they 
produced. In' particular, the design of precast concrete 
systems was based on the production economics of the 
concrete panel. The disciplines of large panel building were 
described, in 1967, by the Deputy Chief Executive Architect 
to the N. B. A., I. Fraser. Basing his figures on those 
obtained from a Jespersen plant in Copenhagen operating at 
design capacity,; the ideal standard panel was gauged to be 
room sized'andsquare with the minimum of indentations. If 
the" panel were- halved in width, despite the fact that it 
would be half the size, only 20% of its cost would be saved. 
Furthermore a half sized panel with indented corners cost 
nearly as much an ideal panel twice the size. A standard 
variant (panels which-although not standard were produced in 
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larger quantities than one-offs) with large openings added 
between 75-85' to the cost, while specials with one-off 
aberrations might cost up to two and half times that of the 
ideal. Simply moving a power point from its standard 
location dictated the manufacture of a special, involving 
labour consuming work in redesigning and adjusting the 
moulds. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the 
extra costs involved in producing non standard panels were 
greater in the more highly mechanised systems such as 
Jespersen. In the case of low capacity off-site systems such 
as Reema and site cast sytems such as Wates, the additional 
costs of producing specials were not so great. 
The implications of utilising efficient panel sizes and 
configurations were numerous. In order to use the standard 
panel at its most efficient span, both wide frontage and 
narrow frontage dwellings were excluded. Staggers in plan 
and section also increased costs to the detriment of the 
system's cost efficiency. Whereas placing dwellings back to 
back, as in the Bison Wall Frame, had little effect, handing 
the plan simply doubled the number of component types. A 
standard arrangement in articulating the layout of 
traditional housing was prohibited by the exigencies of 
large panel production. Balconies fixed to the face of the 
external wall were preferred to those which were recessed 
and the staggered section, which introduced a range of 
additional jointing problems over and above more regular 
forms, was anathema. While plans needed to be repeated on 
each floor so that panels could be simply supported one 
above each other, the superimposition of two panels with 
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large openings might require the insertion of extra 
reinforcement. One dwelling type particularly unsuited to 
large panel construction was the maisonette; a building form 
which had become increasingly popular in redevelopment 
schemes during the 1950s. The requirement of this type for a 
bedroom floor to be superimposed on a living room floor 
prevented the repetition of identical floor plans. 
Furthermore the internal stairs required floor panels with 
large openings which concentrated stresses in a manner 
unsuited to panel construction. C63 The imperatives of 
producing large panels favoured a cellular building form, 
regular in outline and identical on each floor with modestly 
sized openings in its compartment walls. 17E. Fig. 203 Large 
panel system building modified the design process with a 
host of rules and constraints. As the Consultant Architect 
to Concrete Ltd., Clifford Culpin, pointed out in 19671 
'Beware of those presenting systems who say that 
theirs can be readily, adapted to suit any 
circumstances! If it can, then it hasn't been 
systematised... To mess about with a system is as 
illogical as building with bricks of odd sizes'C8] 
The impact which system building was having on the 
design of L. C. C. housing (which by this time concentrated on 
the use of precast concrete, but also the steel frame, and 
insitu concrete) was described in a report by the Architect 
to the Council, Hubert Bennett, in February 1965. In terms 
of design, the impact was not felt on the individual 
dwellings - indeed Bennett claimed that so far the council 
had found no restriction placed on the layout of the units 
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of accommodation 'beyond what would be expected of any 
method of construction now in use". Furthermore, the quality 
of finish in industrialised building could be good or bad no 
matter which of the systems was used and did not appreciably 
differ from that in traditional building. The unavoidable 
effect of system building was stated as that of repetition 
both of the individual dwelling unit and of the dwelling 
block: "Investment in the capacity to repeat carries with it 
an obligation to accept a minimum level of repetition 
without any change in the design". E93 
However, the L. C. C., like a number of larger 
authorities, was in the fortunate position of being able to 
offer contracts of such a magnitude that it could determine, 
within the constraints of the production technology, the 
design of the systems it used. Where unable to offer large 
contracts, or where lacking in the professional resources to 
redesign a system, an authority would be obliged to accept, 
more or less unmodified, a proprietary model. Typical of 
this type was the Bison Wallframe. [Ch. VII3 The purchaser of 
Bison dwellings was subject to a very tight series of design 
constraints. The core of the system was a standard bathroon 
unit, emerging in one piece from the factory and embodying 
the piped services. Against this the kitchen was placed. The 
basic Bison dwelling was a two-bedroom flat with the 
standard kitchen and bathroom configuration against the 
party wall. Structural crosswalls, which could be centred at 
b" increments between 9' and 16', divided the bedrooms and 
living rooms. The standard practice was to join two flats 
back to back to form a wing. Two wings would then be 
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connected by the-lifts and stair 
to be identical the plan of each 
the formulae. The layout could 
separating the wings with 
back-to-back. By arranging the 
of configurations a limited set 
derived, the most distinctive 
block. C 1O&Fig. 19] 
s. While adjoining flats had 
wing could beývaried within 
be further elaborated by 
additional flats placed 
standard wings in a variety 
of block shapes could be 
of which was a staggered 
II. ARCHITECTURE AS PRODUCTION. 
The way in which the modification of design by system 
building was received by architects involved in social 
housing can only be understood in terms of attitudes to the 
design of this particular building type. Such an 
understanding is essential to comprehend the readiness with 
which the majority of achitects accepted, and in some cases 
warmly greeted, the limitations imposed on their creativity 
by system building. This acceptance may be explained by two 
factors: firstly, the disciplines of system building were 
quite consistent with the design orthodoxy established for 
social-housing by the state; and secondly, Modernist housing 
architects - from the turn of-the century onwards - insisted 
that a major source of architectural expression should be 
the process by which a building was produced. 
Like its interest in building technology, the 
government's interest in design began with its involvement 
in housing provision. This interest extended beyond 
standards of accommodation and building construction, and 
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included formal principles of composition. The design of 
social housing was discussed in detail by the Tudor Walters 
Committee in 1917. The main aim of the Report's advice on 
the matter was to secure the maximum economy in construction 
and maintenance consistent with close attention to internal 
planning and orientation. The ideal cottage would be 
"simple, straightforward" and rectangular in plan without 
outbuildings and back projections unless these were 
'justifiable and desirable" in a particular case. Rather 
than relying on ornamentation, the formal qualities of the 
dwellings were to be provided by "good proportion in the 
mass and in the openings, by careful grouping of the various 
parts of each cottage" (11] and by careful site layout. In 
considering the monotony that might arise from large areas 
of similarly design housing the Committee suggested that 
attempts, to introduce variety for its own sake "can only 
result in effects which in their way would be as 
objectionable as the monotony to which reference has already 
been made". 1123 
A more stringent model for social housing design was 
promoted by the `Liverpool School' and displayed in the 1917 
Dormanstown housing scheme by Adshead, Ramsey and 
Abercrombie. CCh. IV] The Liverpool School's understanding of 
an industrial society, characterised by standardisation and 
collectivism, dictated a very distinct approach to mass 
housing design. At Dormanstown, a standard cottage, using 
the Dorlonco steel frame system and characterised by 
strikingly simple neo-Georgian styling, was used without 
variation. (13] The philosophy of design for mass housing 
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pursued by S. D. Adshead relied not upon "its peculiarity or 
idiosyncrasy, nor in a word upon its individuality, but upon 
more general characteristics such as suitability to purpose 
and excellence of design". t14] The M. O. H. itself promoted 
the neo-Georgian style used at Dormanstown from 1919, partly 
in an attempt to wean local authorities away from a tendency 
to embody decoration and needless variety in the design of 
their state-aided housing schemes. t153 Indeed, the potency 
of the simplified neo-Georgian style as an appropriate 
imagery for municipal housing is demonstrated by, its 
wholesale adoption by the L. C. C. and other urban authorities 
in their interwar redevelopment schemes. By 1927 Ministerial 
insistence that good design in social housing was the 
product of a rationalist design orthodoxy, where individual 
expression and idiosyncrasy were displaced by reason and 
order, was displayed in the Housing Manual on the Design, 
Construction and Repair of Dwellings: 
'irregularity, which is merely want of order, is 
always a negative' and destructive quality. Regular 
order is a quality within the reach of most; it should 
only be abandoned by 'those who have a clear vision of 
the more subtle and pleasing relationship and order 
which they are to provide in its place"116] 
A relationship between the design and production of the 
small dwelling was a central feature of the Neues Bauen. 
[Ch. IV] As the exiled architect Walter Curt Behrendt 
described, the social housing projects of the Weimar 
Republic provided the architect with a unique opportunity: 
'Now, for the first time, it became his task to develop, in 
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accordance with actual and clearly defined needs, and with 
all the aid of technical science, a new type of small 
dwelling". [17] The scientific consideration of mass housing 
by Neues Eauen architects produced the 'Zeilenbau' ('strip 
building method') used in E. May's Westhausen -Siedlung at 
Frankfurt (1930). The Zeilenbau derived from '"constant 
attempts to lower both the cost of layout and the proportion 
of land coverage". [18] Housing blocks were arranged on the 
site in parallel rows orientated according to maximum 
insolation regardless of the surrounding road pattern. The 
outcome of the Zeilenbau was the standard dwelling placed 
within a standard site plan: its implicit- assumption was 
that the needs of social housing were best met through the 
replacement of formal -architectural values with the 
scientifically derived, universally applicable method. 
Nevetheless, it would be untrue to suggest that Neues Bauen 
architects eradicated formal concerns from design. In 1932, 
H. R. Hitchcock and Philip Johnson refuted the claims of 
'Functionalist' architects that their work was devoid of 
style and identified a language of composition which they 
termed 'The International Style'. [19] Nevertheless, the 
source of this language, claimed Neues Bauen architects, was 
a 'strict attention to utility, economy and other purely 
practical considerations" in which the process of 
construction-played a central role. [20] As Bruno Taut wrote 
in 1929: 'If everything is founded on sound efficiency, this 
efficiency itself, or rather its utility will form its own 
aesthetic law'. [21] Within Modernist architectural theory, 
the most efficient way" of producing houses was through 
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standardisation and mass production, and it was these 
methods of production which should dictate architectural 
form. 
The dissemination of Modern Movement design theory in 
the mid 1934s, by architects such as F. R. S. Yorke and Maxwell 
Fry, added a new colour to the rationalist trend already 
established in British social housing design. To many, the 
effect of promoting the mass production model for social 
housing meant the acceptance of an inferior order of design. 
Rather than being seen as'architecture the dwelling should 
more properly be regarded as a mass produced article. In 
1944 it was noted by T. P. Bennett that if the manufacturing 
model of housing production were to be adopted in order to 
satisfy the need for housing, the first victim would be "the 
high and interesting qualities that arise from the wort: of 
the highly skilled workman". C223 However, given that 
society could no longer afford work of such "high grade" for 
its everyday products, Bennett suggested that it would have 
to attune itself to the inferior order of design which was 
the inevitable result of mass production. As Basil Honikman 
conceded in 1965, system built housing "must be reviewed 
with the same attitude that one regards any other mass 
produced article designed for mass consumption. To demand 
more is like asking the low priced motorcar to perform like 
a Rolls Royce". 1233 One influential critic, Reynor Banham, 
considered the contribution that technology might make to 
the building programmes of the 1960s, and urged a critical 
judgement of architecture which departed from a 
concentration on form to an appreciation of the social 
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context in which it was produced: "for a decade or so, it is 
not going to be safe to pass judgement simply on the grounds 
of what a building looks like". C24] 
There were those who saw advantage in the restrictions 
which new technology imposed on the designer. According to 
proponents of the 'Modern Movement', such as Nicklaus 
Pevsner, the constraints imposed by new technology could 
bring only good to architectural design: as he pointed out 
in 1960 "they keep the architect to reason. They eliminate 
neo-irrationalism". 125] The positive benefits of system 
building were also described by the Housing Architect to the 
L. C. C., K. J. Campbel l in 1966: 
'To work within such disciplines may be just what the 
profession, at the moment, needs more than anything 
else. It would probably be good for society at large 
also, individuality run riot is one of the banes of 
our age"C 26 ] 
Furthermore, there were those who happily exchanged the 
traditional pleasures of architecture for the excitement of 
system building - such as Miall Rhys Davis, another of 
Concrete Ltd. 's consultant architects who wrote in 1965: 
"let us stop and look at the piece of metal, or 
concrete, or plastic, or glass. It is pretty well the 
same whatever chunk of building grows from it... So 
where the excitement, the fireworks..? The quantity, 
the speed, efficient, neat, fast organisations, 
calculated and planned exactly. A new machine, a 
mechanised administration - this is the excitement... 
it lives on continuity, big investment, and requires 
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vast pipe lines of communication"C 27 ] 
As building programmes, and the pressure on the 
building industry mounted, the call'on housing architects to 
fall into line increased in intensity. As the Civic Trust 
pointed out in 1963, the tendency for a wider variety of 
housing types to be used in British social housing compared 
with the Continent was delaying the introduction of systems 
to Britain. t28] At the Housing From the Factory Conference 
in 1962, Cleeve Barr lamented the multitude of British 
social housing types which had developed over the past 
century. Listing eleven of these he suggested that the 
consequence of this was that: 
'At best this variety has led to some fine examples of 
good architecture which are known throughout Europe. 
At worst it has resulted in a waste of professional 
and technical skills which has- caused additional 
expense to local housing authorities and prevented 
both traditional and non-traditional builders from 
taking full economic advantage of repetitive building 
operations'[ 29 ] 
Throughout the 1960s, an ongoing project within the M. H. L. G. 
Research and Development Group was the reduction of 
"needless variety" in housing- design. A consideration of 
this issue formed a part of the advice given to local 
authorities in Circular 76/65 (December 1965) which stated 
specifically that, as well as providing continuous 
programmes and providing system builders with larger, more 
straightforward sites, it was advised that 'the number of 
plan types in a scheme is kept down, and satisfactory types 
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kept in use". (30] 
Within this context, the universal opinion of Modernist 
architects seems to have been that the design of non 
traditional housing produced immediately after the Second 
World War was a grave disappointment. The source of this 
discontent, however, was not that designs were being imposed 
on the architect from without, nor even that the houses were 
monotonous. As D. Dex Harrison pointed out in 1945, the 
problem lay in the tendency of sponsors to ignore the 
production process as a source of imagery. According to 
Harrison, while interwar architects in Germany and France 
had taken new materials and "examining their design 
potential" produced revolutionary forms such as the open 
plan dwelling supported on 'pilotis': 
'the pioneer prefabricators were trying laboriously to 
adapt these materials to the traditional plan and box 
like concept of the small house... Here we have the 
origin of the deep seated mistrust of prefabrication 
as something which is `substitute' and lacks its own 
inherent validity"131 ] 
In Harrison's view, architects such as Peaudouin and Lods 
(France), Neutra and Buckminster Fuller (America) and 
Gropius (Germany) had indeed already begun to develop an 
aesthetic for prefabrication, primarily by expressing the 
jointed structure between the prefabricated elements and 
abandoning traditional archetypes such as the pitched roof 
and small window opening. 132] According to Joseph Emberton, 
architectural consultant to the Bernal Committee (1945), 
were the design of prefabricated houses to evolve on the 
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lines of the aeroplane, motorcar, tube train and bus, where 
'maximum efficiency was expressed in form' the development 
of prefabricated homes "will produce results equally 
satisfying besides providing more efficient homes'. (33] 
In the event few of the non traditional houses produced 
after the war made any attempt to depart from traditional 
forms. The Keyhouse Unibuilt house, designed by Grey Wornum 
and Richard Sheppard in the early 1940s, displayed a very 
thoroughgoing interpretation of Modernism in its flat roof, 
rectilinear form without traditional excresences such as bay 
windows, and minimalist porch structure. However, this 
particular model only reached prototype stage. CFig. 63 The 
B. I. S. F. house designed by Frederick Gibberd, while not 
adopting a traditional cottage imagery made little external 
display of new technology. Indeed contemporary opinion seems 
to have regarded it as an acceptable compromise between the 
old and new: it was neither praised for being forward 
looking, nor vilified for its backwardness. The roof was 
neither flat nor steeply pitched, the windows neither 
unusually large nor abnormally small, but generously 
proportioned with slender steel mullions. Furthermore, both 
the roof and upper floor were visibly clad in a material new 
to housing - profiled sheet steel. CFig. 7] The concessions 
which the steel frame Unity and B. I. S. F. houses made to 
Modernism were not shared by the popular precast concrete 
models such as Airey and Cornish Unit, the design of neither 
of which was accredited to a well known architect. Between 
them, approximately 50,000 dwellings were produced by 1955 
in an architectural style which made no celebration of 
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precast concrete construction. The Airey house was a bland 
exercise in traditional styling with small windows and a 
steeply pitched roof. Unless seen at close quarters, in 
which case the horizontal precast concrete slabs are 
recognizable as a non traditional walling material, the 
Airey house differs little from the typical austere postwar 
cottage. [Fig. B] The more distinctive Cornish Unit was 
dominated by a mansard roof which stylistically owed more to 
interwar eclecticism than postwar Modernism. [Fig. 9] 
Furthermore, the tendency for all of non-traditional houses 
to adhere to the semi-detached model evoked images of the 
interwar garden suburb arhitecture despised by Modernist 
architects. [34] Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings 
the non traditionl houses were consistent with the British 
tradition of social housing design. They were modest in 
their architectural treatment, without decoration or overtly 
historical references. Furthermore, by their very nature in 
being standard designs they avoided the worst of 
architectural sins described by the M. O. H. in 1927 - 
gratuitous variety in external form. As their sponsors no 
doubt intended, they fitted inconspicuously into the model 
of social housing which had developed between the wars. 
By the time that a new generation of building systems 
arrived in the early 1960s, stylistic preferences had 
changed: Modernism had become the accepted style for social 
housing. Furthermore, the two storey cottage had been 
replaced for much of local authority housing by multi-storey 
housing, and in particular the towerblock. The aesthetic 
expression of high-rise housing developed very much in 
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relation to the technology of its construction and was 
guided by an architectural movement which embodied Modernist 
ideals: the New Prutalism. This restatement of Modern 
Movement design theories pervaded British housing design 
from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s and provided a major 
source of inspiration for architects concerned with the 
design of system built housing. The New Brutalism displaced 
the prevalent British interpretation of Modernism - dubbed 
`The New Humanism' by the Architectural Review and described 
by Reyner Banham as "brickwork, segmental arches, pitched 
roofs, small windows (or small panes at any rate) - 
picturesque detailing without picturesque planning". [35] In 
its place Rrutalism offered a style which drew its 
inspiration from the contemporary work of Le Corbusier and 
Mies Van de Rohe- and concentrated on venerating the 
materials and techniques of construction that were emerging 
in the post war period. The picturesqueness of The New 
Humanism was replaced by a style which concentrated on the 
processes by which buildings were produced. Within this 
restatement of Modernism, the formal character of system 
building was readily accommodated. The material particularly 
favoured by Brutalism, and one which became increasingly 
popular after the war, was concrete, large expanses of which 
were displayed in the Park Hill housing development (1961) 
by the Leeds City Architect's Department. Indeed, it could 
be suggested that the attraction of Brutalism - particularly 
as far as architects involved in system built housing were 
concerned - was the result of it giving coherent expression 
to the techniques and materials being exploited in flatted 
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construction. As in Alison and Peter Smithson's most 
influential projects (Golden Lane Housing competition entry, 
1951, and the Sheffield University Extension, 1953), the 
type of building to which `Brutalists' first addressed their 
interpretation of 'Modernism' was the large scale urban 
architecture of the Welfare State - E363 the very type of 
building which was exercising the minds of architects 
concerned with housing redevelopment. 
One of the first authorities to make a clear union 
between new technology and Modernism (or 'Prutalism' as it 
had by then become) was the L. C. C. ' The early'1950s saw an 
increasing concentration by the L. C. C. on mixed development 
and new technology. CCh. 11I] Furthermore, in 1950, 
responsibility for the design of housing was transferred 
from the Valuer's Department to the Housing 'Architect, 
bringing in a large number of new staff. Amongst these- were 
a number of architects from the Hertfordshire 'Architects 
Department including Cleeve Parr (later Assistant Housing 
Architect), and architects described by K. Frampton as 
"sympathizers and colleagues" E373 of the Smithsons. 
According to Reynor Panham's interpretation, the early 1950s 
saw the L. C. G. Architect's Department as the veritable 
battlefield between the New Humanism and Brutalism, with the 
latter emerging victorious. C38] One of ' the most 
thoroughgoing early L. C. C. essays in Brutalism was the 
Roehampton, Alton West Estate, slab block (opened 1959). 
Based on a scaled down version of Corbusier's Unite 
d'Habitation (Marseille, France 1947-52) the L. C. C. 
architects used concrete, both insitu and precast, as the 
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material for its construction and cladding. CFig. 23A] As 
K. J. Campbell, Housing Architect to. -the Council, pointed out 
in 1962: 'Concrete is a serious material, it is the building 
material of this twentieth century... ithere are some places 
in Roehampton where ordinary Portlandicement has weathered 
as beautifully as Portland stone". C39: 3 Thus, at the time it 
was adopting large panel building -systems, the L. C. C. was 
committed to a design theory which derived its aesthetic 
from modern methods of building production. 
The Morris Walk housing scheme Ccontract awarded 1963) 
was the first of the Council's large concrete panel estates 
and displays a studied attempt toi. develop an architectural 
style derived from the production-technology of system 
building. For this reason the 'estate will be examined in 
some detail. Morris Walk: consisted! ot 562 dwellings in-the 
Larsen Nielsen system. In describing the scheme to the 
Housing From the Factory Conference-c. d n 1962, the Assistant 
Housing Architect to the L. C. C., -J. Wh'ittle, pointed out that 
many of the schemes they had visited abroad had been 
'architecturally disappointing' O. and their layouts 
'monotonous'. According to Whit±le: this resulted- from 
architects seldom designing schemes. specifically for a 
system but too often adapting - a-ýT, preconceived design. 
However, in designing the L. C. C. 'si=i: first large panel estate 
Whittle announced that the. department=had returned to first 
principles: - 
'it is our experience that mangipromoters of these 
systems delight in their' claim thatrthey can build any 
block designed for traditional building. But this is 
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putting the cart before the horse; building by a 
special method should give rise to a recognisable 
architectural expression, which should develop from a 
rational use of the method by the architect"C4O] 
The basis of the Morris Walk design was the "day production 
unit", that is, the number of panels which the factory could 
produce in one day. Together, these components formed a wing 
which comprised the standard unit of design. Each wing (or 
day production unit) contained two living or bedsitting 
rooms, two kitchens, two bathrooms, two W. C. s, two stores 
and four bedrooms. By varying the position of the party wall 
within the wing, a variety of dwelling sizes, ranging from 
three bedrooms to bedsitters, could be provided. 
CFigs. 24A&R3 The degree of standardisation inherent in the 
scheme meant that all the living rooms and bed-sitting rooms 
were identical in size and layout as were the bedrooms. 
There were two types of kitchen and a standard bathroom/W. C. 
for the whole project. The ten storey blocks were formed by 
joining two wings, back to back with a staircase and lift 
tower while the three storey linear blocks were comprised by 
joining wings end-on. The exploded block plan provided 
advantages both intellectual and avowedly practical. The 
accommodation and staircase elements were maintained as 
distinct physical units enabling the complex lift, 
staircase and service core... to be considered separately 
from the dwelling units' leading to greater simplification 
in design and erection (41] but, importantly, also giving 
formal expression to the method of construction. 
The standardisation of the panels, considered essential 
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to efficient system building design, guided the external 
character of the blocks. Whittle boasted that only four 
basic sizes of external panel were used - although admitting 
that, taking the different window configurations into 
account, there were in fact 17. The elevations marked a 
significant departure from preceding L. C. C. designs not 
least in an absence of modelling and a lack of- visual 
expression to the individual units of accommodation. 
[Fig. 24C] A particular departure (although due to its 
expense to become more common in later L. C. C. housing) was 
the elimination of the balcony - the dominant motif iný the 
Alton West slab blocks where it was used to articulate the 
broad facades and give expression to the individual 
dwellings. EFig. 23A] The balcony was a feature that had been 
maintained in the Council's earlier experiments in system 
building at Picton St., Camberwell, (Laing, finished 1957) 
and Aegis Grove, Battersea (Reema, finished 1962) 
[Fig. 21&22] and seems to have been dropped specifically in 
this first rigorous interpretation of large panel 
construction. 
Little was said of the Morris Walk site plan by 
Whittle, other than that it had to contend with a highly 
disordered site with varied levels and that "the design 
problem was to dispose standard units about a site which was 
most irregular in contour and produce an ordered scheme". 
142] Morris Walk is unusual by comparison with other L. C. C. 
mixed development estates in having both its low and high 
blocks built to essentially identical designs with similar 
elevational treatments. CFig. 24P&D] The blocks, both high 
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and low, were composed of identical wing units - which gave 
all of the three storey blocks the same aspect and the ten 
storey blocks one of two aspects. Therefore, there could 
have been no reason, within the L. C. C. 's rationalist design 
philosophys for orientating the blocks differently. Indeed, 
despite the fact that it is divided into two unequally sized 
portions by a railway line, this mixed development estate is 
remarkable in having every block, both high and low, aligned 
uniformly. [Fig. 24E] Such an arrangement- was not the case 
with the majority of L. C. C. estates which hitherto had made 
some acknowledgement of the site topography in their 
layouts. This varied from picturesque site planning at 
Roehampton to the variagated arrangement and external 
treatment of row houses, maisonettes and flats on the 
Loughborough Estate, Lambeth. Whether or not the intention 
of the L. C. C. architects, the degree of rationalism which 
lay at the heart of the Morris Walk design brought it closer 
to the systematization of the Zilenbau arrangement than any 
of their mixed development schemes. 
While the basis on which Morris Walk was designed was 
questioned later, not least by the L. C. C. itself, Whittle 
and his colleagues were undoubtedly proud of their first 
essay in large panel construction: This design demonstrates 
that the dull and repetitive schemes so often associated 
with industrialised housing are not necessarily the fault of 
the system". [43] To the charge that the identical blocks 
and rigid site plan of Morris Walk were monotonous, 
Whittle's superior, K. J. Campbell might have replied with the 
words he used at the 1962 Housing From the Factory 
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Conference: 
'There has been far too much - there is always far too 
much - tall; about variety and monotony. These are 
practically meaningless terms... design begins in the 
bones of a building. It is in the -total. of the 
building that beauty lies... One can easily obtain 
variety,, which is, too often, restlessness, even 
vulgarity, but what one has to achieve is an inner 
richness in one's buildings which comes from quite 
different things entirely... what counts... is how far 
the architect has grasped totally and absolutely the 
technique by which his building is produced'1443 
III. ARCHITECTURE AS FORM. 
Morris Walk represented the outcome of an approach to 
designing social housing that was able to accommodate the 
effects of system building, and indeed fetishised them. 
Another trend was highly critical of'system building largely 
because of the degree to which it compromised the 
contribution which the individual' architect could make to 
architectural design. Responses within this tradition varied 
and included attempts to avoid system building and the 
design of a second generation of housing system which would 
offer greater design freedom - in-which the M. H. L. G. figured 
largely. The challenge to system building grew stronger 
throughout the 1960s as architects, such as those within the 
L. C. C., revised their position on the relationship between 
design and technology. 
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It is evident that the aesthetic shortcomings of 'system 
building played'a large part in the resistance of local 
authorities to new technology. A substantial body of 
opinion, including senior architects, regarded system 
building as inconsistent with high standards' of 
architectural design. Objectors to system building received 
little prominence in the architectural press: the Luddite 
implications of such concerns were in direct opposition to a 
professional ideology concerned 'with the conspicuous 
promotion of new technology. However, these subdued`voices 
represented a substantial body of opinion'aggrieved'at the 
effect of system building on the way-in which they worked'as 
architects and on the way in which it affected standards'of 
design. ' 
One of the first architects to raise his voice'in 
protest at the effects of prefabrication was R. W. Prown, who, 
in May 1944, said of his wartime work for the government 
that he: 
'felt that prefabrication would make' us stale. He 'had 
had experience of that in the'Office of Works, -where 
he had to go to cupboard. no. 1 for section 'p9 ' and so 
on, and copy something. He completely lost interest in 
his work and felt hopeless"C45] 
The effects of prefabrication on the enthusiasm of 
architects for-, their work was noted by the Department of 
Health For Scotland who, '- in' 1951, found that "Architects 
take more care with buildings designed by themselves". [46] 
In his correspondence with the M. C. H. in 1951, the Regional 
Production Officer for the South West Region, C. H. H. Smith, 
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referred frequently to official architects, both in" the 
local authorities and in his own office, who were: 
not enamoured of systems which limit the scope for 
attractive lay-outs... Land]... who feel no 
responsibility for securing rapid housing progress and 
will always prefer to plod slowly, so long as they can 
express their individuality in housing schemes of 
limited extent"147 ] 
Of the various means by which such retrogressive elements of 
the profession chose to frustrate the use of non traditional 
houses Smith mentioned the'"misinformation of lay-committees 
- in which the faults of new methods were dwelt upon rather 
than their merits - and the use of systems on sloping sites 
in an attempt to increase their costs and put them into 
disrepute. 148] A similar reluctance to accept- the 
disciplines imposed by proprietary schools systems was noted 
by L. F. Robinson. In correspondence with the M. O. E. in 
November 1945, he castigated the anarchy of the architect 
who combined two proprietary systems in one school . "to the 
detriment of both" and the refusal of another to alter "by 
inches" the span of a building that had been designed 
causing "a complete series of special beams to be made at 
507 extra cost". 1493 1 
Despite the greater design flexibility of local 
authority sponsored -schools systems, [Chs. V&VI] it is 
evident that many architects and critics held serious 
reservations on the quality of architecture achieved. Of the 
Hertfordshire schools that he had visited, J. V. H. Davis was 
'troubled with an uneasy feeling that something essential 
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was missing. The architect seems to be so far away, his 
voice so very thin". 1503 In May 1961, F. H. A. Crossley, the 
Derbyshire County Architect, summed up the contradiction 
facing many architects when he tentatively suggested to a 
meeting on The Purpose and Organisation of Development 
Groups that he was "proud" to be a member of C. L. A. S. P. and 
felt it "excellent for what it is trying to do, but 
nevertheless, I am left a little doubtful whether it is real 
architecture". 1513 
A senior architect convinced that prefabrication was 
not real architecture was Fred Pooley, County Architect and 
Planner for Buckinghamshire. By March 1968 he was able to 
confess with "some pride in being the architect to the only 
county in the country not to be muddled in a consortium". 
1523 Although Buckinghamshire was not an urban authority 
faced with massive redevelopment programmes it was a 
thriving Home County with, according to Pooley, a programme 
of County building running in 1968 at three to four million 
pounds a year in an expensive building area short of 
building labour. Thus it enjoyed the same incentives to 
adopt prefabrication as the rest of the country. 
Furthermore, Pooley was not ignorant of the characteristics 
of system building - he was employed by the Coventry City 
Architect's Department in the early 1950s and wrote a review 
of the City's No-Fines estate at Tile Hill in 1953.153] The 
reason for Pooley's reluctance was quite plain: so far as he 
was concerned, consortia and industrialised building were 
unsound economic and administrative developments which had 
an "unfortunate influence on design". This is not to say 
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that the County had not even considered prefabricated 
schools systems, it had in the early 1950s, but found them 
by their very nature" incapable of providing the same 
flexibility in planning as traditional construction and 
unproven in any substantial economic advantages. In Pooley's 
opinion, the designs produced by system building were 
inherently poor: 
The trouble with the post and panel theme is that at 
its best it'is a flimsy looking element with little 
civic quality about it: at its worst it is Just plain 
and monotonous... concrete panels are not all that 
much better and by and large those that we can afford 
are uncivilised slabs of material, incapable of 
maturing in a satisfactory way"[547 
In preference to system building, Pooley concentrated on 
"using simple straightforward construction, with an emphasis 
on limited standardisation" and the use of brickwork 
wherever possible - as in the 11-storey block of loadbearing 
brick flats he built at Aylesbury in 1961.1553 
Nevertheless, Pooley was not averse to using precasting 
techniques where he felt them appropriate, for instance a 
proprietary Bison precast concrete frame and floor was used 
at the Royal Grammar School, High Wycombe (1964). '[56] As 
far as Pooley was concerned architecture which combined good 
quality design with economy could only be achieved: 
if every building is designed for its site and built 
in a construction that is economical and sound and 
where the individual architect can use his skills to 
the full "157 ] 
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Official policy was by no means deaf to the criticisms 
of prefabrication levelled by architects such as Pooley. 
Indeed, the two housing systems in which the M. H. L. G. 
participated, 5M and 12M, made a conspicuous attempt to 
introduce more design freedom to system building. The 
significance to government policy of design quality in 
prefabrication had been pointed out by the Bernal Committee. 
In 1945 it commented of the systems. already proposed that, 
unless the low standard of design was raised, there was a 
danger of "unjustified prejudice" forming against the 
appearance of, prefabricated houses which might delay "the 
acceptance of new and progressive methods of building". 158] 
18 years later the government once again drew attention to 
the issue of architectural quality in system building. In 
May 1943, the M. H. L. G. pointed out that "The Government is 
concerned not to repeat the uniformity of some of the early 
postwar prefabricated houses'. (59] As well as forming part 
of the M. P. P. W. 's modular building policy, it is in the 
light of an attempt to increase the'design flexibility of 
system building over and above that of commercially 
sponsored systems that the development of 5M and 12M should 
be seen. However, the outcome of the Ministry's efforts was 
the development of two systems of dubious cost efficiency, 
which, far from alleviating the design difficulties of 
system building, served only to emphasise them. 
The first of the state sponsored systems, 5M (developed 
1962), was derived from C. L. A. S. P., the last in a line of 
flexible steel frame systems developed for education. 
(Chs. IV&VI] Like the educational systems, 5M was based on a 
343 
standardised steel frame capable of providing any building 
form that conformed to a basic module. In the case of 
C. L. A. S. P. this was 3'4", whereas in 5M it was reduced to 
1'8" to account for the finer planning required in domestic 
construction. Attached to the frame -were a -series of 
cladding panels ranging in finish from concrete to timber 
boarding and tile hanging. t60&Fig. 18] Of its developmental 
application to a block of elderly person flatlets- at 
Stevenage the Architects Journal pointed to "the success of 
the design in creating a small scale and intimate 
environment for . old people". 161] However, as the journal 
pointed out, the success of 5M was by-, no means total in 
eradicating the limitations of industrialised building: -"As 
so often happens with system building,! however, a limited 
range of ceiling heights-combined with the inevitable flat 
roofs has resulted in the pavilion arrangement being blurred 
by the uniform eaves". t62] Furthermore, the Journal 
suggested that, the expensive steel -frame might have 
accounted for the poor quality of finish to the external and 
internal -claddings. In its overall verdict, Architects 
Journal felt that "Looked at-in the cold light of reason 
this first essay in 5M CLASP seems to raise as many problems 
as it solves". (63] Despite its achievement in having 
produced 20 different house types by 1966, the M. P. B. W. 
admitted of its 5M barracks at Catterick in 1968 that 
unfavourable comments "on the appearance of the finished 
quarters had come from some Army sources". 164] Flexibility 
in plan and cladding finishes did not ensure the success of 
the system either aesthetically or commercially. As Chapter 
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Six pointed out, only a small number were built. 
1.; '-M Jespersen, a Danish system modified by the M. H. L. G. 
and sponsored by Laing, CChs. II&VI] was even more remarkable 
in its departure from prevailing orthodoxy for it was the 
only large panel concrete system to depart from room size 
panels. The wall panels were of three widths, 4', 6' and 8', 
while the floor panels were 4' wide and variable in length 
by 1' increments. According to the designers, this feature 
made it- uniquely flexible in design for the internal plan 
was not fixed by an established range of room sized panels, 
but could be derived within the variable enclosures formed 
by the modular panels. CFig. 25A3 Furthermore, the narrow 
panels made it possible to introduce staggers in section 
without departing from standard panel dimensions - although 
these in turn required complicated (lashings and additional 
insitu work to render the joints waterproof. Of 12M's use at 
Livingstone New Town, Architects Journal commented 
favourably on the range of dwelling types achieved and the 
richness of the staggered sections in comparison to the 
designs produced by the average building system. Indeed, 
Architects Journal suggested that any constructional 
complexities generated by the staggered forms counted for 
little against the planning problems dealt with by the 
system and the range of dwelling types it had provided. The 
journal's overall verdict was that "If the level of design 
apparent at Livingstone could be achieved in a large 
proportion of our public housing instead of in a pititfully 
small proportion, the national standards would begin to 
approach a desirable level". 1653 
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While it may have been thought that 12M Jespersen had 
solved the technical problem of allowing flexibility in 
large panel system building design, it was apparent that it 
had not solved the economic problem. In terms of the 
N. E. A. 's analysis of optimum panel sizes, the narrow (less 
than room width and hence not square) panels constituted an 
inherent dis-economy. To this was added the tendency of 
designers to exploit the capabilities of the system and 
design relatively complex forms which generated a host of 
expensive detailing problems. In 1967 Laing announced that 
they were unable to operate the system profitably. This news 
was received with dismay by one contributor to Architects 
Journal, J. Jordan, who like many architects "saw the project 
as the most hopeful of the efforts in the British 
industrialised building field`. (66] A subsequent 
contributor, E. Ambrose, drew the following conclusion from 
these events: 
'I have visited the Laing scheme at Livingstone where 
the system has been used and my first reaction was 
that a lot of `architecture' has been added... There 
were many breaks including those required to form roof 
gardens... Cie. terraces]... every time you make a 
break you provide not only a new junction to be 
protected, but a fresh untried problem... This is 
costly and time consuming... if you buy a system you 
must accept its shortcomings so far as exciting 
variations are concerned and concentrate on its 
advantages"C 67 
Illustrating his point by referring to the massive and 
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uniform housing blocks employed in Danish housing using the 
indigenous variant of the system, Ambrose pointed out that 
the real advantages of 12M were speed and that- the 
architectural corollary to this was "a grandeur due to scale 
and effective siting" rather than a picturesqueness derived 
from intricate detailing. Southwark Council seem to have 
applied continental practice in the design of the 2,000`home 
Aylesbury Estate (contract awarded 1967) which rationalised 
the use of the system to only two types of block - four 
storey maisonettes and 12 storey slabs. [68&Figs. 25C&D] The 
latter were identified by the R. I. B. A. Journal as the 
longest housing blocks in Europe. [69] While not true to the 
spirit in which 12M was conceived, in Ambrose's terms the 
Aylesbury estate constituted a more appropriate 
acknowledgement of the system's virtues. 
The mid 1960s saw a significant change in the G. L. C. 's 
approach to system building (the L. C. C. became the G. L. C. in 
March 1965). This was signalled no sooner than the 
foundations of the Morris Walk Estate were laid. In March 
1963, K. J. Campbell expressed misgivings on the degree to 
which his department's concern with production technology 
had controlled the design of the estate: 
'it was an example of architects falling over 
backwards to try to look at it through the eyes of the 
production engineer, and we rather gave up the wider 
viewpoint of the architect. In our 'Mk II' development 
this what we shall be doing"1703 
The "Mk II" housing development upon which the G. L. C. 
increasingly focussed its attention during the acid-1960s was 
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Thamesmeade. This project was one of the first products of 
the Council's extended role in planning the London 
conurbation and the largest scheme it had so far designed. 
Originally known as the Woolwich Erith scheme, - the 
intention, announced in March 1966, was to reclaim 1,300 
acres of marshland from the Thames flood-plane to house a 
population of 60,000. Two-thirds of the homes were to be 
built by the G. L. C., and a half of -these by system building. 
1713 Planned to take place over '15 years, the first stage of 
the project was a system built 4,000 dwelling contract 
placed in 1966. (727 -I 
A further indication that the design philosopy of 
Thamesmeade would be different to that of Morris Walk was 
given by H. Pennett in May 1966, when he suggested that the 
hitherto strictly observed disciplines of system building 
were no longer consistent with the Council's design policy. 
In future large low density developments, such as 
Thamesmeade, the G. L. C. intended to use irregular building 
forms with an emphasis, in line with the new subsidy system, 
on medium rise housing: 
'Designing in this way -exposes the weakness of-most 
industrialised building systems, whether for tall or 
low building, which is their inflexibility in the 
manner in which one dwelling can be related to 
another... the development of a system offering 
flexibility and the opportunity for strong modelling 
is urgently needed"C733 
Rather than continuing to subordinate the design of G. L. C. 
housing to production techniques, Bennett warned of an 
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increasing emphasis within the G. L. C. on the environmental 
quality of system built estates: 
The demand for variety must be disciplined, but the 
large contracts with which the G. L. C. is likely to be 
associated will, for social as well as architectural 
considerations, need to be carried out by building 
techniques which, although making full use of modern 
means of production will also facilitate the creation 
of a first rate environment"174] 
Thamesmeade inverted the design approach of Morris 
Walk. Rather than selecting the system and then designing 
the scheme, Thamesmeade was designed first and the system 
chosen later. The design philosophy was described by A. Pike: 
The design team decided that the correct approach would be 
to design a good project without reference to a specific 
industrialised building scheme and then apply the use of a 
system'. 175] By the Spring of 1966, design work had 
progressed sufficiently for the G. L. C. 's quantity surveyors 
to provide cost plans on the basis of traditional 
construction. Following this, advice was then sought from 
the N. P. A. on which contractors and systems possessed 
suitable production and management capacity for the scheme. 
Three national system building contractors were invited to 
submit proposals for carrying out the work within the 
prescribed cost limits. The successful firm was Cubitts, 
with the Balency system and the contract for 4,000 
dwellings, to be constructed over five years at a cost of 30 
million pounds, was awarded in October 1966. (76] 
Balency was a typical large panel system in all but two 
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respects; it had a particularly sophisticated system for 
integrating piped services into the concrete panels (which 
like most systems fixed the kitchen/bathroom arrangement), 
but more importantly, rather than precast flooring panels 
the system usually embodied an insitu floor. This latter 
feature increased its design flexibility and may well have 
influenced its suitability for the Thamesmeade contract. 
Phase I consisted of 1,500 dwellings in three types: a 
highly modelled 2 to 5-storey linear maisonette block, 
13-storey point blocks and 3-storey terraces. The most 
notable outcome of the G. L. C. 's new system building design 
policy was that a large part of the scheme was not in fact 
built in Palency. The half-a-mile long, intricately shaped 
2-5-storey linear block (completed in 1969 and comprising 
342 dwellings, 9 shops, 2 public houses and 250 garages) 
staggered both in plan and section had been found unsuitable 
for the system at the preliminary tender stage. However, 
rather than rationalise its form to bring it within the 
economic capabilities of the system, the block was built in 
traditional construction with insitu loadbearing crosswalls 
and brick panels. Non structural precast cladding panels 
were styled to match the rest of the system built contract 
and, where the design allowed, Balency units were 
incorporated adhoc. 177] The result is a formally complex, 
traditionally built housing block which forms the core and 
visually dominant element of the scheme. CFig. 26C] 
The 3-storey terraces, in comparison to the Linear 
BLock, conformed more to the principles of system building 
design outlined by I. Fraser in 1967. However, in their 
350 
alternating indentations and projections in plan and section 
they too flaunted the economics of system building in return 
for concessions to architectural formality. [Figs26B&E] The 
same is also true of the 13-storey point blocks. Although of 
a similar shape - two wings connected by an access bridge - 
these were given a richness of form, which contrasts starkly 
with the Morris Walk blocks. Two of the features which 
contribute to this are the incised corner balconies and 
wrap-around kitchen windows. Neither of these - involving 
cantilevered panels and arkward jointing problems more 
readily solved in monolithic framed construction - owe their 
inspiration to an acknowledgement of the constructional 
principles of precast concrete panels. [Figs. 26A&D] The 
outcome of the G. L. C. 's rejection of their former 
rationalism was a highly mannered design of greater formal 
richness than had hitherto been achieved in system building. 
Within this the insitu blocks borrowed an imagery from 
system building, and the system built blocks an imagery from 
insitu construction. While this approach may be seen as 
lacking the intellectual ruthlessness of Morris Walk, it was 
adequate to gain Thamesmeade the highest international award 
for urban design. The Sir Patrick Abercrombie Award was 
given to the G. L. C. in 1969 with the following comment by 
the Adjudicators: An indication of harmonious integration 
of human values, aesthetic expression and modern techniques 
is to be found in this project". 1783 
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IV. BUREAUCRACY AND SYSTEM BUILDING. 
In December 1968, I. B. S. A. C reported C)ve Arup's warning that 
society was in imminent danger of being taken over by 
technology. E773 A former member of C. I. S. P. H. , Arup' s 
recantation was part of a larger process. The'precise nature 
of this shift in cultural values has yet to be explained but 
it seems to have been linked to a more critical recognition 
of the role of technology in achieving economic and social 
progress. 
Within this reassessment of the role of technology came 
a re-evaluation of architectural principles. Rather than 
being seen as the panacea to the `housing problem', system 
building was increasingly identified with bungling 
politicians and unfeeling bureaucrats. These sentiments are 
expressed with particular clarity in Malcom McEwan's Crisis 
in Architecture (1974). Rather than being seen as the means 
to gratify the nation's 'need for public housing, 
industrialised building became identified increasingly as 
the worst aspect of, modern architecture. Furthermore, the 
central government architects and commercial enterprises 
promoting industrialised building became increasingly 
identified as a heartless bureaucracy, as Martin Pawley 
described in 1971, "deeply implicated in all kinds of plans 
for the destruction of old England". E803 At the R. I. B. A. 's 
1967 Annual Conference, Fry mourned the shattering of an 
illusion, formed in the' 1930s, of a fusion between 
architecture and industry which would provide "a renaissance 
of urbanism". Architects, he lamented, "are as much in the 
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grip of the reproductive system as we are the agents of a 
bureaucracy, whether governmental or commercial and the 
buildings we design must reflect the character of both". 
1817 Indeed, according to Banham - another 'technologist' 
dismayed by 1971 at the course which modern architecture had 
taken - the most recent apotheosis of the architecture of 
the welfare bureaucrat was Thamesmead - "Bennett's 
Leviathan" as he described it: 
"a-virtually self manufacturing city, erecting itself 
panel by room-sized panel out of a factory in its own 
entrails... My first reaction to the new environment 
being -created 
there was a kind of numb disbelief... 
What I can't beleive is that we have really created a 
situation in which one man can ordain the environment 
of so many"I 82 3 
1969 saw the publication of Metric House Shells, and 
the requirement of Circular 69/69 that it should be applied 
to all subsequent local authority housing. [Ch. VI3 Rather 
than being remembered for bringing the building industry one 
step nearer industrialisation, the Metric House Shells 
policy should be remembered for the protest which it 
unleashed from an architectural profession aggrieved at yet 
more erosion of its design freedom by Ministerial edict and 
the enmeshing of architecture in a further layer of state 
control. In the November 1969 meeting of the R. I. P. A. 
Council, in which Metric House Shells was the major topic of 
discusssion, Edward Hollamby, Borough Architect to Lambeth, 
protested that The whole of the country's architecture was 
being removed from the field of creative design". 1833 
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Taking up the attack- in Municipal Journal later in the 
month, Jane Drew launched an extended polemic against the 
N. E. A. describing a future environment of Orwellian 
dimensions: 
"there will be no curves, no minor refinements, no 
visual adjusments for heights, no connections at 
corners... Is it really all part of mechanisation 
taking command, of the Orwellian-cum-Giedion world of 
the future where feeling and imagination are blunted, 
convenience takes command and idealism is lost... it 
is noticeable that those who urge metric shells are 
not creators. Not being practising architects, they 
wish to control others"184] 
Defending the N. B. A., in the same issue, Cleeve Barr could 
do little more than reiterate the need for greater 
efficiency in building and point to the fact that most 
council housing was already rectangular, and that the N. R. A. 
was only rationalising the design of a product that was, in 
all but the finer dimensions, standardised anyway: The 
trouble to date is that every architect, for every site, 
tends to use a different set of dimensions for simple 
rectangular houses of the same type". 1853 The interchange 
between Drew and Cleeve Barr carried over into the next 
issue of Municipal Journal. 
While the controversy over Metric House Shells led only 
to words, that over the M. A. C. E. schools system led to 
positive action on the part of a disaffected G. L. G. 
Architects Department. M. A. C. E. (Metropolitan Authorities 
Consortium for Education) was set up in 1966, and like other 
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consortia immediately -beganto, develop its own system of 
construction. Using a space frame based on a IM planning 
grid, M. A. C. E. was intended to be unique in it=_ degree of 
planning flexibility. [86] The adoption of M. A. C. E. by the 
I. L. E. A. also coincided with the G. L. C. Architects 
Department employing Louis Hellman, an architect who had 
moved from private to public practice in 1965 "in the hope 
of entering a more liberal environment". 187] His hopes 
dashed, he found a hierarchy "trained in the forties and 
early fifties... cast in the* orthodox functionalist and 
technological mould... local 'authorities with their 
bureaucratic structures' were ideal for them". [88] In 
January 1973, Hellman published an article in Built 
Environment, `The Myth of the Machine Aesthetic', attacking 
the `functionalist' aesthetic of the Modern Movement. The 
direct descendant of -this, industrialised building, was in 
Hellman's view the quintessential outcome of a fusion 
between Modernist design theories and hierarchical 
bureaucracy: 
'This upper strata finds it hard for its part to cope 
with imaginative proposals or creativity. They have 
generally risen " to high posts not through design 
ability or architectural merit but through political 
and administrative conformity - they generally go for 
the safe solution. For - this new management class of 
non-architect-I. E. is ideal. It allows them not only 
to control the career structure of those below them 
but also their architectural output. I. B. with its 
related codes, graphs, graphics, grids, manuals, 
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financial jugglings, programming and all the other 
paraphernalia of `rationalism' fits in nicely with the 
self-perpetuating mystique of `management' - it is a 
style for bureaucracy, tidy boxes to be labelled and 
administered"[69] 
In August 1973, Dick Collins, the Mayor of Camden, on 
behalf of his Council, refused to accept responsibility for 
the Edith Neville Junior and Infants Mixed School at Kings 
Cross built in M. A. C. E. Among Camden's complaints was that 
there was too 'little stock room, corridor and teaching 
space. [90] Seizing the moment, Hellman published an attack 
on M. A. C. E. in the R. I B. A. Journal. According to Heliman, 
even from the first M. A. C. E. prototypes it was evident that 
"far from being anonymous enclosures for teaching, they were 
assertively `architectural' with a most unpleasant brutalist 
prefab aesthetic'. 1913 The introduction of M. A. C. E. ý was 
followed by aý"growingwave of discontent" on the part of 
architects obliged to use, the system. A, result of this, 
claimed Hellman, was, that 'architects are so demoralised 
that they do not give sufficient care and attention to their 
work with it". Among its technological faults, he listed 
poor sound and thermal insulation; wall and roof leaks due 
to the impractical jointing system; and a lack of-choice in 
finishes. However, as conspicuous as these was the system's 
high cost, which led to a , reduction in teaching areas and 
standards in order to make it work. As Hellman pointed out, 
high costs allied with an inflexible planning grid had 
serious repercussions: "Reduce the area of a M. A. C. E. 
school? How can you reduce area on a iM planning module 
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without chopping off valuable teaching space? How can you 
decrease the height of external walls when only a, -2.4M high 
component is available? ". 192] Following a further 
unsatisfactory report on the system by the Schools Division 
Participation Movement and in view of cuts in its capital 
spending programme, the I. L. E. A. announced, in April 1974, 
that it was withdrawing from M. A. C. E. In all, by this time, 
the G. L. C. had built nine schools, had seven under 
construction and three more due to start in the system. [93] 
In its response to this decision, the M. A. C. E. Development 
Group ascribed the revolt of the G. L. C. architects to "an 
inability to work within the discipline of a standard 
idiom... and a romantic desire for self-expression". 1943 
V. 
Post war social housing was designed in the context of a 
debate on whether or not design should be inspired by the 
production process or by a broader range of architectural 
values. The need for economy to be achieved by an avoidance 
of gratuitous variety had been stated frequently throughout 
the interwar and postwar period. The belief that an 
appropriate idiom for mass housing was to be found through 
the standardisation of the individual unit had manifested 
itself as early as the 1918 Dormanstown Project. The notion 
that design was purely a process of finding the most 
scientific solution to the problems of production and 
building use became a central part of the European Modern 
Movement and formed an ever present motif in post World War 
Two design theory. The allegiance between, on the one hand, 
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design theories based on models of massproduction and, on 
the other, new techniques of construction based on 
industrial processes, provided a context in which the design 
of system building was considered carefully, and commented 
on by Modernist architects. In the case of Morris Walk, the 
two came'together in a tour de force of design rationality. 
The dominance of rationalist design theories, and an 
anticipation of the benefits that might accrue from an 
exploitation of new building methods, does much to explain 
the architectural profession's tolerance to forms of 
building which considerably 'modified the design process. 
However, it is evident that the history of system building, 
in both education and, housing, was characterised by a 
tradition of dissent. Criticisms of the degree to which 
systems prevented architects from- exercising their creative 
freedom-were made both by those'who used systems and the few 
senior architects who refused -to. The- wholesale support 
given to system building by the postwar R. I. B. A., and the 
consequent lack of coverage given to dissenters in the 
architectural press kept this a subdued voice between 1945 
and 1970. However, by the early 1970s, the architectural 
profession had considerably- less to gain by supporting a 
technologically orientated approach to social housing for, 
by now, technology had come to mean something else - 
mindless bureaucracy and the destruction of a 19th Centurey 
environment -a thing suddenly to be valued. From the late 
1960s onwards, aided by the R. I. E. A. Journal under the 
radical editorship of Malcom McEwan, dissaffected architects 
proved willing to make increasingly vocal attacks on the 
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effect which reducing design to an analogue of the 
production process was having on the environment. Within 
this new climate of opinion, system building was singled out 
as the most unacceptable face of Welfare architecture. The 
I. L. E. A. architects were not alone in denigrating their 
system. In 1973, the Board of Chief Architects of S. C. O. L. A. 
noted that thcy were having increasing difficulty in 
persuading job architects to use the system. [95) 
While-the anti-system building sentiment of the early 
1970s may have speeded the eventual demise of the 
educational consortia it could not have had much effect on 
system building generally. By this time it was already in 
rapid decline due to the poor performance of the economy and 
cutbacks in housing and education programmes. The increasing 
criticism of system building by architects, less than being 
instrumental, accompanied its decline. Indeed it could be 
suggested that it was the same conditions which brought an 
end to large housing programmes and industrialised building 
- declining economic power and the conspicuous inability of 
technologism to prevent this -- that sowed the seeds of 
discontent with modern architecure as the road to social 
progress and a new architectural era. 
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CONCLUSION 
The use of system building in British social housing was 
specific to a particular epoch - the Welfare State: it is 
upon the relationship between this form of social policy and 
building technology that this study has concentrated. The 
dominance of the Welfare State between 1944 and 1975 gave 
rise to an unprecedented period of social building activity 
which, coupled with the demand for building created by the 
long economic upswing, placed a consistent strain on the 
building resources of this country. During the immediate 
postwar period, the mid-1950s and mid-1960s the coincidence 
of surges in welfare housing programmes and peaks in 
commercial building activity "overloaded" building resources 
in a particularly apparent way. The association of increases 
in system building with these peaks in building demand 
immediately suggests that new technolgies should be 
understood as the result of an excess of demand over supply. 
While this relationship cannot be ignored, to concentrate on 
a supply and demand explanation undervalues the two salient 
features of system building as it developed in British 
housing: firstly, its almost exclusive application to the 
state sector; and secondly, the role of policy - whether 
framed by government, local authorities or the building 
industry. 
While the peculiarities of demand created by the 
Welfare State undoubtedly generated the conditions under 
which system building arose, it was the policies of the 
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participants in the social housing process which determined 
the extent to which new methods of building were used. In 
the post World War Two stabilisation period the outright 
subsidy of non traditional houses by government grant 
created the market for a host of expensive building 
technologies which could not compete in cost with 
traditional methods. During the 1950s government also 
supported system building believing it to be a means of 
expanding housing supply with the least expansion of the 
building labour force. During the 1960s, industrialised 
building formed the major element of building industry 
policy within the MacMillan and Wilson governments' 
indicative planning strategies. Although not subsidised in 
the way that it was during the 1940s, system building was 
promoted during the 1950s and'1960s by a host of government 
measures ranging from the implementation of National 
Building Regulations to the establishment of a state funded 
quango, later to become part of the M. H. L. G., the National 
Building Agency. 
The state promotion of system building was supported by 
a range of commercial interests eager to sponsor new 
building technologies in social housing. Of these, two in 
particular stand out; engineering industry and, large 
building firms. The attempts of engineering industry to 
enter the housing market by developing new methods of 
construction based on their products can be observed early 
in the 20th Century. At times of a threatened diminution in 
engineering industry's markets, such as immediately 
following the Second World War, a number of systems were 
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launched which used steel products almost exclusively. 
During the 1940s, due to government subsidy, over 30,000 
houses were built by the B. I. S. F. -Generally, however, these 
attempts were unsuccessful as the technologies involved were 
expensive. The involvement of large contracting firms, many 
of whom had been speculative housebuilders. before the war, 
was also a conspicuous feature of system building. The 
prospect of large and continuous state housing programmes, 
let in increasingly large contracts, encouraged building 
firms to adopt new technologies, -despite their historical 
aversion to capital investment. The degree to which this 
aversion was overcome was indicated by the flooding of the 
market by far more systems than could be accommodated even 
had programmes been maintained at projected levels. The 
expectation that building, and in particular social housing 
programmes, would --be maintained at levels sufficient to 
justify expenditure on system building development and 
production plant was undoubtedly encouraged by government 
policy, but also by- the industry's confidence in the 
continuing endurance of the postwar building boom. It is 
also likely that it was the intention of sponsors promoting 
the most sophisticated systems, such as Laing, to mimic the 
remarkable success of Wimpey's No-Fines system in 
monopolising a substantial portion of the social housing 
market. 
Government and industry promoted system building, but 
it was the response of the local authority which ultimately 
determined the extent to which new technology was used. The 
response of local authorities was partial. On the one hand, 
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most of the larger housing authorities, such as the L. C. C., 
willingly used large contractors sponsoring building systems 
for the realisation of their housing programmes. Indeed, 
many authorities felt that this was the only way in which 
their targets could be met and, as in the case of Coventry, 
the virtual monopolisation of an authority's housing 
programmes by one contractor was allowed to take place. On 
the other hand, the expectations of government and industry 
were not met by the many housing authorities which proved 
unwilling to provide the scale of contracts required for the 
most efficient use of system building. In particular, the 
government's consortia policy was made ineffective by 
authorities which, although prepared to join consortia, were 
unwilling to consign the major part of their housing over to 
joint programmes. Furthermore, although a great many houses 
were built in systems, the complaint of sponsors was that 
the local authority client was not prepared to make the most 
efficient use of new building technology. The reasons for 
the rejection of'system building seem to have been varied, 
ranging from objections to the appearance of systems, fears 
of future maintenance problems, and high costs. 
System building was by no means confined to the British 
Isles. However, the brief description of its use by other 
countries 'which follows emphasises the significance of 
welfare policy to its use in Britain. At one stage or 
another, the majority of industrialised economies - and 
although not referred to in this study, many less 
industrialised ones - have adopted housing systems. As 
Chapter Seven pointed out, capital intensive large panel 
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systems for high-rise construction were used in Western 
Europe well before their adoption by the British building 
industry. Indeed, it appears that sponsors met with greater 
success abroad than they did in Britain. Higher labour costs 
and' the willingness of' the state to adopt social 
housebuilding policies sympathetic to system building seem 
to have been the factors favouring system building in other 
European countries. In France, in 1948, the government 
sponsored a competition to encourage designers and 
contractors to develop labour saving house building methods. 
This was followed in 1953 by" a , further competition in which 
system building was applied to 50,000 low-cost dwellings. 
From then on 12,000 houses were reserved annually by the 
state for system building sponsors. As the M. P. P. W. speaker, 
R. Walters, pointed out to a United Nations conference on 
system building in 1964: "by these means government induced 
contractors to invest in technical development and in'the 
installation of plant and machinery, so that France now has 
a number of systems which continue to develop competitively 
without further assistance". C1] According to D. V. Donnison, 
the inability of system building to compete with traditional 
construction in Holland caused it to be highly dependent on 
government intervention: 
the output'of `system built' dwellings rose steadily 
in number until the special subsidy paid for them was 
withdrawn in 1952; production then fell until a new 
boost was given to system building by offering 
continuous contracts designed to assume a predictable 
demand, but as soon as this arrangement came to an end 
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system building flagged once more"C23 
In 19621 10,000 out of 80,000 houses in Holland were built 
by just four systems, and it seems that as long as the state 
limited the number of systems and fed them with steady 
contracts, system building flourished.. 133 A similarly 
steady demand combined with restrictions on the numbers of 
systems was provided by the Danish government. Larsen & 
Nielsen and Jespersen are described by Gosschalk as having 
annual production figures consistently above 1,000 units per 
annum with the former having, maintained this for over 20 
years. The most dramatic example of system building 
flourishing under state intervention was in-Eastern Europe. 
In 1966, in one organisation, the Moscow building department 
embodied 11,000 professional staff, 74,000 manual workers 
and 100 factories producing components for 100,000 dwellings 
that year on 400 sites. [43 
Throughout the postwar period system building has been 
a major-feature of the private housing market in America: in 
1964,600 manufacturers produced 250,000 houses - 22% of 
total production. Rather than arising from direct state 
intervention- in America there is no `state housing sector' 
as such although private housing supply is stimulated by 
Federal subsidies - system building seems to have been 
generated by the scarcity and expense of building labour. 
The "mail-order house", in which precut timber components 
were supplied to the purchaser, was a significant feature of 
the Mid-West housing market between 1910-14, with firms such 
as Sears & Roebuck major suppliers. Indeed, the attempts of 
prefabricators to introduce housing systems during the 
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interwar period was frustrated, according to Burnham Kelly, 
by the relatively low cost of labour and high cost of 
capital during the Great Depression. C53 Nevertheless, in 
the relatively prosperous postwar years the off-site 
manufacture of timber housing has flourished. This seems to 
be because American building labour differs in three ways to 
that in Britain: it is very expensive (in 1968 three times 
as high), it is more expensive than factory labour, E63 and 
skill differentials are greater (in 1966 approximately 2: 1 
in America and 6: 5 in Britain). 17] The expense of American 
building labour, coupled with a cheap indigenous timber -a 
material ideal for prefabrication - has generated a 
consistent development in the off-site manufacture of timber 
houses. In these, the labour content can not only be 
reduced, but unskilled substituted for skilled labour and 
factory substituted for building labour. Indeed, it was 
American timber-frame techniques which formed the basis for 
the British timber systems developed since the mid 1960s. 
Despite the prevalence of prefabricated timber housing, the 
American experience is very different in character from the 
use of system building described in this study. According to 
one Canadian, R. J. Poirer, this evolution of American timber 
technology has been so consistent that the European tendency 
to refer periodically to the concept of 'industrialising' 
building would 'mystify the average North American builder". 
18] The growth of timber frame in British speculative 
housing may be compared with the integration of 
premanufactured timber components into traditional American 
construction methods. 
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The adoption of system building in Britain can be 
explained in terms of the impact of welfare policy on 
building methods. However, the way in which it was promoted 
as the "solution" to state housing provision, can only be 
understood in the context of theories of mass production and 
the role of technology in Welfare State ideology. It is 
evident that system building did not in fact represent the 
mass production of buildings, and that this was apparent to 
a number of commentators at an early stage. The constant 
association made between system building and mass production 
by politicians illuminates the need of the Welfare State to 
assure society that it could provide housing in sufficient 
quantity to satisfy the needs of all social classes. Mass 
production theory was seen as the means of achieving 
abundance in housing provision and system building the 
translation of this theory into building practice. In this 
manner, system building played an important part in 
promoting the concept that it would be through technology 
that the Welfare State would provide the resources needed to 
ensure social cohesion. 
The tendency of technology, wedded to welfare policy, 
to reinforce social stability can be seen in the response of 
organised building labour to system building. In the face of 
promises by the state "to secure equality of opportunity and 
service among all classes of the community" the N. F. B. T. O. 
found it difficult to obstruct technologies they felt would 
be injurious to their craft organisation. Furthermore, the 
hope that new building technology, in the service of the 
Welfare State, would provide the means of satisfying working 
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class housing needs resulted in the building unions calling 
for the establishment of government owned industrialised 
building factories during the 1960s. 
The belief in social progress through new technology 
also encouraged the acceptance of system building by the 
architectural profession. Furthermore, by giving substance 
to the belief in a social role for architects, the promotion 
of system building raised the profession's status in the 
postwar building world. Rather than being the means by which 
the architect was usurped by the production engineer, as 
many feared, system building was the quintessence of the 
architectural profession's dual ideologies of technology and 
social service. System building gave rise to a generation of 
architects venerated by both their profession and the 
departments of state in which they served. 
It seems appropriate to conclude this study with a few 
observations on the relationship between welfare policy and 
some of the more general characteristics of system building. 
The purpose of welfare policy in postwar Britain was to 
compensate for the tendency of capitalism to create an 
inherently unstable social system characterised by competing 
economic classes. The Welfare State was designed to effect 
stability without fundamentally overturning the existing 
social structure. It attempted this in two ways: firstly, 
through welfare provision which redistributed wealth to a 
degree sufficient to mask the more unacceptable extremes of 
inequality; secondly, by securing a continuous rise in 
living standards through economic intervention designed to 
compensate for the inefficiencies of the free market. In 
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terms of social housing provision, these dual aims presented 
a potential conflict. The more of the nation's resources 
that were devoted to social housing, the less there were to 
be applied to manufacture. Although there were obvious 
economic benefits in securing a well housed working 
population, these gains did not have the short term benefits 
to be had from increasing the output of manufactures, 
particularly for export. Indeed, the problem most pressing 
on postwar governments was the declining position of Britain 
in world trade and its recurring balance of payments 
deficits. It could be suggested that the benefits promised 
by system building offered the Welfare State a solution to 
this impass by increasing housing output without draining 
labour away from the factory floor. It was hoped that new, 
more productive, methods of building could raise the output 
of social housing, and for that matter, educational building 
too, without compromising-attempts to secure the continuing 
rise in living standards. 
Furthermore, this was to be achieved in a way that was 
consistent with the larger aim of the Welfare State - to 
ensure stability without fundamentally changing the 
relations of production. Just as welfare policy modified, 
rather than changed, the existing order of things so did 
system building in the form in which it was promoted in 
Britain. It is significant that the state attempted to 
implement its building technology policies without coercion, 
controls or regulation. Indeed, the absence of any attempt 
to regulate the disastrous proliferation of systems at the 
same time as authorities were badgered into using more of 
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them, illustrates the determination with which the 
government hoped to secure a major change in building 
methods without fundamentally changing the relationship 
between it and the building industry. By subsidising the 
product in the immediate postwar years and judiciously 
juggling with the social building market during the 1960s, 
government hoped, through system building, to bring the 
benefits of industrialisation to an industry hitherto 
unwilling to achieve this. Furthermore, it was hoped that 
this could be done without major investment by the 
Exchequer. The industry was to industrialise itself through 
the introduction of a new party to the building process - 
the sponsor -a party willing to invest in capital intensive 
building methods. The relationship between builder and 
client was modified rather than fundamentally changed and it 
could be suggested that the character of Welfare State 
system building policy arose from this. The relationship 
that system building forced upon the client and producer 
avoided many of the more obvious inefficiencies of 
traditional building. These were primarily competitive 
tendering, design in isolation from production and the 
fragmentation of large programmes into discreet contractual 
packages carried out by separate contractors. While it is 
true that each of these inefficiencies could be rectified in 
traditional building technology, their elimination was 
firmly associated with system building by the majority of 
those involved in postwar housing policy. However, the 
traditional relationship between builder and client was 
retained - their separateness. The relationship between the 
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client and the builder within' the capitalist economy, 
remained fundamentally unaffected. System building, as it 
developed in Britain, was a panacea indeed: it promised the 
benefits of a "revolution in building" without a revolution 
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TAFLE 1: Houses Cospleted in England and Wales by Type of Agency 1924-1981 
Source: C. S. O., A. A. S. (1952,1960 & 1963). 
Permanent Permanent Permanent Temporary 
Local Private Local 
Authority Enterprise Others Authority TOTAL 
1924-28{ 59,739 127,539*' 187,278 
1929-33* 59,923 150,837*' 210,760 
1934-38' 69,081 264,915" 333,996 
1945th 508 937 nil 8,939 10,384 
1946 21,202 29,720 168 70,931 122,021 
1947 86,576 39,626 1,348 34,351 161,892 
1948 170,821 31,210 4,374 10,746 217,151 
1949 141,766 24,688 5,326 3 171,783 
1950 139,356 26,576 6,428 172,360 
1951 141,587 21,406 8,190 171,903 
1952 165,637 32,078 11,260 208,975 
1953 202,891 60,528 15,812 279,231 
1954 199,642 88,028 21,282 308,952 
1955 162,525 109,934 10,867 283,326 
1956 139,977 119,585 9,162 268,724 
1957 137,584 122,942 8,127 268,653 
1958 113,146 124,087 4,292 241,525 
1959 99,456 146,476 3,449 249,381 
1960 103,235 162,100 3,891 269,226 
1961 92,880 170,366 5,586 268,832 
1962 105,302 167,016 6,349 278,667 
1963 97,015 168,242 5,398 270,655 
1964 119,468 210,432 6,605 336,505 
1965 133,024 206,246 7,911 347,181 
1966 142,430 197,502 9,548 349,480 
1967 159,347 192,940 10,611 362,898 
1968 148,049 213,273 10,404 371,726 
1969 139,850 173,377 10,938 324,165 
1970 134,874 162,084 10,308 307,266 
1971 117,215 179,998 12,563 309,776 
1972 93,635 184,622 9,037 287,294 
1973 79,289 174,413 10,345 264,047 
1974 99,423 129,626 12,124 241,173 
1975 122,857 140,381 15,456 278,694 
1976 124,152 138,477 16,031 278,660 
1977 121,246 128,688 26,077 276,011 
1978 96,752 134,578 22,671 254,001 
1979 77,192 125,306 18,224 220,722 
1980 78,405 114,377 20,175 212,957 
1981 58,933 103,156 17,398 179,487 
Notes: 
f averages; ff includes any not built by local authorities; a+f April to Deceober. 
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TABLE II: Houses Completed in Building Systets by Local Authorities and New Towns in England and Wales 
1946-79 
Sources: C. S. O., A. A. S. (1952,1960 6 1983). 
M. O. H., Housing Returns for England and Wales (1946-1955). 
Hansard (Caamon s), 5th ser. 735, Nov. 1 1966, cols. 235-7. 
M. H. L. G., H. S. 6. B. (1964-70). 
D. O. E., H. 6C. S. (1970-80) 
A. A. C. D. E. 
Completions Completions Completions In tender Intender 
total systems systems %tage sytess systems %tage 
1946 21202 2767 13.0 
1947 86576 20452 23.6 
1948 170821 52759 30.8 
1949 141766 34279 24.1 
1958 139356 20648 14.8 
1951 141587 20178 14.2 
1952 165637 26365 15.9 
1953 282891 41662 20.5 
1954 199642 52119 26.1 
1955 162525 34833 20.9 
1956f 139977 29000 20.8 
19571 137584 29N O 28.0 
1958f 113148 27000 18.0 
19591 99456 17000 17.0 
1960* 183235 15000 15.0 
1961f 92880 14000 15.8 
1962* 115382 15000 15.8 
1963{ 97815- 140100 15.8 
1964 119468 17171 14.4 30047 21.8 
1965 133824 25527 19.2 46564 29.1 
1966 142430 37494 26.3 65481 38.3 
1967 159347 49849 38.8 71465 42.6 
1968 148849 50569 34.2 59574 39.4 
1969 139850 53150 38.8 34766 30.1 
1978 134874 55701 41.3 19382 19.4 
1971 117215 38314 32.7 19328 28: 6 
1972 93635 24557 26.2 16243 21.8 
1973 79289 17668 22.3 22438 24.4 
1974 99423 24536 24.7 23067 19.1 
1975 122857 25792 21.8 22970 17.5 
1976 124152 23788 19.6 14863 12.1 
1977 121246 19697 16.2 4153 5.5 
1978 96752 18313 18.7 3243 4.5 
1979 77192 4566 6.3 1214 3.1 
Notes, 
Col. A. is taken from the A. A. S.; Col. 1. up to 1955 from Housing Returns for England and Wales and fror 
1964 from H. S. G. T. and H. &C. S.; Col. C. up to 1955 is computed from cols. A. U. and from 1964 is taken 
from H. S. M. and H. &C. S.; cols. D. &E. are taken from H. S. G. T. I H. &C. S.. For years marked with an 
asterisk offial statistics for completions by systems were not compiled; the figures in column PAC. for 
these years represent estimates made by the M. P. R. W. presented to Parliament (Hansard (Commons). 
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TAKLE III: Percentage of Houses Co. Rleted in Building Systems by Local Authorities in England and Wales 
by Region 1945-1954 and Percentage of Houses Started in luilding Systeas by Local Authorities 
in England and Wales by Region 1965-1979. 
Sources: M. O. H., Housing Returns for England and Wales (1946-1955). 
M. H. L. S., H. S. 6. P. (1964-1970). 
D. O. E., H. H. S. (1970-1979). 
A. P. C. 
1945- end 1954 1965- end 1969 1970- end 1979 
Northern 13.75 
North West 14.5 
East & West Ridings 22 




South East 9.5 
South Western 46.7 
London 8.5 
Wales 32.2 
North ' 27.7 9.8 
North West 40.6 21 
Yorks I Hauberside 37.1 11.7 
West Midlands 46.9 24.9 
East Midlands 35.4 24.4 
East Anglia 9.8 12.3 
South East (exluding London) 28.2 18 
South West 17.9 6.5 
Greater London 38.6 12.3 
Males 32.8 16 
Notes; 
Cal. A. is taken fror Housing Returns for England and Wales; Cols. 1. & C. from .S .1 and H. &C. S. 
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TABLE IV: Houses Cctpleted in Building System in England and Wales by Individual Systeus 1946-1955. 
Source: M. tº. H., Housing Returns for England and Wales (1946-1956). 
System; 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
PCC 4 Airey 168 612 7815 18643 21259 22161 23012 23963 25431 25991 RT 
444 7203 10828 2616 902 851 951 1468 560 YT 
ALU 7 Aluiiniui nl 138 9340 13461 14749 16785 nl nl nl al RT 
9202 4121 1288 2036 YT 
S/F 3 R. I. S. F. 94 13045 29828 31046 31120 31320 al nl nl al RT 
12951 16783 1218 74 200 YT 
PCC 23 Eritish Steel 16 138 360 716 1234 1730 2682 2886 3636 4317 RT 
Construction 122 222 356 518 496 952 204 750 681 YT 
PCC 5 Cornish Unit nl 80 573 2416 4833 7693 11242 16226 22024 25601 RT 
493 1843 2417 2860 3549 4984 5798 3577 YT 
S/F 20 Cussins 20 185 864 1196 1259 1347 nl nl nl nl PT 
165 679 332 63 88 YT 
I/S 27 Dyke Clothed - - - 236 396 nl nl nl n1 nl RT 
Concrete Construct ion 160 YT 
I/S 2 Easifora 717 2650 7411 11523 15917 20602 26208 33133 41433 47820 RT 
1933 4761 4112 4394 4685 5606 6925 8300 6387 YT 
S/F 25 Hill 16 125 449 649 in) nl al nl nl nl RT 
109 324 200 YT 
S/F 19 Howard 458 1225 1404 1404 nl nl al nl nl nl RT 
767 179 - YT 
CM 26 Kingston nl nl nl nl nl nl 102 202 244 402 RT 
100 42 158 YT 
T/F 28 Lamella 6 50 183 nl -nl nl nl nl nl nl RT 
44 133 1? 
S/F 16 L. C. Sy5tes - - 122 760 1610 2000 2004 2296 2668 2856 RT 
638 850 390 4 292 . 372 188 YT 
COM 18 Newland nl 47 1250 2122 2329 2391 nl nl nl nl RT 
(inc. Tarran for 4 7) 1203 872 207 62 YT 
PCC 10 Orlit 109 778 3720 6287 7230 7377 7495 7772 8424 8524 RT 
669 2942 2567 943 147 118 277 652 100 YT 
PCC 9 Rem nl nl nl 392 800 1510 2428 3810 6539 8608 RT 
408 710 918 1382 2729 2069 YT 
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System; 1946 1947 1948 1949 1958 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
1/F 22 Scottrood nl nl nl Dl nl 600 732 924 1029 1135 RT 
132 192 105 106 YT 
T/F 14 Spooner nl 124 579 909 1352 1450 1773 2412 3067 3920 RT 
455 330 443 98 323 639 655 853 YT 
S/F 29 Steane -- -- 14 91 136 nl nl nl nl nl RT 
76 45 YT 
PCC 21 Stent nl nl nl nl 2 930 1197 1253 -1253 1253- RT 
928 267 56 -- YT 
T/F 17 Swedish 809 2122 2408 2420 2420 2444 nl nl nl nl RT 
1313 286 12 -- 24 YT 
S/F 15 Trusted 2 62 764 1149 1190 1222 1720 2290 2707 3392 R1 
60 702 385 41 32 498 570 417 685 YT 
I/S 24 Unit No-Fines nl nl nl Al nl 650 1407 1961 3282 4310 PT 
757 574 1301 1028 YT 
COM 8 Unity 2 107 838 1766 2619 3677 5069 8679 12808 15573 RT 
105 731 928 853 1058 1392 3610 4129 2765 YT 
PCC 6 Wates 60 409 2495 4329 5628 6764 9159 12759 18063 -19831. RT - 
349 2086 1834 1299 1136 2395 3600 5304 1768 YT 
I/S I Wimpey No-Fi nes 58 371 2923 4254 7177 10966 18284 33348 50538 61197 RT 
313 2552 1331 2923 3789 7318 15064 17190 10659 YT 
PCC 11 Woolaway 10 96 419 824 1013 1444 2282 3369 4396 5336 RT 
86 323 405 189 431 838 1087 1027 940 YT 
Others 224 857 2221 3666 6628 6014 60980 61801 63681 65190 RT 
TOTAL 2767 23221 75980 110259 130699 151077 177442 219104 271223 305256 RT 
20452 52759 34279 20640 20178 26365 41662 52119 34033 YT 
Notes, 
Housing Returns For England and Wales list completions in running totals, and only list systems 
individually for the periods in which they were most frequently used. If not listed individually, a 
system's completions are included in 'others'. If a system is not listed to the end of the period, the 
last figure represents the total completions to that date and does not necessarily represent an absolute 
total. An attempt has been made to extract yearly totals, but in many cases these can only be computed 
for a limited number of years. The number preceding the name of the system refers to its ranking in total 
production over the period covered. 
Key; 
RT running total CON composite steel and concrete structure 
YT yearly total I/S in situ concrete 
nl system not listed seperately for this year PCC precast concrete structure 
-- no completions for this year S/F steel frame 
ALU aluminium structure and cladding T/F timber frame 
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TABLE V: Houses Completed in Building Sgsteas in England and Wales by Individual Systeas 1964-1979 
Sources: M. H. L. S., H. S. M. (1965-1970). 
D. O. E., H. U. S. (1970-1980). 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 TOTAL 
The Asey Chivers Housing Co. Ltd., Modus PCC L; 
nI Al al 32 - 65 46 125 10 nl nl nl nl nl nl nI 278 
Anvil Enterprises Ltd., Anvil T/F L, 
nl nl al nl nl nl nI nl nl nl nl 167 287 347 30 -- 831 
Barry High Ltd., belfry PCC LM; 
nl - 48 151 182 471 258 32 2 nl nl nl nl nl nl nl 1144 
Bernard Sunleg IC Sons Ltd., Sunley Albetong I/S LMH; 
-- - 250 346 182 91 241 54 -- nl al nl nl nl nl nl 1164 
hlyth Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Ltd., Elyth COM L; 
-- 24 24 72 -- nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl 120 
British Lift Slab Ltd., (Robert M. Douglas Ltd. ), Lift Slab I/S MH; 
129 94 128 128 128 128 - nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl 735 
C. Pryant & Sons Ltd., Bryant Low Rise/Wallfrase PCC L, 
-- 225 1123 1593 1689 2689 1786 1158 461 721 753 20 - 127 281 48 12674 
Building Research Station, I. R. S. ! battery Casting) PCC MH; 
nl nl nl 282 599 694 744 526 741 - nl nl nl nl nl Al 3586 
Building Sgsteas Ltd. Uritish Ropes Ltd. ) PCC L, 
7 111 180 12 nl III nl nl ni nl nl nl nl nl nl nl 310 
Calders Ltd., Calder Hoses T/F L; 
24 297 21 207 14 nl nl nl nl nl nl nj nj nl nj nl 549 
Carus (6.? ) Ltd., Licensees! Unit Casus Ltd., Mitchell Casus Ltd., Fran, Higgs & Hill, Camus PCC LMH; ' 
-- 2 696 614 352 1034 1143 1205 671 '521 24 nl nl hl nl nl 6262 
Carlton Contractors Ltd., Carlton PCC LM; 
nl 8 12 95 141 91 -- nl nl nl DI nl nl' nl nl nl 347 
Centerprise Building Systems Ltd., Cebus PCC MH; 
nl - 12 194 95 -- 240 80 - nl nl nl nj nl nl nl 621 
Concrete Ltd., Bison Wallframe PCC H; 
612 1595 2733 2573 3624 5009 6227 4666 1308 497 904 571 652 688 9 -- 31668 
Cosmos PCC L; 
ni nl nl -- -- -- 154 -- nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl 154 
Costain Concrete Ltd., Siporex PCC L, 
2 10 519 338 -- nl nl nl nl nl 0 nl nj nl nl al 869 
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1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 TOTAL 
Crudens Ltd., Skarne PCC LMH; 
-- 27 187 328 1414 814 1404 1701 913 508 70 - nl nl nl nl 7384 
Crux Developments Ltd., (English China Clay Group of Industries) Crux R/T LM; 
nl nl nl --- 36 179 105 102 -- nl nl nl nl nl 422 
Cubitts Construction Systems Ltd., (Holland Hannen L Cubitts Ltd. ), Ralency PCC LMH; 
nl nl --7 291 605 504 448 507 393 274 452 54 -- 3535 
''''''''''''' Lovtown-Cubitt S/F L; 
4 238 468 441 278 877 1455 831 802 936 1465 447 181 70 33 - 8526 
Dorran Construction Ltd., Dorran COM L; 
-- - 94 192 354 23 nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl al 663 
Drury Building Service Ltd., Drury System 3 R/T LM; 
nl n1 Al - 14 16 642 891 830 302 345 - al nl Al nl 3040 
Dudley Coles Long Ltd., Faculty R/T L, 
nl nl -- 17 58 53 - nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl 128 
' Trio T/F LM; 
-- - 106 10 101 - nl nl nl nl n1 nl nl nl nl nl 217 
Engineered Homes (6. E. ) Ltd., Engineered Homes T/F L; 
nl 6 106 245 264 128 58 2 nl nl nl nl nl nl nl al 809 
Frau Gerrard Ltd., Gerrard Incon ???;???, 
nl nl al -- 28 226 - nl nl nl nl nl Al nl nl 254 
' Gerrand Intrad I/S LM1; 
nl -- 88 - of nl nl nl -- 268 148 115 -- 619 
The Frau Group Ltd., Frau/I. R. S. PCC MH; 
144 189 63 59 109 272 1226 385 11 nl nl nl nl nl nl n1 2458 
' Frau Components PCC MH; 
- 192 288 248 51 51 - 100 - nl al nl 101 nl nl nl 930 
Fredericks and Pelhaus Timber Buildings, Fredericks T/F L; 
nl n1 Al nl nl nl -- 8 51 - nl nl nl nl ni nl 59 
W&C French Construction Ltd., Lecaplan PCC LM; 
-- - 120 4- 470 669 275 4 nl nl nl nl nl Al nl 1542 
Gee, Walker & Slater Ltd., (Sir Robert MacAlpine L Sons Ltd. ), Arcal 6.80 PCC L; 
nl 46 125 220 85 79 55 42 95 75 54 251 24 - nl nl 1151 
George Calverly & Sons (Contractors Ltd), C. M. T/F LM; 
nl nl 6 33 176 272 241 161 102 - nl nl nl nl nl nj 991 
Gilbert Ash Ltd., (Itovis Ltd. ), Tracoba PCC MH; 
-- 462 142 - 69 - nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl 673 
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Meson industrialised Building Ltd., 6le-systea*PCC LMH; 
nl - 38 24 180 243 164 265 246 157 227 204 474 549 432 76 3279 
Greater London Council, SFI S/F LMH; 
nl ni nj - 300 -- - -- 95 - nI nl nl n1 nj nj 395 
Gregory Housing Ltd., Gregory Housing PCC LM; 
-- 127 590 323 118 201 35 - nl nl ni nl nl nj nj nl 1394 
Guildway Ltd., 6uildray T/F L; 
-- 25 129 404 384 420 253 227 72 145 241 296 286 150 95 40 3167 
Hawthorne Leslie (Buildings) Ltd., (The Hawthorne Leslie Group Ltd. ), H. L. Q. S/F L; 
-- 186 618 969 248 5 nI nl nl nl nl nl nl nl Al 11 2026 
Hb. eville Co. Ltd., Ho. eville Industrialised S/F L; 
- 24 171 285 195 21 31 - Al nl nl ill ni nl nl Al 727 
Housing Developsent & Construction Ltd., H. D. C. PCC LM; 
40 278 141 65 --- nl nl nl nl nl 01 -- nI 524 
Industrial Building Services (Northern) Ltd., Peak Hones T/F LM; 
-- - 86 637 628 178 539 -715 - nl ni nl nl nl RI nI 1353 
Janes Riley & Partners Ltd., Fragefora T/F LM; 
nl -- 39 189 405 876 298 855 1048 1629 1724 1818 2195 1112 637 12825 
.'"" Rileyfor. T/F LM; 
nl nj nl nl nl nl ni nl 01 -- 240 886 769 548 439 2882 
John Laing Construction Ltd., Easifon I/S LM; 
2520 2269 2763 2499 1080 1075 272 97 - nl RI nl nl nl nl al 12608 
'"'''' Laings Rat-trad R/T l; 
nl nl nl nl DI -- 70 - nl nl nl nl nl nj nj '70 
'''1' Sectra I/S MH; 
120 505 333 730 10 414 153 88 182 - 01 nl nl nl nl RI 2535 
''' Storifors I/S MH; 
-- 51 421 983 620 905 182 145 - nl al nl nl DI nl nl 3307 
''"1 -1 1 12M Jespersen PCC LMi; 
nl - 133 765 1588 702 1893 1445 774 426 577 -- 340 -- 8643 
John Lynn & Co Ltd., (Duxford & Sunderland Shipbuilding & Engineering Group), British Housing S/F L; 
DI 2 10 62 nl DI DI nl nl nl DI nl DI nl ni nl 74 
Kenkast Buildings Ltd., Kenkast FCC L; 
nl 115 54 226 196 100 39 164 7 40 24 44 - nl nl nl 1009 
Kier Ltd., 'B. D. C. R/T LI 
. nl -6- 
30 -- nl ni nl nl nl nl nl nI nl nI 36 
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J. E. Lesser Building Ltd., Lesser R/T LM; 
-- 221 139 281 435 843 1109 694 264 189 -- 80 122 159 - -- 4556 
Sir Lindsay Parkinson 6 Co. Ltd., Parkwall I/S L; 
-- 38 722 289 276 691 491 511 , 
141 - nl nl nl nl nl nl 3159 
The Lilleshall Company Ltd., Lilleshall PCC L; 
nl nl ei nl - 21 85 68 64 44 102 - nl nl nl nl 384 
Lovell Housing Ltd., Lovell T/F L; 
n1 01 Al nl al -- 17 60 95 407 282 414 251 281 188 2001 
J. McLean & Sons (Wolverhaapton) Ltd., Mactrad T/F LM; 
nl - 141 531 798 537 362 138 - nl al nl nl Al nl nl 2497 
'''''''' McLean R/T L; 
nl 58 42 - n1 Al nl n1 nl nI nl nl nl nl nl al 100 
''' McLean Rat-trad R/T L; 
nl -- 49 35 188 139 117 54 - nI nl nl Al ml nl 582 
Mathews & Muiby Ltd., M2 PCC MHi 
-- 38 158 206 178 74 198 156 228 80 nl nl nl nl nl nl 1316 
Medway Buildings Ltd., Medway T/F L; 
nl -- 154 100 52 130 - nl n1 nl nl nl nl nl nl 436 
Midland Housing Consortium, M. H. C. R/T L; 
n1 153 106 770 855 1033 713 1292 605 271 564 1139 1857 631 468 711 11168 
Ministry of Housing and Local 6overn. ent, 5M S/F LM; 
214 33 349 670 1010 568 624 - al nl nl nl nl 'nl nl nl 3468 
Minox Structures Ltd., Minox R/T LM; 
nI nl - 126 73 261 314 38 213 94 57 206 314 230 150 145 2221 
Modern Building Wales Ltd., Modern Building T/F LM; 
nl nl nl nl 11 14 201 520 191 19 nl nl nl nl nl nl 931 
Maalea Peildings Ltd., Morle2 I/S LM; 
382 519 460 657 1472 1179 1622 825 893 665 1485 1269 1253 1092 985 42 14800 
North Eastern Major Authorities, N. E. M. A. R/T L; 
nl DI al nl - 24 41 23 nl nl nl nl nl nl nl DI 88 
The Northwest Construction Co. Ltd., Norwest S/F H; 
- 142 234 8 nl nl nl nl nl n1 nl n1 nl nl nl nl 384 
Open System Building Ltd., O. S. B. S/F L; 
nl nl -8 54 288 113 19 nl ml nl nl nl nl nl n1 482 
Pearce & Barker Ltd., Surebuilt T/F LM; 
nl 0- 33 617 308 327 112 22 nl nl nl n1 DI nl nl 1419 
410 
1964 1965 1966 . 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 TOTAL 
Precast Associated Constructors Ltd., P. A. C. PCC Pill 
nl ni -- 114 95 45 -- 35 1 ni nl nl nl nl nl nl 290 
Purpose Built Ltd., Purpose Built T/F L, 
Al 4 40 379 440 402 235 71 93 31 279 183 266 443 474 208 3548 
Reema Construction Ltd., Contrad PCC LI 
nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl 47 14 64 - ni nj ni nI 125 
' Reeia PCC LMH; 
638 613 1071 1544 1141 1138 928 177 103 209 539 282 36 171 -- 8678 
Rigid Fraaºe'Constructions Ltd., Rigid Frame S/F LM; 
17 10 98 201 9 182 97 - nl nl nl ni Al nj nl nI 614 
Rowlinson Constructions Ltd., Rowcon R/T LM; 
- 13 307 367 278 231 430 306 82 - nl nl nl nl nl ni 2014 
Rush & Tomkins Ltd., Rat-trad R/T l; 
nl nl -- 79 156 205 - nl nl nl ni nl nl nj nj 440 
S. L. P. Industrialised Buildings Ltd., H. S. S. P. PCC LMH; 
-- 50 -- 310 345 196 - nl ni nl nl nl nl ni ni nl 874 
Selleck Nicholls Williams Ltd., Cornish Unit PCC LII; 
nl 55 112 22 - 30 - nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nI 219 
'''''' Metracon T/F L; 
ni ni nl nl ni nl nl nl -- 13 25 nl nl nl nl 38 
'''''''' Metrati  T/F L; 
ni ni nl nl nl nl ni nI -- 19 946 2414 1634 650 500 6163 
''1 Multilite I/S H; 
-- 52 38 218 114 - nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl 422 
''''' Seileck Nicholls ??? ???; 
ni nl nl nl nI nl nl nl nl - 27 328 317 - 54 - 726 
''''' Selleck Nicholls Rat Trad R/T LM; 
10 125 373 1029 1489 915 465 327 471 470 98 -- nl nl nl 5772 
''''' Seileck Nicholls Timber Frame T/F l; 
nl ni nl nl nl nl nl --- 564 - nl nl nl nl 564 
"''' xw I/S LM; 
-- 37 511 1026 520 876 904 104 - ni nl nl nl nl 01 3978 
The Shepherd Group Ltd., Shepherd's Rat Trad R/T l; 
-- 38 363 381 246 125 123 363 16 126 12 nl nl nl nl nl 1793 
'''' Spaceoaker PCC M; 
184 228 132 784 550 665 101 - nl - 23 171 98 nl nl nl 2936 
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W. J. Sieais Sons a Cooks Ltd., Sinecast PCC MH; 
nl nl -- 225 436 137 -- nl nl nl nl nI ni nl nI 798 
' Sinns 6. D. A. R/T LM; 
17 309 787 601 60 34 - ni nl nl ni ni nl nl nl nI 1808 
Spooners Hull Ltd., Spooner T/F L; 
n1 - 17 305 nl nl nl nl nl nl al nl nl nl nl nI 322 
'''"' Spooner/Caspon T/F L, 
132 606 375 196 540 588 592 571 157 144 155 460 516 284 117 51 5484 
'''' Spooner Urban T/F L, 
nl -- 332 265 24 nI al nI nl nI nl ni n1 nl al 621 
Stanley Miller Ltd., M. W. M. I/S HH, 
n1 311 119 96 - 136 383 422 - 111 463 --- 109 - 2150 
Stoners Appliances Ltd., Canadian Timber Frame T/F LM; 
nl --8 122 45 - nI nl Al nl ni nl nl nl nI 175 
5eo Stubbings Ltd., Stubbings Industrial Low Rise PCC LM; 
nl -- 13 63 - n1 nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nl nI 76 
''' Stubbings Rat Trad R/T L, 
nI 95 546 484 260 - nl nl nl nl al nl nl nl nl nI 1385 
Sundh (Great Iritain) Ltd., ` Sundh I/S MH; 
n1 -- 35 58 23 56 104 110 - nl nl nl nl nl nI 386 
F. & H. Sutcliffe, Shadow Wall ??? ???; 
nl 73 17 - n1 nl nl 01 nl nl nl nl al nl ni nI 90 
Swiftplan Ltd., (The Taylor Woodrow Group), Multiflex H12 1/F L; 
- 20 - 88 2- nl nl nl n1 nl n1 nl nl nl nI 110 
Taylor Woodrow Anglian, (The Taylor Woodrow Group Ltd. ), Anglian PCC LM; 
ni nI 53 32 231 111 35 16 32 114 237 - nl nl nl nI 867 
'''"''11, '''''' Larsen Nielson PCC MH; 
40 406 664 1056 875 480 632 1528 880 393 669 457 - nl ni nI 8080 
fin. Thornton & Sons, Proseto I/S H; 
nl -- 144 - nl nl nl nl nl nl nl al ni ni n) 144 
Timber Research & Development Association, TRADA T/F LM; 
-- - 40 91 5- 47 52 64 60 224 465 444 224 146 127 1989 
Truscon Ltd., Truscon PCC L$1; 
16 - 304 - 126 108 158 - nl nl nl nl nl ni ni nl 712 
Trusteel Corporation (Universal) Ltd., Trusteel MAI S/F LM1; 
52 132 133 282 529 450 238 - nl nl ni nl ni ni nl nl 1816 
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'' 1- ' Trusteel 3M. S/F Llti; 
nl 5 40 530 412 537 392 423 428 245 352 364 84 147 107 -- 4066 
The Unit Construction Co. Ltd., Unit Sgste* 66 R/T L; 
nl - 113 567 772 461 261 80 - ni DI nl nl nl nl nl 2249 
Vic Hallam Ltd., Vic Hallam Mks I, 11 & III T/F LM; 
158 1002 1107 248 602 512 1398 1143 4 ni nl nl nj nl nl nI 6174 
''' Vic Hallam (Hooepack) T/F L; 
nl nj nj 11 nl nl nl ni Dl nl - 19 116 154 56 27 372 
Wale Sindall Develop, ents Ltd., S12 PCC LM; 
-- - 73 91 - nl n1 nl nl n1 nl nl n1 n1 nl nl 164 
Walter Llewellyn & Sons Ltd., Ouikbild T/F L; 
- 20 168 213 442 385 547 272 777 878 1130 2222 2676 1817 744 293 12584 
Wates Ltd., Wates High Rise PCC MH; 
1234 1160 1980 2181 2476 3290 2503 1156 672 460 473 177 - nl nl nl 17762 
'' Wates Lou Rise T/F L; f 
nl nl DI ni nl 688 764 526 236 84 303 361 51 -- ni - 3013 
Weir Housing Corporation Ltd., Weir T/F L; 
nl nl al nl el DI nl nl - - 57 383 149 - nl - 586 
William Moss !r Sons Ltd., M. F. C. PCC LN; 
nl -- 128 129 53 305 249 - nl nl al al nj nj n1 864 
William Old ýr Co. Ltd., Resifore 6RP LM; 
DI nl nl - 20 54 177 161 178 43 86 660 68 14 - - 1461 
Williams & Williams Ltd., (British Steel Corporation), Rofton S/F L, 
nl -- 63 229 87 7 19 67 59 37 33 - DI nl nl 601 
Geo. Wi, pey & Co. Ltd., Wimpey No Fines I/S LM; It 
9085 10271 12085 14420 10031 11077 9906 7204 6477 5496 8018 9565 6066 5782 2803 612 1288% 
"'"''' Wimper 6M 1/S H; 
nl -- 270 1805 706 337 234 5 ni nl nl nl nl nl al 3357 
Yorkshire Development Group, Y. D. 6. H. MK. I PCC M; 
--- --- 541 730 2007 456 nl nl DI nl nj ni ni nj 3T34 
Ibtesi 
The figures for yearly completions of individual systems have been taken from . S. 6.1. and 11. U. S.. The table lists 121 of the 153 systems listed and are confined to those systems where the sponsoring company, 
the type of structural system and its housing form could be identified. The 32 'unidentified' systems are 
mainly those with small production figures, often introduced during the 1970s during which time 
catalogues of systems, giving their details, tended not to be published. The 'unidentified' systems 
listed by the M. H. L. 6. and D. O. E., with their total completions throughout the period covered by this 
table, are as follows: Eeal & Son (360), kro (82), Bury Boulton (49), Discus (74), Eurodean (581), 
Fragecourt (82), Grayholme (148), Hales Rat Trad (140), Wellbuilt (146), F. J. Hallivell (33), 4H/7 (183), 
Housing System Design (508), Howard Mersham Housing (58), ISEC (258), Martin Construction (39), M. C. Meyer 
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(235), Middleton Rat 7rad (740), Mucklot (190), Multi Storey Construction (354), J. Murphy Rat 7rad (280), 
Plus 3 Contracts (49), Ridgeway (69), Rowland (zero), Scan (225), Shanty Rat 7rad (622), Spacevay (48), 
Timber Frame Ltd. (zero), Trygon Rat 7rad (981), Volumetric (zero), Lawrence Weaver Rat Trad (6), W. G. 
West & Sons (1329), C. M. Yuill (460). It may be assumed that most of the 'unidentified' systems were of 
timber framed or rationalised traditional construction. The names of the sponsoring companies, type of 
structural system and building fora have been taken from sources too numerous to mention individually, 
The names in brackets refer to the larger industrial groups to which sponsors belonged in cases where 
these have been identified. 
f Figures for this s9stes were included in Wates High Rise until 1969. 
Key: COM composite steel and concrete structure 
L 1-2 storeys 6RP glass reinforced plastic panels 
M 3-6 storeys I/S in situ concrete 
H 6 and above storeys PCC precast concrete 
nl system not listed individually for this year S/F steel frame 
- no completions for this year T/F timber frame 
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TABLE VI: Houses Cospleted in luilding Systems in England and Wales by Structural Type of System 
1964-1979 
Sources M. H. L. 6., H. S. 6.!. (1964-1970). 
D. O. E., H. S. G. I. (1970-1980). 
Insitu Precast Steel Timber Rationalised TOTAL 
Concrete Concrete frame frame Traditional 
1964 13280 3234 291 347 19 17171 
1965 15647 6021 886 2073 898 25527 
1966 17058 13043 2370 2545 2443 37494 
1967 20354 16471 3759 3632 4821 49049 
1968 15774 19231 3469 5958 6101 50569 
1969 16138 21794 3154 5189 6874 53150 
1970 13204 25566 3012 6681 7238 55701 
1971 9158 18265 1334 4380 5177 38314 
1972 7773 8004 1487 3181 4112 24557 
1973 6161 4914 1315 2727 2543 17660 
1974 9503 5503 1908 5995 1627 24536 
1975 11102 2255 1120 10230 1086 25792 
1976 7467 1766 332 13139 1076 23780 
1977 6991 1955 223 9971 559 19691 
1978 3788 922 140 5171 292 10313 
1979 654 188 - 3571 97 4510 
Notes: 
The categories of system defined by these statistics say be described as based on the following 
principles: Insitu Concrete, concrete placed into reusable shutters assembled on site; Precast Concrete, 
concrete components caste either on site or in factories and then lifted into position; Steel Frame, 
loadbearing steel frame supporting a non-structural cladding; Timber Frame, loadbearing timber frame or 
panels supporting a non-structural cladding; Rationalised Traditional (or crosswall), loadbearing masonry 
construction reduced to the ainivA necessary to support timber floors and roof components and 
non-structural cladding panels. 
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TABLE VII: Average Costs of Local Authority Housing in England and Wales 1964-1977 
Sources: M. H. L. 6., H. S. 63. (1964-1970). 
D. O. E., H. &C. S. (1970-1978). 
Shillings/sq. ' 
Houses & Bungalows 
11 Trad All 
Flats under 5 st. 
11 Trad All 
Flats 5 st. & over 
it 1rad All 
94,4 96,8.5 95,11 
99,3.5 104,4.5 102,3.5 
106,0.5 109,11.5 107,10.5 
105,0.5 110,1 106,11 
99,10.5 114,11 10516.5 
1964 55,3.5 52,0.5 52,7.5 
1965 59,0.5 56,9.5 57,5 
1966 61,6 60,3 60,9 
1967 65,0.5 63,9 64,4 











36.06 37.35 37.03 
38.54 40.04 39.72 
42.84 46.50 45.75 
53.28 55.44 55.00 
71.37 74.16 73.41 
83.06 88.99 87.63 
94.39 96.33 96.02 
97.89 101.71 101.13 
112.67 115.46 115.35 
71,5.5 69,3.5 69,6.5 
76,0 75,4 75,6 
83,4 79,10.5 80,7.5 
84,7.5 80,3 81.7.5 
85,3 83,3.5 83,10.5 
49.62 50.38 50.27 
51.13 54.36 53.82 
55.76 63.08 61.89 
72.87 77.50 76.64 
89.13 104.95 102.04 
112.18 123.25 121.84 
125.35 134.76 133.51 
136.03 142.54 142.16 
109.48 167.18 165.37 
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59.53 63.62 61.25 
68.35 62.97 64.48 
68.14 80.19 77.93 
111.19 95.37 96.02 
105.92 147.90 143.91 
132.66 213.03 179.97 
193.27 186.93 187.24 
239.60 234.58 234.82 
- 226.83 226.83 
